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FOREIGN ACTORS IN THE ANGOLAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1961-2002)

Adam Boček¹ - Josef Smolík²

ABSTRACT

Studies of individual conflicts can be beneficial in terms of general trends which are manifested in the area of security (mainly military). This paper focuses on the analysis of foreign actors in the Angolan Civil War in 1961–2002. It briefly summarizes the course of the conflict, its individual stages and dynamics. The analytical part focuses on particular foreign actors that can be perceived as important units affecting this conflict.

Key words:

Conflict, civil war, foreign actors, security, peacekeeping.

Introduction

The Angolan War of Independence followed by the Angolan Civil War ranks among a wide group of conflicts of the 20th century which took place on the African continent. As with other similar conflicts, the main reasons for the war were the efforts to seize power over the state in the process of decolonization. Besides internal actors, a large number of external actors intervened, which was characteristic of this conflict. The Angolan conflict became a battlefield in the context of the Cold War. The main parties involved were four Angolan factions fighting with each other for the take-over of the liberated country (MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and FLEC – *see the list of abbreviations*).

At the beginning of the conflict, the colonial superpower – Portugal – could certainly be considered as an important foreign actor. With the advancing Cold War and the resulting local support, other external state actors (Cuba, South Africa, Namibia and Zaire) were involved in the Angolan conflict. Other parties (mainly the USA, USSR and China) provided the individual actors with different types of support ranging from weapons to military expertise (External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009, 2011). To a lesser extent, other local regional actors (such as the Democratic Republic of Congo) and countries from other continents (such as North Korea) participated in the conflict. The motivations of these actors were different, from the ideological support of one of the then blocks of the

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bipolar word to the promotion of their own (political, economic, cultural etc.) interests.

It is evident that the foreign interventions significantly influenced, among other things, the dynamics and duration of the conflict. Angola became a battlefield of important actors in international politics, and it was not just about building a new decolonized state and its ideological direction.

1 The Angolan Civil War – 2 phases and the course of the conflict

Basically, the Angolan Civil War can be divided into two main phases. The first part of the war took place between 1961–1974. After this phase, the intense part of the conflict (the Angolan Civil War) dating back to 1975-2002 (Ferreira, 2006, p.25) followed up continuously. Although both phases of the conflict were strongly related, the nature and motivation of the different actors varied over time.

1.1 The War of Independence

The beginning of the War of Independence took place on January 4, 1961, when a group of Angolan farmers attacked Portuguese colonizers at a cotton plantation. On February 4, 1961, further riots occurred when the Angolans violently attacked a police station, a prison and a local radio station in Luanda resulting in the death of seven police officers and many injuries. These violent events are officially referred to as the beginning of the Angolan War of Independence (Paul et al., 2013, p. 226-227).

Gradually, the organization of the Angolan resistance developed, creating three formalized movements fighting for the country's independence: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Although the individual Angolan resistance factions received support from abroad, they failed to create sufficiently effective anti-colonial activities in the beginning, and the Portuguese regime remained stable in the country. This was mainly caused by the rivalry between the individual separatist groups (Guimaraes, 1992, p. 29).

Apart from having one common enemy embodied in Portuguese domination, all groups were ideologically and ethnically very different. They often fought with each other, which was essential for the firm position of the then Portuguese government (Kváča, 2005, p. 58).

A key change affecting the further development of the conflict took place on May 25, 1974, when Salazar's authoritarian regime in Portugal was overthrown and the Portuguese promised to end colonial rule after Marcello Caetano's accession. This was formally confirmed by the Alvor Agreement, when the Portuguese government agreed on the decolonization process with all three Angolan liberalization movements (United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 1975, p. 3).

After the fall of Portuguese domination, it was not clear which of the Angolan factions would take over the rule and the parties that had a common adversary in the War of Independence quickly became the main competitors. (Guimaraes, 1992, p. 32).

The Portuguese could not effectively solve the situation and the Angolan parties started to fight for the official take-over of the rule after the final decolonization. When the Portuguese administration left the country, the capital city of Luanda was controlled by MPLA, which declared independence on November 10, 1975, despite controlling only 20% of Angola's territory. In response, the next day the two remaining factions of FNLA and UNITA declared the independence of their own republic in Huambo, the second largest city.

1.2 The Civil War

The above described events resulted in a situation that inevitably led to another phase of the conflict. Although Angola was a decolonized country, its factions sought to take over political power. Quite a significant change in relations between the actors occurred when in February 1976, with the support of Cuban units, MPLA managed to occupy the city of Huambo, which until then belonged to UNITA thanks to the support of RSA. As a result, UNITA definitively took on the role of guerrilla resistance organization as well as FNLA (Klíma Sieber, 2008, p. 228).

MPLA became a government party due to the support of foreign socialist countries and the exploitation of mineral resources (oil, diamonds, iron ore) (cf. Menšíková, 2011).

South Africa's support of UNITA was also substantial at this stage. At first, the South African Army withdrew its troops from Angola in 1976 as a result of non-compliance with the US support agreement (Kirk, Clayfield, Story, 2018, p. 154). Later, however, due to the deteriorating relations between the Angolan government and RSA, RSA re-intervened in the conflict after which UNITA, with the support of the South African Defense Forces (SADF), formed a strong opposition to the ruling MPLA at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. By contrast, the FNLA played an increasingly minor role in the conflict, and in 1983 it almost completely disappeared (George, 2005, p. 138).

1984 brought a certain hope of calming the conflict. South Africa promised to withdraw all its troops from the country. For this reason, a special supervisory board was set up to supervise the implementation of this process. According to South Africa, the full withdrawal of troops from Angola was completed in April 1985 (Kalley et al., 1999, p. 28). However, the conflict escalated soon after the withdrawal, which meant that Angola was at war again.

In 1986, the U.S. support for UNITA increased significantly. When the Clark Amendment barring aid to private groups in the Angolan conflict had been repealed, the USA were able to intensify intervention. This trend meant that between 1986 and 1989, \$15 million a year was sent to support UNITA, which was also reflected in the modernization of military technology (External Support in Armed Conflict, 1975–2009).

The situation escalated until the most striking series of battles of the Angolan Civil War took place in Cuito Cuanavale between 1987 and 1988. The main actors were, on the one hand, MPLA troops, which were strongly supported primarily by Cuba, and on the other hand it was UNITA, which was strongly supported mainly by RSA. The official results of the clashes were ambiguous, although both parties considered themselves winners. This trend had the effect of reducing the intensity of the war. Negotiations between MPLA and UNITA also seemed promising. They led to the Gbadolite Declaration, which was to implement a cease-fire between the two parties in 1989. However, the agreement was violated after a very short time (Brito, 2012, p. 4).

The political negotiations of Bicesse in 1991, which led to the end of the foreign war support for the individual Angolan parties, were also promising. After that, the situation partly calmed down, leading to free elections, in which a new president and the National Assembly were to be elected on 29 and 30 September 1992. The result was a loss of UNITA in both elections, which led to disputing and ignoring the elections outcome by the opposition. UNITA claimed that the elections were rigged and re-formed the resistance activity (Kumar, 1998, p. 133). Full-scale war broke out again, taking place in almost the whole territory of the country. The approach of foreign actors changed, too. Cuba, in the light of the Bicesse accords, finally left the country in 1991, and the US began negotiations with the MPLA in order to achieve peace (Kvása, 2005, p. 64).

The end of the apartheid regime in RSA in 1994 was also reflected in the Angolan conflict. After a series of brutal battles in this period, there was a change in the individual external intervening parties. Due to a considerable number of victims, they began to vigorously promote the idea of ending the conflict as soon as possible.

Another important milestone was November 1994. The agreements signed in Lusaka were an effort to completely stop fighting and disarm the individual actors. A series of negotiations followed, which lasted until 1997. Meanwhile, there were fighting operations, although a government of national unity was established with a compromise representation of MPLA and UNITA (Kvása, 2005, p. 65).

The war then continued with more or less intensity at the beginning of the new millennium. Over time, MPLA controlled an increasing part of the territory. In February, the leader of UNITA Savimbi was assassinated by MPLA. A peace treaty was signed with the rest of UNITA, which led to the official end of the Angolan Civil War (Klíma, Sieber, 2008, p. 276).

2 The main foreign actors involved in the Angolan War

It is clear from the previous chronological overview that due to the involvement of individual actors, the civil war was not only an Angolan conflict. Besides the powers of the then bipolar world, several regional actors were also involved in the war. They were drawn into the conflict either because of their ideological support for one of the blocks of the ten bipolar world or because they promoted their local interests. The following passages will analyze the role and the course of the conflict in the context of RSA, US, USSR and Cuba intervention.

2.1 RSA Intervention in the Angolan Conflict

The main motives for RSA intervention in the Angolan conflict can be seen from many perspectives. One of the principal reasons was to maintain domination over Namibia, whose army (SWAPO) established cooperation with MPLA after Angola gained independence. Another perspective that led to RSA's participation in the Angolan conflict was the growing influence of the Eastern bloc in the region. RSA did not want to tolerate a possible socialist regime in a neighbouring country that was supported by the Communistic Bloc states so its support for FNLA and UNITA represented a logical step. The beginnings of RSA's support date back to 1975. The first interventions in Angola were strictly concealed by the South African government and were not officially declared (El Khawas 1977, p. 36). An important milestone for the South African intervention was Operation Savannah between 1975 and 1976, whose main objective was to support FNLA and UNITA in the fight against the alliance of MPLA, Cuba and USSR. South African troops achieved considerable success by the end of 1975, which was only halted by Cuba's massive support for MPLA. Cuba did not hesitate to send 36,000 men to fight South African troops and allies (Labuschagne, 2009, p. 20). Another motive for the South African intervention were international events resulting primarily from US policy. Clark's above-mentioned amendment meant the end of US support for FNLA and UNITA. RSA thus remained involved in the conflict without US support, which was decisive in confronting Cuba's continued massive support for MPLA. The African Unity Summit held in February 1976 also had an impact on the position of RSA in the conflict. As a result, the SADF troops were withdrawn from Angola in March of the same year (Labuschagne, 2009, p. 26).

Another turning point was the year 1978 and the killing of Clemens Kapuu, who was president of the ten opposition party Popular Democratic Movement, operating in Namibia as the main political adversary of SWAPO. In response to these events, SADF troops launched the largest foreign operation of RSA since the end of World War II, called Reindeer (Gewald, 2010, p. 559).

This was followed by a period when clashes between SADF and SWAPO played a key role in the Angolan war. South African troops were very successful in their attacks against SWAPO and undertook a high number of victorious operations between 1980 and 1984 (Labuschagne, 2009, p. 31).

Between 1983 and 1984 Operation Askari was launched and carried out. A series of battles and achievements in the battles over SWAPO and the Angolan government led to negotiations between MPLA and South Africa. The result was the Lusaka Accords, where it was agreed to withdraw the Namibian, Cuban and South African troops from the country. A special commission was established to oversee the treaty's implementation (Heitman, Dorning, 1988, p. 1.)

However, the treaty was not kept in the end and as early as 1985 full-scale fights between SWAPO, MPLA and SDAF broke out again (Kváža, 2005 p. 62). Military success of SDAF more or less continued until the greatest battle of the Angolan War – the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale – between 1987 and 1988. South African troops failed to achieve a decisive victory in the battle of this strategic place, which would have given them a free way to advance and territorial gains in the country. Both MPLA, which was mainly supported by Cuba, and the Namibian SWAPO resisted a series of attacks by the UNITA and SADF alliance. Although both parties declared victory, the most important impact on the development of South African intervention in Angola was the awareness of the seriousness of the situation. The Angolan war far exceeded the scale of the local conflict and the intervening parties began to count their losses. A series of negotiations of leaders of the parties that were involved in the conflict led to the signature of the agreement to withdraw all foreign actors from Angola in 1988. The South African party also agreed to Namibia's independence, making the RSA's direct role in the conflict an almost closed chapter.

2.2 Cuba's Intervention in the Angolan Conflict

The beginning of Cuba's intervention in Angola dates back to the 1960s. The Cuban Marxist-Leninist ideology supported MPLA in the fight against the Portuguese colonial domination and although the number of intervening armed forces is estimated to be only a few hundred (CIA.gov, 1997, p.3), there was intensive cooperation on this platform.

Support for the fight against colonial government grew steadily into support for other local or regional actors seeking to seize power in the country. The coalition of UNITA and FNLA became MPLA's main opponent. South Africa's support had a significant impact on what was happening in the country and MPLA's position seemed to be in jeopardy. Agostinho Neto, who was the MPLA leader, also sought support abroad. At first, he turned to the Soviet Union, which did not want to risk direct large-scale military intervention, so he was advised to address the ideologically related Cuba with his requests (Nálevka, 2010, p. 152).

Cuba's support for MPLA was given the name Operation Carlota. This logistically demanding military operation meant the deployment of about 40,000 Cuban soldiers. (Nálevka, 2010, p. 152).

According to the CIA, in March 1976 the estimated number of Cuban soldiers in the country was close to 20,000 (CIA.gov, 1997 p. 4). With this support, MPLA was able to effectively eliminate UNITA and FNLA guerrilla resistance. After the withdrawal of SADF troops and the end of US support for UNITA and FNLA, MPLA (in cooperation with Cuba) recorded numerous achievements leading to the dominance of these parties in the conflict.

In 1976, Cuba announced a plan to gradually withdraw its troops from Angola, which led to a further extension of the conflict. Rochlin (1979, p. 14) states that Cuba's interests in Angola in this period can be divided into two main areas. The first reason to maintain Cuba's support was the events in Zaire Shaba. The local Katang movement was supported by MPLA and Cuba in the struggle for independence from Zaire, which led to worsened relations between the Angolan government and Zaire and could result in a war conflict. The second reason was the support for Agostinho Neto, who faced coup attempts and the presence of loyal Cuban troops was supposed to consolidate his position.

The beginning of the 1980s was in the spirit of the above-mentioned negotiations on the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from the country. However, the interested parties were unable to agree on an effective and truly functional solution or compromise. Cuba's support for MPLA operated more or less continuously although its intensity and methods changed over the years (Moore, 1986, p. 34).

The major turning point came after the Battle of Cuito Canavale. The Cubans received urgent requests for help from Luanda because a key battle was about to take place and MPLA, in cooperation with the USSR, did not record much success in the country. Fidel Castro expected the battle to be a turning point in the whole war and reacted with renewed massive military support. Marcum states that in 1988 the total number of Cuban soldiers in Angola was 50,000 (Marcum, 1998/1999, p. 165).

Although the battle ended with a declaration of victory for both parties, the Cubans, thanks to the renewed intervention, got into a better negotiating position in concluding subsequent peace treaties. These led to the complete cessation of Cuban intervention in Angola in 1991.

2.3 The U.S. Intervention in the Angolan Conflict

The beginning of the US intervention in the Angolan conflict dates back to the 1960s. The initial role of the US in the conflict was somewhat double-edged. On the one hand, the US supplied the Portuguese colonial regime with weapons. On the other hand, it supported the guerrilla FNLA for political and economic reasons (Cox, 1976 p. 1). The seizure of power by the left-wing MPLA was seen

as a major failure after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime. In the mood after the events in Vietnam, many domestic political figures considered further similar interventions to be inadmissible. In this mood, Dick Clark's amendment was adopted in 1976, banning any US intervention in the Angolan conflict.

Although the US official support was only renewed in 1985 when Clark's proposal was abolished, the US role in the Angolan conflict was definitely not negligible in the meantime. Zbigniew Brzezinski, from the position of National Security Advisor, significantly lobbied for the support for UNITA from third countries (Minter, 1991, p. 136).

The renewed support between 1986 and 1988 totalled \$15 million annually and also included arms supplies. Material and financial support continued after the Battle of Cuito Canavale. Americans increased their supplies for UNITA in 1989 to compensate for the end of RSA assistance. Thus, the initial annual contribution increased from \$15 million to \$50 million (External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009). In 1988, US initiatives also played an important role in the negotiations in New York, which were to ensure the independence of Namibia and put an end to the direct intervention of foreign troops in the war.

In 1991, The Bicesse Accords were signed, which meant the end of war-type support for the parties to the conflict if active fighting ceased. Yet the US supported UNITA for the whole of 1991 and 1992 under the auspices of an unspecified reason, and thus without official direction of war support (External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009).

1992 was the last year when the US supported UNITA. UNITA leader Nicolas Savimbi was identified by the US as a problem person for any peace agreements. The US then began to make contacts with MPLA in order to contribute to the final solution of the conflict in the shortest possible time (Kváča, 2005 p. 64).

As early as 1993, the US officially supported the Angolan government in this interest against UNITA by providing assistance to the Angolan Air Force and information on possible attacks (External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009). The US also played a role in the last phase of the Angolan conflict when efforts were made to end the conflict and achieve peace as soon as possible. An example of these efforts are, for example, the events of 1995 when a delegation was sent to Angola at the initiative of President Bill Clinton, which led to establishment of the UN Peacekeeping Mission.

2.4 The USSR Intervention in the Angolan Conflict

The beginnings of USSR intervention in Angola date back to the 1960s. Angolan resistance groups manifested their political orientation as their activities emerged. For the USSR, the MPLA variant was the most acceptable as it profiled itself as socialist. In 1964, the MPLA leader Agostinho Neto visited Moscow, which encouraged stronger ties between the two parties. However, the USSR's

support for some anticolonial activities in the South African region was not supposed to be a mere tool for waging the Cold War. The Soviets supported the liberalization movement under the auspices of anti-imperialist struggle within their own ideology (Shubin, Tokarev, 2001, p. 609).

After the end of the Portuguese domination in 1975, the USSR was the first country to recognize the newly established People's Republic of Angola (Klinghoffer 2019).

The USSR focused on spreading socialism in the African region, which was reflected in the strong support for MPLA. According to the US government, the USSR's support for MPLA from March 1975 to January 1976 amounted to \$100-200 million including 170 expert war advisors and a supply of weapons (Stevens 1976, p. 144).

In October 1976, a so-called agreement on friendship and cooperation was signed between the Angolan government and the USSR, which was the first pact of this kind that the USSR signed with a country in sub-Saharan Africa (Klinghoffer, 1980, p. 21).

In the late 1970s, relations between the Angolan government and the USSR suffered greatly due to the speculations that the Soviets had known of the upcoming MPLA coup to depose Agostinho Neto but unlike loyal Cubans, they did not intervene and express clear support for the party leadership. The speculations deepened when Neto died in Moscow in 1979 and there were voices that the Soviets wanted to get rid of him (MacFarlane, 1992, p. 7).

A certain restraint of the Soviets against their greater involvement in the Angolan conflict was also evident in the early 1980s. MacFarlane (1992, p. 12) states that this approach stemmed from a combination of circumstances including the fact that the USSR agenda was dealing with other and more dramatic foreign policy issues that those in the South African region or the above-mentioned worsened relations with the Angolan government.

The intensity of aid to the Angolan government from the USSR changed during the 1980s as a result of the policies of individual representatives of the Soviet generality of the time. However, it was still based on the supply of war equipment and financial support (External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009).

Awareness of the low political influence in the region and efforts to improve the situation led the USSR in 1987 to support MPLA more in the form of weapons, finance and planning further action against UNITA, primarily to gain a better negotiating position in the future (MacFarlane, 1992, p. 23).

Despite these initiatives, the alliance of UNITA and the South African Army succeeded in achieving military objectives. In spite of a further increase in the USSR support, MPLA had to withdraw to Cuito Canavale and it was clear that a battle which would have a major impact on the future development of the war was bound to happen.

Cuba, under the auspices of an actor independent of the USSR, sent massive support to Angola to defend its strategic position, which had an impact on other war events.

Both the US and the USSR acted as supervisors in resolving the subsequent peace processes. This was manifested in the negotiations in New York in 1988 as well as in Bicesse in 1991. After the agreement on the complete cessation of foreign support in the conflict, the USSR and later also the Russian Federation participated as an actor trying to guarantee peace in the region during the course of the civil war until 2002.

Conclusion

The events in Angola connected with the problematic decolonization and subsequent division of political power after the fall of the Portuguese government led to an armed conflict. The post-colonial situation in Angola resulted in an approximately thirty-year conflict, which was strongly influenced by foreign actors. The motivations of these external actors were different. In many cases, the ongoing Cold War and the ideological support of the parties, which was based on the belief that the support for partners with the same political opinions were correct, played their part. At other times, factors that supported local interests of individual actors (Namibia's independence or efforts to maintain the RSA's dominance) played a role.

It was possible to extend the conflict only due to the dynamics of this external support. Foreign interventions in the form of financial and military aid had an immediate effect on the development of the war. As a result, the achievements of individual parties were almost directly related to the level of such foreign aid. For example, UNITA supported by the West and RSA struggled for its existence in the second half of the 1980s after Clark's amendment was adopted and the South African troops withdrawn from the country.

On the contrary, after the resumption of support from both sides, it managed to fight MPLA very effectively until 1987, and after a series of victories in many battles it significantly improved its position. A similar statement applies to the support for MPLA. Dependence on Cuba's support was considerable and if Fidel Castro had not agreed with repeated massive support for an ideologically related regime, the conflict would probably have unfolded in a completely different dynamic.

Although the direct military involvement of foreign actors was to end in 1991, their support was still evident (under the auspices of non-war purposes) in the following years.

This changed only in the last phase of the conflict when the West recognized MPLA as Angola's legitimate government, mainly because of the behaviour of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who repeatedly blocked the possible end of the war. After his death in 2002, the country finally saw peace negotiations and could enter a new phase of its history.

Studies of past armed conflicts are still important today because the impacts (political, cultural, economic etc.) can often be of global, regional or local character, which was also manifested in the Angolan conflict (cf. Šmíd et al., 2016).

List of abbreviations

MPLA – The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
FNLA – The National Front for the Liberation of Angola
UNITA – The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
FLEC – Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
USA – The United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SADF – South African Defence Force
RSA – Republic of South Africa
SWAPO – South-West African People's Organization
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
UN – United Nations

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JCPOA AND INF - SUSTAINABILITY OF GLOBAL ZERO IDEALS

Matej Drotár¹

ABSTRACT

Recent developments with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty have marked yet another important milestone in nuclear affairs. With these, truly crucial instruments either shaking or gone, the perspective of the so-called Global Zero initiative diminishes. The possible repercussions for the Middle East and the world have already caused diplomatic alert and therefore merit significant consideration. Given the fact that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and control of the so far existing means of delivery are communicating vessels, it is incumbent upon international relations scholars to suggest what could be done, lest this trend wreaks havoc with security order, balance of power and overall transparency amongst states. Put differently, to provide as balanced a response as possible to the following questions: First, how do international relations theories and some of their core assumptions respond to the very quest for a complete nuclear weapons disposal. Second, what could follow after some of the most important international relations instruments dealing with the issue have not served its purpose any more. The so-called Global Zero initiative is definitely worth of trying for many reasons and as long as this article adds to their better understanding, then its very purpose shall be considered as fulfilled.

Key words: JCPOA, INF, nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, Global Zero

Introduction

In order to properly understand the so-called Global Zero initiative and its ideals one shall look back, for this truly universal and historically unique trend could be tracked in the late 1970s. Some crucial thoughts about general and complete disarmament were part of Programme of Action which appeared within Resolutions and Decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its tenth special session in 1978.

This outcome document of the General Assembly of the United Nations, if legally non-binding, clearly said that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to humankind and to the survival of civilization. It was therefore essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context was therefore logically the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Needless to say, that in this very task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-

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weapon states, in particular those amongst them, which possessed the most important nuclear arsenals, were expected to bear a special responsibility. At that point of time, as well as today, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the Russian Federation as its successor state for that purpose, were the most dominant powers. Moreover, the process of nuclear disarmament was supposed to be carried out in such a way, and required measures to ensure, that the security of all states was guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states and the rest of the world alike. It meant nothing more or less than a systematic approach towards complete reduction. The document also informed that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiations and agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the states concerned for three vital goals. Scant wonder, that they were only achievable through diplomacy.

First, cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems. Second, cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Third, a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to the ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time (Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During its Tenth Special Session, 1978).

One has to admit, that the above-mentioned approach was clearly intentionally shaped by a disarmament logic. Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of humankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, the General Assembly of the United Nations was able to articulate a common approach towards this issue for the decades to come, nonetheless. It was a remarkable achievement.

That said, some of the basic tenets of liberal institutionalism which were at the origin of the so-called Global Zero initiative and which will be dealt with at a later stage, were not the only possible answer to the quest for order and stability in the nuclear realm. Quite to the contrary, there were others, which claimed otherwise. In fact, according to some pundits it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the academic study of international relations is predominantly a debate about realism and realism only, not liberalism. However, the author of this article begs to differ on this presumption. Setting basic international relations theory principles at this point in order to better navigate through details of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty therefore seems to be in order.

1 Theorizing the conundrum

Arguably, the best-known theoretical proposition about international relations is balance of power theory. Given the basic problem that under anarchy – a basic feature of realism – any state can resort to force to pursue its own goals, it follows that states are likely to naturally guard against the possibility that one state might amass the wherewithal – possibly the nuclear wherewithal – to compel all the others to follow its will. The theory posits that states will check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabilities – possibly nuclear capabilities – or aggregating their capabilities with other states in alliances – possibly nuclear alliances – even though the second one is obviously more complicated to accomplish. The so-called security dilemma – a term coined in the 1950s – adds to this. It pursues the argument that in arming for self-defence a state might decrease its own security via the unintended effect of making others insecure, forcing them to arm – possibly via nuclear weapons – in response. Some say that this consequence of anarchy could lead security-seeking states into a downward spiral of mistrust and further rivalry (Reus-Smith, Snidal, 2010).

It goes without saying that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty are in clear opposition to the above-mentioned core assumptions of the realist tradition in international relations, for they seek cooperation and common good with the help of means and instruments of multilateral diplomacy for example. Interestingly enough, some of the most prominent realist scholars think that armament could be justifiable and encouraged. They claim that the international community can live with for instance a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran, thus implicitly suggesting that international cooperation embodied in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for that purpose might not be the only resort for a safer Middle East and subsequently for the world. Here is why.

First, nuclear alarmists suggest that the Islamic Republic of Iran could use its nuclear capability to ramp up its support for instability in the Middle East. However, this concern has found itself at odds with the historical record since the time when the first nuclear power came into existence. Quite to the contrary, new nuclear states become more cautious and conscious of their own vulnerability. Second, every new nuclear country discovers that nuclear weapons have only one conceivable purpose – deterrence – and there is no reason why would the Islamic Republic of Iran act differently. Third, the dangerous idea of transferring nuclear weapons to non-state actors or losing control of nuclear arsenal is also not probable due to the surveillance capabilities of major nuclear powers and some specific international organisations in particular (Waltz, 2013).

Realism, however, is not the only possible way of approaching the question of nuclear issues. Liberal institutionalism or neo-liberal institutionalism is considered by many scholars to represent the most convincing challenge to realist and neo-realist thinking. The roots are to be found in the functional integration

scholarship of the 1940s and the 1950 and regional integration studies of the 1960s. These studies suggested that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pooling their resources and even surrendering some of their sovereignty to respond to regional problems. That is why institutions are seen as persistent and as connected sets of rules and practises that prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape the expectations of actors, thus eliminating a desire of going nuclear. Therefore, the balance of power in the international system is an example of an institution and not a result of some self-help desperation. In the same vein, regimes are social institutions that are based on agreed rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures (Baylis, Smith, 2001). All these proved to be a benefit for the process of approaching the so-called Global Zero initiative. Be it on a regional or a global level.

2 Multilateral diplomacy in action – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

True, in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, much of the discussions of its motives to acquire nuclear weapons are derived from rational choice theory. Indeed, realist and neorealist scholars postulated that the anarchic international environment prompted states to seek opportunities to enhance their power with regard to other states. Given the fact that nuclear weapons are the ultimate security guarantee, as well as the golden standard of deterrence, acquiring an arsenal is seen as a rational response to the existential predicaments of an anarchic world (Rezaei, 2017).

There again, it seems obvious that achieving international treaties based on mutual, if limited, trust and cooperation are easier as long as relevant decision-makers are liberal institutionalists by heart. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action shall serve as a shining example. The level of international involvement in this case was striking. Resolution 2231 adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations at its 7488th meeting welcomed first of all diplomatic efforts by its five permanent members, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Islamic Republic of Iran to reach a comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Moreover, it emphasized the importance of political involvement with the aim to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes (Resolution 2231 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7748th Meeting, 2015).

Needless to say, the words such as diplomatic efforts, negotiations or comprehensive solution were used on purpose. It demonstrated that states could be better off as long as they cooperate and not vice versa. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action therefore proved that multilateral diplomacy could work and bring about tangible results. Its adoption meant that the region of the Middle East approached, if for a short period of time, to the ideals of the so-called Global Zero initiative.

Nowadays, it seems that in the face of the maximum pressure policy adopted by the United States of America towards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which in practice has mainly taken the form of economic sanctions, the Islamic Republic of Iran employs a response of maximum resistance. Therefore, on the nuclear issue, both sides have reached a dead end. The United States of America might be very probably struggling with identifying a long-term politically driven strategy other than continuing the economic sanctions as a tool for a change and the Islamic Republic of Iran does not intend to negotiate if its demands regarding the sanctions are not met (Shine, Zimmt, Landau, 2020).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could have sparked a positive domino effect throughout the region of the Middle East. The highest-level-negotiations-related expertise, as well as the involvement of practically the whole world shall not be wasted, nevertheless. The international community has the means such as diplomacy, the institutional backup such as the United Nations and the European Union and most importantly, it has an idealism-driven call for duty for a safer world. These have been already put into work and shall be revisited as the first resort option for the time to come. The so-called Global Zero initiative in the region of the Middle East is not gone, but it also needs to see some inspiration on the global level. Alas, here again, the prospects are not bright.

3 Verifiable compliance – Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

According to some scholars, ballistic missiles are and will continue to be a big threat to many nations in the near future. Countries may want to build these weapons for a number of reasons. Indeed, once built they are alternatives to fielding large standing military forces and provide a source of national pride. Furthermore, because few missiles defences are available to most nations, ballistic missiles can strike with relative impunity against a nation that might even have a military advantage over a rival. Nations that once disputed borders with conventional forces can now deliver a strike against their neighbour's capital cities, much like was the case in the War of the Cities in the 1980s in the region of the Middle East. However, make no mistake. Ballistic missiles also cause problems for nations that adopt them. Instead of creating a stable source of security, nations could create a destabilizing arms race. Moreover, ballistic missiles acquisition could spawn international repercussions. Some nations might treat missiles developers as rogue or pariah states. Finally, missile deployment may escalate military actions. Instead of using diplomatic means to settle a problem, nations could revert to using military means, including nuclear missiles, to achieve an end to their disputes (Chun, 2006).

Having set some general scene for the issue of ballistic missiles, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty shall be approached. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty took the best from various liberal traditions in international relations. This landmark agreement launched one of the most

prominent process of major nuclear weapons reductions in the world in decades. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty's collapse in 2019 truly affected world's security and the future prospects are not bright. A new round of nuclear weapons competition is already underway, driven by the fast-paced technology revolution. On top of that, non-proliferation efforts are wavering and the probability of miscalculations is rising (Murray, 2019). There were a couple of reactions to that development worth of mentioning.

From the point of view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter as NATO), the Russian Federation remains in violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, despite years of various Allied engagement, including a final opportunity over six months to honour its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty's obligations. As a result, the United States of America decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a decision fully supported by NATO Allies, took effect. According to NATO, the Russian Federation was responsible for the demise of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, showed no willingness, and took no demonstrable steps to return to compliance with its international obligations. Obviously, a situation whereby the United States fully abides by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Russian Federation does not, was not sustainable (Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 2019).

From a European perspective, only a few European leaders have chosen to argue with the United States of America decision to renounce the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in response to the Russian Federation's refusal to withdraw the prohibited ballistic missiles system. There have been no panicky appeals from European politicians for the United States of America to match the Russian deployments, to maintain deterrence and transatlantic confidence. One might argue that European indifference to the end of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty stems not from confidence but from a deep-seated reluctance to accept that nuclear issues are back on the agenda at all (Witney, 2019).

Conclusion

When looking back to the recent developments related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the very difference between theory and practise in international relations could probably not be more obvious. Both documents were at one point of time shining examples of multilateral diplomacy and cooperation. Moreover, they were also acts of political courage and showed the ability of world leaders to listen to reason.

To reply the first question posed about how international relations theories and some of their core assumptions respond to the very quest for a complete nuclear weapons disposal, the answer is twofold. Various great international relations theory debates keep constantly showing that liberals are stronger in theory, whilst realists show otherwise referring to practise. This, of course, might be true until some extent and a mixture of both approaches might be in order.

As far as the second question about what could follow after some of the most important international relations instruments dealing with the issue have not served its purpose any more is concerned, the reply is yet again complicated. A simple answer would be that practice should follow theory. The reality show otherwise. The ideals of the so-called Global Zero initiative could only be fulfilled if they are embraced as universal principles. At the same time, a massive regional accomplishment such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is a success itself, for it creates the ground for further action on a larger scale. There are means and institutions for both creating theoretical guidelines of cooperation and for its practical fulfilment. Diplomacy should play the leading role here, for diplomacy not only creates ideals, but being an working ideal itself provides a lot of inspiration for the very practise of international relations.

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NATIONAL POPULISM - NATO SECURITY THREAT

Peter Dubóczy¹

ABSTRACT

The subject of our article is the phenomenon of national (or reactionary) populism and the crisis of liberal democracy. The article focuses on identifying both factors as security threats to NATO and USA as its main protagonist (not only) in 2020. It focuses on this issue in an environment of international relations in conjunction with the internal policies of individual member states (primarily United States and France). In particular, it focuses on the transformation of the nature of liberal democracy in a role of "soft power" instrument in relation to the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The article describes the current direction of NATO and the trends affecting the change in perception of the position of the alliance within the global international system. It also focuses on NATO's global changing role with an emphasis on the gradual loss of its position as a defense platform for liberal democracies, mainly due to the presence of national populism becoming more challenging. The article also addresses the primary challenges NATO has faced and will face, which will further determine the current and future shape of the alliance. The key lines of the article are thus questions of transformed nature of liberal democracy, global power position of the USA, value of facts, national populism and hybrid security threats.

Key words: national populism, liberal democracy, soft power, security threat, NATO

Introduction: Alliance of Liberal Democracies

The last decades of the 20th century marked the final victory of democracy in its liberal form over the idea of total control of society under the direction of totalitarian regimes. The end of the bipolar system of the world opened the door for strengthening the hegemonic position of the United States. In particular, the value and intellectual export of the USA in the role of flagship of liberal democracy has influenced the global system substantially. The effects of world trade liberalization measures, the inevitable interconnection of world economies and the creation of a global interdependence with the key idea in underpinning the process through the pillars of capitalism have come to the forefront. The nature of the future intellectual and power course of the world was predicted, but to some extent even designated, by the voices of experts or thinkers who pointed out the primary determinants of future development.

The dynamic and turbulent period of the 20th century brought challenges that required not only quick but effective decisions. Despite the chilling events of World War I and World War II, a wave of optimism and expectations for a better

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future has been created - the 20th century has become an American century, and the prophecy of a new leader to replace Great Britain as a global arbiter has been fulfilled. Fragmented calls for political measures of isolationism and unilateralism were not heard after the events in Europe in 1948. Communist coups in Eastern Europe or the blockade of Berlin clearly indicated the advancement of a totalitarian enemy and ultimately motivated the US to work more closely with European states devastated by two massive conflicts.² The commitment to help every nation defending its freedom and sovereignty from violent submission has become a mantra that has led to the creation of NATO with the mission of a military defense platform opposed to the efforts of communism and totalitarian regimes expansion.

After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, NATO members were justifiably concerned about the potential of the Soviet Union, which did not obscure to use the client (or proxy) states to fulfill their power interests. Soviet success in launching a "new" strategy in Asia, which further defined the form of the Cold War, could also be transferred to European space. This has prompted the Allies to review the functioning of NATO, which has undergone changes to make it more effective and hinder the expanding influence of the USSR. The United States have played an important role in shaping NATO's military structure. In essence, they have become the main protagonist, mainly because of their size and military capabilities/capacities. So, if the US is viewed as a global defender of the freedom of democracies, then NATO is acting as their mutual platform of cooperation, which, alongside economic factors, were the primary pillars of Western integration. In 1967 **Samuel P. Huntington** claimed that *"by the year 2000 it should be clear retrospectively that the dominant feature of international politics during the thirty years after World War II was the expansion of American power."* (Nye, 1990, p. 1-2)

However, the image of a positive hero in the bipolar clash of powers was disrupted over time, but the struggle against the horrifying image of the dominance of totalitarianism and the 20-year-long role of the most powerful protector of the free world brought their toll. Vietnam's war, Afghanistan, oil shocks, rising inflation, and other facts have indicated that the US, as a global geopolitical guardian and aspirant for the position of a power hegemony, is slowly out of breath. A gradual decline of power, also determined by the state of American public opinion, seemed necessary, as was the case with other powers with similar ambitions in the past. **Huntington** states a few years later: *"in 1988 The United States reached the zenith of its fifth wave of declinism since the*

² A clear signal of a specific political / power orientation is the financial assistance to Greece and Turkey in an effort to stop the threat of advancing communism. The same goes for the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), whereby the US ensured the reconstruction of Western Europe's economy and revived international trade on the old continent. Around 13 billion US dollars meant increased influence and prestige for The United States, but in particular confirmed the division of Europe into two power blocs.

1950s. “ (Huntington, 1988) He looks for the root cause of the US decline in the economic dimension, especially in comparing the national economy and its performance with the economies of Japan or the growing European states. If we understand economic power as one of the main determinants of the state's position in the international system, then its decline naturally affects other power options. The reason for the relative economic decline in the US can also be found in excessive spending on military purposes.³

In 1990, the “*soft power*” tool became one of the main aspects of the further development of the world (and the position of the US or NATO in it). Its importance was described by **Joseph Nye** in his work *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. In response to the US decline in power, resonating in the eyes of the American public of the 1980s and early 1990s, the author seeks solutions for an emerging problem. He points out the transformation of the meaning of the term “*power*”, when over the course of time its soft form comes to the fore. On the contrary, its hard format, hence the use of military, geopolitical or economic means to pursue state interests, has been slowly but surely losing its importance. Thus, if we perceive power as an ability to assert interests, then the path of export of social, cultural, intellectual or political-economic products (which were mainly marked by the presence of values of the West), seemed as the key one. According to **Joseph Nye**, the decisive factor is not the ability to *impose* but to *attract* - the ability in which The United States had unparalleled capabilities over the rest of the world (Nye, 1990).

NATO as a defense alliance of democratic states. USA as flagship of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy as the flagship of soft power. A simple sounding but otherwise complex formula that represents the core of our article. The implosion and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the triumph of The United States was to herald the future shape of humanity's existence. For authors like **Francis J. Fukuyama**, it was the final solution to the power or ideological puzzle, where the path of liberal democracy appeared to be the ultimate winner (Fukuyama, 1992). However, the end of history did not take place and its continuation carried not only a valuable lesson but also a bitter aftertaste of failure. History is repeating itself and even now we can uncover several analogies between the development of the 20th century and today's reality. The ideas of political and economic liberalism, democratic institutions and globalized American capitalism have paved the way for the development and success of democracies across the world but have also created space for new problematic issues and threats. The beginning of the 21st century seemed to be an optimistic moment for the Western world, led by the US, as the protector of democratic states, and NATO, as their official platform for defense and power cooperation.

³ In this context, we can speak of a phenomenon that Paul Kennedy calls “*imperial overstretch*” - a hypothetical situation where an empire extends beyond its capabilities in an attempt to maintain or expand its military or economic ties. (Kennedy, 1988)

The global perspective was clear, but its potential remained unfulfilled, and erroneous decisions brought a lot of uncertainty to world society.

1 Liberal Democracy - 21st Century Instrument of Soft Power and Its Crisis


The weakening of the US in any sense must be ultimately seen as a weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance, especially if we see the image and values of liberal democracy as one of the common aspects of soft power. This thesis is also supported by soft power's very essence - NATO, which primarily plays the role of a military or defense organization and thus represents an aspect of hard power, is getting overshadowed. While the revitalization of the Wilsonian spirit is already commendable at the substantive core of its basic formula, the tools for its realization change over time, following the pattern of the international system and its priorities. It is thus in the interests of the Allies that the American dream will not gradually become a nightmare, so that liberal democracy does not mutate into forms unfavorable to the stability of the global system and the position of the alliance in it. Of course, it is not only about the potential of soft power in the hands of The United States. The same logic can be applied to every NATO member state, primarily to larger players from Europe such as France, Great Britain or Germany. However, the oscillation of the soft power index in the context of NATO members also provides the public with a picture of changes in the hierarchy of relations and interactions that translate into a change of rhetoric or the nature of cooperation.

At the beginning of the new millennium, The United States experienced the peak of their power potential. After the events of September 11, nearly the whole world stood on the side of the "*lighthouse of democracy*". For more than a decade, however, the image of soft power's success still faced the greatest challenges of the illegal invasion of Iraq, the economic crisis or military intervention in Libya, during which NATO member states' ability to cooperate has been fully proven. The global expression of empathy and solidarity following the fall of the World Trade Center has been replaced by an increasing call for global justice and respect for international law applicable to all countries of the world, including the US. The upheavals in the very foundations of the world leader's position have been confirmed by the US' inability to respond to China's growing influence (with an emphasis on the economic dimension) and Russia's activities (with an emphasis on the political dimension). However, the absence of authority was not only reflected in the international system, but also at the level of society. **Hannah Arendt** perceives a critical moment in the penetration of the realm of politics by general scepticism and its radicalization. According to her, the world was naturally led to the loss of its *stability* and *reliability*, which found *its political expression in the loss of authority* (Gbúrová-Koziak-Dobiaš, 2015, p. 30).

The deformities or threats to the world and the ideal of democracy as such were also pointed out in 1977 article by **Fareed Zakaria**, who expressed his

concerns about the flourishing of illiberal democracies. In spite of (thanks to) their democratically elected governments, they violated the principles of political liberalism, followed the same approach to the rule of law, and also trampled the fundamental rights of their citizens (Zakaria, 1997). 20 years later, **Edward Luce** published his work with a symptomatic title *The Retreat of Western Liberalism*, which describes the crisis of liberal democracy and draws attention to its impending collapse (Luce, 2017). However, the threat to liberal democracy is also harboured, for example, by the political-economic model represented by the People's Republic of China. It can generate influence sufficient enough to change the rules of the international system, which were created by the countries of the Western world, especially the US (Dvorský, 2017, p. 109). The main line that flows through the intellectual atmosphere is obvious - liberal democracy is at risk and, if it is facing its crisis, it must be confronted by bearers of its values and institutions - states and international organizations.

The decay of liberal democracies is also evidenced by the latest data from *The Economist Intelligence Unit* (EIU). The Democracy Index of 2019 shows that democracy is declining - a global score of 5.44 out of ten is the lowest number since the index began in 2006.⁴ Based on the data obtained, more than a third of the world's population lives under the rule of authoritarian governments (Global Democracy Has..., 2020). In our article, we primarily focused on data relating to NATO member states, which are also predominantly experiencing democratic index regression. Of the 29 members, three can be defined as hybrid regimes (Albania, Montenegro and Turkey), 15 states as flawed democracies (including The United States or the Visegrad Four states) and 11 states as full democracies (led by Norway as the leader of the whole ranking). On average, the NATO member states' democracy index was 7.66 points in 2019. The US and NATO challengers, the Russian Federation and China, have gained score of 3.11 and 2.26, respectively, which placed them in the category of authoritarian regimes.




Graph 1: Democracy Index of NATO member states (in average) compared to Russia and China. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

⁴ The state of democracy is evaluated in research in 167 countries around the world on the basis of five factors: the electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of the government, political participation, democratic political culture and civil liberties. Research divides countries into four categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, authoritarian regimes.

With NATO leading members in consideration, The United States have suffered the most damage, with a score of 7.96 points in 2019, falling into the category of flawed democracies. Narrowly, but still. Another dent in the overall image of the US soft power, which was also reflected in the perception of their position within the global system by other players of international theatre. It is certainly worth mentioning poor diplomatic activities and the halting US administration in relation to Syria, the Middle East and the triad of Asian giants: China, Japan and South Korea, where the absence of US influence is beginning to show itself quite markedly. We are not trying to suggest that the decline in power potential is solely caused by the decline of liberal democracy (and hence the soft power itself). However, we certainly see signs of a coherent relationship between the status/perception of liberal democracy and the possibilities of American foreign policy (or NATO for that matter). The values of one category affect the shape of the other, and vice versa.

On the contrary, the revitalization of the values of liberal democracy can be seen in France, whose rhetoric and activities are slowly starting to take over and dominate the leadership initiative in NATO structures. France uses the protectionist tone of The United States' internal policy, which is further echoed by increasing decibels of national populism. The vastness of the French diplomatic network bears its sweet fruit, with France unrivalled as a pioneer in a multitude of memberships in multilateral agreements and international organizations. French form of soft power can be traced to the massive machinery of diplomatic missions focusing on cultural convergence through the *Alliance Francaise* network (France - Soft Power, 2019). It is also aided by the shape of French democracy, which ranked “only” 20th in the ranking above but managed to get into the category of complete democracies, ahead of The United States. The “*Great National Debate*”, a series of town-hall meetings convened by President Emmanuel Macron, also proved to be effective in resolving the *gilets jaunes* (yellow vests) protests (Global Democracy Has..., 2020).




Graph 2: Democracy Index. The most influential NATO states. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

The relationship between the triad of soft power, liberal democracy and national populism as an element of internal politics, is best described by the rivalry between member states in NATO structures. Especially between The United States and France. The schism in the vision of NATO's continuation is manifested on several levels, arising from (but also created by) the erosion of the global order. The radical change in US foreign policy can be seen as one of the decisive factors - questioning the importance of multilateral cooperation in favor of bilateral treaties was reflected not only in international policy, but also in the economic disruption seen in the failure of long-standing trade agreements with European partners (TPP and TTIP). The same goes for the inability to respond to the growing economic impact of China, which emerged clearly during the course of current trade war. The protectionist direction of the Trump administration certainly does not appease the eroded state of global stability. “*America First*” did not earn a positive reputation in international terms (especially in the context of both US and NATO partners), which was also reflected in the US drop in *The Soft Power 30* ranking by USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Although The United States continue to be a leader in the areas of culture, education, and the digital industry, the soft power potential with a score of 77.40 only gained them the ranking of 5th in the world in 2019 (United States - Soft Power, 2019). The decline was mainly due to a sharp decrease of government ratings (as a soft power factor). The potential of European soft power seemed to be largely undermined following the events of the migration crisis beginning in 2014. It was a big question of who, if anyone, could replace The United States as an international (or Western) leader. France succeeded in creating a positive momentum, when it was ranked first in soft power ranking on behalf of its foreign policy. The positives that played a huge role in positive evaluation can be found in the above-mentioned network of diplomatic missions with a focus on intercultural dialogue. Similarly significance can be perceived in a case of hosting the G7 summit, when President Macron succeeded in establishing France as *a reliable European leader* capable of putting pressure on critical issues (climate threat, terrorism as NATO's primary enemy, change in attitude towards the Russian Federation, Common European Defense Structure, etc.) even in a global sense (France - Soft Power, 2019).

| | 2015 | Index (2015) | 2016 | Index (2016) | 2017 | Index (2017) | 2018 | Index (2018) | 2019 | Index (2019) |
|---------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|-----------------|
| United States | 3rd | 73,68 | 1st | 77,96 | 3rd | 75,02 | 4th | 77,80 | 5th | 80,28 |
| France | 4th | 73,64 | 5th | 72,14 | 1st | 75,75 | 2nd | 80,14 | 1st | 77,40 |

Table 1: Soft power rankings of US and France. Author's work. (Source: *The Soft Power 30*. USC Center on Public Diplomacy)


The soft power rivalry of The United States and France can also be seen in relation to the development of liberal democracy. While France has improved on both fronts (both soft power and democracy index) with an acceptable response to the protest wave of *yellow vests*, The United States suffered a significant decline in both ratings due to national populism and unbalanced administration after 2016. This development was inevitably reflected by France's growing ambitions, which, coupled with the weakening influence of the US, led not only to destabilizing the structures of global order, but also, to a lesser extent, to uncertainty about the vision of NATO's future existence. Uncertainty has manifested itself in several dimensions and the desire for de-escalation was not helped by the aggressive (and according to international law, illegal) US activities in Iran followed by President Trump's demand (or reprehension) directed to the North Atlantic Allies for greater participation in the Middle East. So, the problem is not the natural rivalry between the US and France itself, but rather the lack of a clear future leader that could stabilize an uncertain international environment. However, the reality is determined by the presence of two powers, one losing its position and the other, for the time being, with a lack of potential to take over the reins. A stalemate that by its instability automatically opens the door to unwanted elements in the form of interventions by external players (outside of NATO) using hybrid disinformation tools in combination with the support of national populism. National populism thus acts as a cause (technology) as well as a consequence. National populism as an imminent security threat to global order and NATO.



Graph 3: Average Democracy Indices of NATO, V4 and Southeast European states. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

2 National populism as a security threat to NATO

According to EIU research results, the collapse of democracy in the Western world seems to be most present in the region of Central Europe and the Balkans, where the largest regression of the Democracy Index is recorded. All countries of the Visegrad Four have declined, and we can see similar developments in the Balkan countries such as Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Romania. Only Albania and Bulgaria have successfully maintained their standards. In the context of research, most states in the regions can be understood as erroneous democracies or hybrid regimes of democracy and authoritarianism (Albania, Montenegro). The growing problem of illiberal democracies has been also pointed out by **Yascha Mounk** in 2018. In his work *The People vs. Democracy. Why Our Freedom Is in Danger & How to Save It*, he described the Hungarian government of Viktor Orbán as a prototype of an illiberal democracy fed by the phenomenon of national populism contrary to the fundamental values of international entities such as the European Union or NATO (Mounk, 2018).⁵



Graph 4: Democracy Index of the Visegrad Four states. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)


The illiberal axis of Central Europe is formed mainly under the surface of a "hidden" contempt for democratic institutions and a move towards Russia's foreign policy. A similar evolution of the political situation is emerging, perhaps in an even more accelerated form, in the case of Poland, whose ruling party *Law and Justice* operates, like *Fidesz*, on a platform of nationalism, Euroscepticism

⁵ The author classifies democracies within three groups: liberal democracies, illiberal democracies and neoliberal democracies.

and a stern attitude towards migration issues. The basic difference between the two fulcrums of Central European illiberal democracy appears to be the long-term willingness (stimulated by historical experience) to cooperate with NATO and The United States troops in defending Polish sovereignty against foreign attacks, mainly from Russia. The chief threat can be seen in the ostentatious undermining of the independence of the courts, or the limitation of the capacity not only of NGOs but also of the media to freely operate and function as guardians of democracy. An interesting ideological and axiological combination of two subjects, which finds its paradox in their varying approach to foreign policy. On the one hand, Hungary, which is getting closer to Moscow, on the other hand, Poland, which hosts one of four multinational "*battle groups*" on the eastern edge of NATO (Berschinski, 2018). Nevertheless, it is likely that by undermining the foundations of democracy and supporting the Orbán government, Kaczyński will eventually (and even unintentionally) help Russia's interests. Thus, the largest countries of the Visegrad Group are spotless examples of how the increase in national populism, or the decline in the presence of democracy (which is also reflected in its rating), can weaken NATO from within.

We can also see a more serious form of this trend if we turn our eyes to NATO's borders with Asia, where, according to EIU research, Turkey is ranked as the member state with the lowest democracy index score.⁶ In particular, the events of the coup d'état in 2016, which President Erdoğan used for his own benefit by introducing a state of emergency, are responsible for the low rating. The pattern has been repeated, and the freedom and rights of the population have been trampled by an increased level of state interference in society. Particularly in the context of persecution of the media and opposition voices. NATO's relations with Turkey have been disrupted as a result of the migration crisis and the war in Syria. During its course it has been shown that Turkey is able to find common grounds with Russia, especially when it comes to their own territorial interests beyond their eastern borders. Turkish tendencies were fulfilled by the launch of the military operation "*Peace Spring*" in October 2019, which eventually confirmed a fading of The United States' influence in the region. In particular, the question of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which continued to be reflected in France's foreign policy, was controversial. President Macron, also in connection with the Turkish purchase of the Russian anti-aircraft missile system S-400 Triumph, has repeatedly questioned the functioning of NATO, which he believes is currently in a "*brain death*" state.

⁶ In 2019, Turkey obtained a score of 4.09, only very narrowly avoiding its position in the category of authoritarian regimes..



Graph 5: Democracy Index of Southeast European States + Turkey. Author's work. (Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit)

However, the burden of national populism is not only borne by the states of the eastern or south-eastern region of NATO. The phenomenon also manifests itself in the context of its other European members. Marine Le Pen and *Rassemblement National* in France, *Alternative für Deutschland* in Germany, Wilders with the *Party for Freedom* in the Netherlands, Boris Johnson and Brexit (preceded by UKIP in the UK), *Vox* in Spain or *Lega Nord* and Matteo Salvini in Italy - political entities, whose activities and electoral successes unequivocally confirm NATO's internal enemy status and the crisis of democracy as such.

We enclose the circle with a return to national populism in The United States. The cause of its growth can be found mainly on two levels. The first is the question of social inequality, matched by the lack of social or economic mobility of the population (Lehmann, 2016). The second is the issue of public opinion (and its orientation) and education of the American population. This fact is underlined by the statement of president Trump: "*I love the poorly educated*" (Trump in Nevada..., 2016). However, the situation is not so simple - under the poor conditions of the US democracy, we discover several factors that are similarly related to the erosion of the global position as well as the erosion of the image of liberal democracy. The loss of authority we have described in connection with **Hannah Arendt's** intellectual message is gaining momentum, especially in the atomized and polarized society that the American (but also global) society is today. Growth in populism in countries that The United States has (not only) recently seen as its leading allies may be another aspect of global order (in)stability. Israel and India, the nuclear powers associated with a common affection towards the US, are similarly experiencing a populist decadence determined primarily by the combination of religious and national identity.

National populism is becoming a specific parallel of soft power. It is not only a consequence, but also an instrument. The crisis of liberal democracy opens the door for dangerous phenomena, which continue to act as security threats not only to NATO's structure, but also to the stability of the global order. They create an opportunity for multiplying the unwanted effects of political decisions, which are then reflected by (sometimes manipulated) public opinion in the elections. The effect, which, like avalanche, gains in intensity by spontaneous fall without further enemy intervention. In the end, it opens up the space for explaining the phenomenon of national populism. It is probably not possible to find a single definition, but we have already set out the role of national populism sufficiently. His strength, however, is reflected primarily in the ignorance of those affected. In other words: *"national populism is only distinguished from nationalism and racism in that its supporters do not see themselves in these terms"* (Davies, 2018).

Conclusion

In 2020, NATO will formally celebrate its 70th anniversary. It is up to its members, as bearers of the values of liberal democracy and soft power players, to face the challenges of the new decade of the 21st century. The character of the common enemy has changed to some extent. It cannot be directly specified, its nature acquires hybrid features whose origins are also found within NATO borders. The growing phenomenon of national populism is no longer the result of the crisis of liberal democracy alone. Jumping onto the momentum of running hybrid threats train, national populism itself becomes a technology of power struggle. The crisis of liberal democracy is also reflected by the data figures, whether we are talking about the annual research of The Economist Intelligence Unit or the results of the elections in the individual NATO member states. The designation of NATO as an alliance of liberal democracies is no longer up to date. Liberal democracy is in decline and so is the classic concept of soft power. On average, NATO is (at its best) an association of flawed democracies, which, however, have an unfortunate tendency to continue in the trend of decay. Even the US is no longer the *"homogeneous"* beacon of - neither liberalism nor democracy (especially considering the Mueller report). On the contrary, defined by undermining the foundations of the rule of law and violating the freedom of the individual or society, illiberal democracies are on the rise. Essentially, the future shape of the power struggle and the global order becomes a fundamental issue. Will it derive from political and economic liberalism or from an illiberal approach with the necessary ally in national populism?

The key problem is the uncertainty or destabilization that this transition brings. The decisive factor will be the approach of NATO in the role of a defender of democracy - especially the approach of the USA and France. The power struggle we observe in NATO structures comes naturally in this situation. If one player slowly decays, it does not take too long for the other player to attempt to

gain the leadership. However, internal disputes ultimately add to other factors that weaken the overall alliance position. This situation only favours those who are miles away from the values of liberalism and democracy.

The US is (un)willingly relinquishing its power potential and France has not yet reached the level needed (even if it is on the right path). The absence of a leader might yet evolve into a productive platform. Dangerous, but still. It is questionable whether President Macron's demands will bring about a change in the same way his predecessor Charles de Gaulle succeeded in 1966. The transformation of the present situation is in any case necessary, the struggle of liberal democracy and national populism must find its victor. Neither alternative will not disappear completely, the threats to democracy will always find their supporters - especially if the goal is to undermine the global order built around the pillars of democracy. Perhaps neither NATO nor democracy is really “*brain-dead*”, for this would mean a true end to the history of the Western world.

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DISINFORMATION AS A HIDDEN TOOL OF INFLUENCE

Tomasz Dukiewicz¹

“...[Russia] uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.”

June 2009 Open Letter to the Obama administration from Central and Eastern European Leaders. (Conley et al., 2016)

ABSTRACT

After a longer period of relative security, Europe is again facing a deteriorating security situation. As the recent economic crisis has weakened, which has shaken European confidence in certain aspects of integration, Europe has to tackle challenges of social, humanitarian, political, cultural and security problems. After nearly two decades, armed conflict broke out again in Europe, which resulted in annexing part of the territory of a sovereign country. Over the years, the EU has been addressing the challenges related to the international situation and the potential military threat not only in distant countries abroad, but also in their immediate vicinity. One can also notice that the deterioration of the security situation in Europe has also been influenced by the UK's decision to leave the EU. Until now, these threats only indirectly affected individual countries, intensifying various decisions regarding their national interest. Possible military threats that generate and shape relations with Russia in the vicinity of EU and NATO members' borders must not be overlooked. In addition to traditional threats related to international security, the security of EU countries is also threatened by relatively new menaces of the information warfare, organised cyber-attacks and widespread disinformation, consciously or unintentionally used. (Molander, Riddile, Wilson, 2020)

Key words: *disinformation, manipulation, propaganda, security environment, security system, security strategy.*

Introduction

Changes taking place in the security environment, including real and potential threats, will always take into consideration the synergy of all state instruments such as security potential in terms of social, economic, international, military and, above all, informational aspects in the decision-making phase. In this context, there are changes in the nature of security, which is increasingly determined by disinformation.

Providing false content is the main assumption of disinformation. The process of disinformation is done by creating features that identify certain apparent actions depending on the initiator's intentions towards the recipient, and the aim is to introduce informational chaos or uncertainty in the decision-making

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process. (Auerbach, Castronovo, 2013, p. 8) The contradiction of information content or the excess of information is to make what was supposed to be an auxiliary (false) action to be perceived by the recipient as real actions. All possible available means of information communication are used in order to convince the recipient of the truthfulness of apparent (false) intentions. As a result, the system of obtaining information is provided with facts justifying apparent false data and information as true. This is done by introducing relevant images, sounds, texts, statements, etc. into the recipient's sources of information.

Spreading disinformation also affects policy-making processes by exerting pressure on public opinion. (Editorial, 2015) Domestic and foreign entities may use disinformation to manipulate policy, social debates and behaviour in areas such as economy, climate change, migration, public security, health or finance. Disinformation can also lead to diminished confidence in science and empirical evidence.

Disinformation is a tool for running the information

The dynamics of events in Poland's security environment is today the greatest since the collapse of the Soviet Union. One can observe increasingly rapid changes, not only political, but also economic, social or cultural. These global trends are a considerable source of disinformation activities affecting the security environment. The gap between facts, truth and fragmentation of reality, which often turns out to be a source of disinformation necessary to shape an alternative reality, becomes more and more visible

Example: Putin's narration about World War II in the context of misinforming the public opinion about Poland's guilt for the outbreak of World War II.

Disinformation is a tool for running the information fight that one can see today in both developing and developed countries. In the security environment, a significant increase in the importance of disinformation can be observed, which takes various forms and is more frequently becoming an alternative reality violating security pillars. Disinformation operations demonstrate different proportions of impact programmed to achieve their intended goal by obscuring facts, e.g. by fragmenting them. (Cunningham, 2002)

The order based on facts is subject to further shocks. They are mainly due to the effectiveness of disinformation actions aimed at realizing a given strategy or aspirations of individual countries, alliances or political groups to play a more important role in the regional or global order. Although their motivations are different, there is usually a belief that it is necessary to fight the enemy, opponent or competitor.

Disinformation actors play an important role in the international environment. Depending on the objectives pursued, they are often an important source of fact-forming, affecting the stability or intensifying threats to the security environment. National governments are increasingly drawing their attention to the

dangers of using disinformation actors for carrying out specific activities. Disinformation actors constitute a wide spectrum of conscious or unconscious groups which can include special services, army, national and supranational corporations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, social movements, extremist groups, ideological organizations, oligarchs, scientific circles). (Conley et al., 2016) They are very broad and diverse group with different motivations as well as methods and objectives of the actions undertaken. Monitoring their activities will be increasingly difficult in the future. Social trends such as populism or growing tensions caused by disinformation in societies that are less and less resistant to their influence may over time trigger crisis situations that will require international support in order to take them under control. The effects of dynamic technological development, which influence the formation of contemporary (information) society bring not only positive implications, but may also become a source of instability. The spread of new communication methods and the lack of control over them has created a space where disinformation is a challenge of a previously unknown nature and scale.

Julian King, EU Security Commissioner, stated that the Kremlin's disinformation campaigns are a synchronised strategy so that the same messages appear simultaneously in many countries on different information channels. Examples of selected disinformation tools are, e.g. TV channels such as Russia Today or publications on rubaltic.ru, sputnik.ru. These are media that convey disinformation translated into the languages of countries covered by the influence strategy, financed by the Kremlin, which provide content supported by the actions of special services such as GRU.

The above propaganda tubes operate not only in the Polish environment, but also in their branches in various countries, which can disinform societies to achieve their strategic objectives in the international dimension. Mass disinformation campaigns are often used by different domestic and foreign entities to sow distrust and create social tensions (combating political competition), which can result in serious consequences for our security. Moreover, disinformation campaigns run by countries may form part of hybrid threats to international security, including electoral processes, in particular in connection with cyber-attacks. For instance, the information fight was unequivocally recognised as one of the areas of Russian military doctrine.

The Russian authorities do not really hide the goals of their information fight. The official military doctrine points out false data and false information as part of military operations. The EU Member States and the NATO Alliance are at the forefront of these actions.

By using the information fight, the Russian Federation is ready to destabilise the situation in other countries and undermine their territorial integrity, while explicitly violating international law. Its actions are often masked and carried out below the threshold of war. It should be considered how real the action of Russia is, which initiates a conflict on a regional scale, involving one or more

NATO member states. Observing Russia's superpower policy, it cannot be ruled out that it will generate substitute conflicts in different parts of the world in order to create new areas of pressure on Western countries. The Russian policy is vastly coordinated with the operations of special services, including active measures (eg disinformation actions) used against other countries.²

Based on the source literature, it can be stated that by disinformation, the subject of actions may use the strategy of data transfer.

The first form of action is the so-called 'bypassing' in which the subject of actions uses a false source information transfer, which makes it completely unknown to the subject of influences.

The second form of action referred to as 'parrot' consists in transferring responsibility for the spread information. The practice of this action boils down to the fact that the subject of actions, aiming to hide its authorship of the prepared message, first transfers it to the substitute sender, then collects 'its' message and sends to the subject of influences as obtained from a foreign source of information. In this way, data which are not or cannot be reliable at the given moment since they come from a source of unknown origin can be transferred.

Using today's technology to carry out disinformation activities, it is possible to learn about the expectations and concerns of social groups, which allows to specify a strategy for disinformation activities³.

Disinformation as trends of social sensitivity

Analysing the general trends of social sensitivity of our region, the most important issues of these activities include:

- historical policy;
- relations with Ukraine and Belarus;
- migrations;
- European Union;
- ideological conflicts;
- climate policy;
- security.

Further analysis of the source literature makes it possible to distinguish two general limitations in terms of using disinformation:

Disinformation can only be used if there is a group of recipients susceptible to informational impact.

Disinformation has the potential to escalate tensions in a given situation in a group of recipients or in society, but will only be effective if it uses already

² https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf p. 3, accessed 6-01-2020

³ <https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/potemkin-pages-personas-sio-wp.pdf>, p. 83, accessed 26-12-2019

existing hot spots (eg poor diplomacy, economic problems, financial scandals, etc.). Therefore, in disinformation, it is pointless to provide data that not only will not cause confusion, but may even raise objections and doubts as to the reliability of the source.

The above restrictions stem directly from the specificity of disinformation interactions, which in their essence consist not in the recipient believing in something suggested by the initiator, but in modifying his attitudes and behaviours. On that account, it can be concluded that two techniques can be considered as forms of disinformation: simulation and manipulation. (Darczewska, 2018)

Simulation is based on the artificial creation of a 'picture' (by means of images, sounds, texts, statements, etc.) closed to real one. The purpose of apparent actions is to introduce information chaos that misleads the recipient. Apparent activities can be specified as the spectrum of organizational and material undertakings as well as activities that are consistent with the assumed purpose of apparent influence, place, time and situation of the recipient, aimed at erroneous reception of data in relation to the facts. Apparent activities are those that indirectly affect the recipients. They determine the results obtained from incorrect data based on, eg the recipient's belief as the main data source. Therefore, if they are considered to be true, they will make the recipient's decisions wrong.

The second form of disinformation is manipulation. The term 'manipulation' is not clear and easy to define. So far, the attempts to organize knowledge in this field on the basis of social psychology, sociology and social engineering have not given unequivocal results. When dealing with manipulation issues, it is often the instrumental approach that seems to be appropriate for this type of activities, due to the tasks performed by the subject of these interactions and relations that take place between the sender and recipient of these actions. In order to understand the essence of manipulation, it seems advisable to consider the analysed concept in the context of social influence and persuasive influence on human attitude and behaviour. Every member of the community directly or indirectly involved in the spectrum of real-life perception is subject to a certain social impact, reacts to the environment and tries to shape its surroundings. Following the above, manipulation uses two essential elements: feelings and emotions. By transferring disinformation, taking into account that these operations are conducted in a dense social environment and the recipient has an information deficit, the transmitted content can evoke a number of emotions and feelings in the subject of influences in order to provoke particular functional and verbal behaviours. In this case, disinformation will permanently seek to limit or completely block the control mechanisms of the individual's consciousness to whom it intends to impose the assumed patterns of attitudes and behaviours. The most common methods to manipulate the information process in order to shape human attitude and behaviours are:

- providing false information – US President Barack Obama was not born in the United States. Pope Francis supports Donald Trump in the election⁴;
- preparing and sending to the subject of disinformation messages that are not important or less important, with the most important ones omitted;
- providing information of high importance as marginal or even irrelevant;
- sharing prepared information to evoke specific reactions;
- sending ambiguous data that makes it difficult to understand – an election campaign where election committees, seeking to win public opinion, manipulate facts and present advertising campaigns by appropriately selecting scenes and events;
- generating information overload to cause information chaos.⁵

Disinforming the recipients is easier when special services, social media, mass media, celebrations, etc. are used. However, sometimes disinformation of a person with informal leadership in a large social group may be better and less costly solution. It is assumed that a citizen of a country – a target whose social position or abilities enable him/her to disinform compatriots or influence them, can be recruited by a state intelligence officer who provides disinformation. Once certain information content is transferred, it is very likely to be spread as it comes from a person with social trust. After all, disinformation is based on human emotions, incompetence, credulity and lack of situational imagination, and these are global and timeless, hence the effectiveness of disinformation operations.

Conclusion

As a consequence of the dynamic development of technical possibilities of information transfer, and therefore its electronic processing, the catalogue of tools and circumstances where disinformation can be used is growing. Given the threats of the influence of disinformation on the security of individual EU countries, it should be assumed that it is still not only an educational challenge. There has been increased awareness in EU Member States of the need for efforts at EU and national level to improve media literacy and empower users, especially younger generations and enhance their critical thinking. The effectiveness of disinformation is not only up to coordination within the initiating structures but also the awareness of the recipients. Therefore, in disinformation, it is pointless to provide data that not only will not cause confusion, but may even raise objections and doubts as to the reliability of the source.

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THE HETERONOMY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Adnan Džafić¹ - Nezir Krčalo² - Tatjana Bašić³

The cause of anguish sprouted in the ruins of a state-controlled setting.
Zygmunt Bauman

ABSTRACT

The condition of the contemporary society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as its development, cannot be observed from the standpoint that only considers the period after parliamentary democracy was implemented and after the first parliamentary elections. Various ideological positions are trying to assert their versions of the development and the nature of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their initial standpoint regularly lacks the understanding of a part of the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the social actors significant for the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina in that historical period. The contemporary period, which has been characterised as the age in which ideologies have ended, can be described as a collection of a multitude of ideologies dominated by a single, global, neoliberal capitalist ideology, freedom of movement, freedom of choice, and the freedom of opportunity. All other ideologies, of which the ideology of operative nationalism is dominant, fight for the souls of everyone. They are backed by the heteronomy in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is characterised by at least four elements: 1) the constitutional foundations and social norms include foreign nationals and international institutions that are limiting the sovereignty of the state; 2) nationalist ideological programmes, linked to neighbouring countries, which are instrumentally aimed at their electoral base and their own “general goals”; 3) some of the civil society organisations formed by international actors which should be the counterbalance for the ineffective functioning of state institutions, but which instead go hand in hand with the two previous elements; 4) the citizens themselves, who allow the previously mentioned heteronomy elements to “externally” impose norms to the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina by not participating in elections and other political activities.

Key words: ideology, society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, social actors, heteronomy

Introduction

The term heteronomy (Greek heteros - different, nomos - law) has multiple meanings – determination by something alien, dependence on someone else's laws, external determinations, order established by someone else, dependence on laws determined by someone else. A complex society consists of three key

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spheres: cultural-ideological, economic, and military-political. The representatives of the cultural-ideological sphere “justify” their existence by providing the regime with a “higher” meaning, the economic sphere provides the material basis for social order by concentrating wealth mostly in the hands of the upper class. The upper class has the military-political and the cultural-ideological monopoly, i.e. the monopoly in interpreting the life in the community and the monopoly on knowledge (Katunarić, 2012, p. 119-120). However, the mentioned spheres do not completely reflect those circumstances in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their function gives off an impression of being determined by an external element and a dependence on laws established by someone else, not the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or representatives in the parliament elected by their will.

The second half of the 20th century in Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterised by developmental interventions and social transformations. They play out in the global context, where political, economic, cultural... borders are simultaneously overstepped and continually redrawn. This environment is the setting for the processes of intensifying opposites and bringing them closer, according to the socially constructed and self-amending nature of social life. Waves of administrative reforms are imposed in the name of increasing efficiency and rationality. In practice, social actors, individual and collective, are forced to self-organise. All those that inhabit, test, and transform the contours and details of the social scenery are part of an imposed self-organisation (Long, 2001, p. 11). In the process, they are doomed to fight a series of interconnected battles for resources, meanings, institutional legitimacy, and control (production and prescription of meaning). In the sociological sense, a perspective focused on the actors and the issues related to the conceptualisation of action place the process of change in the centre of attention. Everyday life is the field in which the goals of actors’ actions are either realised, or the prevalence is on the side of the actions by the factors that are preventing the goal to be realised. Synergetic historical and sociological understanding of everyday life incorporates everyday matters into the wider framework of a specific social order, in the currents of commerce, politics, and culture. We observe everyday life as a time-space complex where a confluence of individual roles plays out in the areas of professional engagement, free time, etc., which are limited by the possibilities available in a specific society. Everyday life is the sphere in which an individual may satisfy their needs in a specific social context that determines the quantity and the type of available resources, the possible activities that can lead to satisfying those needs, and the degree to which those needs are satisfied (Spasić, 2004, p. 324). However, that sphere cannot be the origin of change, neither for an individual nor for the entire social order. Individual autonomy is an insufficient but necessary precondition for civil action. This can be seen most clearly in those societies where change is most necessary. People in destroyed societies, unlike those in functioning societies, lose their direction with regard to taking actions. Therefore, destruction at the

national level should not block interest for observing the everyday life of the actors in specific events, in order to analyse the influence of macro-processes on the family level and the individual level, on the issues related to labour and entrepreneurship, or on the grey economy and employment.

The approach to the analysis of everyday life designed in this way is mostly attributed to the French sociologist Jean Claude Kauffmann, who observes the relationship between the individual and the contemporary society in a specific way. One of his arguments about the changes in contemporary society is related to the issue of identity, i.e. the issue of individual freedom and autonomy in the context of newly-formed social relationships (Kauffman, 2006, p. 46). The consequences created by the collapse of the feudal system and the de-aggregation of communities have resulted in the formation of a concept of an individual forced to self-determine in the new social relationships. However, that concept has not resulted from the loosening of social control, instead it was created due to its intensification (Kauffman, 2006, p. 45)⁴.

1 Unity of differences or forgetting the difference?⁵

Common ideas are the condition for common action, and common action enables the existence of the social entity. In order for a social entity to exist and prosper, it is necessary that most of the participants of the same society support the common ideas. “Therefore, in order for a society to exist, even more, to prosper, it is necessary for all the spirits of the citizens to always be together and commonly maintain some key ideas. And that can only be achieved if every one of them sometimes draws their opinions from the same source and if they mutually accept a certain number of common ideas”. (Kalanj, 2007, p. 130) Common ideas are the basis for the formation of social-life systems, which are the basis for the formation of identity. Daniel Bell calls the first type of communities or social-life systems the *location community* – and it is related to the physical or geographical connection to a location, a place where we live. It is followed by the *memory community*, which is formed by the past and its historical aspect includes the last several generations. The third and the last type of community is the *psychological*

⁴ However, in the late modern period the source of control over the citizens has changed. Instead of the state and social regulation of social relationships, the freedom of choice ideology took centre stage. Bauman says: “The society wants nothing more from you than to stay in the game and have enough chips on the table to keep playing. The strength of the society and its power over individuals now rest on the fact that it cannot be precisely located or identified” (Bauman, 2009, p. 47)

⁵ The first phrase from the subtitle was used by Jusuf Žiga to describe the multi-century concept of unity of various ethnic and religious groups, and cultural models of the society in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Žiga, 2007). The other phrase, which is also the title of the book by Senadin Lavić, is characteristic for the contemporary paradigm of neo-liberal capitalism that eliminates the differences both at the global level and in the local context, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Lavić, 2018)

community, which is created around common goals. “Such communities, founded on face-to-face interaction, are guided by the feelings of trust, cooperation, and altruism, in the sense that the constituent members of the community have the welfare of the community in mind” (Bell, 2004, p. 174).

If we attempt to apply the mentioned community types to the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can see that the location community – the local place of residence and the location in the geo-political sense (state) – is acceptable to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a point. The other type of community – the memory community – has been significantly formed by ideology for the majority of the population, in the range from ethnic exclusion to being stuck in the image of “brotherhood and unity”, without any possible vision for the future and with a characteristic of constantly living in the past. The psychological community, as the third type of community, is the area where the realisation of cooperation, altruism, and trust in the existing circumstances of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina is most difficult. Even the communities of citizens have been divided on ethnic grounds, so the new administrative-legal division, according to the results of the war goals, has *de facto* embodied the obscure fantasies about ethnic ghetto islands of constituent nations. Of course, the results of the 2013 census clearly show the ethnic image of Bosnia and Herzegovina (mono-ethnic image of the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as the consequences of the people returning to their homes. The psychological community will also be the basis for the functioning of state institutions in any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarding the visions for the society and state by the ruling political oligarchies, because, as Vedad Spahić put it: “If the prerequisite for the national strategy and the strategic unification of all the promotional efforts of the various state institutions is the consensus of all the groups about the basic values and the vision for the future, then, if we consider the real abilities for designing and affirming identity, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosniaks will not be a part of that story for much longer” (Spahić, 2016, p. 124-125). The same narrative about identity can freely be applied to the other constituent nations. The institutional context of political unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is, and will probably remain, in the framework provided by a nation-state or a state of nations. Despite the futuristic announcements about the dissolution of nation-states and the formation of new forms of state and super-national alliances, national flags are still defiantly billowing. Even though some institutions of nation-states have been reduced in substance and some super-national alliances have been formed (the EU), the nation-state will not disappear as a form of political-social order, at least not in the conceivable future,⁶ instead, “nations and nation-states will be a main unification point for a long time in the

⁶ “Considering that national cultures had a central part regarding the solidification of the relationship between the political identity, self-determination, and state power, they are, and will remain, a very strong origin point for ethical and political motivations” (Held/McGrew, 2002, p. 29).

future, a point that is better able to define the identity of citizens” (Cerutti, 2006, p. 58).

2 Lessons in the period of “building peace”

Is it possible to see the first buds of economic, social, and cultural modernisation at the level of everyday life in the contemporary society of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the dissolution at the institutional level? The reconstruction of the structures of the social state has been stopped by opposing and inconsistent visions and activities of ethno-focused local, national, even international institutions that agreed to function according to the same ethno-template. The spreading of separatist and nationalist loyalties and the ambiguous institutionalisation of the functions of the international community has fragmented and multiplied political authority.⁷ The period immediately after signing the peace treaty and several years after that can be summarised by the term neo-patrimonialism, in which there is a process of combining formal-democratic institutions with the power dynamic based on patronage in the political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸ An attempt was made to establish the process of democratisation of institutions in the same period by strengthening civil activism and the institutions that were supposed to supervise the (mis)use of political power. However, the stale public, ethnocratic discourse left its efforts toward economic and social justice at the declarative and election campaign level, while the anomic civil society, formed by international organisations as part of the technocratic “project logic” and the apolitical service sector, went hand in hand with the ethno-political processes of extinguishing the social state. “Governance in the hybrid state is implemented under the conditions of double hegemony of local nationalists and international liberals. The hegemony is also reproduced through state institutions, where international actors have set up a right to intervene and where ethnic collective rights have been institutionalised, as well as through civil society institutions, where ethnic civil society institutions have become clients of political organisations” (Puljek-Shank, 2018, p. 671).

⁷ “After the vast amount of international aid for the reconstruction of the destroyed economy, factories, and structures, international institutions were formed within state institutions. Active institutionalised organisation was invented. The Bosnian political representatives were expected to play the role of responsible participants in democratic procedural roles at all institutional levels, but with an ambiguous role of EU and UN representatives, who had the power to cancel legitimate political decisions. The characteristics of the Bosnian society in the years after the war can be summarised as “new feudalism” (Deacon, Stubbs, 1997, p. 1).

⁸ “... governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be characterised as neo-patrimonialism, defined by the patronage and clientelist relationships of power within the institutions of a formal legal state” (Shank, 2017a, p. 671). According to Shank, neo-patrimonialism is a process where normal rules apply, but in the reality of the same regime, informal rules and norms supersede formal institutions.

In parallel with incremental progress in the rehabilitation of the institutions of state governance and the social state, the society is experiencing processes of instrumental identification and acted re-traditionalization. After the decades of “top-down” imposed identification, the ethnic groups are accepting the party visions of a “good” society and plausible identity. The establishment of new value systems after the dissolution of the socialist norm systems brought the situation in which individuals are joining groups not necessarily because of the belief in common values, but instead because of the range of interests and possibilities offered by that membership. Post-Yugoslavian societies, much like post-Soviet societies, are experiencing the process of fictitious, symbolic, and dramatized traditionalization, without any real focus on traditional values. The stage in which the real differences between members were mostly social, has transformed into the stage in which symbolically designed, fabricated borders became the main lines of social divisions (Woodward, 2002, p. 76). The differences which were unknown in the capitalist-liberal form of democracy became dominant. This, in a way, represents a hypertrophy or a caricature of late-modern trends in the area of culture, i.e. seeking rights to be specific or different. “Cultural problems have become so important that the social thought must be organised with the focus on just those problems” (Kalanj, 2007, p. 136). This led to dissociation, destruction of the society, to violence that rejects social norms and values. But that expansion of those unconstrained, manipulatable, non-communitarist calls to personality and seeking of cultural rights is just why the civil society appears as the possible form of true manifestation of social existence. “It is, on the one hand, perceived as the cure for all social ills (...) out of reach of parties and formal state and institutionalised apparatuses, at the edge of their tactical-political games or programme-based strategies of power” (Kalanj, 2007, p. 120). Nevertheless, there cannot be an efficient civil society without efficient state institutions.⁹

In the age of “end of ideologies”, the dominant values adopted by social actors have a goal-instrumental focus. For instrumentalists, culture is a possibility, a “resource” from which individuals and groups draw their emblems at will. In the age of late “de-ideologized” modern period “those emblematic, transparent, presentable features are essential, because the identity spoken about is the child of liberal democracies and the rich history of their misuse” (Spahić, 2016, p. 85). In post-socialist societies, like the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political modernisation has “replaced the idea of social-state totality with the idea of a state structure that rests on the foundations of forming public will on the basis of pluralism and free choice, but at the same time it has, consciously or

⁹ As emphasized by researchers into civil society, the failure of the civil society sector to function after the conflict is in the post-war politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the irresponsible behaviour of the political representatives at all levels of government, but most importantly, in the poorly reconstructed institutional system of the state, because “the development of functional civil society is part of the framework for the creation of responsible and transparent state structures” (Belloni, 2001, p. 178).

paradigmatically-opportunistically, *sacrificed or intentionally suppressed almost all ideas about the society or social existence that “stand out” from the ideologically understood liberal doctrine*” (Kalanj, 2007, p. 117).

The actors in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the late modern period can be categorised according to the terms like exclusion, precariat, recognition, and subclass. In the world of free movement of goods, knowledge, people, and capital, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are moving “freely” from profession to profession while continuing to look for cheap airline tickets to EU countries. According to the 2013 census, young people aged 15 to 30 make up 17.7% of the total population, 42-60% of whom are unemployed. Regarding the educational structure of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the same source, only a little bit more than 9% of the population have completed university education.¹⁰ The average age of the population is above 30. The relevance of the official databases is very questionable. Recent information about the number of work licences for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Slovenia, according to Slovenian sources, speak about more than 20,000, while sources in Bosnia and Herzegovina mention only slightly over 10,000. It is not surprising that the work-capable population is emigrating to EU countries looking for work, especially when considering the category of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are employed and are leaving the country with their families. This category, the people that mostly live in urban centres, does not receive any media attention.

This raises the question: What can be done with the resources at our disposal? According to Bauman (2009), the logic of goal rationality is defined by the selection of means that are required for achieving a specific outcome, which is always prefaced with the determination of the attractiveness of the outcomes that can be achieved with specific means (Bauman, 2009, p. 44). In a framework set up in such a manner, we will look into some of the characteristics of the social actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Ideological framework for the activities of actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Scientific and technological development has created new and sophisticated means of manipulation. Denying ideological influences and advocating the end of ideology is just a new ideology with influences that “are realised in a less visible, more modern, and more efficient way, through new methods and mechanisms, or even through a renewed content of old patterns and forms of social life” (Đurić, 2004, p. 68). What are the key terms we could emphasize in the contemporary social theory that characterise the late modern

¹⁰ <http://www.popis.gov.ba/popis2013/knjigePregled.html>, date visited 10/10/2018.

period in the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina? We will start from Bauman's analysis of the modern global-fluid society and the term "recognition". Bauman's analysis of the late, fluid modernity or the globalised era finds the key reason for the dissolution of social and state structures in the weakening or destruction of the institutions of the social state. The weakening function of the institutions of the social state originates from the monopoly of a single world view – the liberal capitalist world view, the features of which are the global financial corporations and the lack of a fixed centre of power within them. The key issue of the global ruling elite is "recognition". That is maybe the only thing that this successful sector lacks. However, "for the increasing part of the human population "recognition" is a hazy notion, and it will remain such until money continues to be avoided as the subject of conversation" (Bauman, 2009, p. 36). The majority of the world population is between the globally recognised and the non-territorial (refugees, single mothers, the homeless, etc.), in a world where reality is based on territory. This part of the world population could be designated under the term precariat. Therefore, the precariat consists of the groups with formal education that does not match the demands of the market. The consequence of the market demand is the need for continuous professional education of the labour force to meet the requirements of uncertain jobs and global professional mobility. So "the Bosnian precariat can basically be viewed as a social group and class with formal education, but that education is mostly obsolete, ideologically painted, limited, unrelated to the world knowledge currents, and almost unusable" (Lavić, 2018, p. 41).

The third category that "enriches" the modern "de-ideologized" world can be described by the term subclass. A subclass is the group of population in a society outside of the borders of that society, outside of the group within which one can seek identity and thereby a right to a legitimate place in the community, "expelled from the social space in which identities are sought, selected and built, evaluated, confirmed, and refuted (...) reduced to "zoe" a purely animalistic existence, where all recognisable vestiges of humanity are snipped or destroyed. Refugees, non-territorial in a world where reality is based on territories" (Bauman, 2009, p. 38). And the fourth, of course not the last, category of fluid modernity can be described by the term exclusion or social exclusion.¹¹ Exclusion or the sense of exclusion of identity is deeper than the understanding of a marginal or disenfranchised social position. "From a certain perspective, exclusion is a super-class and sociological wider term, but according to its anthropological content and scope, it is even more radical than the class level of a social issue. Ultimately, the

¹¹ "Looking into the abyss for too long, an abyss that expands and becomes deeper as time goes by, is therefore not only the problem of the marginalised and the humiliated, but also the problem of the entire community (...) and whether we have succumbed to the strong commercial powers and promoters of the *rational choice theory* persuading us to believe that we are building our identities through free choice" (Spahić, 2017, p. 200).

excluded identities are socially structured and we should not forget that their symbolic, cultural, and political outputs are the radicalised or fundamentalized expressions of a realistic condition of social relationships. The excluded identities are actually, regardless of their class, symbolic-cultural, and political features, *socially excluded identities*” (Kalanj, 2007, p. 146).

Conclusion

According to the previously presented analysis, we can say that the condition of the heteronomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is “decorated” by several elements of socially constructed reality.

The idea of post-war democratic transformation, that started in 1991, contained a social framework of free, political, economic, and cultural transformation of post-Yugoslavian societies. The specific circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina are that the constitutional foundations and social norms include foreign nationals and international institutions that are limiting the sovereignty of the state. The second element of the heteronomy are the nationalist ideological programmes, linked to neighbouring countries, instrumentally aimed at their electoral base and their own “general goals”. The third element of heteronomy are some of the civil society organisations formed by international actors which should be the counterbalance for the ineffective functioning of the state institutions, but which instead go hand in hand with the two previous elements. And finally, the fourth element of the heteronomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the citizens themselves, who allow the previously mentioned heteronomy elements to “externally” impose norms to the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina by not participating in elections and other political activities.

The influence of political parties, media attention focused on particular identity-social configurations, and international influences have collapsed the model of the equality of the peoples and citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the social reality is being presented differently, the neo-liberal capitalist concept has become the only interpretation of the development of the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The sovereignty of the peoples has replaced national sovereignty (Lavić, 2018, p. 10) even though in the middle of the 1970s Bosnia and Herzegovina was not recognised first, and the Bosniaks were recognised only after (Filandra, 2018, p. 16). The myopic view used to view the state, the society, neighbours, etc. has been glossed over and accepted. Instead of the reality of the “complicated” Bosnian identity, the age of “forgetting the difference” has been ushered in (Hadžimuhamedović, 2012, p. 236). The condition of heteronomy in the state and the society which has been installed by peace solutions is also encouraged by the domestic ideological patterns of secessionist chauvinism and the “victim ideology” (Filandra, 2012, p. 367), and it is “cemented” by the

capitalist neo-liberal ideology that successfully sells the consumerist lifestyle and self-censorship under the freedom of choice motto.

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THE PITFALLS AND RISKS OF PRO-RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR

Dávid Gajdoščík¹

ABSTRACT

The evolution that occurred in the organization of the world system, national political conditions, but mainly people's minds. The gradual expansion of the Internet has erased not only state-geographical definitions, but also the boundaries between fact and lie. All information on the Internet is seemingly equivalent – understanding this equation has shown some actors how to realize and achieve their long-term interests. The return of the status of a world superpower remains a priority for the Russian Federation. As the spread of influence by force is no longer as easy as it used to be, Russia is undermining the democratic systems in the countries of former influence, otherwise. By spreading a wealth of misinformation and misleading rumors, it fosters social chaos and tension. The ultimate goal of this activity is to increase social distrust towards state institutions, representatives or the media and thus open social minds to some eventualities. The untrustworthy population is easier to manipulate and more willing to respect other, even undemocratic forces. In addition, statements by domestic political leaders who question the pro-Western direction of the Visegrad region increase Vladimir Putin's chances for Western expansion.

Key words: misinformation, propaganda, media, political parties, Russian Federation, Visegrad group

Introduction

„Zoon politikon“, Aristotle's well-known concept emphasized the human predestination of meeting, communicating and sharing their experiences and interests. These human activities have been greatly facilitated and accelerated by the media phenomenon of this time – the Internet. The recent vision of computer scientists is a common part of our lives today. Today's "Internet world" can gather and transport huge amounts of data and information in milliseconds. Unfortunately, the influx of extreme amounts of information makes it impossible to differentiate truth from lies. Understanding of this Internet weaknesses leads some actors to spreading of various hoaxes, misinformation or conspiracy theories.²

The transformation of the world system, as well as a technological and internet development, has affected countries of the Visegrad group too. That are

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² See more: GBÚROVÁ, M. at. al. 2018. *Sekundárny analfabetizmus alebo o príčinách a dôsledkoch nízkeho záujmu verejnosti o politiku na Slovensku*. Košice: Šafárik Press, UPJŠ v Košiciach, 2018. 236 s. ISBN 978-80-8152-699-2

the reasons why the Central European region has faced historically the greatest disinformation campaign in the recent years. The gradual disinformation boom of the People's Republic of China does not change the fact that the Russian Federation remains the disinformation leader in the region. **Maryia Sadouskaya-Komplach** specifies Russian power in Central Europe through diplomatic activity, energy and economic policy, information warfare and support for domestic political forces (mainstream and peripheral) that sympathize with Russia. (Sadouskaya-Komplach, 2018a)

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis, we have seen that the extreme and extremist right and the other extremist groups have not only turned their attention from national, religious and sexual minorities to the geopolitical issues, but also to the admiration of the Russian president whom they regard as their ideological and political role model. (Krekó, P. et. al. 2017a)

NATO's aggression, the migration crisis, the decline of the Western world – topics that are a proven tool for expanding the electoral base of political parties in the Visegrad countries. With the media presentation of these and similar confusing statements from some political leaders, Russia systematically completes its image of the Western world, which is on the verge of disintegration. (Panyi, 2017a)

The advancement of communication technologies, the decentralization of an information flows, as well as an immense Internet coverage, have shown Putin the opportunity to circumvent the classical media and manipulate the public opinion in the countries of Russian interest. (Kačmár, 2016)

The main objective of Moscow, which seeks to undermine confidence in democratic institutions and public authorities, is to create chaos and gradually destabilize the Central European region. A particular problem is the Russian sympathizers, whose statements are reinforced by the pro-Kremlin media network aimed at spreading fake news and conspiracy theories, especially on social networks. This strategy is based on the Soviet legacy of active interventions seeking immediate impact on political developments in various countries. (Krekó, P. et. al. 2017b)

Any disinformation strategy that instigates mistrust, social fear and tension, polarizes society and in some cases, encourages interpersonal intolerance. The inhabitants of the Visegrád Group countries are no exception.

Misinformation – media and political scene

Beside the fact, that Slovak republic, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland shared the similar story of overcoming soviet influence and the euphoria of integration into the Western structures, has to face of enormous increase of misinformation campaign since Ukrainian crisis in 2014, too.

The absence of a common and coordinated V4 policy against this Russian propaganda machinery is a clear illustration of the fact, that this action is difficult

to make. In addition, disinformation heterogeneity is amplified by the various aspects of thinking, acting and expression of a political parties and leaders in V4 countries. Occurrence and expansion of pro-Kremlin actions works as a limiting factor to political and economic direction, values of a political parties, media heterogeneity, strategic communication of the governments and public opinions within the Visegrád region. According to a study by *GLOBSEC*, the most prominent pro-Russian direction is seen in Slovakia. However, while the population of Hungary shows a strong western orientation, our western neighbors – Czechs – take a diametrically different attitude. A specific feature is Poland, which is the only V4 country directly adjacent to the Russian Federation. Despite its geographical proximity, the Polish population shows relatively high resistance to the disinformation campaign by the Kremlin and its assistants. The reason may be the strong historical memory of the Polish population, which confirms the predominantly pro-western orientation. (Nikolic, 2018a)

Slovak republic

According to **Vladimír Šnidl**, the journalist from the *Denník N*, the Slovak specificity in the field of misinformation is not only medical fiction, but also migration threats. (Denková, A. et. al. 2018a) The range of alternative medias, from which questionable and often unverified information could be disseminated, is wide. The Slovak portal *Konšpiratori.sk* proves that there is 160 controversial websites.³

This list, compiled by experts from several spheres, mention the medias that has a similar worldview as Vladimir Putin. The top fifteen of the list is closed by the magazine *Zem a Vek*. The articles of this monthly are often doubts about each member states of the European Union and NATO. His editor-in-chief, Tibor Rostas, does not conceal his sympathy for the Russian Federation. The All-Slavic Assembly, an event from 2017 that was honored by his presence, according to the experts aimed to increase the Russian influence in the Central and Eastern Europe. (Šnidl, 2017a) However, social tolerance has its limits. Rostas was recently accused, and subsequently lawfully convicted of defamation of a nation, race and belief. (Rostas dostal za...2019) Some retail chains refused the impact of one of the leading actors in the disinformation scene. Tesco, Billa, and Kaufland decided to withdraw the conspiracy periodical from the sale. (Čimová, 2020)

The news portal *Hlavné správy* is one of the most important tools of pro-Russian propaganda in Slovakia. (Šnidl, 2016) Initially an insignificant website used to publish an articles, that were just a translations of the Russian ones. This website established its pro-Russian direction in 2014, at a time of intense crisis in Ukraine. For example, at the time of investigation of the Malaysian Boeing shoot down over the Eastern Ukraine, the *Hlavné správy* brought several potential culprits. (Šnidl, 2017b) Such information confusion creates in some people

³ See more: <<https://www.konspiratori.sk/zoznam-stranok.php>>

a sense of uncertainty that led to a suspicion that there is no trustable medium at all. Ultimately, spreading of a doubts makes public to be prone of manipulation and less resistant to an external and domestic disinformation attacks.

In addition, the most frequent content in the *Hlavné správy* was focused on topics related to how Western Christian values being regularly threatened by hateful Islam and how decent people were intimidated by the homosexual culture. Due to the sharing of a similar worldview, *Hlavné správy* has become very important channel for spreading agenda of *People's Party Our Slovakia* (ĽSNS) political party. Since the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová, *Hlavné správy* started to advocate Robert Fico and *SMER-SD* political party, too. (Šnidl, 2019)

Spreading of misinformation and fake news is a common characteristic of all alternative political subjects. That is even more dangerous if misinformation became a part of a rhetoric of a standard politician. When Robert Fico recently stated that almost all the Slovak people are identified with Milan Mazurek's⁴ anti-Gypsies statement, he basically legitimized the racist opinion of a young extremist. (Jančovičová, 2019) However, the daily spread of fake news and hoaxes is the work of another member of Fico's party – Ľuboš Blaha. The statement by **Marián Repa**, the journalist of *Pravda*, who considers Blaha disgusting conspirator (Repa, 2019), is unlikely to be accidental. Indeed, the *SMER-SD* candidate's opinions became very often viral. His long-term relationship with Pro-Russian propaganda, questioning of Slovak membership in NATO and support for Vladimir Putin is not hide on *Facebook* either. In a recent Facebook status (9.1.2020) he did not hide his joy of a fact that the Russian President is the most popular world leader in Slovakia.⁵

Blaha knows that information fire on social networks can hit as many people as never before. Fortunately, it seems that some institutions' patience is slowly falling. A large number of offensive statements have recently upset the *Slovak Academy of Sciences* (SAS), which openly dissociates itself from his statements and recommended to its employee - Ľuboš Blaha, to consider his working at this institution. (Vedenie SAV sa..., 2019)

SMER-SD and *ĽSNS* are not the only parties with the links to Russia. Anti-Western tendencies are visible even in the *Slovak National Party* (SNS) and in the *We Are Family – Boris Kollár* as well. (Gressel, 2017)

Political populism spreading social confusion and tension makes society easier to manipulate and thus it's a significant distortive aspect of democratic establishment. Repetition of a sensational themes and offering fast, mostly simple solutions, to a complex problems, contribute to the polarization of a society. This

⁴ Milan Mazurek – The former deputy of the People's Party Our Slovakia – Marián Kotleba, who was lawfully convicted of defamation of race, nation and belief.

⁵ See more: <<https://blbec.online/post/1149009/summary>>

helps to many rhetors to spread disinformation and nurture any conspiracy theories easier. (Fabiánová, 2019)

Czech Republic

There are approximately 50 similar websites on the disinformation scene in the Czech Republic as in the Slovak Republic. One of the best-known is the news portal Sputnik CZ, which produces the biggest fake news in the Czech Republic. (Denková, A. et. al. 2018b) However, this Czech periodical poses a real threat to the Slovaks due to the language similarities. There were even real efforts to extend the scope of this disinformation news site to Slovakia, as well. In the spring of 2017, then head of the public law agency TASR, Jaroslav Rezník, decided to start cooperation with Sputnik. The potential exchange of information between the two entities could thus easily mean that the news published by Sputnik would casually appear in TASR reports. (Šnidl, 2017c) However, after intense criticism, Rezník abandoned this ambition.

There is another disinformation website *Aeronet.cz*, that is well-known for its aggressive content. (Šnidl, 2018). Its articles are often originally published in various Russian sources. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v.... 2018a)

Many of Czech disinformation websites mostly work on the same principles. Their narratives are often very similar and targeted to an identical audience. European Union regulations, migration flows supported by non-profit organizations and various kinds of medical inventions dominates in these medias. Misinformation about how the criminal EU tries to dominate the Czech Republic is fostering the idea of pan-Slavism⁶. Other websites stand in between traditional and alternative media. (Holcová, 2017a)

According to some sources, Czech Republic is considered to be the center of Russian intelligence activities in the Central Europe. A large number of Czech non-governmental and cultural organizations hold positive sympathy for the Russian Federation, and some of them intentionally promote misinformation from the Russian government. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v..., 2018b)

However, even in the Czech Republic, we can find pieces of the disinformation puzzle among the political elite. For example, hoaxes and lies are practices adopted by Tomio Okamura and his *Freedom and direct democracy* (SPD) party. Racist and anti-migration statements are complemented with hate of the media and non-profit organizations and sympathizing with the Russian Federation. (Ižák, 2019)

Much greater concern, both on the domestic and foreign political scene, is caused by disinformation attacks by the Head of the state himself. Miloš Zeman, a pro-Eastern orientated politician, enriches his Russophiles expression package.

⁶ See more: STERGAR, R. 2017. *Panslavism*. [online]. 2017. International Encyclopedia of the First World War. [cit. 20.01.2020]. Dostupné na internete:<<https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/panslavism>>

By declaring the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula by the Russian Federation as an „*accomplished fact*“ (Zeman uznal Anexi..., 2017), he outraged the general public and denied gross violations of international law.

There are even journalists suspecting Miloš Zeman's direct link to the information portal *ParlamentníListy.cz*, which publicly disseminates anti-immigrant narratives similar to news from the Russian state media. For example, the opposition to Western critique of Russian participation in eastern Ukraine confirms the closeness of both. (Sadouskaya-Komlach, 2018b)

The political sympathy between the Kremlin and the President of the Czech Republic is also confirmed by the fact that the domestic media in Russia give the Czech President extraordinary space. It can be assumed that with these steps Kremlin partially legitimizes its expansive and aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, the Russian propaganda machine confirms that the real political power, influence and size of the state represented by specific political leaders is not important to it. (Panyi, 2017b) For Russian site seems to be enough that Zeman's statements about Western aggressors (NATO, USA, EU) threatening the Russian Federation correspond to Putin's vision of the world.

The occurrence of pro-Russian disinformation clouds over the Czech Republic has been attracting the attention of the professional public for a long time. For example, The Czech Information Service (BIS) in several annual reports openly speaks about the external threat posed by the Russian Federation to the Czech Republic and the entire Central European area. Increased attention is directed to some pro-Russian activists who are increasingly proclaiming their resistance to the democratic establishment of the Czech Republic and its membership in the EU and the NATO. (Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní..., 2018) By applying deceptive and manipulative statements, pro-Russian activists can influence public opinion and thus spread social fear and frustration. These motives continue to undermine the belief of the population in the democratic principles and to fostering of a social polarization.

Hungary

In contrast with Slovakia and the Czech Republic, in the Hungary, disinformation activities have considerably started during the peak of the migration crisis in 2015. Hungary currently has around 100 portals that publicly spreading misleading, predominantly pro-Russian disinformation. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v..., 2018c)

The disinformation leader is the *Hidfö.ru* website, founded by the Hungarian National Front in 2012. The warning finger was picked up by then version of *Hidfö.net*, which addressed the society with its first content in Russian Cyrillic. The disinformation power of this, initially insignificant website, has reportedly started in 2014 after the declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation that accused Hungary of providing large quantities of weapon supplies to Ukraine. It justified its claims by an article from the Hungarian

internet platform. Today this website is the part of the Russian domain *Hidfö.ru* and faithfully serves the purpose of Putin's military propaganda. (András, D., Panyi, SZ. 2016)

The Russian news media – *Sputnik (Hidfö.ru)*, *RussiaToday* (RT) as well as domestic news agency – have had a great influence on the Hungarian disinformation scene. In the main news, owned by the government, we can sometimes observe various types of fake news. As a proven tactics are identified recurrent migration threats. These manipulation techniques, which arouse fear and social tension, make it impossible to discern the truth from lies. (Holcová, 2017b) What's the worse, there's a new significant actor on a Hungarian disinformation scene. It is the Orbán's government that in some of its statements strongly supports the expansion of many conspiracies. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v..., 2018d)

Within the Visegrad Group, Hungary has the highest risk of potential surrendering to misinformation. It is caused by the fact, that a large number of Hungarians trust in conspiracies, and also by the fact that every fifth citizen of that state prefers alternative media for entertainment. Despite the well-known disinformation activities, none of the documents of the Government identifies Russian involvement in this area. Despite this, the pro-Kremlin political activities of Orbán's *Fidesz* and extremist political party *Jobbik* are undeniable. (Yar, 2017a) In Hungary, several links of domestic political parties with representatives of the Russian Federation were revealed. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v..., 2018e) Regular social awareness of such links is one of the added values of democracy. The future application in Hungarian practice provokes rather skepticism because of fact, that Hungarian media (including state media) are owned by government and pro-government entrepreneurs. (Yar, 2017b)

One of the misinformation by government has been revealed only recently. In its 2017 refugee questionnaire addressed to millions of Hungarians, it blamed American financier George Soros for an attempt to flood the European continent with millions of migrants in 2017. (Harzer, 2019) Ex-president of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, even named the Hungarian Prime Minister as one of the main promoters of misinformation and fake news. (Drevená, 2019) According to *Stopfake.org*, disinformation activities in Hungary were evident even before the municipal elections in 2019. For example, the organization's attention was drawn to pro-government trolls who tried to criticize anyone who condemned Fidesz's policies while supporting Orban's rhetoric at home and abroad. (Krekó, P. et. al. 2019) As in the Czech Republic, the Hungarian Prime Minister was another politician who was given by a very generous space in the Russian media already during the Ukrainian crisis 6 years ago. By emphasizing his statements, Russia supports its own battle against the values of the West and maintains uncertainty in various parts of Europe and in the world, as well. (Panyi, 2017c)

Poland

Poland is generally known for its historically conditioned distrust of Russia. Although this experience greatly limits the pro-Kremlin efforts in this state, the ruling party of *Law and Justice* (PiS) admits the application of Russian-style rhetoric about the decline of the Western world. As the independent media in Poland work in an increasingly limited space and PiS has a monopoly on the state broadcaster TVP (*Telewizja Polska*), most media that support the government have very close relations with Jarosław Kaczyński. This is also an explanation why media like *Niezależna.pl*, *Gazeta Polska*, *wSieci* or *TV Republika* take over the views of this party. (Denková, A. et. al. 2018c)

According to some experts, TVP reports are in some cases suspiciously similar to those from era before 1989. Most PiS voters are well aware of pro-government media propaganda, but we can also find those who raise slight concerns with their statements. The reason is the occasional homophobic, anti-refugee and racist views of the representatives of this constituency. (Vasilko, 2019)

Fear of losing Christian identity reinforces anti-Western statements in Polish PiS, but it does not automatically mean pro-Russian orientation. (Gressel, 2017b) Although the Polish government seems to be inspired by Viktor Orbán on media ownership, the term „fake news“ in its environment is more often associated with political struggle between the opposition and party of Jarosław Kaczyński. (Sadouskaya-Komlach, 2018c)

The presence of media from the Russian Federation in Poland is limited today. Tendency of the expanding Russian influence is constant, but mostly in smaller Internet platforms that work with anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western narratives. (Vplyvy Kreml'a v..., 2018f) Doctor Jerzy Targalski⁷ records approximately 50-70 websites that present Russian propaganda. Sites such as *neon24.pl*, *prawy.pl*, *wprawo.pl*, *konserwatyzm.pl*, *zmianynaziemi.pl*, etc. are the best-known disinformation media in Poland. (Targalski, 2018a) The latter has spreader one of the most widespread conspiracies – *Chemtrails*⁸. Of course, the main culprit in this case was NATO, which inhumanly powdered the Polish population. (Ižák, 2018)

Another tool of pro-Russian propaganda is the Internet portal *Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny* (NDP), administered by the Russian Information Services. Confidential content from official sources is systematically falsified by NDP administrators, translated into Polish and then presented on pro-Russian websites and home Internet platforms. (Targalski, 2018b)

Polish population is the most pro-European oriented one of the V4 countries (Yar, 2017c) It will be interesting to watch if the growing Euroscepticism and criticism of the EU by PiS will gradually increase the susceptibility of the Polish

⁷ See more: <<https://studium.uw.edu.pl/kadra/wykladowcy/dr-jerzy-targalski/>>

⁸ See more: ŠNÍDL, V. 2017. *Pravda a Lož na Facebooku*. Bratislava: N Press, 2017. s 156.

population to pro-Russian disinformation activities. With the absence of a change in government's media policy, the decline in pro-Western sympathy by the Polish government with the ingenuity of Putin's propaganda machinery could change Poland's current public opinion in a relatively short time.

Conclusions and solutions

Dissemination of disinformation and the establishment of relations with political entities sympathizing for Russia will remain to be one of the priorities for the Kremlin. The statements of the politicians who support Vladimir Putin allow the Russian Federation to intervene more and more in the political debate of Central European states and thus manipulate public opinion according to their needs. It is essential that effective prevention is a priority not only for selected individuals but for the governments of all Visegrád countries as well. Population of V4 countries could be a significant actor in this effort. One of the possible solutions certainly is a higher civic participation, campaigns, discussions and lectures focused on a raising awareness of the general public about the power and effects of the information that is confronted with. A potential solution is to improve the education policies in this field and increase the level of a media literacy. These activities could help to learn critical thinking, becomes intelligent and conscious consumer of information, creates media responsibility, realizes and resists attempts of misinformation on a personal level. (Nikolic, 2018b) Individual problems require individual solutions. This thesis is also held by the countries of the Visegrád region, which take different approaches to disinformation activities.

There are more and more Slovak initiatives, whose attention is focused on solving disinformation campaigns. *Konšpirátori.sk*, a website operating under the conditions of the Slovak Republic, is collecting a list of websites that publicly disseminate conspiracy theories and misinformation. Uncovering political propaganda is covered, for example, by the *Dezinformácie*, *Hoaxy*, *Propaganda* Facebook page and *Slobodný vysierač*. (Kačmár, 2016b) The veracity of political statements is verified by *Demagog.sk*. A similar factchecking domain (*Demagog.cz*), also operates on the Czech Internet. The Czech project *FactCzech*, which aims to educate the public, journalists and the media, includes quizzes lessons and advices on how to recognize fake news and misinformation. (Andrejkovičová, 2017) The *Center of Combating Terrorism and Hybrid Threats*, which is directly under the Ministry of the Interior, has a dominant position in the Czech fight against misinformation.

The complexity of media ownership and the misinformation campaigns produced by the governments of Hungary and Poland suggests that the future progress in these countries is still questionable. Poland launched the *OKO.press* website in 2016, focused on investigative journalism and factchecking. In

Hungary, the positive initiative is the *urbanlegends.hu* project, focused on detecting misinformation. (Denková, A. et. al. 2018d)

Democracy and the western values in the Visegrád group countries will be eroded by various actors, unless there will be no change in the attitude toward misinformation in its population. This change could improve people's ability to differentiate between the fact and fiction, because the conditions of the previous, more credible media environment is a history, and there is just a little hope that it will ever return.

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SAFETY ASPECTS OF DRIVING ACROSS A RAILWAY LEVEL CROSSING*

Tatiana Hajdúková¹ - Martina Binderová²

ABSTRACT

An important element of internal safety of a society is the maintenance of a functioning transport connection throughout the territory of the country. Railway level crossings are intersections between a railway and a road therefore they are exposed to the increased traffic performance requirements. There is a need for extraordinary caution when driving across a railway level crossing, though this is not always the case in practice. Despite the use of multi-factor security devices, level crossing accidents with tragic consequences repeatedly occur there. The paper presents the development and current situation in recorded level crossing accidents including their causes in the Slovak Republic in the last 11 years.

Key words: *safety, level crossing, level crossings accident, caution, fatalities, road barrier, light signals, sound signals, stopping*

Introduction

Safety is a life-sustaining need of the population of a state. Human history is tied to seeking the ways of ensuring all levels of safety, from internal through external to international safety. Under the impact of globalization, the differences between external and internal safety, domestic and foreign policy have been wiped out. Everyday life is directly influenced by internal safety and internal order which should be based on principles of freedom and democracy. The current internal safety policy is a matter of massive migration to the European Union and various forms of international crime, terrorism, extremism and cybercrime. In addition to the above-mentioned challenges of global importance, it is also necessary to permanently ensure day-to-day activities linked to the interests of the society from within. That means that the state must be able to create suitable legal environment, institutions, and allocate resources, means and mechanisms to address possible crises and threats. Development of the society inevitably affects the conditions for ensuring its safety. There constantly occur new threats and risks that are, in many cases, more sophisticated when compared to the ones from the past, and unmanageable without the support of technologies.

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Due to the dynamic changes, safety issues have always been topical, making the humankind come back to and deal with them on a regular basis. In his publication *Nová teória bezpečnosti*, Volner (2007, p. 99) refers to safety as to a specific historical phenomenon which has always been topical and present, and which relates to a specific phenomenon, process, thing, or relationship under specific circumstances and conditions at a specific location and time, in a specific form of its manifestation and quality.

The line between safety and unsafety is often very thin. That is why we cannot explore safety without being aware of the danger. In other words, it is particularly important to determine the point at which we can consider a certain event a safe one, while having crossed that point the same event becomes dangerous. It is important to realise the risk which can occur and become a reality under certain circumstances. Concerning the road traffic, the hazard is represented by the existence of traffic accidents bringing consequences for the health of road users. In this article, we address internal safety of the Slovak Republic from the aspect of transport. In the article, we are dealing namely with safety at level crossings which represent an intersection between a road and a rail line.

Transport sector functions

Transport is an extremely important sector for the functioning of any developed society. Its disruption would result in enormous complications in all aspects of operation of the state. Problems would occur, for example, in the field of defence of the state by disabling the transportation of manpower, arms, equipment, food, medicaments and other necessary military equipment to the place of destination. Economic life in the country would be completely halted, and performance of the tasks by state administration and self-government, including protection of life, health and property of the population, would be rendered impossible. The transport sector is broken into four subsectors:

- a) road transport,
- b) rail transport,
- c) air transport,
- d) water transport.

Each of them has a special significance in the Slovak Republic, fulfilling to a certain extent different tasks by various means of transport with different transport routes in mutual interconnection and complementing each other.

1 Road transport

In the field of passenger and freight transportation, the road transport takes the most significant share from all transport subsectors. It takes place on roads which allow for mobility of people by means of transport, bicycles or on-foot.

Mobility is a daily necessity for citizens. It is important in connection with their commuting for a job, study, or for the purpose of fulfilling their personal needs and interests. Primarily, a road is designed for the public operation of motor vehicles. As of 1 January 2018, the length of roads in Slovakia constituted 18,058 square kilometres. Roads differ in their significance, traffic characteristics, surface quality, regular and seasonal maintenance, traffic density, intensity, and numerous other criteria. In the Slovak Republic, traffic police officers supervise the safety and smooth flow of road traffic. Municipal police officers are entitled to impose an on-the-spot fine for offences against road safety and smooth flow of traffic committed when failing to comply with a prohibition resulting from traffic regulations represented by traffic signs or traffic devices.

Motorways, highways, major roads and important traffic installations, such as bridges and tunnels, are considered the most important for ensuring the functioning of the road traffic.

2 Rail transport

According to Act No 258/1993 Coll. on Railways of the Slovak Republic, activities of rail transport include:

- transportation of persons and goods on national railways, operation of railway tracks and cableways,
- activities related to the operation of railway tracks and cableways,
- operation of transport on the track for the construction, modification and maintenance of railway tracks and cableways, provision of handling services, attendance transport services, attendance transport services for transport operators on railway, performance of activities ensuring the operation of rail vehicles on a railroad of national railways.

Characteristics of a level crossing and rules for driving across a level crossing

Level crossings are the most critical spots from the aspect of safety of railway operation. A level crossing refers to an at-grade intersection of a railway and a road. At all times, train traffic has priority at a level crossing. That is why a driver of the motor vehicle is nearly always considered to be at fault of the level crossing accident.

This intersection must be marked in compliance with the rules for the railways and according to the road traffic regulations. If the level crossing is an intersection between a road and main railway, the road must also be protected by a road barrier. All safety devices on level crossings are under permanent supervision by designated employees of the Railway Company of Slovakia³.

³ Railway Company of Slovakia is a state company which runs railway in the territory of Slovakia. They provide transportation services responding to the interests of the state transport policy and market demand.

According to Act No. 8/2009 Coll. on the Road Traffic, the traffic police in cooperation with the railway police is responsible for supervising the compliance with the rules for crossing a railway level crossing by road users and observing the obligation of stopping in front of a level crossing.

Concerning their protection, level crossings are divided into two main groups:

- active (protected) level crossings which are equipped with road barriers and marked by traffic signs,
- passive (unprotected) level crossings which are only marked by traffic signs.

To decide about the degree of protection of a level crossing lies within the authority of the Railway Company of Slovakia, and as well it falls under the authority of state administration and traffic police.

A method of protection of a level crossing depends on:

- the type of a rail line,
- the type of a road,
- view conditions,
- local conditions.

The decision to raise the level of protection shall be based on the local conditions, frequency of road and rail traffic, and occurrence of level crossing accidents.

According to the method of alerting the road users, level crossing protection devices are divided into:

- light devices - basic alert is given by lights. Based on the layout of the additional mechanical alert, they are divided into:
 - light devices without road barriers,
 - light devices with half road barriers, whereby the arms restrict the one-way lane of the road directly in front of a level crossing,
 - light devices with full barriers which close the one-way lane, or depending on local conditions, they can completely close the road in front of and behind the level crossing.

The warning sound (60 - 80 decibels) and light signals (flashing red lights) are set so that the longest and slowest road vehicle which was unable to stop in front of the level crossing can drive across it safely (applies to a truck with a 22 meters long trailer crossing the track at speed of 5 km/h). Only then the road barriers, if they have been fitted on the level crossing as an additional alert device, start descending.

Based on the valid legislation, the basic protection system is a warning light and sound signalling, while road barriers are only an additional alert device.

The current situation and development of level crossing accidents in the Slovak Republic

Although it is impossible to exactly measure or calculate the road safety, statistics of traffic accidents, including their consequences for health of road users, provide only an indirect insight. Records of traffic accidents have been stored in the Information System of Traffic Accidents (ISDN) which is operated by the Police Force of the Slovak Republic. The summary of level crossing accidents in figure 1 was created based on the stored records of accidents in ISDN in Slovakia in the 2007 – 2017 period. The figure also shows the development in the consequences of accidents for health of road users in terms of the number of fatal injuries, severe injuries and minor injuries.




Figure 1 Development in the number of level crossings accidents, minor injuries, severe injuries and fatalities in the Slovak Republic in 2007-2017

The horizontal axis represents the monitored period between 2007 and 2017. The vertical axis shows the number of level crossing accidents, number of minor injuries, number of severely injured persons and fatalities in level crossing accidents in the Slovak Republic. From the grey curved line of the development of traffic accidents we can see that the highest number of accidents was recorded in 2007. The decline in 2011 was only temporary, and since 2015 the number of level crossing accidents has levelled off.

The year 2009 will be remembered for a level crossing accident with particularly tragic consequences in the village of Polomka, Brezno district. On a railway crossing, a passenger train hit the left central part of a bus. The bus was turned over to its right side and the engine ended up derailed. The bus was pushed for the distance of 26 meters until the train stopped. 12 people were killed, 6 people suffered severe and 19 light injuries in the accident⁴. The prosecution

⁴ Press release of the Railway Company of Slovakia of 2009.

stated that the bus driver had entered the level crossing without checking whether the bus would be able to cross the track safely. The approaching train was well visible on an approximately 300 m long straight section of the track and could also be heard. Nearly a month later, a new signalling device was installed on the level crossing.

Though we recorded an increase in the number of level crossing accidents in 2010, they had less impact on the health of road users when compared with the situation in previous years. The number of level crossing accidents has levelled off, or slightly increased since 2011. A more detailed overview of causes of level crossing accidents over the past 11 years is presented in table 1.

Table 2 Causes of level crossing accidents, Slovak Republic 2014 - 2017

| No . | Cause | Number of accidents | Relative frequency | Total |
|------|--|---------------------|--------------------|--------|
| 1. | Not checking if the vehicle can drive across the level crossings safely | 166 | 36,5% | 36,5 % |
| 2 | Ignoring the light warning of the level crossing protection device | 142 | 31,2% | 67,7 % |
| 3 | Ignoring the descending or closed road barriers | 72 | 15,8% | 83,5 % |
| 4 | Failing to stop and look either direction in front of a level crossing marked with the Stop, give way! sign | 22 | 4,8% | 88,4 % |
| 5 | Ignoring the approaching train or a rail vehicle | 19 | 4,2% | 92,5 % |
| 6 | Ignoring the sound warning of the level crossing protection device | 14 | 3,1% | 95,6 % |
| 7 | Speeding and non-compliance with smooth flow of traffic rule when driving across a level crossing | 6 | 1,3% | 96,9 % |
| 8 | Incorrect behaviour of a pedestrian on a level crossing | 6 | 1,3% | 98,2 % |
| 9 | Stopping and remaining stationary on a level crossing, in an underpass or a tunnel and at a distance shorter than 15m in front of or behind them | 4 | 0,9% | 99,1 % |
| 10 | Not removing the motor vehicle from the rail, not alerting the rail vehicle driver | 3 | 0,7% | 99,8 % |
| 11 | Driving across the level crossing out of the lane | 1 | 0,2% | 100% |

Table 1 lists the causes in a descending order. Except for cause No. 6 - accidents caused by incorrect pedestrian behaviour - all remaining 449 level crossing accidents were caused by careless behaviour of motor vehicle drivers on level crossings.

Keeping the order of table 1, legislative definitions of the behaviour of motor vehicle drivers on a level crossing according to Act No 8/2009 Coll. include:

1. The highest number of accidents occurs despite the fact, that under Section 27 (1) the driver is obliged to take special caution in front of a level crossing. The driver must check mainly if s/he can drive across the rail safely.
2. According to Section 28 a) the driver must not enter the level crossing if an alert is given by two flashing red lights of the level crossing security device.
3. Section 28 (c): The driver must not enter the level crossing if the barriers are descending, closed, or being lifted.
4. Section 27 (5): In front of a level crossing marked with the "Stop, give way!" sign, the driver is obliged to stop the vehicle at such a spot at which s/he can have a proper view of the track.⁵
5. Section 28 (d): The driver must not enter the level crossing if the approaching train or other rail vehicle is already visible or can be heard.
6. Section 28 (b): The driver must not enter the level crossing if an intermittent sound warning is being given by the horn or bell of the level crossing protection device.
7. Section 27 (3): At distance of 50 m in front of a level crossing and while driving across it, the driver is obliged to drive at maximum speed of 30 km/h; if a white light is flashing, the maximum speed limit is 50 km/h. The driver must not unnecessarily extend the time of crossing the track.
8. Section 25 g) Incorrect behaviour of a pedestrian on a level crossing
9. Section 27 (4): If the vehicle stopped, the driver is obliged to remove it from the railway track; if the driver is unable to do so, s/he is obliged to immediately take steps to warn the driver of the approaching rail vehicle in a timely manner.
10. Section 27 (2): If it is not a parallel driving in traffic lanes, the vehicles may cross the level crossing only in one traffic lane.

From total 455 level crossing accidents, alcohol was detected in 11 cases, thus driving under the influence cannot be determined as an important determinant of level crossing accidents. The data from table 1 were transformed into a Pareto diagram (figure 2).

⁵ At the same time, the driver must ensure that the vehicle does not obstruct the section of the rail where it might be caught by the passing rail vehicle.




Figure 2 Causes of level crossing accidents, Slovak Republic 2014 - 2017

Figure 2 shows the apparent dominance of three most frequently occurring causes of level crossing accidents which in total constituted more than 80% of all monitored accidents, namely:

- Not checking whether it is safe to drive across the level crossings
- Ignoring the light warning given by the level crossing protection device
- Ignoring the descending or closed road barriers.

As depicted in figure 3, if we concentrate our attention to the most serious accidents resulting in severe injuries or fatalities, we will arrive at a slightly different quantity of accidents based on their causes.




Figure 3 Causes of level crossing accidents resulting in a fatality or severe injury of a person, Slovak Republic 2014 - 2017

80% of causes of level crossing accidents resulting in most severe injuries and fatalities of road users were narrowed down to two main causes:

- Not checking whether it is safe to drive across the level crossings
- Ignoring the light warning given by the level crossing protection device.

Other causes of traffic accidents resulted in property damage, or minor injuries, but did not lead to severe injuries or fatalities.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the studied traffic accidents according to their location in

- urban areas,
- rural areas.




Figure 4 Number of traffic accidents on level crossings in urban areas and rural areas, Slovak Republic 2014-2017

Based on the number of accidents, causes of all traffic accidents on level crossings shown in figure 4 were arranged in descending order. In general, we can see more frequent occurrence of these accidents in urban areas.

The largest proportion of accidents in rural areas (close to 50%) was recorded on unprotected level crossings. They were caused by a driver failing to stop at the "Stop, give way!" sign and entering the level crossing when the incoming train could have already been seen or heard.

Discussion

The only way to successfully reduce the number of level crossing accidents is to remove the intersections between the railway tracks and roads, for example, by grade-separated crossings. At present, the crossing of the new main railway lines with roads is solved by a grade-separated crossing as given by law. When upgrading, or significantly renewing the existing major railways or intersecting roads, the existing at-grade intersections are rebuilt into grade-separated crossings.

This initiative is limited by its considerable expensiveness. In the period of 11 years, the number of level crossings in Slovakia was gradually reduced from 2307 to 2102 which means that more than 200 level crossings were removed. The achieved reduction in number of level crossings since 2011 has not been that substantial to be reflected in the decrease of number of level crossing accidents neither in the consequences of those accidents. As of 1 July 2018, the Railways

of the Slovak Republic operated 2092 level crossings, of which more than a half (1073) are active (protected) level crossings. The mechanical barriers have been installed on 53 level crossings. Level crossings protected by light security devices with barriers constitute 515, and there are 463 level crossings with light safety devices without barriers. Still there remain 1019 passive (unprotected) level crossings marked by St Andrew's Crosses and represent a major risk of a level crossing accident.

Although monitoring of compliance with the rules of driving across a level crossing is carried out on a regular basis, still there occur level crossing accidents. On-site inspections detect significant violations of traffic regulations by drivers of road vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists, being proven by the recorded traffic accidents. Investigation of collisions between a train and a road vehicle on a level crossing revealed several cases in which the driver overtook a group of stationary vehicles and drove directly under the incoming train. People often underestimate the train braking distance, which can be up to 1000 m depending on the weight and speed of the train. The imposed penalties do not exert the desired effect.

Conclusion

Road safety depends mainly on the level of compliance with the road traffic regulations. In front of a level crossing, drivers, pedestrians and cyclists must be extremely cautious, disciplined, and considerate, and must check carefully if they can safely cross the track. Micro-sleep, health problems, and taking a risk while driving have fatal consequences on level crossings. The analysis of the development proved the unprotected level crossing to be dangerous. Despite the fact, that their number is steadily decreasing, the number of accidents is on the increase.

A possible remedy is to continue developing the prevention and to increase the awareness among road users about complying with traffic regulations on intersections between a road and a railway. It is necessary to strengthen and improve the supervision over road safety and smooth flow of traffic in combination with investments into the development of road infrastructure and introduction of intelligent traffic systems.

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CYBER COMBAT AS ONE OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WAYS OF FIGHTING

Radoslav Ivančík¹

ABSTRACT

Cyberspace had finally become, except of land, air, water and space, the fifth dimension for warfare during the second decade of the third millennium. From a military-strategic point of view, it can even be said without any hesitation that controlling cyberspace is of the same importance today as controlling airspace in the 20th century. Internet, computers and their keyboards have become weapons, information and communication technologies, systems, means and devices are weapon systems, cyber warriors use software and hardware to fight, and public and private networks are battlefields. Conventional ways of fighting are being replaced by unconventional, and classical terms such as defence, attack, place, identity (identification), violence or speed are given a completely new meaning, resp. dimension. All the above-mentioned facts are reasons why cyber combat is the subject of our research and scientific interest.

Key words: *Cyber combat, cyber space, cyber attacks, cyber security, fighting.*

Introduction

In close connection with the massive deployment and use of information and communication technologies, systems and tools, and with the inevitable need to face new symmetric and asymmetric security threats, more or less (in terms of threat, amount of available resources, access to new technologies, etc.) the military transformation, reorganization of structures of the armed forces and building new modern capabilities and special military units are taking place to a greater or lesser extent in most countries of the world. Simultaneously, in connection with the above, intensive debate has been held in recent years, not only within the professional community, about new ways, methods or forms of warfare. The bulk of this discussion is based on the assumption that in the particular case of the use of information and communication technologies, systems and tools, this is a qualitatively new, unconventional form of warfare that has unique parameters, characteristics and requires a completely new approach. The approaches used in traditional, conventional ways of fighting cannot be applied to them.

First of all, in this context, it has to be assumed that in recent years there has been a shift in the focus on the use of combat technology, weapons and weapon systems, strategy and tactics from traditional to new forms, known as

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unconventional. Rather, it is a natural development, linked to the development in the field of science and technology, induced by the search for the most efficient and effective way to achieve victory, resp. how to defeat an opponent, or at least cause him as much loss and damage as possible and discourage him from further combat activities. It is in close connection with the massive deployment and use of information and communication technologies, systems and tools that cyber combat can serve as an example of new ways of fighting.

Conventional war is a type of conflict in which the fighting parties (adversaries) use conventional weapons, it means all the weapons with the exception of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical – and fight openly on the ground, in the air or on the water. The forces of both sides (opponents) are clearly defined, organized and used weapons to fight the armed military units of the enemy. The basic objective of conventional war is to destroy or weaken the enemy's armed forces, to occupy its territory and, overall, to undermine its ability to fight. It is important to add that combat operations that are conducted in accordance with international war law (the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Convention and a number of other agreements and documents) are considered to be a conventional war. This means that conventional war has a certain legal framework and the parties of the conflict respect certain rules regarding war (eg. designation of fighting parties, use of

A conventional weapon is one that does not contain toxic, nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological components. Conventional weapons cover a wide range of on the land, in the air and on/in the water usable weapons including, for example various types of small arms, rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, howitzers, rocket launchers, warships, helicopters, aircraft, but also ammunition, grenades, mines, bombs, missiles and a huge number of other types of weapons and ammunition into them. In general, those are weapons whose damage capability derives from kinetic, incendiary, explosive or chemical energy; it is by no means a chemical weapon or a nuclear weapon. The use of all types of conventional weapons at the time of war is governed by the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention. However, the use of certain types of conventional weapons is prohibited or regulated under the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Types of Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Mine Ban Treaty, etc.

In this context, for a better understanding of the issue under consideration, it is necessary to state that conventions are generally accepted standards governing the way in which war is conducted. On the other hand, in the event of a fundamental change in the situation, some conventions may be discarded, resp. they are also being violated by strong actors as they prevent them from exploiting, strengthening or multiplying their military potential in a given changed situation. Thus, in some cases, there can be political (power) demand and pressure to legalize some unconventional forms of warfare to strengthen the military

capabilities of powerful actors. On the other hand, some forms of warfare that would not bring benefits and profits to strong actors can be kept outside recognized conventions by political (power) pressure. This may also be the case for cyber-fighting.

1 Theoretical background

Military and warfare have always been limited in some ways, so the commencement and conduct of the fight as organized violence has always been tied by certain standards. Key adjustments were made under what conditions and for which war could be fought; for what reason to conduct war, and - in particular - how the fight is to take place (Roberts, 2007). The current rules for distinguishing war, understood as legal warfare, and crime, including war crimes, illegal forms and methods of warfare, are largely the result of developments following the conclusion of the Westphalian Peace in October 1648. It has brought more international law responses to questions of state sovereignty, international policy and dispute resolution, which have since influenced international relations for a very long time (Lasicová – Ušiak, 2012, p. 14). At the same time, it confirmed the two basic dimensions of sovereignty of states – external (it means that all states are legally equal) and internal (it means that each state is sovereign in the area of internal sovereignty, is not restricted by anyone, and is itself the administrator of its territory and population) (Brhlíková, 1997, p. 363).

The adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and Conventions governing warfare rules and the drafting and establishment of international war and humanitarian law most likely played the most important role in the codification of warfare rules. However, attempts to codify the rules of warfare have all the time met with different interests of major actors, different cultural approaches to warfare and, last but not least, technological developments that have also had a major impact on the military field. After the changes brought to the military by weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, the development at the end of the last century began to move in a different direction.

Technological changes, mainly very rapid development and the increasingly widespread application of information and communication technologies, systems and means, have significantly strengthened the ability of the rich, developed and technologically advanced states to conduct war. Their adversaries – poorer, developing and technologically less developed states, rebels, guerrillas or non-state groups – cannot simply win in a conventionally conducted war against powerful actors. This motivates opponents to look for unconventional ways, methods and forms of fight that compensate the conventional superiority of superpowers (Darton, 2016, p. 296).

The understanding of the rules known as 'jus ad bellum' and 'jus in bello' is therefore dependent on the context of the traditional understanding of war as a massive conventional armed conflict between states, or in cases of civil wars in

which mass clashes of organized parties take place, and one of those parties is the state (Roško – Musladin – Kazanský, 2019). It is quite clear and evident that a mass clash of organized parties is extremely unlikely in those cases where, for most adversaries of technologically advanced nations, such a form of struggle would literally be suicidal, doomed to failure. And it is in such cases that the use of unconventional tactics, methods and methods of combat and weapons is offered.

Clearly, terrorism is undoubtedly the most unconventional way of fighting in recent years. However, other unconventional forms of combat have also been used for years to combat the armed forces and components of high-tech nations, for example guerrilla warfare, guerrilla campaigns, sabotage, etc. that go beyond the limits of conventions. Another unconventional possibility, especially nowadays, is the use of new way of fight, such as cyber combat.

2 Cyber combat as one of the unconventional ways of fighting

The essence of cyber combat is to relocate combat operations from ground, air or water to cyberspace which is in its crucial part interconnected. National cyber space, private and public space as well as military and civilian space are interconnected. The boundaries between them are often obscure, unobservable. Actions can run at speeds limited only by processor performance and infrastructure capacity, much faster than operations in the physical world. The disappearance of borders (territorial, social, etc.) also entails the denial of long centuries of development, which was aimed at drawing sharp contours between war and peace, military and civil, legal and criminal, on which the present war and humanitarian law is based (Dahl, 2014).

Cyber combat can be both defensive and offensive. The defence includes continuous, permanent protection, the construction of robust and well-protected computer networks, the establishment of cyber teams capable of responding quickly, detecting and stopping cyber attacks, eliminating and repairing damage, etc. The problem lies mainly in cyber attacks. Offensive cyber attacks envisage, in addition to direct aid to troops on the battlefield, attacks on enemy infrastructure. (Kollár, 2020)

The infrastructure, against which cyber attacks are targeted, has not changed much: industry, agriculture, food and energy resources, transport system, water supply, sewerage, communication and information systems, finance, health, etc. Nowadays, none of this works without computer support. Cyberspace is the place from which it is possible to control the entire "nervous system" of our modern world. An effective and efficient cyber attack can damage communication and information technology and the state's system to such an extent that its economic, social and security structure collapses completely. A successful attack from the Internet could even lead to the collapse of the whole state without exaggeration if it did not have the defence means. Today, it is possible to get the

country to its knees without planes and tanks, and no military force in the world can prevent it (Šitrit, 2015).

The target of cybernetic operations are data in computers and computer networks, those data may not be found only in military computers and networks, but vice versa, a lot of scenarios (eg. in the framework of strategic information war, unlimited cyber war etc.) use the weaknesses of adversary infrastructure to carry out widespread cyber attacks to cripple the economy, economic life, create fear, panic, inflict physical and material damage, and, in their effect, lead to moral disruption of the adversary and break his will to resist. The aim of cyber combat is not, and cannot be, the physical destruction (of military forces) of the adversary.

By its very nature, cyber attacks deny and cross the border between the military and civilian spheres. In general, there is discussion of cyber combat in the context of the principles of:

- differentiation - is one of the key principles, refers to a strict distinction between military and civilian objectives, so that armaments and tactics are legal, and must not cause even indirect damage to the civilian sector and non-combatants;
- adequacy - stipulates that the weapons and tactics used must be proportionate to the military objectives of the operation, in order to prevent unreasonably massive use of force;
- legality - refers to international treaties (conventions, agreements) under which the military equipment is used and the way it is deployed must not contradict such treaties;
- necessity - is based on the assumption that used weapons and tactics must be reasonably necessary to achieve the military objectives of the operation;
- humanity - consists in prohibiting the use of weapons and the way they are deployed, which would cause unnecessary suffering to the victims and would allow the spread of fear;
- neutrality - deployed weapons or their use should not lead to harm to the health or death of people in neutral countries, their property or the environment (Greenberg – Goodman – Soo Hoo, 2008).

In the case of an offensive cyberwar, these principles cannot be upheld. The principle of differentiation is not applicable in the case of a strategic information war or unrestricted cyber war, because both military and civilian infrastructure are closely linked, as armies also use commercial (civilian) communication infrastructure, and because cyber combat has a truly effective impact often counted with attacks on the critical infrastructure of the state that affects the lives of the entire population, and deliberately.

The principle of adequacy is not applicable in the case of cyber combat in cases where cyber operations have no direct military objectives, and obviously

this also plays a role in the necessity principle. While the principle of legality would be respected in the sense that cyber weapons are not directly prohibited, on the other hand, their use violates a lot of different treaties and conventions, starting with, for example the protection of communications and mail.

The principle of humanity, which presupposes the avoidance of fear, is difficult to apply in cases where the aim of cyber combat is to disrupt the morality of the enemy population and the creation fear and panic would be one of the key components of such an operation. In the interconnected cyberspace, it is also impossible to guarantee the principle of neutrality, as it may be necessary to use the cyberspace and communication routes of neutral states, but it may not be intentional either. Moreover, the impact of a cyber attack cannot be accurately allocated.

Nonetheless, cyber combat is one of the areas of the military that has received considerable attention, especially in the last decade, as it can strengthen or multiply the military potential of technologically advanced countries. It is not at all surprising that this area attracted the greatest interest in the United States, that is to say, in a country clearly one of the most technologically advanced and most heavily invested in the military. The doctrines that have been developed in this field in other NATO countries (such as the United Kingdom), or in the Russian Federation or China are far from being as complex as the theoretical or doctrinal materials of the US military. American doctrines are therefore also a reference for the other countries mentioned.

In the US, cyber-threats have in recent years strengthened the position of advocates of the opinion that a cyberwar defence is in the worst case doomed to failure, at better case it would be disproportionately costly and demanding. During several exercises conducted to combine natural disaster and / or physical and cyber attacks, it has been repeatedly shown that infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber attacks that can cause or multiply enormous damage and loss of human life. But defence against cyber attacks is extremely difficult. One reason is the very significant share of commercial or private infrastructure in defence infrastructure, which varies between 80% and 95%, depending on the country (Childs, 2017, p. 36). In this case, it is necessary to consider the fact that commercial infrastructures have always been and are now being built in such a way as to generate the highest possible profit at the lowest possible cost.

Commercial infrastructures were not built primarily about security. In addition to the above, another factor should be considered, namely that the damage caused by attacks or failures may be lower than the cost of increased security (Andrassy – Grega, 2015, p. 12). In private information infrastructure segments, the situation may be considerably worse given the fact that a significant proportion of users of information and communication systems and equipment do not have sufficient knowledge and experience to secure the infrastructure they own (Korauš – Veselovská – Kelemen, 2017, p. 568). An example of a threat

based on private resources is the huge botnets that rely mainly on thousands of personal workstations.

Securing commercial and private infrastructure would entail significant financial costs, demanding legislation and the conclusion of private-public agreements, and certainly, despite that, everything could not be 100% at best. And while the situation in the protection of computers and computer networks is improving, there are strong voices that the armies of technologically advanced nations need an offensive doctrine of cyber-fighting. However, what is a disadvantage in defensive cyber war combat is an advantage in offensive cyber combat. And so, the doctrine of offensive cyberwarfare appears. Unlike a defensive one, where observance of conventions can be imagined, offensive struggle is unconventional. Several tendencies converge at this point. In the case of weaker players, this is, as already indicated, an attempt to compensate for the superiority of the opponent. In the case of strong actors, trying to exploit their potential, their technological capacities to conduct offensive cyberwarfare and the low effectiveness of cyber-fighting. The result is a versatile failure to respect conventions.

By its very nature, cyber combat shows signs that are fundamentally different from conventional ways of fighting. These features are common to many other forms of combating an advanced society and are beyond the standards under which the legitimacy of shares and their legality are currently being assessed. However, attempting to present cyber combat as a completely new, unique and qualitatively different form of warfare may be based both on misunderstanding of the essence of its unconventionality and on political (both conscious and unconscious) codification of rules suited particularly to strong players with sufficient political (power) influence

Conclusion

Based on the research and evaluation of several attributes, it can be concluded that cyber combat is a specific, unconventional and unique case of warfare, although in the fight against superior, technologically, logistically and numerically stronger enemies are used also other, long-standing forms of warfare that exhibit similar characteristics. In this context, it is necessary to add, given the fact that the importance of all unconventional forms of warfare is constantly increasing, depending on the strengthening of the conventional capacities of some strong players, that this is a symptom of general military developments. A common feature of the ongoing changes is the shift of focus of combat operations. Instead of the military defeat of the enemy and the destruction of his armed forces, the aim of operations becomes the enemy's morale, the economy and the will to fight and to resist. Obviously, the weaker actors, who cannot face substantially stronger actors openly, on the battlefield, have no reason and do not want to respect conventions too much. Strong players know that it is disadvantageous for

them to face unconventional threats in a conventional way. In some cases, this is not even possible.

These developments, as well as closely related discussions, can be without any hesitation illustrated by the example of cyber combat. There are basically two possibilities. The first possibility is that conventions will be reviewed and modified, and consequently military doctrines will be modified, since doctrines that aim at defeating or physically destroying the enemy's military forces are insufficient when using unconventional forms of combat, and, as indicated, unconventional forms will be used more and more often in the future. The second option is that the problem remains unresolved and each case will be considered unique of its kind and analysed within the existing conventions and according to the political influence of the particular actors. Military doctrines will remain essentially unchanged, and unconventional operations will be carried out in the framework of special operations as support operations, as long as they are only a marginal area and a marginal component of the battle. Such developments are likely to lead in the future to the collapse of the system of conventions as such and to the creation of specialized units, constituents, organizations and institutions that will participate in the fight but will not have military status. This will create a kind of transition between the civilian and military spheres, while the duality of the system will be weakened and / or will gradually disappear completely.

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THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF KENYA'S ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the article is the investment and development policy of Great Britain in Kenya in the second decade of the 21st century. These issues are analysed in the context of Kenya's economic security. The introduction includes a definition of economic security and a review of basic Kenyan macroeconomic data. The next two parts of the article cover, in turn, the conditions and scale of investment and development support of Great Britain for Kenya. Cooperation in these areas with the United Kingdom is of particular importance for Kenya in the context of increasing economic security. In recent years, a special threat and uncertainty, but also new opportunities and prospects for this cooperation has been brought by Brexit.

Key words: The United Kingdom, Kenya, economic security, investments, development assistance, Brexit.

Introduction - Kenya's economic security

The aim of the article is to analyze and evaluate the UK's investment and development policy in the 21st century in the perspective of Kenya's economic security. The main research problem is whether British investment and economic aid for Kenya has a positive impact on its economic security? The main thesis of the article is that the UK's economic involvement in Kenya is extremely important for Kenya's economic security. However, the prospects and scale of these activities are quite uncertain in the context of the upcoming Brexit.

The economic security of the state depends on the level of its economic development and competitiveness on the world market. It guarantees the economic independence of the state, promoting socio-economic well-being of society and weakening of social contradictions (Metelev, 2014, p. 82). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRS) approaches the issue of economic security more from the perspective of individuals and societies, and focuses on the ability to meet their basic needs. ICRC defines economic security as „the ability of individuals, households or communities to cover their essential needs sustainably and with dignity. This can vary according to an individual's physical needs, the environment and prevailing cultural standards. Food, basic

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shelter, clothing and hygiene qualify as essential needs, as does the related expenditure; the essential assets needed to earn a living, and the costs associated with health care and education also qualify” (*What is Economic...*, 2015).

Kenya has the second largest economy in East Africa after Ethiopia. For Kenya, the second decade of the 21st century was a strong recovery after the global economic crisis (The International Institute for Labour Studies). In 2018, Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) was USD 87.9 billion and real annual GDP growth was 6.3%. Annual GDP growth fluctuated in the range of 4.6-6.3% throughout the entire decade. In 2018, GDP per capita was at the level of USD 1.83 thousand, which placed Kenya at a distant 141 place in the world. Services had the largest share in GDP (42.7%), followed by agriculture, forestry, and fishing (34.2%), and industry (16.4%) (*Kenya economic...*, 2019). Such a significant share of agriculture and derivatives in generated GDP is characteristic for low-developed countries. In the World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking 2020 Kenya was placed at a high position of 56 among 190 analyzed economies (*World Bank...*). According to the World Economic Forum, Kenya is the most competitive economy in the East Africa in terms of business sophistication and innovation (Krishnan, te Velde, Were, 2018, p. 30). Kenya belongs to five regional communities, which is the largest number among African countries. On the one hand, this shows the extent of Kania's economic cooperation, but on the other, overlapping memberships limit trade benefits from regional agreements (Jerome, Nabena, 2016, p. 89). Even before 2014, two banks from Kenya - the Equity Bank and the Kenya Commercial Bank had plans to expand beyond East Africa toward Mozambique and Zambia (Bach, 2016, p. 78).

The Kenyan economy is developing dynamically, but there are many barriers in the way of this development, including in the area of political, security and climate. In the 2018 Human Development Index, Kenya obtained a value of 0.590, which classified it at a distant 142 place in the world (*2018 Human...*). In 2018, 48 million people lived in Kenya, of which 39.8% were under 14, 57.9% between 15 and 64 and only 2.3% over 65. On the one hand, this gives considerable development potential, but on the other, it has caused the unemployment rate to remain above 9 percent over the past ten years (*Kenya: Unemployment...*). These data do not include hidden unemployment, mainly in the countryside. In 2018, life expectancy at birth was 65.9 years, and literacy rates 81.5% (*Kenya economic...*, 2019). In Kenya, still over 16 million citizens live below the national poverty line (*DFID Kenya*).

Since independence, Kenya has established economic relations with a number of countries around the world, including the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan, India, Israel, Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, as well as East Africa. At the same time, it maintained traditional economic relations with Great Britain (Orwa, 1992, p. 391). Nowadays, a major investor in Kenya is China, which is trying to oust the country's economic influence of the British and the West in general. Currently,

Kenya wants to maintain economic relations with all economically active countries in Africa, including China, the United States, France, India and of course Great Britain. Kenyan authorities assume that its development needs are large enough that it cannot be limited to one economic partner.

1 British investment in Kenya

Kenya has a relatively small share in the stock of UK foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2015, it was just 2% of the total UK FDI stock. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is invariably the largest foreign investor in Kenya. For example, in 2012, the UK was contributing 40% of Kenya's total FDI inward flows. It is worth emphasizing that the share of British investments in Kenya was much higher than in other countries of the region. The same year, 216 British companies invested in Kenya. 52% of them invested in services such as marine transport, real estate development, and hotel and conference centers. Another 36% invested in manufacturing, in areas such as electronics, paints, chemicals, cement, garments, renewables and housing. In turn, 10% invested in horticulture and agro-processing (Krishnan, te Velde, Were, 2018, p. 23-24).

In 2017, British companies based in Kenya valued at over GBP 2.5 billion (*Kenya, UK...*). In 2019, some estimates already showed up to 300 British companies investing in Kenya (Mutambo, 2019). The largest British companies investing in Kenya include Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Vodafone, GlaxoSmithKline, ACTIS (formerly CDC Capital Partners), De La Rue and Unilever. British investors are primarily active in the real estate market, transport, financial services, telecommunications, chemicals, agricultural and manufacturing sectors (*Kenya-UK...*). 1 in 10 working Kenyans are employed by a British company (*DFID Kenya...*). British companies are the two largest private sector employers in Kenya. Moreover, UK companies make up half of the top ten biggest taxpayers in Kenya (Crump, 2019).

At the beginning of 2012, new oil and gas deposits were discovered in northern Kenya. In the second half of the decade, approximately 200 globally operating energy companies from 30 countries were involved in East Africa, including British companies - BG Group and Tullow (Shaw, 2016, p. 116). For political reasons, the United Kingdom diplomatically supports Somalia in dispute with Kenya over maritime territory of 100,000 square kilometers with prospects of vast oil and gas deposits (Maluki, 2019). Nevertheless, depending on the political climate in bilateral relations between Great Britain and Kenya, the British could also invest in the mining industry in Kenya. Therefore, Kenya may also become an investment target of British fuel companies in the long run.

During an official trip to Africa in August 2018, Prime Minister **Theresa May** presented Britain's ambitions to be the G7's number one investor in Africa by 2022 (*Prime Minister's...*, 2018). In Cape Town she announced direct investment in Africa of GBP 4 billion. At the same time, a similar amount was

expected to be invested by the British private sector (Crump, 2019). In Nairobi, on the other hand, the prime minister announced the intensification of investment activities of British enterprises in Kenya. The declaration caused high expectations among Kenyan authorities and entrepreneurs (*Prime Minister's...*, 2018).

On May 3, 2019, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom **Jeremy Hunt** met in Nairobi with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya Monica Juma. During the meeting, Minister **Hunt** stated that „Kenya is a preferred destination for investors in Africa. I hope that our engagement at the Economic Development Forum will give impetus for companies from the two countries to create business to business relations and utilize opportunities that we have created especially over 182 flagship projects under the Big 4 priority sectors”. In turn, Minister Juma said „It is our expectation that our two countries will enjoy greater cooperation and a deeper relationship in the post Brexit era” (*Kenya-United...*, 2019). Declarations made at such a high political level give hope for their actual implementation.

To increase Kenya's investment attractiveness, first of all, it needs to invest more in special economic zones and industrial parks. This will reduce barriers to market access, facilitate exports and promote industrialization (Krishnan, te Velde, Were, 2018, p. 37). UK investments in Kenya are to be part of Kenya's flagship development program initiated in 2018 under the name 'Big Four Agenda'. This Kenyan government development initiative is „focusing on boosting manufacturing activities, achieving universal health coverage, improving food security and supporting the construction of affordable housing” (Ng'ang'a, 2019). The program is focused on stimulating economic and social growth. The agenda includes the appreciation of industry's role in providing economic stability and a high quality of life to all citizens. The program is intended to reinforce the belief among investors that Kenya really wants to be the best investment destination in East Africa (Gudka). As part of the "Big Four Agenda" the Government of Kenya priorities for 2019/20 remained unchanged and include universal healthcare, affordable housing, manufacturing and food security (*Kenya's 2019/20...*, 2019, p. i).

UK investors are interested in all of the four main areas of the "Big Four Agenda". As mentioned earlier, construction has already a large share in the investments. Due to the desire to increase imports of agricultural produce from Kenya, interest in investing in the development of agriculture in this country should increase. The manufacturing sector creates enormous investment opportunities. This mainly concerns the area of new technologies. While Kenya is a leader in Africa's digital transformation, United Kingdom is a world leader in this area. British expertise, knowledge and investment could help Kenya grow its role as Africa's innovation hub (Crump, 2019). Great Britain has been supporting Kenyan and African health programs for years. This area potentially offers great investment opportunities, for example in the area of manufacturing medicines and medical equipment. In 2020, the first UK-Africa Investment Summit will be

organized. The aim of the summit is to bring together businesses, governments and international institutions to encourage investment in a range of sectors (*UK to partner...*, 2019). Such a meeting will be a very good opportunity to establish a number of new and develop existing investment projects.

It is worth mentioning that demographics are conducive to British investment in Kenya. About 30,000 Britons live permanently in Kenya, while in the United Kingdom live 200,000 people with Kenyan roots. In addition, the British constitute the largest group of tourists in Kenya, reaching 100,000 annually (*DFID Kenya*). Direct contact between citizens of countries on such a large scale is an important factor facilitating the initiation and conduct of business. Nevertheless, there are barriers, such as, for example, considerable difficulties in obtaining a UK entry visa for Kenyan citizens. However, Kenyan authorities are seeking London to relax the rules in this area.

Other factors conducive to investment cooperation are historical ties between countries and the consequent cultural closeness. One of the tangible manifestations of the colonial period is English as the official language of Kenya. In addition, Kenyans are attached to the cultural values of United Kingdom and the West. The cultural dominance of the West is confirmed, for example, by the fact that Kenyans are most likely to watch American and British television programs, are intrigued by Western show business stars, and embrace Western lifestyle patterns. So far, attempts to limit the influence of Anglo-Saxon culture in Kenya by other countries, mainly China, have been unsuccessful (Maweu, 2016, p. 131).

2 British-Kenyan development co-operation

Great Britain is Kenya's main development partner. Department for International Development (DFID) supports Kenya's development priorities, currently mainly in the fields of "Big Four Agenda". This includes engagement on a range of development, stimulating inclusive growth, improving service delivery, and innovative approaches to private-sector provision of basic services (*Kenya-UK...*). In Kenya, the DFID is primarily trying to combat extreme poverty, support self-sustaining development, and counteract a number of developmental restrictions. It helps in creating good quality jobs and stimulate investment through improving the business environment. The DFID also helps the Kenyan government in providing basic services and building resilience to crises. In this area, among other things, it counteracts the consequences of drought and conflicts, provides support to refugees and raises the level of medical assistance to women during childbirth. In a broader sense, the DFID supports Kenya to improve government systems and accountability, including tackle corruption and reduce radicalism and conflict-causing factors. The goal is to enable the Kenyan government to take more effective action to improve citizens' well-being. The DFID's budget for Kenya for 2018/2019 was GBP 111 million. That year, three

priority support programs were - Hunger Safety Net Program (GBP 20.7 million), Regional Economic Development for Investment and Trade Program (GBP 20 million) and water and sanitary projects - PAMOJA Program (GBP 10 million). In turn, the budget for 2019/2020 is slightly smaller and amounts to GBP 98 million (*DFID Kenya*).

To build the foundations for Kenya's self-sustaining development, it is particularly important to help create favorable conditions for investment and develop trade cooperation. An example of support in this area is the modernization of the port in Mombasa, for which the DFID has allocated GBP 63 million. Infrastructure investment at the port in Mombasa is aimed at addressing energy efficiency, speed up import and export trade handling, and minimize environmental impacts (*UK pledges...*, 2015). In the development area, Kenya also receives support from the Catalyst Fund, which is an inclusive fintech accelerator that helps tech startups build solutions designed for underserved communities in emerging economies (*Catalyst Fund*). Thanks to the support of the DFID, the Catalyst Fund helps to connect Kenyan fintech companies with international investors and mentors (*UK to partner...*, 2019). In 2015, thanks to the support of the United Kingdom, the "green bond" program was launched, and in October 2019 Kenya closed its first ever „green bond” . It will raise funds to provide 5,000 university students with environmentally-friendly, affordable housing in Nairobi (*Kenya closes...*, 2019). Great Britain is also initiating other, smaller assistance programs. For example, in August 2019, it announced the program to support Kenyans with disabilities access employment opportunities (*UK government...*, 2019). As mentioned earlier, significant of the DFID resources are dedicated to meeting the most basic needs of the rapidly growing population of Kenya, including access to food, clean water and basic health care.

An important area of development support is funding scholarships for Kenyan students. For example, in the 2016-17 academic year, Kenya received 61 scholarships from Great Britain for various fields of study. 31 scholarships were funded by Chevening and another 30 by Commonwealth Scholarships (*Kenya, UK...*). The British government offers scholarships to Kenyan citizens in different areas to train professional and technical experts (Kamau, 2018, p. 91). Kenyans who have received British scholarships gain specialist knowledge that can contribute to the economic and social development of the state. In addition, many of them become proponents and initiators of strengthening cooperation between states.

A specific, but increasingly important form of Great Britain's development support for Kenya is the area of counteracting adverse climate change. The United Kingdom primarily provides support through the UK's International Climate Fund (ICF) in implementing programs to build state resilience in the face of climate change. In July 2019, during a visit to Kenya International Development Secretary **Rory Stewart** announced a package to help Africa deal with climate change and reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. Over five years the United

Kingdom will allocate GBP 250 million, which is its biggest commitment in history to tackle climate change in Africa. This help aims to build resilience to climate change and develop low carbon economies (*UK aid's...*, 2019). In addition, the United Kingdom, including the Royal family, is involved in supporting wildlife conservation in Kenya. It does so through various charity such as Tusk which has His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge (Prince William) charity's royal patron, and the Duke of Edinburgh International Awards Trust (*Kenya-UK...*).

Conclusion

The historical and cultural bond between Kenya and the United Kingdom, the dynamically developing Kenyan economy and newly discovered deposits of energy resources make the country an attractive economic partner for Great Britain. On the other hand, however, the country is facing many serious problems, including poverty, the demographic boom, corruption and adverse climate change. In order to improve investment conditions in Kenya and improve the quality of life of its inhabitants, and to gain the favor of local authorities and society, the United Kingdom is engaging in development aid for Kenya. This constitutes an important help in overcoming the main development barriers ensuring the economic security of Kenya. At the same time, Great Britain increases its investment commitment in this country to maintain its leading position in this respect.

Great uncertainty and danger not only for Great Britain, but also for Kenya brings Brexit. Due to close economic ties with Great Britain, Kenya is potentially the most vulnerable to the negative consequences of Brexit among all East African countries (Mold, 2018, p. 6). Particular uncertainty is associated primarily with the dynamics of economic development of Great Britain after leaving the European Union. If a serious economic crisis occurs, it can significantly weaken the United Kingdom's international economic position. This would translate into reduced investment activity and development assistance in partner states, including Kenya. Limiting development assistance and investment by such a key partner as the United Kingdom would translate into a weakening of Kenya's economic security. In this situation, the Kenyan authorities would be forced to tighten economic cooperation with China. This, in turn, could lead to economic dependence on global economic power pursuing an increasingly assertive policy.

However, Brexit also potentially creates opportunities for Britain to strengthen its economic relations with non-European regions, including East Africa. Kenya could be a model country in implementing the "Global Britain" strategy. The message from the United Kingdom towards Kenya is unambiguous. It wants to strengthen economic relations with Kenya, including increasing investments, supporting it technologically and expertly, providing support and

dynamizing trade. If there is a positive scenario related to Brexit and Kenya seizes the chance, it can positively translate into its economic security.

During the trip to Africa in August 2018, Prime Minister **Theresa May** presented Brexit as an opportunity for both Great Britain and the countries of the continent, including Kenya. She presented ambitious plans that are expected to significantly increase the investment activity of British companies in friendly African countries. Great Britain is going to turn into a truly global player doing business around the world, mainly with emerging economies with growing potential, such as Kenya (Kohnert, 2018, p. 126). The current prime minister, **Boris Johnson**, has upheld Britain's aspiration to leave the European Union. It presents the global aspirations of the United Kingdom, which are to be realized primarily through cooperation with various regions of the world. One such region is East Africa, in which cooperation with Kenya is a priority for the British government.

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WAR AND POLITICS

Jaroslav Kompan¹

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the relationship between politics and the war, identifies and defines the basic determinants of the use of war by political leaders as a means of clash for obtaining of the political power. Based on analyzed relations, it further defines and characterizes the relationship between the politics and the military strategy.

Key words: politics, military strategy, war.

Introduction

Warfare looks like a simple and unambiguous action based on the concept of „we against the enemy,” an armed violent clash of states, alliances or ideologies. With such a concept, the strategy is then simply a mathematical redistribution of the resources that are available to achieve clearly defined goals. But it must be considered that in the current security and strategic environment, this is a very difficult concept to be applied. Especially in recent security environment, because security became highly dynamic state that reflects the development of security environment and security threats associated with security risks at a particular time (Brezula, 2019). War and warfighting are in fact increasingly complex and unpredictable phenomena.

In the past, when monarchs directly commanded their military units and their own personality linked politics directly to warfare, there was no need to distinguish between politics and military strategy. The monarchs made direct decisions with whom, where, why and how long they would fight. The constant balancing of opportunities, threats, risks, and potential gains was the responsibility of the monarch. This implied an immediate and close link between tactics, strategy and politics. With the development of modern state, this military concept, based on one monarch, has become unsustainable. The economic and social organization of modern states allowed the deployment not only of small military units, but also of large army formations. These large army formations required large maneuvering space, and therefore the battlefield grew in proportion to their size. The monarchs were no longer able to personally lead large armies, and the link between politics and military strategy became increasingly complex and distant. But reducing the role of political leaders only as strategic sponsors is even more widening the gap between politics and warfare. In other words,

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winning battles and successful operations have not always contributed to strategic success (Vietnam, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria). In general, we must understand that the role of the political leaders is not only to determine the objectives of the war, to allocate the necessary resources, and then to wait for the victory at a distance. Political elites must be fully engaged in warfare in accordance with Clausewitz's idea that *„the role of the military leader is to assist to as great extent as possible in the crafting of a policy that makes strategic sense, but the final choice rests with the statesman.”* (Clausewitz, 1984) Understanding the changing nature of the 21st century war, which omits standard definitions and concepts, when the adversary seeks to find vulnerabilities within the democratic political system, it is necessary to reduce as much as possible the gap between politics and warfare (Hrnčiar, 2017). This implies the need for solutions which involves military engagements to be strongly shaped by strategic political authorities. War and warfighting are never the only and ideal solution to the crisis, even though it sometimes does. Throughout history, it has been seen that there are elements in human society that always desire a violent form of enforcing their own ambitions against others, but they must then defend their own ambitions also in a violent form only. Therefore, politicians need to understand military capabilities and not misuse or underestimate the military component.

1 War as a political tool

The term politics (from the Greek „polis“ - city, or „politiké techné“ - municipality/city/state administration) usually refers to the process and method of decision making of a certain group of people with various interests and opinions who are trying to achieve a common goal. In the narrower sense, the term politics is used to denote collective decision-making aimed at achieving or maintaining state or municipal power. Such collective decisions often include the ability to manage public affairs, manage the state or community, and defend its interests vis-à-vis others. In accordance with this broader and narrower understanding of the concept of politics, two basic content levels can be traced in this phenomenon (Šušol, 2012):

- *The politics* - everything related to the political process and political activities within the political system of society, including politicians and political parties.
- *The policy* - formulation of programs, measures, intentions that may not be linked to specific actors, but rather to certain topics, areas of activity (defense policy, development policy, information policy). Anyone, not just politicians, can be the creator and implementer of policy - in this sense. for example, we can talk about the specific policy of an institution or organization.

Thus, politics is the process by which power is distributed in human society. The process of distribution, which may be relatively fair, through consensus,

inheritance, elections or tradition. This process can also be chaotic with the use of violence, revolution or fight. In any case, the dynamics of politics create constant pressure on the distribution of power and change in power order. Political events are the result of conflicts, i.e. the activities of compromise or antagonistic parties and their interactions. Exactly these same characteristics can also be applied to war, which makes war an instrument for policy enforcement, i.e. the division of power.

In defining a war, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of politics resulting from the political system and processes and its violent manifestation, called war. One of the fundamentals on relation of the war and politics is the idea that: „*War is nothing but continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.*” (Clausewitz, 1984) War is directly based on the definition of conflict, which is one of the three basic relationships and situations (others are the state of security and crisis) that are the results of relations between the communities of states, states, nations, communities and other elements of the human society (Military doctrine AF SR, 2009). Peace and also war do not exist in their extreme forms. Ideal peace is utopia and absolute war is a theoretical construction with unlimited violence. Rather, these terms belong to both ends of the spectrum of conflict, which express the great diversity of evolving conditions that exist between states. By its nature, war is an act of violence designed to force an adversary to perform a foreign will. The war can be characterized as a long-term and broad-spectrum organized violence with a social impact between at least two distinguishable opposing parties in order to achieve a certain political goal. War is a violent manifestation of tensions and disagreements between political groups and begins when political conflict reaches the emotional level at which organized violence is unleashed.

War is a conflict between states, organizations, or larger groups of people, characterized by the use of violence or physical force between the parties. A typical feature of war is the fact that the parties are convinced that the use of military force is the only way to resolve disputes (Vejmelka, 2005). The concept of war has a complex legal status in relation to international law regulating the circumstances in which states may use armed forces (the traditional term „*jus ad bellum*”) and the way in which armed forces are actually used („*jus in bello*” or more commonly used the law of armed conflict). The traditional definitions of war focused on armed conflict between states in which one or both parties usually fight for national survival. Such a conflict is close to the concept of „absolute war”; it is state that requires the mobilization of all national resources. War can be seen as an intersection between the social and military domains, so it is a social and military phenomenon. Therefore, the use of force in war is determined by the broader context (based on politics) and not solely on military capabilities or lack thereof. During the war, social groups compete for resources, identity, religion or emotional expression and states struggle because of material interests or values.

In general, war ends with destruction, exhaustion, compromise, defeat, surrender, or just a break before its next violent or non-violent stage.

Each particular war has its own specific causes, but in general it can be said that the most fundamental cause is always the human desire for power. Political conflict is usually transformed into war when political opponents feel the opportunity, based on their relative power and war as a means of defending and spreading „their truth” and expanding their power. Power can be understood as a material component that is determined by the amount of money, resources or physical means (weapons and units). At the same time, power can also be understood as a non-physical, intangible component that results from legal, religious and scientific authorities, intellectual or social prestige and reputation, and which supports a diplomatic or military component of power (Bassford, 2015). By its very nature, power provides the means to attack and, at the same time, to deter the attack of another entity. Power is inherently unevenly distributed and its distribution varies in time and character from one entity to another. Therefore, it is also essential for the military strategy to be able to identify where and in what form the power of the opposing party is and to take such measures that the military component is used to produce the right effects and achieve the desired outcomes by politicians.

The fundamental issue of conflicts and wars after World War II (Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria), is the achievement of political and strategic outcome and at the same time ending the deployment of military forces which does not look like withdrawal after defeat. Without legitimate committed political support, military forces cannot achieve a relevant and desired political outcome. Likewise, without legitimate support from the Allies and own country, it is not possible to pursue political goals and effectively use the space and time created by military intervention. Without support, then there is a general perception of a partial failure that results from the different views of politicians and military commanders on their responsibilities and capabilities in times of conflict, war, or intervention. Politicians are needed to determine political goals, ways and ends, and deployed military forces to achieve them. Military forces are executing military activities, in accordance with their standards and policy directives, which represents violent politics solution. Approved political goals have significant impact on conducting military activities and safety of own troops. Safety of own troops is the priority for achieving success during any kind of military activities (Turaj, 2019). Therefore, it is only up to the political decision-makers to determine the political outcome of war or intervention that can be achieved by military forces.

In general, it can be claimed that political leaders deploy military forces when they consider it politically necessary, regardless of whether or not this is beneficial in the situation. This means that military strategy makers must also fully understand political goals, which can sometimes be very emotional or militarily

unclear. And these political goals must be transformed into military effects that support the achievement of the desired political outcome.

2 Military strategy and politics

Building and maintaining mutual trust between political decision-makers and military commanders is crucial, especially in times of crisis or war. Politics and war are both human interactions. It is important that military leaders provide clear and apolitical recommendations and, on the contrary, receive clear and unambiguous political guidance whenever possible. The key is an open and honest exchange of information. It can be argued that the strategic environment is always defined by the nature of the politics and the interactions between political entities. Such a complex environment tends to be influenced by dynamic and sometimes contradictory factors that result from both the rationality and the emotional nature of politics. Strategy makers must be able to assess the importance and peculiarities of these factors and their degree of impact on the strategic environment. Based on the dynamics of the environment, strategies are then created - long-term plans created to achieve the goal or goals. The strategy is one of the outputs of strategic management. In practice, this is usually a formalized document containing a description of the mission, vision and strategic objectives and a timetable for their implementation. It is appropriate that the strategy creator also considers the level for which the strategy is applicable.

The Grand or National Strategy sets out the direction of using all instruments of power to maintain political independence, achieve long-term national goals or protect the vital interests of a country. A collective strategy (Alliance/International Strategy) determines the mission of an alliance or international organization, mostly to maintain peace and prevent war, depends on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and the successful resolution of security crises. The collective strategy also contains strategic concepts that describe how forces and means are coordinated and directed to achieve security goals using diplomatic and military instruments of power. A military strategy is part of a national or international strategy that represents a way to develop military force and use it to achieve the objectives of a given country or group of countries. Documents that guide the military strategy must clearly set out how the strategy will integrate with other non-military elements of the strategy. It is also necessary to clarify the relationship between military strategic goals and the achievement of the strategic outcome. It is highly unlikely that the resulting strategic state will be achieved only by military activity. Once a decision has been made on the strategic outcome (status) and the role of the armed forces in achieving it, resources are allocated and a decision is made on how to use them.

Therefore, a perfect understanding of the relationship between political and military objectives is necessary for all military strategists. It may happen that military factors at some point shape politics. On the contrary, political objectives

will affect the nature of the conflict. The more effort is made when the existence of a system is jeopardized and there is clear eligibility for armed intervention, the more obvious the military nature of the conflict. Based on the outcome, the entity's political goals can be divided into „limited” and „unlimited/high-end” (Bassford, 2015). Unlimited political objectives are aimed at eliminating the adversary as a political entity, that is, eliminating political leaders, including political organizational structures. Rather, limited political objectives are aimed at forcing an adversary to negotiate or adopt proposals without eliminating political structures or initiating a process of political change (Figure 1). Based on this background, it is clear that unlimited political objectives will be largely supported by a military strategy of annihilation. The erosion strategy is not appropriate in achieving these goals, because when the adversary understands that our goal is to completely eliminate it, it will seek to use all available resources to avert such a threat and preserve its existence. Limited political objectives can be achieved by an erosion strategy that is socially and politically more acceptable in this case. In specific cases, it is also advantageous to use a military strategy of total destruction, which would be aimed only at the military component or even at specific military capabilities.



Figure 1 Political objectives in war
Source: (Bassford, 2015)

Based on the lessons learned, it can be claimed that political and military strategic objectives are fundamentally different, even though military strategic objectives must be based on political objectives. Political objectives should describe the vision of what the desired outcome is, i.e. what we want to achieve, including the success criteria. Military strategic objectives should define how to achieve the desired political outcome by military means.

Conclusion

War can be understood, in accordance with Clausewitz's claim, as a natural and fundamental part of politics, because it represents the basis of politics - the struggle for power. War is a long-term organized violence mostly among political opponents. According to Clausewitz, the statement is that „*political intent is a*

purpose, war is a means, and a means cannot be diverted from the purpose.” (Clausewitz, 1984) War can therefore be defined as a „politics tool” or even more precisely identified as a tool for resolving political disputes (Krejčí, 2011). This means that a war without political decision and goal setting is unsustainable. At the same time, but after the start of the war, military activities should be left to the military commanders, and political activities to the politicians. Such an understanding of war could be also found in the work of the Chinese philosopher and warlord Sun Tzu from the 6th century BC, who claimed that *„the war is initiated by monarch giving orders to his military commander. But only the military commander to whom the monarch does not interfere with the command of the army will prevail.”* (Sun-C’, 2008) Military and civilian leaders have different competences, capabilities and responsibilities. Therefore, close cooperation between political and military leaders is needed to ensure that military forces and resources are used to achieve the right political objectives. War represents total violence and conflict resolution using maximum power. And it also influenced by the exponential increase in the use of new technologies (Brezula, 2018). Especially those technologies which are directly involved in warfighting. But war is still just one means of resolving conflicts, essentially terminal. First of all, international law and diplomacy need to be used to resolve conflicts. But one should not forget the lessons of history and claims from Prussian King Frederick II. Great that *„diplomacy without weapons is like music without instruments.”*

In establishing political objectives, particularly those achievable through military power, close cooperation must be maintained between political leaders and the military component. Maintaining the national and military strategies as separate strategies is the first step towards overall misconception of strategies and creates a prerequisite for later failure to achieve political objectives. Such a separation opens the gap between political goals and military plans, which should be bridged by a strategy that specifies exactly how to use military force to achieve the desired political outcome and not just a military outcome. A military strategy that effectively destroyed targets is successful from a military point of view, but can fail politically if it also has no impact on the adversary's politics. The formulated strategy should in all circumstances be nationally apolitical and must be based on defined political objectives. The strategy aims to initiate military activities and identify the military outcome, which sometimes contradicts a democratic politics that is based on avoiding restrictions and exploiting opportunities. Politicians are trying to find ways to keep divergent interests in consensus, which means avoiding long-term and resource-intensive conflicts until absolutely necessary. It is therefore essential for military commanders to understand the nature and nature of politics and the interests of the political leaders who are leading the war. So, military strategy is to answer the fundamental question of how to effectively use military power to achieve political goals.

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THE GLOBAL SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IS A CONSTANT THREAT IN TRAVEL MEDICINE

Bożena Konecka-Szydełko¹

ABSTRACT

Globalization leading to ever greater integration of countries creates a global society. Infectious diseases know no borders and can spread quickly if action is not taken in time. The occurrence of an epidemic threat of infectious diseases can occur in all regions of the world. *International travel can pose epidemiological threats to the import of viral fevers to Poland caused by exotic and Mediterranean pathogens (Dengue hemorrhagic fever, West Nile fever, Zika, Chikungunya) and the potential risk of spreading tropical microorganisms in temperate climate zones. In addition, diseases such as typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, rabies, hepatitis A, B, C, E, measles, cholera, poliomyelitis, due to the development of knowledge, improvement of living conditions, and above all increasing hygiene awareness are less and less frequently listed and even considered eliminated in Europe. In the context of international travel they still pose a potentially high threat to public health.* The risk of contracting infectious and parasitic diseases, which are much more common in regions of the world with different climatic conditions, still largely depends on the behavior of the traveler. There is a lack of awareness of health behaviors during stay and during travel. Travelers doesn't have an know to learn about securing their health. They underestimate the risks posed by tourist visits. It is worth getting information before leaving using reliable sources. *Recommendations for travelers taking into account the latest research results are published by the World Health Organization, the American Center for Infectious Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well as by other international and national units, e.g. Chief Sanitary Inspectorate, National Institute of Public Health National Institute of Hygiene NIZP PZH) in Warsaw.*

Key words: travel medicine, infectious diseases, vaccinations

Introduction

Tropical diseases only occur in countries with a tropical or subtropical climate. They are also particularly common in these regions, but they can also spread to other climates. Tropical diseases can be caused by bacteria, viruses, fungi and single- and multicellular parasites. Infection occurs either directly or via vectors. The occurrence of tropical diseases in certain regions of the world is associated with the climate, poor hygiene conditions, occurrence of transmitters, and the way food is prepared.

Despite many scientific achievements and attempts to prevent the spread of infectious agents, they pose a serious threat to the health of the inhabitants of the globe. Authorities of many countries should unite in the fight against disease. In

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the face of particularly dangerous and highly contagious diseases, which are easily spreading, with high mortality, causing a special threat to public health (viral hemorrhagic fever and other), require the implementation of emergency safety measures by teams providing medical assistance, transporting and treating the patient and teams biological recognition. The occurrence of infections or infectious disease in a given area in a significantly greater number than in the previous period, or the occurrence of infections or infectious diseases not yet occurring is referred to as the epidemic. If there are conditions or indications of an epidemic risk in your area, then we say about the epidemic threat. All measures taken to prevent infectious diseases are directed primarily at breaking the epidemic chain, including inactivating the source of infection, breaking the pathways of infection and immunizing the population at risk of infection. In the global communication network and collecting data on the incidence of travel associated with GeoSentinel, the difficulty in estimating the relative risk of specific diseases acquired during travel causes: regional differentiation in the availability and application of microbiological diagnostics and therapeutic, and the lack of a full clinical relationship between records, which causes the collection of data on basic demographics and travel data, and translates into insufficient representation of all cases in the network. (Wilder-Smith, 2018, p.1).

Globalism in public health connects the problems of developed and developing countries. The occurrence of a biological hazard may have various causes. Some of them are natural, others are and can be in the future caused by intentional and intentional human activity (bioterrorism). Climate warming and related change in the natural area of many diseases, increasing tourist traffic to and from endemic areas, rapid transfer of tourists from areas threatened by epidemics, military peacekeeping missions and stabilization as well as humanitarian missions increase the risk of entering infectious diseases unknown to Poland, including particularly dangerous diseases. The uncontrolled large scale migration movements currently taking place from various regions of Africa and other regions of the world increase the risk of the abovementioned threats (Trzos et al., 2017, p.19).

Changing the environment is associated with the body's exposure to biological, psychological and social factors. The needs of medical care for travelers gave a distinction in medicine of various specialties adapted to the category of illnesses and / or injuries considered typical for individual forms of travel. Risk factors for travel: endemic diseases in specific regions of the world, health burdens for travelers (occurrence of chronic diseases, impaired immune system), differences in age of travelers, abandonment of preventive measures such as preventive vaccinations, anti-malarial chemoprophylaxis, repellents, lack of planning activities during travel (climbing, jumping, diving), threat of terrorism.

Objective of the article

The purpose of the article is to show health threats on international journeys that carry infectious diseases that spread globally.


1 The volume and characteristics of tourist traffic

Data from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), i.e. the United Nations agency, shows that in 2018 the number of tourist trips around the world increased by 6% - to 1.4 billion. In terms of the number of visitors, the Middle East stands out, where there was an increase of 10%. Asia and the Pacific followed the Middle East, where the number of arrivals increased by an average of 6%, mainly due to tourists from China.

Despite the distinctive Middle East region, Europe is still the most visited area in 2018, it was visited 713 million times. Mainly Europeans traveled the continent, but there were also tourists from the United States, China, Japan and the Gulf. UNWTO forecasts an upward trend for the coming years. In 2030, the number of tourist visits is already 1.8 billion, i.e. 400 million more than today. Growth in the long run is also impressive - from just over 0.5 billion in 1995 to the current 1.4 billion (Medoń, 2019).

Figure 1. Number of tourist travels in the world in 1995-2030. The blue line is prognosis, while the red one is data from past years.

Actual Trends vs Tourism 2030 Forecast- World



Source: World Tourism Organization UNWTO

According to data from the Travelplanet Traveler Report covering 2018 (a group of over 200,000 tourists), tourists from Poland traveled and rested in the countries (Table 1):

Table No. 1. Countries where tourists from Poland traveled and rested year

| Year State | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2008 |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Greece | 26,26% | 30,84% | 36,73% | 31,34% | 23,41% | 15,46% |
| Turkey | 15,99% | 9,79% | 7,38% | 16,06% | 14,86% | 14,38% |
| Spain | 12,83% | 15,57% | 17,09% | 12,93% | 10,14% | 9,55% |
| Egypt | 11,46% | 9,78% | 5,83% | 13,13% | 21,41% | 26,75% |
| Bulgaria | 10,77% | 10,81% | 10,57% | 8,27% | 6,32% | 2,72% |
| Italy | 3,32% | 3,98% | 4,87% | 4,37% | 3,23% | 5,35% |
| Albania | 2,63% | 2,18% | 1,53% | | | |
| Tunisia | 2,49% | 1,11% | 0,70% | 1,18% | 8,01% | 13,75% |
| Cyprus | 1,97% | 1,49% | 1,83% | 1,60% | 1,48% | 1,11% |
| Portugal | 1,28% | 1,93% | 1,59% | 1,04% | 1,07% | 1,63% |

Source: *Traveler's Travelplanet 2019 report, s.20.*

Travels from Poland were carried out by means of transport such as: aircraft, own transport and a bus (table 2).

Table No. 2 Means of transport used by tourists from Poland

| Year | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2008 |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| plane | 95,23% | 93,33% | 92,84% | 94,10% | 92,50% | 89,80% |
| own travel | 3,38% | 4,51% | 8,86% | 7,76% | 4,07% | 7,69% |
| coach | 1,39% | 2,16% | 2,30% | 1,14% | 3,43% | 2,5% |

Source: *Travelplanet Traveler's 2019 report, s.30*

If we take into account scheduled and charter flights from Warsaw Chopin Airport (as of December 22, 2019), the threats to travelers are as follows (Tables No. 3 and 4):

Table 3. Selected health threats in the countries to which flights took place from Warsaw Chopin Airport

| Continent | Country | Selected health threats |
|-----------|-------------|--|
| Asia | Armenia | dengue, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, rabies, hepatitis, B, E. |
| | China | measles, cholera, dengue, tuberculosis, Japanese encephalitis, malriaria, poliomyelitis, avian influenza, rabies, hepatitis A, B, SARS-CoV virus infection |
| | India | diphtheria, chikungunya, cholera, dengue, Japanese encephalitis, Zika virus infection, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, malaria, rabies, hepatitis A, E |
| | Israel | West Nile Fever, Hepatitis A |
| | Japan | measles, Japanese encephalitis, rabies |
| | Jordan | typhoid fever, hepatitis A, B, E, MERS-CoV infection |
| | Qatar | hepatitis A, B, MERS-CoV infection |
| | Kazakhstan | Typhoid fever, tuberculosis, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | South Korea | measles, tuberculosis, Japanese encephalitis, malaria, rabies, hepatitis A, B |
| | Lebanon | measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, B, virus infection MERS-CoV |

| | | |
|--------|----------------------|---|
| | Oman | dengue, malaria, hepatitis A, B, MERS-CoV infection |
| | Singapore | measles, dengue, Zika virus infection, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Sri Lanka | dengue, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Thailand | chikungunya, dengue, measles, Zika virus infection, damnit, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, malaria, rabies, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Turkey | West Nile fever, typhoid fever, hepatitis A, B. |
| | Vietnam | dengue, measles, hepatitis A, B, C, Zika virus infection, damnit, tuberculosis, Japanese encephalitis, malaria, rabies |
| | United Arab Emirates | hepatitis A, B, MERS-CoV infection |
| Africa | Egypt | Travelers' diarrhea, dengue, typhoid fever, West Nile fever, tuberculosis, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E, MERS-CoV infection |
| | Gambia | typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, yellow fever, malaria, hepatitis A, B |
| | Kenya | cholera, dengue, measles, chikungunya, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, malaria, poliomyelitis, yellow fever, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Madagascar | measles, dengue, typhoid fever, West Nile fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, malaria, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Morocco | Travelers' diarrhea, dengue, typhoid fever, West Nile fever, tuberculosis, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Mauritius | measles, dengue, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Tanzania | cholera, dengue, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, malaria, hepatitis A, B, E |
| | Tunisia | West Nile Fever, measles, travelers' diarrhea, typhoid fever, malaria, rabies, hepatitis A, B, C, E |
| | Cape Verde | typhoid fever, HIV / AIDS, malaria, hepatitis A, B, rabies |

Source: Border Sanitary and Epidemiological Station in Warsaw
(update 22/12/2019)

Table 4. Selected health threats in countries to which flights took place from Warsaw Chopin Airport

| Continent | Country | Selected health threats |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--|
| Australia and Oceania | Maldives | chikungunya, dengue, measles, Zika virus infection, cholera, tuberculosis, rabies, hepatitis A, B, E |
| Europe | Austria | measles, hepatitis A |
| | Belarus | diphtheria, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Bulgaria | measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Croatia | hantavirus diseases |
| | Cyprus | West Nile Fever |
| | Montenegro | typhoid fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, |
| | Czech Republic | measles |
| | Estonia | typhoid fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | France | measles |
| | Greece | West Nile fever, measles, tuberculosis |
| | Georgia | typhoid, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Spain | measles, dengue |
| | Lithuania | measles, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, B. |
| | Latvia | measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis A, B. |
| | Macedonia | typhoid fever, West Nile fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis A |
| | Malta | tuberculosis |
| | Germany, | measles, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis B, C |
| | Norway | HIV / AIDS, hepatitis B, C |
| | Polish | measles |
| | Russia (European part) | diphtheria, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, B, C, E |
| | Romania | West Nile fever, measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, C |

| | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|--|
| | Serbia | West Nile fever, measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Slovakia | measles |
| | Slovenia | hantavirus diseases |
| | Ukraine | measles, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, hepatitis A, B, C |
| | Hungary | West Nile Fever |
| | Great Britain | measles |
| | Italy | West Nile fever, measles |
| | Canary Islands (Spain) | measles |
| North America and Central | Dominican Republic | Zika virus infection, dengue, typhoid fever, cholera, tuberculosis, HIV / AIDS, malaria, hepatitis A |
| | Canada | West Nile Fever, hantavirus disease |
| | Kuba | Zika virus infection, dengue, typhoid fever, cholera, West Nile fever, hepatitis A, B |
| | Mexico | Zika, dengue, chikungunya, typhoid fever, travelers' diarrhea, cholera, West Nile fever, tuberculosis, malaria, hepatitis A, E |
| | United States | hepatitis A, Zika virus infection, travelers' diarrhea, dengue, HIV / AIDS, West Nile fever |

Source: Border Sanitary and Epidemiological Station in Warsaw
(update 22/12/2019)

2 Epidemiology of selected threats of infectious diseases in the Word

Chikungunya is a viral infectious disease. Most commonly found in Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. Clinical signs are similar to dengue fever (Chikungunya,2020).

Dengue is an infectious disease caused by the dengue virus. The infection vector is *Aedes aegypti* mosquito. It does not transfer directly from person to person. Most often, dengue is asymptomatic (80%) or mild (10-15%). Adults get sick more than children. Dengue hemorrhagic fever with concussive syndrome - occurs mainly in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Philippines). Deaths mainly concern children (Dengue, 2020).

Malaria is a parasitic disease caused by five types of malaria in humans. Human malaria occurs after being bitten by infected mosquitoes, blood transfusions or transmission from mother to fetus. In highly industrialized countries (North America, Western Europe), approximately 10,000 infections are imported annually from disease regions, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The so-called airport or port malaria is known, i.e. the disease near airports and ports of countries where the disease does not occur, and infection vectors (mosquitoes) enter the temperate climate zone by means of transport (airplanes, ships). (Malaria, 2020).

Viral hemorrhagic fever - (VHF) are serious systemic infectious diseases that occur with fever and vascular damage, usually accompanied by symptoms of a hemorrhagic diathesis. VHF belong to vector diseases (mosquito bites, ticks), droplets or direct contact with infectious material (blood, sweat, feces, urine, vomiting). Man is a natural reservoir of VHF for dengue and yellow fever (urban form). Other VHFs are zoonoses in which the infection reservoir is located in the

natural environment of wild fauna (monkeys, rodents, birds, ticks) or among domestic animals (sheep, cattle). In the course of the hemorrhagic fever of Marburg, Ebola, Lassa, as well as part of South American fever in the New World (Bolivian hemorrhagic fever), viruses can spread between people through drops or contact with infectious material. The incubation period for hemorrhagic fever is usually 3-21 days (average 7 days). Neurological disorders and signs of renal failure may also occur in severe conditions. Some viral haemorrhagic fevers may be the cause of intravascular coagulation syndrome (DIC). The predictions for VHF depend on the location and severity of the hemorrhagic diathesis, the occurrence of systemic complications (shock, DIC) and organ complications (renal failure), and primary accompanying diseases. African fever (Marburg, Ebola, Lassa) and Hanta virus are worse. Mortality in VHF is high and is about 10-15%, in the case of infection with Ebola and Marburg it reaches 50-90%. (Viral hemorrhagic fever - (VHF), 2020).

Travelers' diarrhea is usually defined as three or more loose stools a day. For this, there must be one symptom such as abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, pressure on the stool, fever. The most common pathogen of travelers' diarrhea is enterotoxigenic *Escherichia coli*. Other infectious agents include bacteria (*Salmonella*, *Shigella*, *Campylobacter*), viruses (Norwalk, adeno- and rotaviruses) and protozoa (*Entamoeba histolytica*, *Giardia intestinalis*, *Cryptosporidium parvum*). Travelers' diarrhea is cosmopolitan. The highest incidence occurs in children under 2 years of age and in adults in the 20-30 age range. Most cases of the disease are associated with the consumption of contaminated food and / or water. (Travelers' diarrhea, 2020).

Cholera is an acute bacterial contagious gastrointestinal disease. It belongs to particularly dangerous diseases, especially untreated. Infection occurs through ingestion of contaminated water or food, rarely through direct contact with a sick person or carrier. Over the past decade, an increasing number of cases have been observed worldwide. The World Health Organization estimates the global prevalence of cholera at 1.3-4 million infections and 21-143 thousand deaths annually. (Cholera, 2020).

Poliomyelitis - in 1988, 350,000 cases of poliomyelitis were reported worldwide. Currently, the incidence has been reduced by 99%. Despite this, new cases are still being observed, which delays reaching the state of full eradication of the disease in the world. Until the global spread of wild Polio strains is interrupted, all disease-free countries and areas are considered to be at risk of WPV attachment and an outbreak of epidemics. *Prevention*: vaccination is the most effective prevention method (Poliomyelitis, 2020).

Tuberculosis - an infectious disease caused by *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*. Tuberculosis is a cosmopolitan disease, the most common infection in the world. WHO estimates that TB is infected with over 2 billion people, especially in Third World countries in Asia and Africa, where the incidence rates reach 100-300 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. Tuberculosis is, along with AIDS,

the main cause of death from infectious diseases in the world (over 2 million people a year). (Tuberculosis, 2020)

Measles is an acute, viral infectious disease that spreads through the droplets or through direct contact with the infected and its secretions. The disease occurs all over the world, especially in people who are not immune (at any age) in countries where the level of vaccination is low. A threat to travelers is contact with infected people. Measles is most dangerous for children up to 5 years and people with low immunity (Measles, 2020).

Rabies - a viral infectious disease. The source of rabies virus are wild animals (foxes, bats, rodents) and domestic animals (dogs, cats). Human infection occurs by biting or swallowing the skin of a sick animal. Rabies is a cosmopolitan disease that occurs all over the world. The list of countries reporting human rabies is regularly updated by WHO; it currently has 90 countries in Asia, Africa, Central and South America. It is estimated that about 55,000 people die from rabies every year. Most rabies cases are recorded in India (about 20,000 a year), and in other countries of South and Southeast Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia) and in Africa (Democratic Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso), Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique) (Rabies, 2020).

Infections with SARS coronaviruses - epidemic in the years 2002–2003 SARS incidents occurred in 29 countries / territories in Asia, Europe and North America. The highest number of cases was observed in China - 87.7% (including 21.7% in Hong Kong). In other countries, cases were reported in a significantly lower number. Based on the analysis of the spread of infections together with travelers around the world, the risk of hauling and spreading SARS infections was considered high. An example would be Canada, in which the largest SARS outbreak occurred outside of Asia - incidence was confirmed in a total of 251 people, of which only 5 were imported cases. In this country 43 people died as a result of SARS-CoV infection. One of the reasons for this SARS outbreak was that the patient disregarded the quarantine recommendations and the need to seek medical attention. *Prevention*: the application of strict hygiene rules to cut the pathways for these infections and to submit to tests and recommendations for dealing with suspected illness or illness (Pancer, 2018, p.26).

Summary

The risk of contracting infectious and parasitic diseases, which are much more common in regions of the world with different climatic conditions, still largely depends on the behavior of the traveler. When planning a trip, take appropriate preventive measures to reduce the risk of getting sick. People with chronic illnesses should consult their physician before planning a trip. Any traveler with chronic illness he should carry all necessary medications and medical items with him throughout the journey.

The basic ways to prevent some infectious diseases include vaccinations, which are the most important element of preparation before departure, and compliance with broadly understood hygiene during the journey. In the international travel movement, according to WHO guidelines, mandatory vaccinations are carried out against yellow fever and against meningococcal infections.

Recommended vaccinations are a proposition for preventive measures, the implementation of which is not obligatory but can protect travelers against infections that pose a threat to health and life. Before traveling, in places of endemic occurrence of infectious diseases transmitted by insects, you should obtain personal protective equipment, which includes repellents (chemical repellents) in the first place.

In the place where there are flying insects (mosquitoes, flies, etc.), ensure the tightness of the nets in the windows of closed rooms, the efficiency of air-conditioning devices and the tightness of the mosquito net above the sleeping place.

In areas at risk of malaria, use antimalarial prophylaxis. In the prevention of food-borne diseases: avoid drinking ice-cold beverages of unknown origin, eating food from street vendors, avoid consumption of unpasteurized dairy products, drink only bottled or boiled water, maintain hand hygiene (washing your hands with soap and water before eating or using gels, wipes with a disinfectant).

When traveling, take precautions before and after biting by animals (tropicalmedi-cine.pl/traweler-necessity). Traveling to exotic destinations is associated with the risk of tourists suffering from diseases typical of the visited area.

A comprehensive review of the literature published in the Journal of Travel Medicine (Journal of Travel Medicine, 2018,s.1) emphasized that between 6% and 80% of travelers will fall ill during or as a result of travel. Understanding the health practices of international travelers is therefore a key element in developing strategies to reduce the transmission of infectious diseases.

Education of travelers in terms of behavior plays an important role here in tropical regions, in particular regarding the principles of diarrhea prevention, protection against exposure to infection and the equipment of a travel kit. In addition, having a vaccination before traveling is one of the best ways to prevent infectious diseases.

Recommendations for travelers taking into account the latest research results are published by the World Health Organization, the American Control Center and Prevention of Infectious Diseases (CDC), as well as by other international and national units, e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Sanitary Inspectorate, National Institute of Public Health National Institute of Hygiene NIZP PZH) in Warsaw.

The priority of travel medicine in Poland is to provide medical care to people first, who, on their return, experienced symptoms that were in troublesome

climatic conditions and low sanitary standards for many months, people prone to risky behaviors (avoiding the use of personal protective equipment, consumption of meals of unknown origin, unprotected sexual contacts).

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SAUDI ARABIA'S VISION 2030

Dominika Kosárová¹

ABSTRACT

Saudi Arabia adopted Vision 2030 four years ago to diversify economy and reduce dependency on oil. Since then, certain important reforms have been introduced, however, there are numerous challenges that still need to be addressed for the Vision to successfully transform economy and society. The objective of this article is thus to evaluate Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of its implementation, challenges and implications on domestic as well as regional level. It points out to several issues that may influence Vision's implementation negatively, one of them being the impact of the Vision on the social contract. If the social contract is violated without successfully transforming the economy, people might call for compensation in the form of political benefits, thus endangering the Saudi regime and stability.

Key words: *Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, rentier state theory, social contract*

Introduction

Saudi Arabia introduced Vision 2030 in 2016 to overcome the economic dependency on oil. It was adopted under specific circumstances which revealed that the rent-based social contract managing state-society relations since decades would not be sustainable if no major economic restructuring occurred. Saudi Vision 2030 is thus an ambitious project of socioeconomic transformation. However, its implementation, to be successful, requires dealing with numerous challenges and obstacles. The aim of this article is thus to evaluate Saudi Vision 2030 in terms of its implementation, challenges and implications. At first, circumstances of its adoption will be examined with a particular focus on the rentier state theory and social contract between the royal family and Saudi citizens, and the content of the Vision will be briefly outlined. Afterwards, we provide an overview of major reforms that have been initiated already as part of the Vision's implementation since its adoption four years ago. The final part is focused on challenges that could prevent successful implementation of the Vision, while some authors including **H. Khashan** consider them as insurmountable obstacles that predetermine the Vision's failure. Finally, potential implications of the Vision's success or failure are suggested. This article thus provides a complex overview of Vision 2030, by first looking in the past (why was it adopted, what does it aim for and what has been done so far), then in the present (what are the

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challenges that need to be addressed) and finally providing possible future scenarios and their implications.

The most relevant source was the Vision itself and Saudi government's official websites devoted to the Vision. This part was written in the Czech Republic given that in Slovakia, where the author has her personal background, the access to these websites is denied. In addition, this article stems from numerous analyses that evaluate Vision 2030 critically including the articles written by **A. A. Ghafar**, **M. Nuruzzaman** or **J. Kinninmont**, who focused on the Vision's impact on Saudi Arabia's social contract.

1 Vision 2030 explained

Saudi Vision 2030 needs to be understood in a specific context of state-society relations which are determined by the kingdom's enormous oil resources. Until the USA took over its position last year, Saudi Arabia was the world's major producer and exporter of oil and its economy was highly oil-dependent. In 2018, oil incomes represented as much as "42% of the kingdom's GDP, 90% of export earning and 87% of budget revenues." (Nuruzzaman, 2018) Similar to other Gulf monarchies rich in natural resources, enormous wealth coming from the oil industry enabled the royals to establish a rentier system of governance. The rentier state theory stems from the premise that oil revenues determine the relations between the state and society. When revenues are high, an authoritarian government is able to buy popular support and fidelity by means of subsidies for water, fuel, electricity and other commodities, high wages in public sector and freeing citizens from taxes. It literally means "no taxation, no representation", in other words the state provides people with economic benefits in exchange for loyalty. (Baumann, 2019) In this system, people are only passive beneficiaries who do not contribute to the state budget. (Mohammadzadeh, 2019) It may work only as long as the state has enough revenues to fulfill its part of this rent-based social contract.

In Saudi Arabia, the social contract has been working since oil became its prime economic commodity. However, oil-dependency makes Saudi economy highly vulnerable to changes in oil prices which was manifested not once in the history. Being aware of risks stemming from the excessive oil-dependency, Saudi Arabia has been trying to diversify its economy since 1970s, when the first five-year development plan was adopted. Its objective was to transform the Saudi oil-based economy and achieve balanced development, however, the above-stated numbers from 2018 reveal that even nine successive development plans did not manage to accomplish this goal. (Ghafar, 2018) Vision 2030, adopted in 2016, and a more detailed National Transformation Program 2020, are sometimes perceived as the continuation of the ninth development plan. (Khashan, 2017) However, since 1970 it has been probably the most ambitious attempt to transform

the Saudi economy. There are two specific reasons behind the adoption of the Vision and its high ambitions.

Vision 2030 was initiated by **Mohammad bin Salman** in reaction to two major trends that the kingdom has been facing: *decrease in oil prices* and *demographic challenges*. Combination of these two tendencies have potential to significantly endanger the rentier system and hence the social contract that exists between the royals and the people, and thus endanger the legitimacy of the regime and stability of the state. The drop in oil prices in 2014-2015 (from 115 USD to 40 USD per barrel) forced Saudi Arabia to adopt a deficit budget, which re-emphasized the need of economic diversification. (Nuruzzaman, 2018) Not to mention that oil is not a renewable resource and there is an ongoing debate how many reserves Saudi Arabia actually has. Therefore, there is an urgent need to prepare for the post-oil future, which is in fact the ultimate ambition of Vision 2030. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's population is rapidly growing. In 2016, approximately 70% of the Saudis were under the age of 30, (Reed, 2016) while by 2030, half of the population is expected to be under 25. (Ghafar, 2018) It means that the state will have to create millions of new jobs for young people in the near future which will further increase pressure on state budget. The combination of these two trends, decreasing oil prices and growing population, makes the rentier social contract system unviable and points to the need to reassess the Saudi economic model. (Alhussein, 2019) Under these circumstances, the Council of Ministers approved Vision 2030, a new strategy for the kingdom, in April 2016. Vision 2030 is regarded as a "mega-project" or a "monumental experiment" of Saudi economic transformation with the ambition to reduce dependency on oil revenues and enhance economic diversification. Although considered as a primarily economic project, and by the crown prince presented even as a *purely* economic program, (Reed, 2016) its implementation requires also considerable social reforms. The Vision consists of three major pillars, while each of them has its strategic objectives defined (see the table below).

| Pillar | Strategic objective |
|------------------|--|
| Vibrant society | Strengthen Islamic and national identity |
| | Offer a fulfilling and healthy life |
| Thriving economy | Grow and diversify the economy |
| | Increase employment |
| Ambitious nation | Enhance government effectiveness |
| | Enable social responsibility |

Each pillar also consists of numerous *directions* (ways to achieve the desired end state) and specific *goals* (means to do it). The Vision outlines 96 goals all together such as enhancing tourism including welcoming more than 30 million pilgrims annually; increasing the private sector's contribution to the GDP to 60%; enabling partial privatization of several sectors such as health care, air travel and

housing; increasing foreign direct investment to 5.7% of GDP; enhancing non-oil exports and the role of SMEs; manufacturing half of all military gear; reducing unemployment to 7% by Saudization of private sectors; increasing women's participation in the workforce to 30%; increasing the average life expectancy to 80 years; increasing ratio of people exercising regularly or encouraging people to spend more on entertainment and cultural events. Ultimately, it seeks to move into the world's top 15 economies. The achievement of these goals requires human capital, therefore, the Vision seeks to invest in education and training of both men and women and attract qualified workforce. (Vision 2030, Strategic objectives...) Vision 2030 is regarded as an ambitious plan of socioeconomic liberalization.

2 Implementation

Given its high ambitions and relatively short timeframe, some analysts remain skeptical on whether it will achieve its objectives, (Nuruzzaman, 2018) while others even believe that it is "bound to fail". (Khashan 2017). Nevertheless, since its adoption four years ago, there has been certain progress and several important reforms have been implemented.

Already in 2016, the competencies of the Committee of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, also known as religious police, have been diminished. The Committee was an important instrument of clerics to enforce the social order based on their ultra-conservative interpretation of sharia. It imposed severe social restrictions on public spaces as well as harsh punishments for violation of law. Curbing its powers was regarded as a prerequisite for economic liberalization and social change. Moreover, the ban on cinemas was lifted after 35 years and since then, concerts, operas and movie screenings have been organized in the country. (Abdellatif, 2019) Certain liberalization is required if Saudi Arabia wants to attract more tourists, not restricted solely to pilgrims. In 2019, an unprecedented decision was taken to allow citizens from 49 countries to apply for tourist visa. Female tourists do not even have to wear abaya although there are certain dressing norms that need to be respected. More liberties have been granted also to Saudi women, which had been treated from the Western perspective as second-rated. They were not allowed to drive and without the consent of their male guardian they were forbidden to work, get married, visit hospital or travel inside or outside the country. Many female activists campaigning for women empowerment were imprisoned. Yet finally, in 2018 women were officially granted the right to drive, and since 2019, they are allowed to apply for passport and travel without requiring the guardian's consent. These steps were imperative in order to increase the women's participation in the workforce as stipulated in one of the Vision's goals.

When it comes to employment in general, most Saudis (approximately 70% of the workforce) are employed in public sector where they are paid high wages. (Ghafar, 2018) However, this will be unsustainable given the demographic trends

and increasing pressure on the budget. In response to these trends, Saudi Arabia needs to support the private sector, which has been traditionally dominated mostly by foreigners, who work for much lower salaries when compared to the public sector. The public sector employs twice as many Saudi citizens as the private sector, (Kinninmont, 2017, p. 3), while in the overall it is estimated that 80% of the Saudi workforce are expatriates. (Khashan, 2017) Saudi Arabia thus announced the so called Saudization program which requires private companies to employ certain quota of Saudi nationals. Yet, as **Khashan** (2017) points out, it remains questionable whether Saudis will be willing to work in the private sector for less money and if they are adequately qualified for such work.

Yet the major rupture with the social contract came with lifting subsidies from fuel and introducing taxes on undeveloped urban lands, which was later expanded to include also tobacco products, e-cigarettes, sugary drinks or air tickets. (Abdellatif, 2019, Khalid, 2019) However, income and some basic commodities were claimed not to be taxed. (Reed, 2016) Money raised from taxes have thus become another source of the state budget. As **Alhussein** (2019, p. 6) points out: *“The leadership has broken from the old social contract by emphasising that Saudi Arabia has now entered a new era in which citizens must contribute to the good of the country, as opposed to simply receiving benefits as their forebears did.”* In this context, investment in the entertainment industry may also be perceived as a certain kind of “compensation” to young people for lost economic benefits in order to maintain their support in favor of reforms.

However, implementation of the Vision requires significant investments and financial resources. For that purpose, Saudi Arabia has been counting on selling a share in Saudi ARAMCO, Saudi national oil company and the world’s largest oil producer. This money will be used by the Public Investment Fund to further implement the Vision. In December 2019, Saudi ARAMCO started to trade on the Saudi stock exchange and by selling 1.5% of its shares it managed to raise 25.6 billion USD, which makes Saudi ARAMCO’s initial public offering the biggest in history. (Horowitz, Defterios, 2019) One of the biggest investments is expected to be the establishment of the megacity called Neom. It has been presented as a futuristic city operated by smart technologies, artificial intelligence and solar energy, and given its location on the Red Sea coast, it should serve as a logistical hub. However, number of analysts compare this initiative to a similar project of six new economic cities that Saudi Arabia launched around 2005, that nevertheless failed to attract enough investors and inhabitants. (Baumann, 2019, Ghafar, 2014)

Hence, despite certain progress towards socioeconomic liberalization, it remains questionable whether Saudi Arabia will succeed in implementing Vision 2030 efficiently and whether its implementation will manage to transform the Saudi economy and society in the desired way. Currently, there are several challenges that the Vision is facing and obstacles that need to be addressed for its implementation to be successful. Moreover, whether it succeeds or not, there is

another question what implications it will have on domestic as well as international level.

3 Assessing challenges and implications

Major challenges that might impede the implementation of the Vision stem from domestic structural as well as regional issues. One of the greatest structural obstacles concerns *ultra-conservative Muslim tradition* that is strongly present throughout the society. Since the establishment of the Saudi state, Wahhabi clerics have been responsible for culture, religion and social order in line with their interpretation of religion. Yet Wahhabism is a fundamentalist ideology that is opposed to modernization and Westernization and instead, it seeks return to early Muslim practices. Being aware of the incompatibility between strict ultra-conservatism and opening of the society, **Mohammad bin Salman** restricted coercive capacities of the religious police and announced the intention to “*revert to the moderate Islam open to the world and all religions*”. (Lacroix, 2019, p. 97) How such a transformation should look like and how the ultra-conservative and traditionally closed part of the society and Wahhabi clerics will react to it, remains uncertain. There is a risk that the followers of the ultra-conservative Wahhabi tradition would disapprove **Mohammad bin Salman**’s reforms such as granting women more rights and enhancing entertainment. Moreover, it has already happened in the past, when king **Faisal** tried to modernize the Saudi society, yet his attempts were encountered by strong opposition from the part of radical ultra-conservatives who eventually sieged the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The clash between a pro-reform-oriented king and radical ultra-conservatives ultimately ended king’s ambitions to modernize the society and reinforced the Wahhabi traditions instead, in order to appease the ultra-conservatives and avoid another attack. Today, the situation might be slightly different given that the society is more used to some elements of modernity such as technology and internet, however, the conservative tradition is still strongly embedded. The right balance thus needs to be found between modernizing and opening the society on one hand and maintaining religious traditions on the other hand in order to avoid prospective unrest from the part of both, clerics and people. Up to now, clerics have been rather quiet, although the right for women to drive was considered for many of them as the red line, yet, at the same time, it is regarded by the crown prince as a necessary step towards women’s integration into the labor market. (Lacroix, 2019) Clerical silence might be explained also by the state repression of those who oppose or criticize the regime.

Another challenge stems from the inadequate *education system*. One of the Vision’s goals aims to rank four Saudi national universities among the world’s top two hundred. However, the Saudi education system is focused on religious subjects and memorization instead of science and technology that are crucial for the Vision’s implementation. According to PISA testing, Saudi 15-year old

students performed far behind the OECD average in all three tested areas: reading, mathematics and science. (PISA, 2018) Similarly, TIMSS 2015 testing of mathematics and sciences revealed that the results of Saudi elementary and secondary school students were among the lowest in the world. (Nuruzzaman, 2018) This shows that Saudi Arabia lacks scientific and technological know-how to implement its Vision and depends on foreign workers. However, importing workforce from abroad would increase costs and it would marginalize Saudi nationals, which is in conflict with the declared Saudization of the labor market. Given that the Saudi education system that is not sufficiently equipped to provide graduates with the required know-how, private companies already face difficulties in meeting the quota in hiring Saudis that would be not only willing but also able to work in the private sector. (Ghafar, 2018) Adequate education and training is thus a prerequisite for the successful implementation of Vision 2030.

Moreover, analysts usually emphasize the *exclusion of political modernization* as the Vision's weakness and they doubt that economic transformation is viable without political accountability and transparency. (Nuruzzaman, 2018, Ghafar, 2018, Khashan, 2017) Saudi Arabia's political system is authoritarian, restrictive in terms of liberties and freedoms and repressive against regime opponents and critics. A minor progress has been made in some areas such as curbing powers of the religious police or cracking down on corrupted royals, prominent businessmen and government employees. However, all this happened in parallel to further limiting the freedom of speech and arresting activists. Moreover, a new counter-terrorism law was adopted in 2017, yet, its objective is to deter public criticism of the regime, while the application called Kulluna Amn encourages citizens to report those who allegedly offended the state. (Alhussein, 2019, p. 8-9) Hence, despite some reforms, the political system as such is not going to change. However, this authoritarian system may work as long as the *social contract* remains intact. But cutting the subsidies and introducing taxes violates the basic principles of the social contract between the state (provider of subsidies) and citizens (passive beneficiaries of economic privileges in exchange for loyalty and no political representation). If one part of the equation (subsidies) is violated without changing the other side of it (loyalty without political representation), it could lead to a dangerous disbalance. In such a case, domestic stability would depend on the Vision's implementation and its impact on the citizen's living conditions. If the Vision succeeds to decrease unemployment and produce sustainable economic growth, people could refrain from requiring political representation even without subsidies. The worst-case scenario would be the failure of the Vision to create enough jobs for the Saudis while cutting subsidies, introducing taxes and depriving them of the right to criticize the regime. This would lead to growing dissatisfaction, social pressure, eventually unrest and demands to renegotiate the social contract.

Another challenge that might undermine the Vision's success stems from regional developments. First of all, Saudi *foreign military engagement* caused

budgetary constraints. Saudi Arabia had been long refraining from direct military involvement abroad. A policy change occurred on the background of the Arab Spring when Saudis first sent their troops to Bahrain in support of the Sunni monarchy. Moreover, since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition fighting against the Houthi rebels in Yemen, while it has been also supporting Syrian rebel groups. (Poljakovič, 2017) Defense spending has thus increased at the expense of domestic socio-economic development. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia has been *losing regional export markets*. In 2017, Saudis declared the blockade of Qatar and ended trade relations with their neighbor regardless of the fact that for the Qatari market, the Saudis were the primary suppliers. (Nuruzzaman, 2018) In consequence, Qatar established relations with Iran and Turkey, Saudi's regional rivals, while Saudi Arabia lost an important market for its products. Saudi export markets have been negatively affected also by recent development in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Last but not least, *security situation in the Middle East* has had direct implications on the investment climate. The investors' appetite to invest in the Middle East has been affected by the increasing instability and volatility of the environment. However, foreign investors are crucial for the Vision's implementation, hence, lack of them would make its implementation difficult, if not impossible. Part of the Saudi Vision is to make the environment attractive for investments, however, several steps have been made that had exactly the opposite effect, including the arrest of prominent businessmen in Riyadh as well as the murder of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey. A similar logic can be applied also to tourism.

Thus, there are several challenges that may impede the Vision's successful implementation. Whether the Vision will succeed or not, it will have direct domestic as well as regional implications. In case of failure and breakdown of the social contract without renegotiating a new one, the regime risks losing legitimacy and loyalty, which could trigger social unrest. Moreover, instability in Saudi Arabia, one of the largest oil producers and exporters, would endanger global energy as well as economic security. On the other hand, **Nuruzzaman** (2019) suggests that the Vision's success could further encourage **Mohammad bin Salman**'s ambition of regional dominance. It could thus affect the regional order and further aggravate relations with Iran, which claims a similar position in the region. Hence, whatever the fate of the Vision, it will have consequences not only for Saudi Arabia's future and stability, but it will also affect the Middle Eastern stability and order as well as the energy and economic security.

Conclusion

Vision 2030 definitely is an ambitious project of socioeconomic transformation of Saudi Arabia aiming to promote economic diversification, reduce oil-dependency, enhance private sector as well as socioeconomic

liberalization, and open Saudi Arabia to investors and tourists. However, achievement of these goals requires considerable financial resources as well as human capital. For that purpose, the kingdom made Saudi ARAMCO's initial public offering and adopted certain steps towards women empowerment and their integration into the labor market. Yet, more needs to be done to improve the education system, which currently does not provide enough skilled workers, making Saudi progress dependent on foreign workforce.

The implementation of the Vision is facing a number of challenges, including ideological facets of traditionally conservative Saudi Arabia, non-attractiveness of the private sector for Saudi nationals, impact of regional instability on investments and tourism, and loss of regional markets. Yet, one of the Vision's greatest challenges is the impact of the socioeconomic transformation on the rent-based social contract. Cutting the subsidies, introducing taxes and limiting the number of easily available and well-paid jobs in the public sector undermine the principles of the state-society relations in Saudi Arabia. There is a risk that the reduction of economic benefits without adequate compensation would make citizens call for more political benefits, such as political representation and democratization. Saudi domestic stability and legitimacy of the regime thus largely depends on the successful implementation of Vision 2030. It depends on whether the socioeconomic transformation would ensure enough jobs for enormous youth bulge and sustainable economic growth that would not depend solely on oil prices. Yet, regardless of the Vision's success or failure, the Saudi domestic development is the matter of regional stability and order given Saudi Arabia's geopolitical significance and its regional ambitions.

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EVOLUTION OF GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE MAIN GERMAN PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

Michał M. Kosman¹

ABSTRACT

The unification of Germany in 1990 influenced in a significant way the geopolitical map of Europe. On the one hand, it gave rise to fears of neighbors about the possibility of Germany renationalising its policy and loosening ties with the European Communities and then the European Union. On the other hand, expectations for greater activity in solving international security problems have been formulated towards Germany. The article aims to present the evolution of Germany's security policy, which has been characterized by both, elements of continuation and as well as change over the past thirty years. The author will describe the attitude of Germany to the most important international security challenges in this period and will outline the content of the most important documents in the field of German security policy.

Key words: Germany, German foreign policy, international security, White Paper, Defense policy guidelines.

Introduction: Doubts around German foreign policy after reunification (continuation or change)?

One of the most important results of the end of the Cold War with far-reaching geopolitical effects was the unification of Germany in 1990. This event was part of the process of détente in East-West relations, manifesting itself in earlier transformation in the Soviet Union as part of perestroika, democratization of Central and Eastern European countries from 1989, or finally the collapse of the USSR. The foundations of the „old” Federal Republic of Germany were supposed to be the antithesis of the Nazi ideology of the Third Reich, so it is not surprising that they were based on strong pacifist accents and far-reaching restraint in proclaiming and advocating their own interests internationally. The unification of Germany in this situation became an event that raised a number of questions and doubts related to the future of this country, which significantly increased its territorial and demographic potential. In the course of the unification process, fears of the neighbors appeared (more or less camouflaged), whether united Germany would not be tempted to treat its presence in the European Union as a corset restricting its freedom of action on the international arena and return to the path of hegemonic rivalry on the Old Continent. Confirmation of such fears

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was for instance a very reserved attitude of the leaders of France (**François Mitterrand**) and Great Britain (**Margaret Thatcher**) to the process of reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 (see more M. M. Kosman, 2003). Similar doubts were manifested in the attitude of the Polish authorities. It is important to stress that Polish diplomacy has intensively demanded participation in the „2+4” conference on the conditions for the unification of Germany, in particular in its part devoted to German borders. These efforts were crowned by the presence of Polish representatives at the Paris meeting in July 1990 (see more Tomala, 2000).

At the beginning of the 1990s, German political circles were aware of the fears about growing potential of Germany, raised in neighboring countries. The CDU/CSU-FDP government, led by **Helmut Kohl**, made efforts to convince partners from the EC and the NATO that it intends to continue multilateral cooperation within these organizations and continue to support efforts to maintain international peace and security. An important step to close the speculations about the possible questioning of the Polish-German border was the conclusion of the border treaty with Poland on November 14, 1990 (*Vertrag...*, 1990). Difficult talks with the Soviet Union also ended with success of German diplomacy. In exchange for relatively small concessions (mainly financial) Germany achieved all its strategic goals - unification of the two German states, withdrawal of the Soviet troops from eastern Germany and consent to remain in NATO as united Federal Republic of Germany (Kosman, 2013, pg. 77-137).

New geopolitical circumstances that prompted to reflect on the new role of the united Germany are as follows:

- external factors, i.e. the end of the Cold War and thus a significant decrease in the threat of global conflict, but also an increase in the risk of regional conflicts and destabilization of Germany's international environment, as well as enforced caution caused by the presence of Soviet/Russian troops in eastern Germany until 1994.

- internal factors, i.e. an increase in the territorial, demographic and economic potential (despite reservations related to the need to invest huge financial resources in the economic recovery of the former GDR).

The sum of these circumstances has become a source of reflection on the future of German security policy. During the Cold War, it was part of Western policy based on foundations such as the alliance with the United States (military security guarantees), reconciliation with France, and active efforts to promote west-european integration. However, after reunification in 1990, the existing axioms of German foreign and security policy were confronted in the public debate with the new conditions of international policy.

1 First years of debate on the continuation and change in German foreign and security policy

One of the most serious issues of the German debate on foreign and security policy involved the international intervention against Iraq after its attack on Kuwait and the announcement of its annexation in August 1990. During preparations for the intervention, the United States expected military support from NATO allies. These appeals were received with positive response, among others Great Britain and France, while the Federal Republic of Germany limited its reaction to financial support (so called „checkbook diplomacy”) and sending air defense units to Turkey and ships to the Mediterranean (Guérin-Sendelbach, 1999, pg. 221- 236). The reluctance to participate in combat operations in the Middle East was criticized by allies (especially the US), however at that stage it could have been justified as the continuation of the West German policy. The German authorities claimed that the Constitution did not allow Bundeswehr's armed forces any operations outside the area of the NATO treaty. Another argument would be the negative public perception of the possible decision on Germany's participation in combat operations against Iraq. In addition, the calendar of the unification process, which after signing the treaty restoring German unity on September 12, 1990, entered the phase of ratification procedures, discouraged Germany from participating in military operations. Germany wanted to avoid any complications in the process of ratifying the treaty in the USSR. It took place in March 1991. Gradually, Germany freed itself from its current restrictions, slowly entering the path of increasingly independent actions on the international stage. The recognition of the statehood of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991 was a spectacular example of changes taking place in German foreign policy. This decision was met with very critical reception in the European Community, especially later on, accusations were formed that it contributed to the escalation of the conflict in Yugoslavia. That was also reflected in the internal public debate in Germany. (Koszel, 1999, pg. 243-266; Rupnik, 2007, pg. 466-467; Guérin-Sendelbach, 1999, pg. 236-257).

Both the elements of continuation and change in German foreign and security policy were reflected in the main programming documents of individual ministries. The first comprehensive document of this type was Defense Policy Guidelines of November 26, 1992, published by the Ministry of Defense. The starting point was the conclusion that after the end of the Cold War, Germany's security improved. At the same time, the authors of the document noted the growing importance of Germany in the international arena and the resulting obligations. The diagnosis of the international situation sounded optimistic for Germany, because the risk of widespread aggression against Germany was clearly decreasing. However, the emphasis was placed on the likelihood of smaller conflicts in the international environment, including non-military threats, requiring appropriate security prevention from Germany and its allies. The

necessity to support the stabilization of the post-Soviet space was pointed out. In addition, a strong emphasis was placed on the need to further strengthen European integration processes, strengthen Europe as a global actor, support stability behind the eastern Germany's borders, reform the transatlantic partnership, and further develop Euro-Atlantic institutions. The document emphasizes the collective nature of German security, underlining the importance of NATO, the European Union, which was in process of creation, the Western European Union, the CSCE (since 1995 OSCE - MMK) and the UN (*Die Verteidigungspolitischen ...*, 1992, pp. 6-16).

The above-mentioned issues were more extensively reflected in the White Paper published two years later - in April 1994. The conclusion about the outdated threat of aggression on a large scale and the security of territorial integrity of Germany appeared again. However, conflicts have been noted with concern in other parts of Europe, especially in the area of former Yugoslavia, as well as an increase in global threats (*Weißbuch...*, 1994).

In the debate on the continuation and change in German security policy, important decisions were made in mid-1994. One of the most important problems in this regard was the issue of the admissibility of the Bundeswehr's involvement outside the NATO area. Making a generalization it can be assumed that the ruling CDU/CSU and FDP were in favor of a greater use of German potential for international security and the involvement of the German armed forces out of the area. The SPD and the Greens presented a more conservative position. These doubts were resolved with the verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) of July 12, 1994. The Tribunal interpreted several articles of the Constitution and issued a verdict that the participation of German armed formations outside NATO, including combat operations are compliant with the German Consitution, provided that they act under the NATO, EU or UN mandate (*Urteil...*, 1994, pg. D428-D431). The verdict of the Tribunal created a constitutional framework for greater German military involvement in the international arena and thus participation in solving international security problems. Germany has taken a huge step towards the „normalization” of its foreign policy - bolder articulation of its own interests and greater international activity, according to its potential. As a consequence of this step, as early as mid-1995, decisions were made regarding the dispatch of Tornado aircraft to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after the end of hostilities in that country, Germany decided to direct 4000 of its soldiers there as part of the IFOR peacekeeping force (*Deutscher...*, 1995; *Bundestag...*, 1995). Another psychological breakthrough was participation in NATO military operations against Yugoslavia in 1999 following the failure of talks on a peaceful solution for Kosovo. It is worth noting that the decision on this matter was taken shortly after winning the elections by a new government coalition led by **Gerhard Schröder** and Minister of Foreign Affairs **Joschka Fischer**, composed of the SPD and the Greens - parties that a

few years earlier (especially the Greens) were reluctant about Germany's international military involvement and assessed NATO in a critical way.

2 Germany in the face of new challenges for international security at the beginning of the 21st century

New threats to international security at the beginning of the 21st century required an appropriate response in the field of German security and defense policy. The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the American „war on terror“, followed by an attack on Iraq and the deepening of transatlantic disputes over US policy (German-French-Russian criticism of US unilateral policy) created a new situation in the field of international security. The Chancellor **Gerhard Schröder** announced „unlimited solidarity“ with Washington, after the terrorist attacks on the United States, but later the American plan to attack Iraq and its implementation in 2003 was met with open criticism from Germany. It should also be noted that 2002 there was an election campaign for the Bundestag. The pacifist accents presented at the time by the SPD-Greens coalition turned out to be a move that improved the popularity of these parties, enabling them to win again. The price for this was the deterioration of German-American relations. The assurances of German support for the war on terrorism did not help much. The crucial significance of those events was the fact that for the first time in more than fifty years of its history, the Federal Republic of Germany has so openly demonstrated its opposition to US policy (Kosman, 2013, pg. 395-402).

As a result of these circumstances, on May 21, 2003, Defense Policy Guidelines were published, constituting another German strategic document covering security issues. In the document, the unilateralism of American foreign policy was criticized, but at the same time the priority approach to transatlantic relations in German security policy was stressed. An important conclusion was the increase in threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional crises and conflicts. The huge changes that have taken place internationally in the last decade have been highlighted, showing the increase of challenges that require potential engagement of German armed forces (*Verteidigungspolitische...*, 2003).

The next program document was the White Paper from October 25, 2006. This publication was urgently needed, because twelve years have passed since the previous one, which meant that some content has to be updated. The fact of the Bundeswehr's increasing involvement in various parts of the world (in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, Lebanon, in Africa and in the Caucasus) was emphasized (*Weißbuch...*, 2006, pg. 4). According to the White Paper, the transatlantic partnership within NATO remained the basis of German and European security policy. The European Union, on the other hand, has been identified as a promoter of political stability, security and prosperity for Germany and other Member States. However, shortcomings in the development of the European Security and

Defense Policy were noticed, emphasizing the need to increase the EU's contribution to own security (*Weißbuch...*, 2006, pg. 40-43). The White Paper attributed NATO to the role of the main organization solving international security problems using military means, while in the EU the use of both military and civilian tools was highlighted. This led to conclusions about the priority role of NATO and the US in eliminating military threats (*Gut...*, 2006, pg. 8-9). On the other hand, the differences compared to the previous White Paper consisted of taking into account factors that significantly influenced the international security after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Therefore, greater emphasis was placed on combating terrorism, threats related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, from failed states and internal conflicts in Europe, Asia and Africa. The relative decline in the importance of military security measures was also emphasized - the military force, which was the foundation of security policy during the Cold War, has become one of its tools alongside civilian capabilities. Conflict prevention was given a high importance. In the implementation of this task, special importance was assigned to mechanisms called „network security” (*vernetzte Sicherheit*), including the close cooperation between both internal entities, such as individual ministries or federal states (*Länder*), and external - states and international organizations (*Gut...*, 2006, pp. 25-26).

The following years brought further challenges for the international security environment in Europe, which were in the sphere of German interest. A serious challenge turned out to be the „Orange Revolution” in Ukraine following the disruption of the presidential election in 2004. Determination of Ukrainian citizens protesting on the streets, convinced of electoral fraud in favor of Russia-supported **Viktor Yanukovich** against **Viktor Yushchenko**, made a great impression in Germany. Chancellor **Gerhard Schröder** focused his activities primarily on conducting „telephone diplomacy” with President **Vladimir Putin**, using the thread of friendship between them. Foreign Minister **Joschka Fischer** also actively worked to resolve the dispute, holding talks with the High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy, **Javier Solana**, seeking to support the mediation efforts of Polish President **Aleksander Kwasniewski** (Timmermann, 2007, pg. 108). It should be noted that the „Orange Revolution” and the victory of **Viktor Yushchenko** in the repeated second round of elections caused in Germany an increased interest in Ukraine, which from Berlin's perspective has so far stood in the shadow of Russia.

Another serious challenge to the European security order was the brief Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. The shelling and offensive of Georgian troops at Tskhinvali in southern Ossetia triggered Russia's armed response that resulted in invasion of its troops to Georgia. The swift end of hostilities took place among others as a result of an agreement between the presidents of France (then presiding in the EU) and Russia, **Nicolas Sarkozy** and **Dmitry Medvedev**. It is worth noting that German diplomacy was also actively involved in resolving the conflict. „Telephone diplomacy” (talks between Foreign Minister **Frank-Walter**

Steinmeier with Moscow and Tbilisi) was again used, and an experienced diplomat, **Hans-Dietrich Lucas** was sent to Georgia (*Bundesregierung...*, 2008). While summing up the stance of Germany on the 2008 conflict, the two accents can be noticed. On the one hand, the decision of Georgian President **Mikheil Saakashvili** to try to reintegrate South Ossetia with Georgia using force was criticized, on the other hand, Russia's reaction was criticized as disproportionate to Georgia's actions.

Changes and challenges in the international security space have prompted German political elites to develop another strategic document. On May 27, 2011, Defense Policy Guidelines were published. It is worth to mention that, despite the disturbances in stability in the post-Soviet area, the authors of the document still presented the view that an attack on state territory using conventional military means is very unlikely. The greatest dangers were noticed in international terrorism, failed states, dictatorships, organized crime, climate change, resource and migration problems, epidemics and infrastructure threats. The emergence of new regional powers and the resulting consequences for international security have been highlighted. A lot of emphasis was placed on climate change, resulting in a water deficit in many countries, forcing migration and rise of social conflicts (*Verteidigungspolitische...*, 2011, pp. 1-4). In addition, an emphasis was placed on „keeping crises and conflicts at a distance”, allowing the appropriate actions of the Bundeswehr, including the possibility of conducting evacuation operations. Traditionally much content was devoted to international institutions such as the UN, NATO, EU or OSCE (*Verteidigungspolitische...*, 2011, pg. 7).

Work on the above document almost coincided with pressing events in the close surroundings of Europe - i.e. rapid political changes in North Africa and the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring. They were of particular interest to Germany and the European Union because they directly affected the security of the Old Continent, especially in the context of migrational pressure. Libya turned out to be one of the most important fronts of the Arab Spring and became the arena of the uprising directed against the long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi. On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, condemning human rights violations by the Libyan authorities and announcing all possible measures to protect civilians (*Resolution...*, 2011). These records became the legal basis for conducting air raids against the forces of the Libyan dictator. It was important, however, that during the vote on the resolution, Germany (as a non-permanent member of the Security Council) abstained from voting alongside Russia, China, India and Brazil. This aroused the consternation of Western allies as well as controversy on the German political scene. There were allegations of disloyalty to allies or even fears about possible isolation of Germany in NATO. Of course, representatives of the ruling coalition CDU/CSU-FDP spoke in defense of the decision (*Pressestatement...*, 2011; Westerwelle, 2011). There were opinions in the debate on this topic that possible voting for the resolution could be an argument for supporters of the Bundeswehr's participation in military

operations against Gaddafi. It can be concluded that abstention was part of the tradition of post-war German restraint in the use of force on the international stage. Without going into details about this and other reasons for the German government's decision (for more see Kosman, 2017), it is worth noting that it has once again provoked a debate about the continuation or change in German foreign and security policy.

Chaos caused by the events of the Arab Spring in the coming years (especially the war in Syria), including migrational pressure on Europe, especially from the shores of Turkey and unstable Libya, the decision of the German government to depart from the rules of the common EU asylum policy in the summer of 2015, the conflict in Ukraine from 2014 – all these circumstances preceded the preparation of the next program document of German security policy, i.e. the White Paper of 13 July 2016.

This document highlights the changes in international order that have taken place in recent years. Globalization and digitization of life on the planet have facilitated numerous flows and contacts, but also created many dangers. The changes also included the evolution of the global security system towards multipolarity. Shifts in the global balance of power concerned not only countries (the importance of China, India, BRICS was emphasized), but non-state actors, as well. The reaction to the events in Eastern Europe was the conclusion about the questioning of the current international order by Russia, which annexed Crimea and initiated a hybrid war in Ukraine, thereby giving up the policy of partnership with the West. According to the authors of the White Paper, these activities placed Russia as a major challenge to international security. At the same time, the document emphasized that because of its potential, its neighborhood with the EU and a permanent place in the UN Security Council, Russia is an extremely important partner that could support the solution of international crises. Among the new circumstances affecting international security policy, threats to European integration (financial and economic crises, migration crisis, instability in the EU environment) have also been mentioned. Following challenges for German security policy were noticed: international terrorism, threats from cyberspace (cyber attacks), revival of the classic power policy in the form of interstate conflicts (especially in a new form - hybrid conflicts), weakness in the structures of many states (failed states), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and armament, threats to trade and transport routes, climate changes, uncontrolled migration, pandemics. The other parts of the document discuss Germany's strategic priorities. Particular emphasis was placed on strengthening cooperation and efficiency of NATO and the EU, moreover, high importance was assigned to preventive measures, guaranteeing security of communication, commercial lines or strengthening the international order based on law (*Weißbuch...*, 2016, pg. 27-52). It can be concluded that, compared to the White Paper of 2006, greater emphasis has been placed on phenomena such as migration problems, threats from cyberspace, hybrid threats, and territorial defense. There has been a change in the

perception of Russia. It also seems that a stronger focus was placed on territorial defense or the Bundeswehr's participation in combating terrorism.

Conclusion

German security policy has undergone a significant evolution since unification. Its important component was a departure from the Cold War dilemmas related to the threat of a destructive conflict on a large scale, potentially involving large armies and ongoing mainly in Europe. It was part of the overall dominant trend in national security strategies after the Cold War. On the other hand, German specificity has become a gradual awareness of its own potential and aspirations to conduct international politics according to that potential (change - *Wandel*), while maintaining certain elements of the continuation (*Kontinuität*) of the German security philosophy of the Cold War. The manifestation of continuation were primarily such elements as reluctance to solve international problems using force, priority for soft power in international relations, international law and international institutions, and multilateralism. On the other hand, the change was manifested by limited acceptance for the use of force in accordance with international law as well as greater assertiveness and courage in articulating its position on matters of international security.

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INSTRUMENTS TO PROMOTE CHINESE INTERESTS IN EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES AND THE IMPACT ON THEIR POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING TOWARDS THE PRC

Barbora Linhartová¹

ABSTRACT

The European union is currently facing attacks by two authoritarian regimes. While the adverse impact of the Russian Federation is a long-term problem, the Chinese threat has been reflected for approximately the last decade. Targeted steps to eliminate the influence of China began to be implemented by the European Union authorities only recently. However, China has already established and firmly anchored its networks to try to influence the political attitudes of individual states of the European Union, as well as public opinion there. At present, the 17+1 project resonates in the society, which has received considerable attention, mainly due to open cooperation between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, China uses many other soft power and sharp power tools, which we have divided ad hoc into geoeconomic, psychological and direct. The aim of this study will be illustrate the specific means and consequences of these factors.

Key words: *European union, People's republic of China, soft power, sharp power*

Introduction

The European Union is currently going through a period that we could identify as an attempt to unite at a time of integration crisis. This situation, as well as the integration crisis itself, are secondary to China's activities in the region. As the main pillars of the European Union we consider the promotion of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Over the past decade, the European Union has undergone stability tests such as the economic crisis, terrorist attacks, the financial crisis in Greece, the migration crisis, the brexit, the success of extreme right-wing parties in some states and the rise in extremism. The increasingly receding memento of the two world wars has suppressed the Europeans' peaceful perspective based on unity and mutual cooperation, and particular national interests, often at the expense of the whole, are coming to the forefront. This has been used in recent years by China to promote its own national interests, while contributing to undermining the integrity of the European Union. The aim of this study will be to point out the tools of Chinese coercion in the European Union and its consequences.

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1 Instruments of Chinese pressure in the European Union

Since the end of World War II, Europe and the rest of the so-called Western Bloc have been fighting threats from the Soviet Union and later the successor Russian Federation. This antagonism, which continues to this day, seems to have locked the European Union and its allies for decades in a black and white perception of the international system in which Russia is the main enemy. This allowed China to subtly expand its power to today's proportions, when all major powers began to perceive it as a real threat to the current world order. China, however, is fundamentally different from Russia, which, in pursuing its interests, does not hesitate to use its hard power and open aggression. Their instruments of coercion, which, with the advancement of technologies, have radically changed their form in particular, are adapted to the nature of these actors. In this context, **Henry Kissinger** points out that China has traditionally sought a psychological dominance, which it sought to ensure through its performances and only with occasional military conquests (Kissinger, 2016). As it was in the past, China continues to use predominantly economic and psychological tools to influence EU member states beyond its borders. It is a combination of Chinese soft power and sharp power.

In general, we can classify real-world use of Chinese influence instruments not only in European Union countries into:

1. Geoeconomical
2. Psychological
3. Direct pressure

The media is currently predominantly suggesting that the greatest threat to the single Europe and the European market is the 17 + 1 initiative due to the one-way flow of Chinese investment and the consequent impact of China on the region of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. According to BakerMcKenzie, however, most of China's direct investment went to the largest European Union economies and to the two Nordic countries - Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Finland and Sweden (Chinese investment in Europe ..., 2020).² On average, around 75% of China's direct investment goes to developed western countries, while only a small percentage of 17 + 1 countries (Zeneli, 2019). So the main problem is not how much China is investing, but in what sectors. While in the 17 + 1 region, these are mainly infrastructure projects under the New Silk Road initiative and the purchase of strategic ports, investment in technology and energy is preferred in the developed Western economies. Both types represent a fundamental threat to the sovereignty of the recipient state and, on the contrary, strengthen China both at home and abroad, while reflecting the character and maturity of the state. The interest in European energy is conditioned by several factors. As **Stephan**

² Finland (\$ 5.3 billion), United Kingdom (\$ 3.8 billion), Sweden (\$ 1.3 billion), Germany (\$ 0.7 billion), Italy (\$ 0.7 billion) (Chinese investment in Europe ..., 2020).

Liedtke points out, in addition to being the world's most populous state, the amount of energy consumed has greatly increased the rate of economic growth in China, which has therefore become the largest energy consumer in the world. However, the disadvantage is the lack of industrial infrastructure and technological knowledge, which makes China predominantly using coal as an energy fuel, causing enormous damage to the environment and the population. (Liedtke, 2016). So China's intention is not just a business partnership with European energy giants, but also political or even intelligence benefits to gain the know-how of successful states. In recent years, for example, the majority share of the Vensys wind turbine producer in Germany, a significant share of the French nuclear company Areva, a 33.5% share of the Hinkley Port nuclear power plant in Great Britain, or Portugal's most famous case energy company and plans to increase its share. (Konrad, Cube, 2016).

Investments in the less developed countries of the European Union and the states that are trying to integrate into it (Western Balkans) are associated with the 17 + 1 grouping and the Belt and Road initiative. This implies that infrastructure projects are primarily funded, but are not limited to them. Currently, there are mainly cases of highway construction in Montenegro, the construction of a hydroelectric power plant in the Bosnian town of Tuzla, or a case that is somewhat similar to the Western European one, when China acquired a majority share of the strategic port of Piraeus in Greece. Most investments are classified as loans, but the problem that is little pointed out is that, in particular in the Western Balkans, there is no or limited activity by independent media that would point out the risk of receiving such investments. (China is deeply in the Balkans., 2019).

However, despite their strategic location, the Visegrad Four countries, which are also involved in the 17 + 1 project, still have a black hole, but they are unrivaled in the least investment from the regions. Paradoxically, this phenomenon is present despite Hungary and the Czech Republic showing an open interest in cooperation with China. The nature of the cooperation between China and the V4 countries can be described as declaratory rather than planned projects and promised loans have not been realized yet. China's investments are mainly limited to the acquisition of existing businesses, which, as in Western Europe, raises concerns about the outflow of new technologies. For now, according to VSQUARE, it is important for China to maintain good relations, especially with the most influential players in the EU, and the V4 countries remain on the periphery of interest (Facts and propaganda ..., 2018). In the future, however, this situation is likely to change due to the strategic location of these states.

China, however, uses not only economic instruments but also what we call soft power or sharp power. Of course, these pressure manipulation tools are not as visible as funding. They are hidden behind positive propaganda through a network of think-tanks, educational institutes, and are also implemented through Chinese news agencies, whose statements are mainly taken up by commercial media or paid ads. Today, the Confucius Institutes, which have been named after

a pacific philosopher, are relatively well-known elements. Less known, however, is the existence of an Action Plan of education for the Belt and Road States.³ It interferes with the most sensitive pillar of democracy and free thinking - education. In the light of the objectives he has set, this program is, in our view, a way for China to indoctrinalize European society while at the same time having legal access to the latest technologies that represent European intellectual property.

Another psychological tool is the use of media to project Chinese soft power. In this case, the activity of the Chinese intelligence agency Xinhua, which operates on almost the entire continent, is particularly worrying. In 2018, the German server Deutsche Welle reported that China uses Western media for its own positive propaganda, which disguises for news. He also reported that the largest German news agency DPA will transmit news from the Chinese agency Xinhua (Is Chinese propaganda infiltrating ..., 2018). Xinhua has offices in 105 countries around the world and is a direct tool of Chinese disinformation and propaganda⁴ fully subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party. (Xinhua: The World's Greatest..., 2016). In this case, China's tactics are similar to Russia's disinformation, for example through Russia Today. However, Russian disinformation activities are now much more research-oriented than Chinese. Here we come to the words of Henry Kissinger from the introduction of this chapter that China is seeking in particular psychological superiority by demonstrating its achievements. In addition to distorted information about their internal political situation and positive presentation as a peaceful state and regime, the great content of their propaganda is also great achievements in the fields of science and technology, or economic development.

The least visible is direct pressure. **Michael Pillsbury** points out that there are several known cases of psychological terror by American journalists, or bullying, in which scientists and journalists criticizing China have been denied visas to that state. It identifies direct intervention goals as an effort to complicate the collection of information and prevent the disclosure of unwanted content (Pillsbury, 2019). China seems cautious about this kind of manipulation within the European Union, but that does not mean that it does not exert such kind of pressure. The first reports of Chinese government direct interventions in the

³ Among other things, it can be read in this Action Plan that China's goal is to make China a favorite destination for Belt and Road students, advising governments on coordinating educational policies, teaching Mandarin, independent research on China, developing presence in China. abroad with the best Chinese professional and technical institutions, establishing relationships with "sister cities" along the route and others (Education Action Plan..., 2016).

⁴ The Slovak media also receive reports from Xinhua. For example, they appeared on the disinformation site Hlavné správy, but the news from her twitter account was taken over by the mainstream Fun Radio. In 2019, even on the Trend print media pages, an PR article appeared on the whole page of the PR: "China follows the principle of one country - two systems, foreign should not interfere with its internal affairs" (Kern, 2019).

European Union area were released in early 2020. Euractiv reported that 7 of the 8 largest Swedish media was contacted by the Chinese embassy to criticize the content of the broadcasts. Journalists of these media have received e-mails or phone calls, and some have even been invited to the Chinese embassy to provide "true" information on the state of affairs (STOCKHOLM - China putting pressure ..., 2020). Such an isolated case suggests that China is increasingly confident in the European Union.

2 Consequences of Chinese pressure in the European Union

In the previous chapter, we have shown that China has fully developed a network of power tools in Europe to help promote its national interest. However, China's action is generating a response in the European Union in the form of dual political decisions, which we can classify as supporting China, and which come from the most subsidized states, which are characterized by euroscepticism and tend to sympathize with autocratic regimes. On the other hand, there are protective political decisions by which the European Union and the countries we can call our leaders try to minimize China's influence and its disruptive character as much as possible. Here are some examples where the member states of the European Union have either blocked its decisions against China or supported it in another way.

In the context of China's geo-economic strategy, so-called debt trap syndrome is emerging in countries of south-eastern Europe in particular. This means that funds are provided to developing countries as a loan, but hardly able to repay them. Therefore, they remain indebted to China for decades, or, in an effort to ease their economy, provide long-term rents or sell shares of the strategic points of their infrastructure straight away, mostly ports. Both cases indicate the commitment of these states to China and the restriction of their free choice. If coastal states such as Italy or Greece lost their ports, this would significantly impede their trade. Not to mention that the continuing acquisition of European ports could lead to a blockade of the whole continent. States committed to China are aware of this situation. Let's take the example of Greece, which vetoed in 2017 a joint statement by the European Union condemning human rights violations in China (Greece blocks EU's criticism ..., 2017).

With regard to energy, which we mentioned in the previous chapter, it is necessary to say that ensuring energy security is one of the basic prerequisites for state sovereignty. If it is in the hands of foreign power, it is likely that it will use it to manipulate that state. Portugal, for example, is increasingly worried about whether it is still on the European Union side. Indeed, Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa has opposed a stricter monitoring of Chinese investment in the European Union (one of the few EU measures against China so far) and has described it as very positive (Portugal: A China-friendly..., 2019). Finally, the asymmetric relationship with China is also a problem for the Western Balkan countries which are in the process of joining the European Union. There is a

reasonable assumption that these states could in future be the Trojan horses of China, which through them would only make the European Union a dysfunctional grouping at the time of its collapse.

China, on the other hand, puts pressure on the political decision-making of the European Union itself. Since the European Union has declared China a systemic rival, it has taken steps to slow down the spread of its impact and minimize the harmful effects of its actions. These include, in particular, anti-dumping laws, ensuring reciprocity of trade between China and the European Union, and screening China's national funding. For example, from the point of view of strategic defense, this screening is ineffective, as it contains a clause that the last word in whether or not a foreign investment can or may not be allowed in their territory is given by the Member States concerned (EU foreign investment screening..., 2019). The Global Public Policy Institute points to a major turnaround in EU policy, which in 2018 celebrated with China the 15th anniversary of a strategic partnership, and one year later defines it as a rival. The process of eliminating China is tied to the unofficial EU leader of Germany to curtail bilateral negotiations between China and the EU states and to plan an EU-China summit in 2020 to bring together leaders from all EU countries. (Benner, 2019).

Conclusion

Michael Pillsbury, advisor to several US presidents, published the Hundred-year Marathon in 2014. Among other things, he deals with a phenomenon called Sh', which he believes is a fundamental factor in China's strategy. Sh' characterizes as the ability "to trick an adversary of its own will and wait for the moment when the most appropriate opportunity comes (Pillsbury, 2019, p. 53)." China was clearly the most appropriate opportunity to conquer the largest free market in the European Union for the 2008 economic crisis. Since then, it has initiated targeted steps to break it up from the inside. As we have shown, it uses mainly geoeconomic, psychological and to some extent direct instruments of coercion appear. One of the conclusions of this study is that the European Union is divided into three geoeconomic regions from China's perspective. The first is the developed western economies, the second is the developing economies in the east and southeast, and somewhere between them is the central European region. Different handling tools are adapted to each region. In the western countries, it is predominantly investing in strategic energy and business sectors, trying to undermine their state sovereignty and seize their technology know-how. While the former is a more sophisticated way, in the 17 + 1 countries (except for the V4 countries), China is using loans to build infrastructure under the Belt and Road project, which, however, will also benefit the beneficiary states. However, they are getting into a debt trap and consequently there is a threat of creating a kind of Chinese zone of influence directly by the

European Union. Outside the European Union, its enlargement to the western Balkans is threatened, as it can be perceived by member states as a burden and a gateway to China's EU to block its decisions. This strategy is complemented by the pursuit of psychological conquest through positive propaganda, reaching out to the two most sensitive areas of independent thinking - education and the media. Recently, there have also been cases of direct pressure in the form of bullying of journalists who reported on what was happening in China in a way that was not in line with the Chinese strategy.

Years of effort have begun to translate into the decision-making of the states concerned in favor of China, and the European Union has stopped speaking with a single voice, which weakens it in particular relative to third parties. The European Union began to respond to these factors in an open way only in 2019, when it identified China as a systematic rival and adopted a number of measures. However, these are predominantly defensive in nature and are even rejected by some member states for the reasons mentioned above. However, despite this horrible forecast, we are of the opinion that the European Union will withstand Chinese pressure. The answer can be found in central Europe, which China has neglected, namely in the Czech Republic. Failure to deliver on promises and lack of funding has caused Czech President Miloš Zeman to renounce his participation in the planned summit of 17 + 1 in April 2020 (Lau, 2020). It is necessary to realize that most of the money to the European Union countries comes from the Eurofunds. Given China's slowdown in economic growth as a result of the trade war with the US, which was also reflected in an enormous decline in investment in the European Union and the Western Balkans, pragmatically-minded states choose a stable partner rather than uncertainty about Chinese investment which they also carry other risks mentioned above.

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AUTOCRACY AND IMPACT ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF SELECTED STATES

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ABSTRACT

In the first part of the paper we define the autocratic establishment as a research object. In the second part we determine its occurrence in selected countries for example Russia or China and their role in creating security environment. The subject of our explanation is the security environment in autocratic states.

Key words: *democracy, autocracy, regime, government, citizens, establishment, rights, society, politics, political, responsibility,*

1 Autocracy or democracy?

The central idea of a democratic establishment is the belief that all decisions in a country should reflect the will of the majority. However, the democratic government is limited in its power and built on acceptance of human rights. Citizens' voices should be a decisive element at the decisive moments in the country and, in order to be democratic, political responsibility should be brought to bear on people and consequently integrated in all spheres of society. Citizens in a democracy should have a sense of values that are considered fair and virtuous for society as a whole. Adequate participation of citizens in political affairs and incurring political responsibility is generally seen as a stabilizing element and a means of peacekeeping for the security environment. The security environment of democratic countries is not only defined by the surrounding relations and immediate interactions with their surroundings, but also by the abundance of natural resources, human capital, migration policy, military potential, or the rate of economic growth of the state. and the interactions between them. The security environment is defined as a part of the social environment in which the conditions of existence and development of social subjects, their activities of relationships and interests are determined on the basis of their security (Šimák et al., 2018)

All elements or elements that are conditional on the nature of the security environment reflect a democratic establishment based on the concept of the rule of law in which the government is subject to law, political equality, belief in the collective good, personal liberty, or freedom. accepting citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms. Democracy works best when citizens are actively involved in the political process and what is becoming a stabilizing element for the country's internal security environment. For example, in terms of geographical

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definition of the regional security environment of the Slovak Republic, the Central European region (presented by the neighboring states and Ukraine) is declared, but it also presents security interests (especially in the direction of deepening stability and democracy). (Hofreiter L., 2016, p. 15).

Autocracy as a kind of regime in a country represents the rule of one person or a narrow category of elites. The autocratic regime does not have to exclude elections, but they are merely a formal matter and do not fundamentally shape the ideology the country is pursuing. Political decisions are solely the will of autocrats and are subject to political and social institutions (L.P. ; Mar 27th 2013).

Autocratic rule (authoritarianism) as opposed to a democratic establishment is characterized by totalitarian or communist elements. In particular, the overall control of society, the control of the public and private lives of citizens, the artificially created intimidation of the population and the enforcement of respect by the forces (military, police, intelligence services) are dominant. Censorship and propaganda are also control mechanisms for controlling citizens. Only the form of an official and autocrat-only political ideology that is right and appropriate for a particular country becomes acceptable. The rule of law does not exist and the history of the country is modified to reflect the ideology of the country in which "autocracy" reigns. Autocratic regimes have a destabilizing effect on their own security environment. Under this form of regime and its elements that incite national conflicts, people are constantly dissatisfied and then rebelled (protests, riots, civil wars).

2 Autocratic institutions in selected countries

Until the mid-1990s, Americans were convinced that American liberal democracy was the wave of the future around the world. The Warsaw Pact fell apart and dictatorships in Latin America dictatorships turned to the vote on human rights. Francis Fukuyama also described humanity and its direction in "The End of History", in which he speaks of the victory of the West and liberalism, and considers the best form of government to be one that combines liberal democracy with a market economy.

US presidents praised and presented democratic ideals. Bill Clinton anchored them in his "National Security Strategy," which was meant to spread democracy wherever we were, and George W. Bush had his "Freedom Doctrine," in which he sought "a balance of power and favored freedom."

In 2017, however, another trend is gaining momentum, and autocracy is beginning to become fashionable again. Russia is returning to the autocratic tendencies of strengthening its power through its forces, and Chinese President XI Jinping has accumulated more power in his hands than anyone before him since the MAO. One group of people insists that China is a temporary exception and that liberalization will not wait long. But these are mostly assumptions; these analysts also predict the impending collapse of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) for decades. The second group sees China's success in demonstrating that autocracies are as good as democracies to support countries' economic growth, if not better. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad claimed in 1992 that "authoritarian stability" enabled prosperity, while democracy brought only "chaos and greater suffering." But not all autocracies lead to economic success. In fact, some of them are completely disastrous, including China under Mao.

In Europe, ruling parties in Hungary and Poland, which are pro-authoritarian-oriented and openly reject liberal ideals, are not lagging behind the new autocratic trend (Stephen M. Walt., 2017). There is talk of the winter that came to Europe, but it is also the spring for autocracy. Following the example of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his political party Fidesz, he is followed by the nationalist-populist party Law and Justice (PiS) with a new government led by Jaroslaw Kaczinsky, which controlled the public media. In 2015, thousands of policemen demonstrated against this establishment, and even the threats of the European Commission did not stop Kaczinski's actions in spreading autocratic ideology and its accompanying phenomena (R. Daniel Kelemen and Mitchell A. Orenstein, 2016). According to Donald Tusk, before the G20 Summit in Osaka, in which he strongly disagrees with Russian President Vladimir Putin's argument in an interview with the Financial Times that liberalism is obsolete. "We are also Europeans to strongly and unequivocally defend and support liberal democracy. Those who claim that liberal democracy is outdated also claim that freedoms, the rule of law and human rights are also outdated. However, for us in Europe, these values are and will always be fundamental and lively. I think that authoritarianism, the cult of personality and the rule of the oligarchs are truly outdated. Even though they may sometimes seem effective." (European Council Press Release, 28 June 2019). From these observations in the development of autocratic systems, it is clear that their security environment is a living mechanism that is constantly working. Just as the influence of oligarchs and economic expansion in the interaction with neighboring countries can turn into a post-communist country, as well as autocracy through systemic changes and the external or internal influences of democracy. Both policy orientations have a significant impact on the security environment of countries both outside and inside. Within smaller countries, we can talk about changes at the local level and, for larger ones, the regional or global level. However, states and their populations themselves decide to deal with the form of government or regime either by adopting them or by means of resistance and unrest.

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EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY AFTER BREXIT: CONSIDERABLE IMPETUS FOR EU

Markéta Mackuľáková¹

ABSTRACT

One of the most striking questions posed by academics in connection with Brexit is undoubtedly related to security and defense. These questions concern particularly the UK's commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of the development of European security after Brexit and the European Union's willingness to give the United Kingdom a significant role after the withdrawal. The article seeks to address each of these issues in turn. This article focuses on a brief review of the UK's position in the field of European security and defense, while stressing the ambiguous position of the United Kingdom on security and defense cooperation within the EU. The article states that, given the apparent overlap of threats and challenges associated with the strategic environment and the priority interests of both organizations, the United Kingdom is expected to continue to engage in the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). At the end are mentioned rising uncertainties, especially in terms of that the departure of the United Kingdom could also be a point of impulses for Franco-German CSDP cooperation, however only partly because of NATO's superiority.

Key words: *Brexit, CSDP, United Kingdom, EU, Franco-German leadership.*

Introduction

Not so long ago, the European Union (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was one of the main sources of tension between the UK and other EU Member States. In response to any new proposal aimed at extending this very sensitive area of EU action, the United Kingdom was not among that advocating deepening defense cooperation in the EU context. In addition, they were determined to hold a line against any development that could be characterized as further integration. Any progress in this area had to be systematically mitigated in order not to contradict the UK veto. Since the country has announced its intention to leave the EU, the United Kingdom has increasingly indicated that it wants to maintain its role in the CSDP.

It is essential to note that the United Kingdom is increasingly giving priority to its commitments to NATO and its leading role in European security and defense in the broader sense in bilateral and other multilateral fora. This apparent contradiction was a function of the increased politicization of “Europe” within the UK's domestic policy and reflected the UK's anxiety that the EU's ambitions in some European capitals threatened NATO's central role. Understanding these different aspects of the relationship is crucial to understanding the viability of the

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different options for EU-UK security cooperation after the British have left the European Union.

In this article, we aim to assess the position and role of the United Kingdom in the field of European Security and Defense, whether the UK's commitment to European security will decrease, whether the EU will move towards further integration and whether it would be ready to offer the United Kingdom a strong role in the security policy after Brexit. The article sets out a hypothesis through which we can explain the evolution of the CSDP since the UK referendum in June 2016. The hypothesis is that the UK's decision to leave the EU gave CSDP new power and led to faster development. The Brexit referendum leads to considerable prosperity in the EU's security and defense policy, as the United Kingdom has been blocking significant changes over the last decades.

1 Commitment of the United Kingdom to European defense and security after Brexit

“There are indications that the UK's commitment to EU security and defense initiatives has been waning in recent years, which inevitably encourages speculation about the declining British interest in regional security cooperation” (Martill a Sus 2018b, p 7). The British government has declared that NATO is the cornerstone of European defense and security, backed by a network of strong multilateral and bilateral alliances and partnerships in which the United Kingdom is the part. From the United Kingdom's perspective, the EU has been a remarkable player “soft power”, focusing on crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilization (Heisbourg, 2016).

The UK as such generally supports the CSDP and has played an important role in its development since the 1990s. This has been reflected in efforts to improve EU Member States military assets and capabilities, including the establishment of EU Battlegroups and the establishment of a European Defense Agency. However, successive governments have proceeded cautiously in their approach to greater European defense integration and have shaped their participation in CSDP decision-making to reflect UK interests. For example, the United Kingdom has historically opposed efforts to build military planning capability for NATO-independent EU operations (Mills, 2019).

In September 2017, Prime Minister **Theresa May** asked for 'creative' solutions for UK involvement in CFSP/CSDP. Paradoxically, the Brexit led to a revival of British interest in European defense cooperation. Prime Minister **Theresa May** has proposed a defense and security treaty with the EU to define a framework for future relations based on two pillars:

- economic partnership,
- security and defense partnerships.

The British Government clarified that it wanted a closer future relationship with the EU than any existing partnership which it has with third countries. That

say a “special and deeper partnership” with the European Union and its Member States. In particular, the British Government suggests close cooperation on CSDP missions. Such framework agreements exist with Norway, Canada, Turkey and the United States. However, these agreements concern the states concerned following the decisions taken by the EU, while the United Kingdom calls for involvement as much as possible. The British Government has also expressed its interest in Permanent Structured Cooperation, particularly in the case of the military mobility project, as well as in the European Defense Fund. Also, it wants to conclude an administrative agreement with the European Defense Agency. However, the British Government will not be able to participate in the launch of the operation if it will no longer an EU member. The British Government has also proposed the creation of structures for consultation and coordination. The rapporteurs saw the great British resentment that resulted from the refusal of access to the Galileo calls for proposals. This is an issue that will have to be resolved in the common interest in the negotiations of future relations.

The proposal by the European Security Council, on the one hand is worded to maintain, the UK anchorage on the European continent and, on the other, to circumvent the cumbersome CFSP/CSDP procedures, through the unanimity rule. However, it is a format that should remain flexible and include all EU countries, so as not to create a sense of “Europe at several speeds” (Blockmans, 2017).

2 Brexit as the cause of deeper integration in the field of EU security and defense policy

Since the United Kingdom voted on leaving the EU in 2016, other EU Member States and EU institutions have taken steps to strengthen their military cooperation. The United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU in conjunction with the above-mentioned external pressures has generated considerable impetus in the field of EU's security and defense policy. *“The EU Leaders' meeting in Bratislava in September 2016 gave a formal impetus to launch intensive negotiations on the further development of the CSDP. The decisions of the EU Council of November 2016, March and May 2017 and the conclusions of the European Council of December 2016 and June 2017 were of key importance in this process, in which the European Commission played an important role”* (Gotkowska 2017, p 2-3). Other important documents were the European Commission's European Defense Action Plan of November 2016 and a reflection paper on the future European Defense Policy, which was announced in June 2017 as a stimulus for the CSDP debate (Tardy, 2017). The EU has also set up Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to “jointly develop defense capabilities” and make them available for EU military operations. All-year EU work has resulted in the formulation of initiatives in five areas that can promote a new quality of CSDP: the European Defense Fund (EDF) can be a breakthrough instrument to accelerate EU military integration through which the European Commission plans to allocate funds (€


600 million per year to 2020 and then € 1.5 billion) for technological innovation, defense research and technology (European Commission, 2017).

The United Kingdom's exit decision opened new opportunities for discussions that resulted in the creation of military planning and leadership capabilities in June 2017. All the important changes that have been conflicting over the past decades and have been blocked by the UK have now begun. The creation of a command structure EU (military planning and capability) has been a controversial issue with a very political and symbolic dimension for many years. Creating this structure would mean that the EU would be recognized as the second (after NATO) independent actor in the field of security and defense in Europe. Although intended solely for military training missions, it may become a starting point for the creation of more comprehensive European command structures in the future (Tardy, 2017).

2.1 Franco-German leadership

Brexit is effectively preparing the European Union for the departure of the Member State with the largest defense budget (GBP 45 billion or 2.15% of British GDP) and the member with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (UNSC). France thus becomes the only EU country that owns nuclear weapons and still has its seat in the UN Security Council, which gives it greater responsibility. *“British withdrawal occasions the demise of the complex tripartite relationship in which the UK, France, and Germany balanced one another’s influence, leaving a simpler game of bilateral Franco-German cooperation as the key determinant of the future direction of the EU”* (Heisbourg 2016, p 15-16). To be effective, cooperation between France and Germany must meet several conditions. First, it must be based on their complementarity and their common will to work together in the search for consensus likely to bring Europeans together. But secondly, it must also base itself on a relatively balanced balance of forces which ensures a certain parity in the joint positions of the two capitals (Trouille, 2014). The French, as well as the Germans, find it difficult to cooperate in the field of defense, mainly because of the asymmetry of their cultures and intervention policies. However, the Franco-German defense convergence is the result of some development, in particular because of concerning German policy and its so-called “normalization” process. In 2016, the United Kingdom represented one fifth of the EU's combined defense spending (Chart 1). If this departure weakens European defense, it will also lead to a significant increase in the relative weight of France and Germany in the EU. Without the United Kingdom, these two countries account for almost half of the EU's combined military expenditure. Even more than before, the Franco-German leadership is an essential prerequisite for a meaningful European Security and Defense Union (Drake, 2018).

Chart 1 *EU defense spending and Brexit*



Source: SIPRI military expenditure database (2016)

Meanwhile, Germany is beginning to overcome its historical restraint and engagement in international security matters. The new White Paper on German Security Policy reflects this gradual change and sets out the nature and extent of the country's participation in future military operations (Major, 2017). It therefore seems that all the conditions for the Franco-German leadership after Brexit are fulfilled. In addition, the bilateral axis could be strengthened by Italy and Spain, with whom France and Germany regularly negotiated during the PESCO negotiations. The dynamics of the Franco-German leadership is also confirmed by the Franco-German Defense and Security Council in July 2017, highlighting the Permanent Structured Cooperation Projects (CSPs) and the European Defense Fund, where the Franco-German responsibility in this area represents a revival of European defense policy (Major, 2017). There are, of course, several important obstacles facing this revitalized Franco-German cooperation. Perhaps the most important of these is the continued reluctance of German citizens to see the greater international role of their country despite recent changes. A survey by the Köbrer Foundation in May 2014 showed that most of German public opinion was in favor of greater international responsibility, but 82% refused more military engagement (Köbrer Stiftung, 2014). In 2017, 52% said their country should not engage in international conflicts or interventions (Körber Stiftung, 2017). Another challenge lies in the differences between the French and German concepts of the future of EU defense, which emerged in the PESCO negotiations (Billon-Galland a Quencez, 2017). According to the 2013 French White Paper, the diversity of Member States' perceptions, strategic cultures and ambitions is a major obstacle to rapid integration in defense matters and a potential “source of mutual mistrust” crucial to Franco-German cooperation. In the French case, there is a sovereignty-based tension between Europeanism and national strategic autonomy. On the other hand, German Europeanism (or, more generally, its multilateralism) is against its culture of political and military constraints. Differences in preferences over the EU's role also affect conflicting views on the legitimate use of force. In

its intervention culture, France sees the EU as a multiplier in terms of legitimacy and capacity. It has long advocated for a defensive Europe and strategic autonomy from the United States. Although not opposed to the idea of a stronger European defense policy, Germany requires a comprehensive approach to security at national and EU level (Major, 2017). These differences in strategic cultures are firmly rooted in the respective political systems. At the German constitution, the armed forces can only be deployed in defense or in multilateral operations. However, there is still controversy over what the EU calls multilateral operations. In addition, Parliament must approve any armed deployment. In France, the President decides on the deployment of the armed forces. However, since 2008, Parliament must give its assent, but only if the operation is extended for more than four months from the initial decision. From 1991 to 2016, the Bundestag voted 12 times more often than the National Assembly on military deployment matters (see Table 1).

Table 1 *Parliamentary votes on military engagement (1991-2016)*

| | TOTAL NUMBER OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTES | AVERAGE SHARE OF NEGATIVE VOTES |
|---------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| GERMANY | 149 | 13,9% |
| FRANCE | 18 | 8.2% |

Source: Wagner et al.

The Visegrad countries reject the Franco-German “G2” favorable to stronger integration with the “vanguard” of European, even federalist Member States. In this respect, the Franco-German leadership could become a major obstacle rather than a driver of deeper defense integration.

Table 2 *Summary of driving forces and constraints*

| | DRIVING ELEMENTS | CONSTRAINTS/ CHALLENGES |
|-----------------|--|--|
| EXTERIOR | External threats and challenges • Donald Trump | |
| EUROPEAN | Brexit • Public support for European security and defense policy • Untapped potential of the Lisbon Treaty | UK temporary veto power • Other actors who can oppose their veto fearing duplication of NATO • Fear of a "G2" and a two-speed Europe |
| NATIONAL | French pro-EU and pro-German government | • Different strategic cultures • German interior constraints |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Germany's new sense of international responsibility • Strategic convergence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overuse of the French military tool • Aging equipment from the Bundeswehr |
|--|--|--|

Source: Wagner et al.

From this point of view, the Franco-German leadership is an important opportunity, but the old restrictions remain (see Table 2). Emmanuel Macron acknowledged them in a speech following the terrorist attack on Westminster on March 23, 2017. He said Europe to be stronger through Franco-German cooperation at the forefront of the Union in the field of security and defense. Finally, he adds that it is not realistic and in the coming years there is little chance that this will happen (Wagner et al., 2017).

3 The UK Withdraw and its role in the field of EU security and defense

Upon the departure of the United Kingdom, the CSDP will lose up to 20% of its military capabilities and it will be difficult for France to bear this burden. This is particularly important in operational and strategic terms. From an operational point of view, the United Kingdom is one of the two military powers in the EU and one of the few European countries that can lead a CSDP missions by sending an operational headquarters. Although the EU has a strong interest in harnessing the United Kingdom's capacities, political considerations regarding the UK's important role in the field of CSDP are unlikely.

An important factor affecting the EU to involve the United Kingdom in the EU decision-making process and to give the British an important role in the post-Brexit period in the field of CSDP are the various political incentives. First of all it can be the existence of many of a number of Member States where antitrust sentiment and which is growing and which could become largest if the terms of any Brexit agreement were considered more favorable to the United Kingdom (Bakker and Drent, Zandzee, 2017). Such as of example we can, the United Kingdom's participation in PESCO projects, in which Britain's capacities offer significant value, where the UK ready to offer more than other non-EU countries such as Ukraine or Norway. Although the United Kingdom calls for a “special partnership” in the area of foreign, defense and security policy, however, unlikely to occur the European Council's decision to offer Britain a bespoke arrangement (HM Government, 2017). The EU's willingness to cooperate with the United Kingdom could hamper the Member States' desire for the Union to become a major player in the field of security. This could be at a collision course with Britain's commitment to NATO as a major provider of security on the continent. French-British cooperation, which may be limited by different geopolitical cultures and ambitions, is also an example of constraint. Again, European integration is a priority for France and traditionally wants to strengthen Franco-German cooperation. Paris's support for the EU's concept of strategic autonomy

may also be the limit for strengthening NATO in Europe (de Hoop Scheffer and Quencez, 2018).

However, if the Union does not wish to create a special status for the United Kingdom that could truly unduly distort relations with other third countries, it seems possible to find agreements that would make it a privileged partner. In addition, an agreement on a new third-country status that would ensure closer association and require the introduction of new consultation procedures could open certain defense and security mechanisms to several third countries, which are currently reserved only for Member States. However, for the United Kingdom, it seems unlikely that it would be willing to assume the position of a 'regular' third country.

Conclusion

The development of the EU in the field of foreign, security and defense policy has always been slight and sensitive to the prerogatives of the Member States. At the same time, if we compare the Union's current security and defense profile with that of 20 or 25 years ago it is clear that there has been significant movement. The second point is that Member States remain the main actors in this policy area. The Commission can propose, stimulate and lobby, but the decision-making framework remains formally intergovernmental. Therefore, political dynamism within and between Member States becomes crucial. It is likely that calls (including from the highest political sources) for Member States to submit to qualified majority voting in the field of foreign, security and defense policy are unlikely to be feasible.

Based on an analysis of documents about the CSDP developments, this article shows that the field of security and defense have been at the heart of the EU agenda to initially overcome the challenges of a rapidly changing world and respond to crises. Security and defense area have emerged as a relatively unlikely candidate for reviving enthusiasm in a European project. Results of the referendum on the exit the United Kingdom contributed to the existing existential crisis in the EU, but at the same time opened the political space for progress in the field of policy where the United Kingdom has often been an obstacle. Some have argued that the United Kingdom's departure provides the European Union with a chance of greater integration and faster development of the CSDP, as the substantial "brake" to the European Security and Defense Policy will leave the EU and can no longer contradict and veto fundamental policies (Svendsen, 2018; Martill and Sus, 2018b).

This article emphasizes a new impetus in the field of CSDP following the Brexit referendum, in the case of France and Germany. However, in this case, there is a deficit of concrete decisions and a clear ambition for future developments as regards the loss of the largest army and one of the greatest economic forces to be compensated.

Building European defense requires accepting some interdependence and thus establishing trusts between European states. An attempt to submit the French “turnkey” vision would be condemned to failure. It is the initiation of knowledge and understanding of the position of our partners, an approach that must of course be reciprocal in order to build trust, which is based not only on mutual understanding but also on the long-term adherence to the commitments made. Building trust also requires the support of nations in relation to the objectives and methods of European defense. The 'Europe that protects' must become a reality. For this reason, it is necessary to start by changing the 'talk' on European defense to emphasize common interests and collective action, of course, without falling into any propaganda, but by trying to respond to misinformation and rumors multiplied by digital networks. It is urgent to create a shock in the European position, to explain the continuum of security and defense, to highlight Europe's strengths, and not always to its weaknesses and the finally try to strengthen the European defense before there is a major crisis that would the EU make aware of the problems too late.

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DECENTRALISATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN POLAND AT THE EXAMPLE OF CITY GUARDS

Paweł Malendowicz¹

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the problems of municipal guards in Poland at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. City guards are formations acting for the benefit of public security and order at the local level. They are independent of the police, but collaborate with the police. They also supplement the activities of the police, owing to which police can focus on prosecution of criminals, and city guards deal with minor offences which are, however, of importance to preserve public order. City guards have preventive, repressive, protective, prophylactic, and informative functions. City guard establishment is facultative: a city may but needn't establish its own city guard. City guard activities depend on local communities, and actually on their local authorities. Similar local formations also function in other European countries.

Key words: city guard, police, local security, decentralisation, Poland

Introduction

The 1990's were the time of political and economic transformations in Poland, which also involved the state's internal security area. Previous Militia formation from the socialist regime was replaced with the police. Also private organisations and institutions oriented at security emerged, such as security agencies, detective agencies, informal neighbourhood watches, etc. The latter were a spontaneous response to the decreased sense of security among local communities across Poland. Another example of local measures to strengthen public security and order in cities and municipalities was formed by municipal guards (city guards). Municipal guard (*straż gminna*) is referred to as city guard (*straż miejska*)² in the cities (Malendowicz, 2009, p. 291). These formations are separate and independent of the police, establishment and detailed tasks of which depend on national laws and local authorities, not on national authorities or police. Although city guards are independent of the police, they do cooperate with the police, complementing their activities.

This article aims at answering the following questions:

- What is the role of city guards in Poland's security system?
- What are the tasks of the city guards?

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² The article uses the term "city guards" in reference to both municipal and city guards. In some publications, the authors use the English term "municipal police". However, this is not a correct translation. Police and municipal guards are two different formations.

- What are the effects of city guards' actions?
- What are the relations between the city guards and the police?

In order to answer these questions, the author has analysed both legal acts regulating the functioning of the city guards, and the effects of city guards operations.

1 Tasks and competences of the city guards

When city guards were established early in the 1990's, there were no detailed regulations to govern their functioning. In 1990, the *Act on municipal authorities* entered into force. In line with the Act, meeting the needs of the local community remains to the responsibilities of the municipality itself. Such needs also included the duty to take care of the public order (Ustawa 8.03.1990). The basis, however, for city guards' operations was formed by legal standards contained in the *Act on the Police* of 1990. These were just a few regulations specifying the tasks of city guard formations and rights of the guards. Currently, the *Act on the Police* states that the task of the police is "supervision of municipal guards and specialised armed security forces within the scope laid down in separate provisions" (Ustawa 6.04.1990).

In the early 1990's, when city guard formations were established in Poland, they were modelled, to a limited extent, on existing formations from other European countries. Such examples included: city police in the Czech Republic (*městská policie, obecní policie*) and Slovakia (*mestská polícia, obecná polícia*). Similar formations also existed in Austria (*Gemeindepolizei* and *Stadt-polizei*), Germany (*Stadtpolizei*), Estonia (*Munitsipaalpolitsei*), France (*Police municipale*), Spain (*Policia Municipal*), the Netherlands (*Stadswacht*), and Italy (*Polizia Municipale*). Names of such forces clearly indicate they are strictly related to local authorities (Bismor – Brodny, 2018, p. 32).

Functioning of city guards in Poland was systematised and harmonised by the Act of 29 August 1997 *on municipal guards* (Ustawa 29.08.1997).

According to the *Act on municipal guards*, the formation performs the tasks in the area of securing public order. Its tasks, in particular, include:

- securing peace and order in public areas;
- traffic monitoring and control – to the extent specified in traffic regulations;
- collaboration with relevant entities as regards saving citizens' life and health, assistance in eliminating technical failures and effects of natural disasters, as well as other local threats;
- securing crime scenes, disaster sites, and similar places or places at risk of such an event against third party access or destruction of traces or evidence, until relevant forces arrive, and determining any witnesses, if possible;
- securing public buildings and devices;
- cooperation with organisers and other forces on preserving order during public gatherings and events;

- bringing people under influence to special facilities or their homes if such persons' behaviour is scandalous in a public place, if it poses a threat to their life or health or to the life or health of the others;
- informing local community about the status and types of risks, as well as initiation and participation in actions aimed at preventing crimes and offences, as well as crime-inducing phenomena, and collaboration in this respect with national and local authorities, as well as social organisations;
- escorting documents, valuables, or monies for the municipality (Ustawa 29.08.1997).

The Act states that, while performing one's tasks, a city guard shall have the right to:

- instruct members of the public;
- ask of people's ID documents in justified cases to check their identity;
- apprehending people obviously posing direct risk to human life or health, as well as to property, and bringing them immediately to the nearest police station;
- imposing fines under a fine proceeding for offences stipulated by regulations on offence handling proceedings;
- performing explanatory activities, filing penalty requests to courts, prosecuting at court and filing for appeals;
- removing vehicles or their immobilising by blocking wheels in instances, within the limits, and according to procedures stipulated in traffic regulations;
- giving orders;
- requesting necessary assistance from national and local institutions;
- addressing, in emergency situations, business entities dealing with public utility services or social organisations, as well as any person for ad hoc assistance on general terms specified in the Act *on the Police*,
- observing and recording the image, using technical measures, of events in public places (Ustawa 29.08.1997).

City guards are financed from the municipal budgets. City guards are managed by the Chief appointed by municipal authorities. Such a candidate must be previously approved by a representative of police authorities.

2 City Guards Functions

The tasks and competences of city guards formulated by legal regulations referred directly to the public order, and indirectly to security. Public order means e.g. assuring appropriate sanitary condition of public facilities, keeping order on roads, enforcing orders and prohibitions applicable pursuant to legal acts, following acts on associations, public collections, vehicle registration, construction law, forestry or hunting laws, as well as fighting alcoholism and drug abuse, effects of natural disasters, and enforcing social discipline. This term

comprises not just public law regulations, but also social and moral standards. Public order is related to security because e.g. absence of lighting in parks is a violation of public order but may also affect public security, or poor condition of roads violates public order but road accidents affect public safety (Ura – Pieprzny, 2015, p. 49; see also: Malendowicz, 2017, p. 167).

City guards, therefore, have the following functions:

- protective – related to keeping order within the municipality;
- order-related – manifested by enforcing the law to be observed by the local community with respect to public order;
- preventive – in the form of continuous patrols of streets and districts, and intervening in response to reported violations of public order;
- prophylactic – involving prevention of crimes, offences, and crime-inducing phenomena, as well as educational tasks among children and youth;
- informative – informing other forces and institutions about observed threats, and informing local communities about the status and types of threats and ways to mitigate them;
- socio-administrative – manifested by cooperation in the area of security and public order with national and local authorities, as well as social organisations;
- integrative – integrating local communities by participation in sports, cultural, and charity events (Misiuk, 2008, p. 208; see also: Malendowicz, 2017, pp. 168-169).

3 Quantitative and qualitative effects of city guard activities

As of 2016, there were 530 city guard formations in Poland. This meant 120 more than in 1994, when city guards were emerging, but a drop down vs. 2012. In 2012, there were 596 guard units. In 2016, the city guards employed 10482 people (Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 7). This meant 10% people employed by the state police.

According to the data from the Public Order Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration in 2016, the guards imposed fines on 568,209 people to the total amount of PLN 57,695,828; instructed 923,452 people, and filed penalty requests to court regarding 52,530 people (Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 14). Effects of other measures taken by the city guards have been presented in Table 1.

Table 1 Effects of measures taken by municipal (city) guards in Poland in 2016

| Measures | Effects |
|--|---------|
| Blocking vehicle wheels | 80610 |
| Requests to remove vehicles | 13233 |
| Vehicles found | 122 |
| Persons under influence brought to special places or their homes | 85361 |
| Crimes detected | 2361 |
| Persons apprehended and handed over to the police | 4784 |
| Securing crime scenes and disaster sites | 11468 |
| Secured public facilities | 34625 |
| Escorting documents and monies for the municipality | 63187 |
| Checks of people and baggage | 28642 |

Source: Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 15.

The guards undertake interventions as a result of patrols, or go at the place of the event after receiving calls from residents. The number and type of calls handed over to city guards have been presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Types of events reported to the city guards in Poland in 2016

| Object of call | Number of calls |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Public order violation | 221321 |
| Traffic-related risks | 577431 |
| Wastes, environmental pollution | 164219 |
| Threat to human life or health | 140938 |
| Fire hazard, disaster hazard | 6194 |
| Technical failures | 37678 |
| Stray and wild animals | 161215 |
| Other calls | 276159 |
| Total | 1585155 |

Source: Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 15.

4 Relations between the city guards and the police

As stated in the introduction, city guards and the police are separate and independent organisations. The police is an authority governed by special government administration. It is thus a separate, hierarchical state force

established to assure public security and order in Poland, acting in its regions managed by local authorities (Tatańczuk, 2010, p. 45). There is, therefore, one national police divided into particular units operating at particular levels of the state's administrative system. In the case of municipal guards, this is entirely different. There is no single municipal guard, but many of them. This is why, in Polish, we speak of the police in singular, and city guards in plural. Although there is an institution named National Council of Municipal and City Guards Chiefs (*Krajowa Rada Komendantów Straży Miejskich i Gminnych*), but it only serves to coordinate actions taken by city guards, and to exchange experiences among them. It also acts as city guards representation with respect to central national authorities. It has no governing competencies.

City guards are local units governed by local authorities. They are established if the local authorities decide so. Nevertheless, in order for the city guard to be established, an approval from the police is required, which is also the requirement for a person to become the chief of the city guard. Furthermore, the police provides substantial governance over the city guards. There are controls, e.g. as regards weapons storage (exclusively city guards escorting documents and monies and securing public buildings may carry weapons) or effects of the work.

Despite being separate and independent entities, city guards and the police tend to cooperate with one another. Such cooperation is mandated by the Act *on municipal guards* (Ustawa 29.08.1997). The cooperation involves the following areas:

- continuous information exchange about threats occurring in a given area as regards security of people and property, peace, and public order;
- organisation of the communication system between the police and city guards, accounting for local needs and capacities, and assuring continuous communication between police and city guard units;
- coordination of police and city guards distribution, considering threats in a given area;
- joint management of order-oriented measures to assure peace and order at gatherings, artistic, entertainment, and sport events, as well as in other public places;
- organisation of joint training sessions and drills for the police and city guards;
- information exchange regarding observation and recording of the image, using technical measures, of events in public places (Jankowiak, 2014, pp. 218-219).

Another document by the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of 2009 points out that chiefs of city guards and the police cooperate through:

- periodical meetings of chiefs or persons delegated by them to assess threats to people's safety, as well as public security and order, and to set joint tasks;
- mutual consultations regarding tasks performed, in the continuous mode;

- organisation of meetings if there is a need for joint tasks by the police and city guards;
- appointing city guards and policemen to act as contact persons (Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 19).

In fact, cooperation between city guards and the police refers to:

- carrying out joint patrols;
- training organisation (joint training and training organised by the police for the city guards);
- joint initiatives related to public order maintenance, including mass events;
- preventive measures and prophylactics (Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 19).

It must be added that organisation of joint patrols and preventive measures is the most important element of cooperation between city guards and the police. For example, in 2016, city guards and the police carried out 44,580 joint patrol shifts and 10,500 preventive actions (Informacja o działalności straży gminnych, 2017, p. 19).

5 City guards as complementation to police operations

The idea to establish local police emerged in Poland early in the 20th century. In 1919, State Commander-in-Chief Józef Piłsudski issued a decree *on organisation of communal police*, which implemented the concept of making local authorities co-responsible for public order maintenance (Podemska, 2017, p. 129).

At present, in line with Polish regulations, municipalities perform tasks which include matters in the area of public order and public security. In this area, they undertake protective tasks, performing auxiliary function to governmental administration, and doing so as mandated by the law, while also issuing order-related resolutions via municipal councils, if necessary to protect citizens' life or health, and to assure public order, peace, and security (Szczęch, 2017, p. 67). The opportunity to establish city guards is the most important option available to municipalities with respect to measures oriented at public security and order. They are not a competition to the police, but rather complement the forces' operations.

City guards do not get involved in investigations or operational and exploratory actions which remain within the competences of the police. They have the right to take actions related exclusively to detecting and prosecuting offenders, as mandated by the regulations. If the city guards have revealed, within their activities, a crime or an offence beyond their competencies, they must notify the police. It must be pointed out that city guards cannot, in such a case, secure the evidence by themselves. They are only to secure the crime scene against third party access or against destruction of traces and evidence until relevant services arrive, and to determine any witnesses, if possible. It must be noted that city guards cannot take fingerprints or smears from the inner cheek to identify people

of unknown identity and people wishing to hide their identity. These remain within the competences of the police. City guards do not also have an absolute right to search people and premises (Podemska, 2017, p. 130-131).

The main argument raised in favour of liquidating city guards in Poland is the claim that there is no sense in having a formation doubling the tasks of the police while also not having relevant competences to act. In small towns, however, where the problem of serious crime is small, the police may focus their actions on prosecuting minor offences. It is, however, difficult to imagine that, in large cities, police officers can devote enough time to prevent minor order violations. In order to mitigate the risk of competition between city guards and the police, many Polish cities conclude agreements to determine the scope and forms of cooperation between the police and the city guards. The cooperation involves mutual consultations to plan joint actions, and to agree on joint patrols of both forces. As regards joint work by the guards and police officers, one can indeed observe such negative phenomena as mutual distrust or guards being disregarded by the police. Many positive aspects, however, can be observed: sharing experiences, knowledge of the area, and sharing other professional knowledge. Joint actions should focus on optimal use of resources of both formations (Podemska, 2017, p. 131).

It is worth repeating that city guard establishment is facultative: a city may but needn't establish its own city guard. The facultative nature of city guard establishment is due to the fact that the city may pursue tasks related to assuring public order and security of citizens also by other means. Local authorities may also decide to co-finance the police or to support crime prevention programmes (Lis, 2014, p. 168).

Conclusion

The establishment of city guards in the early 1990's was a manifestation of state decentralisation projects. Decentralisation also involved the sphere of national security. Decentralisation of the state was related to the assumption that local problems can be solved, at least to a limited extent, by local communities. Therefore, city guard activities depend on local communities, and actually on their elected local authorities. City guards can, therefore, be referred to as "available groups", established as a result of specific social needs (Michalczyk – Mazur, 2016, p. 390).

Nevertheless, since the beginning, there were discussions surrounding justifiability of their establishment. Every now and then, there are postulates to liquidate the force, pronounced both by local communities and some political parties. Among the main claims against city guards, there is an argument they excessively focus on detecting traffic offences. In some places in Poland, these constituted the majority of offences detected (Podemska, 2017, p. 131). In particular, smaller towns used the guards to "raise" money. This changed when

city guards were deprived of the option to detect offences related to speeding using traffic enforcement cameras. City guards, similarly as the police, cannot be treated as commercial institutions. This causes a need for further discussion on the shape of such formations governed by local authorities, and their reforms.

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MORAL ASPECTS OF THE SECURITY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE HYPER-CONNECTED SOCIETY

Katarína Miňová¹

ABSTRACT

The paper examines the moral aspects of the security of individuals, which is considered to be the part of the security environment of the present time, from the point of view of social constructivism. An individual can modify the security environment on the principle of social constructivism. The author is trying to confirm the abovementioned based on the analysis of the development of the society, she finds the way of communication the key aspect in the society's development and current status. The way of communication and subsequently the development of society into its knowledge stage has enabled our society to survive. However, the current status of society, where an individual increasingly occurs and operates in the hyper network, might be endangering for the society in terms of security. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with all aspects impacting an individual within the hyper-connected reality and influencing their behavioral pattern. The following paper confirms that issues that, at first, appear to be the issues of morals and ethics, can modify the security environment.

Key words: *information society, information security, social media, hyper-connected society, security environment, security of individuals, social constructivism.*

Introduction

As we already know, the present security environment is considerably diversified, and individual reference objects must face increasingly asymmetric security threats. One of the most actual phenomena of society as a whole is the existence of social networks. Their massive worldwide utilization had raised many security-related questions. Our society reached a point, where the utilization of information flows presents a tool for survival, but these information flows transformed into data in cyberspace could easily become a security threat. This security threat presents no immediate threat since it acts asymmetrically. At the beginning, it makes changes at the moral and ethical levels – affects them and causes a distortion of perception of reality interpreted in a virtual world what results in a behavioral change at the individuals' level. Through the principle of social constructivism, the asymmetrical threat subsequently penetrates into nationwide up to global level and its consequences are obvious in actual reality, e.g. as a disruption of the process of democratic election. The article submitted tries to confirm the abovementioned statements, based on the analysis of social development into the state of hyper-connected society, which is supplemented by the case study, in which the ethics of hyper-connected society and its impacts on

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the security reality is investigated through the analysis of Cambridge Analytica company.

1 From the First Words to the Information Society

1.1 Awareness as the Survival Condition – Historical Development

In today's society, we could not even imagine our life without electronic communication. We are all aware now know that *Homo sapiens* species had succeeded among others human species (e.g. Neanderthals) and settled in many ecological environments mainly thanks to the cognitive revolution in communication. This cognitive revolution has given rise to the unique speech which pushed other human species on the edge of their existence. What makes the speech of our ancestors different from the speech of animals and other human species is the speech flexibility by which we mean the manner, how *Homo sapiens* had learned to describe phenomena. Unlike animals, people gradually learnt to use compound sentences. There were not only to screaming out - "Beware – the enemy!", but they had learned to explain to a fellow that he saw a lion watching his surroundings near the forest this morning. Beyond that, we have survived due to the ability to create *social information*. Social cooperation is a key for survival – since it is also the key for reproduction (Harari, 2011)

Thus, from the beginning of their history, a man is a social entity and as many other beings, they could survive over the long term only as an active part of a certain community – society. Information and its communication are the phenomenon, which always has played a fundamental role and their nature has always been determined by the interactions created among people themselves. These opportunities were determined especially by the society hierarchization manner. It means that communication between people with the lowest social status depends considerably upon the interactions at the highest level of the social scale. (Rankov, 2006)

By the time the agricultural society prevailed, the ways of communication were relatively simple, the set of concepts had been formed based on the masses' communication (e.g. in households, in the fields, at social events, and so on). However, people had begun to collect information not only because they had needed them for their survival, but also to fulfil the need to save information for future generations. As we mentioned above, this way of understanding the exchange and storage of information we can see since ancient times through the Middle Ages up to modern history. With the arrival of the industrial revolution, the media development, the mass spreading of the written word, the discovery of the printing press, the information stimuli became more complicated. In the end, particularly the industrial revolution has changed the nature of information means and thus contributed to the radical change of the set of concepts. Unlike the past, today it is necessary to have the ability to process a message which is

premeditated, concentrated, functional and rich in the content when receiving and processing the information. However, its processing time has been disproportionately shortened. As a consequence, there is the opinion that if **W. Shakespeare** emerged in the '90s of the 20th century, he would be considered a semiliterate, since he could not be able to process and understand a half of English language vocabulary, nor to process and apply information necessary for his further existence in the Great Britain' social life (Toffler, 1992).

According to the statement of **V. Zuska** (2007), the consequence of delivering and receiving of information today is also so-called *language functionalism*.²

1.2 Emerging of a Knowledge-Oriented Individual

The 20th century is probably the only century that influenced a huge number of radical social changes and it was the century of the most significant historical events and its heritage remains. The advanced market economy, their arrangement, processes, problems and structures are incomparable from the quality and quantity points of view not only with the status in which they were at the beginning of the 20th century but also with any other historical period. In the recent 30 years, there was more information produced than during the previous 5,000 years³. (Hashemi, 2002)

Information became a primary concern for all participants, the basic attribute and goods that are to be purchased, sold and thus, in direct proportion, there arose the need to protect information. Information is understood as a tool of societal progress. They are a fundamental prerequisite for building the advanced, post-industrial society and knowledge-oriented economics. The society has acquired entirely new characteristics, based on which it had been given the name „knowledge-based society“.

² It cannot be confused with the theory of functionalism in international and economic relations. The language functionalism means that words of another language become incorporated into the domestic language of recipient, today mostly from the English. They are used not only within common Internet communication but also in the expert writings, especially in administration. By the penetration of various formal documents (e.g. of a political nature) such words as “ofis” – office, “pí ár” – public relations, and so on, are getting into the mother language of recipients. It is not possible to stop this development, but it not only the present language imagination. This phenomenon, called today the language functionalism has its historical determinants (Ancient Greek, Latin passing through the Middle Age, up to present as expert terminology for given scientific fields and practical activity, such as medicine, pharmacy, biology, linguistics. These strange elements in the regional languages fulfilled the important role of *lingua fraaca*. We become the witnesses of the important argument somersaults as the part of information. (Zuska, 2007)

³As a matter of interest, today's New York times issue contains more information than the average Englishman in the 17th century had available in his whole life. (Noam, 1995)

According to the Confederation of British Industry, the knowledge-based society is the society, which systematically improves capabilities and knowledge of all its members to make the best use of all achievements and technological innovations of all its members to obtain a competitive advantage in the sphere of services at rapidly changing global markets. To fulfil this purpose, a physical strength, literacy and ability to count is not enough, the basic prerequisites have started to include knowledge preferably in the form of what we call *informational literacy*.

It follows that fast development requires currently the capacities that are capable to adjust themselves continually to the changes and innovations related to technological progress. Therefore, the lifelong learning becomes a part of the life of the society, replacing the original approach consisted in obtaining education in youth exclusively substituted subsequently by practical „adult“ life during which an individual drew on needed information sources from the period of his/her education obtaining only. It has started to be necessary to dispose continuously of actual and as exact information as possible in every sphere of social life. (Ainley, 1999)

1.2.1 Applied Awareness – the Condition of Survival in the 21st Century

The knowledge-based society is characterised by the fact that the key attribute for ensuring of the stable position for all participants of the international and political system – states, corporations, organizations, institutions, individuals – is the ability to obtain and apply the accumulated knowledge.

The competitiveness of every participant is perceived based on this ability. To be successful in this struggle, the participants must realize that the concept of a knowledge had completely changed. Whereas before, in the past societies, especially in the Middle Age, the concept of knowledge was understood at a singular level of obtaining a literary education in the sphere of so called *liberal arts* that included literature, philosophy, mathematics and other basic spheres of education that serve for a personality development of an individual and rarely it was oriented to a job that the individual performed as a gainful activity. Two centuries ago, a scientist might completely follow the development within his/her sphere. Two hundred years later, the individual not only does not have capacities to research news around the whole field, but the scientific fields appear as though they do not exist. They split into many subfields and scientists specialize narrowly. This is the reason why it is not possible to grow up today a polyhistor with encyclopaedic knowledge at the level of Leonardo da Vinci or Matej Bel. Because today, there is a problem with the encyclopaedia concept. (Rankov, 2006)

In present, the knowledge is understood only in the pluralistic context of many specialized knowledge and possibilities of their use in the professional life. It results from abovementioned that the knowledge-based society of the 21st

century is created by the specialized experts, who have acquired the required amount of knowledge in the sphere they are involved in. One who does not have the required specialized knowledge (the innate abilities – e.g. the ability to sing or the knowledge acquired during the educational process – e.g. in the architecture) or the ability to adapt to the environment and to acquire the required specialized knowledge within requested time, is not competitive in the knowledge-based society. The more specialized a knowledge is the more irreplaceable and competitive a participant is in the system. It means that specialized knowledge resulting from the ability to acquire and process information became the fundamental and crucial value of the quality of the existence in the society.

But the amount of information that an individual has to process today to be oriented within a certain field, is really huge and this extreme quantitative increase of information amount is often referred to as the information explosion. This explosion results in so called information crises, which arise as a consequence of discrepancy between principles of functioning of information, communication and knowledge environment and tools that are available for navigation and orientation within this environment. (Uhlíř, 2002)

1.3 From Knowledge-Based to Hyper-Connected Society

The abovementioned organization of social life includes a probability that individuals have a need to change the environment in which they operate intending to become a part of superior unit. The basic prerequisite of such society is the need of mobility in the sphere of activity and the sphere of operation. The commitment to the geographical area has been weakened to the extent where the loyalty to state or location is broken by the loyalty to corporations, professions, associations or communities. The social structures are no longer bound to a place, but to structures that are movable in their nature. (Toffler, 1992) The society oriented in this way has no boundaries. There are no national and foreign knowledge. It is always knowledge that is equally valid for all involved participants and differs only in the extent to which the participants are capable to acquire and use the knowledge. The knowledge-based society works globally, even though its sources are at all levels of world political system, from the individuals' level up to the institutions, states and supranational level of corporations or international organizations. (Drucker, 1994) *"In today's global society, the boundaries between states, nations or cultures disappear."* (Bauman, 2000, p. 13) The societies and nations are no longer divided by borders, but by the option and capability to participate in the information and processes exchange, utilization and exchange of knowledge.

Technological advances have brought the extreme reduction of distance resulting from the transfer time compression which resulted into the formation of information society. (Virilio, 2004) Using the theory of **M. Castells**, we can say,

that the information society has a paradigm, which becomes evident by the network logic. *“The networks constitute a new social morphology of our society and spreading the network logic considerably modifies the operations and outputs of the processes of production, power and culture.”* (Castells, 1997, p. 469) *“Power is no longer concentrated in the institutions (state), organizations (a capitalist company) or symbolic checkers (media, churches). It had diffused in the global networks of wealth of power, information and images.”* (Castells, 1997, p. 359).

All dominant social functions and processes at the level of participants of political system have a network nature, since the running of information society is determined by the communication network. It is the network which is the key sign of information society, since networks connect individual users without a central point, what means that there is no hierarchization in such constellation. (Tapscott, 1999) For example, the President of the Republic communicates on Internet directly with citizens through social networks, the members of parliament talk with voters at virtual discussion forums, any citizen may contact government authorities or international bodies and to request certain information under applicable legislation. At present, it is common enough to use the social networks for an election campaign. However, as it is shown also by short case study hereinafter, the boundaries of legality and morality are perceived differently in the cyberspace. Even though the social networks are nothing new at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, only in the past few years some processes make possible to perceive the legality and ethics in the same way, both outside and inside the virtual world.

According to **S. Kumon**, in this kind of society, people disposes of big potential of information which leads to so called *hyper communication*. Therefore, the culture in such *hyper-connected society* is based on efficient and intense human communication and interaction within *network citizens*, creating so called *virtual communities*. These are according to quoted author, a source of power created by a consensus based on a participation. Therefore, the virtual world is not only a channel of information exchange. (Kumon, 1996) It is also the space for creation of strategies – of the state, region, institutions, organizations, from the individuals’ level up to the global space. It will probably be a network citizen, who will define, by its influence, a shape of political strategies of all kinds and thus, the security environment of the whole world will be put on entirely new footing.

We can state that information technologies, through their broad spectrum of utilization, influence all the spheres of social life. The possibilities of a disruption of this space are growing and they present the potential threats that almost all social subjects have to deal with.” (Ušiak, Nečas, 2010, p. 95)

From abovementioned, we can assume, that current society is describable as society hyperconnected via networks.

To designate the network, some authors use word *cyberspace*, which includes the material infrastructure, its content and users. “*Cyberspace is the carrier of intellectual technologies which expand, exteriorize and modify multiple human cognitive functions: memory (databases, hyper documents, digital files of all types), imagination (simulations), perception (digital sensor, remote attendance, virtual realities), thinking (artificial intelligence, modeling of complex phenomena).*” (Lévy, 2000, p. 141)

According to multiple authors, this development is heading to the formation of a parallel virtual world, where a special virtual society created by the whole spectrum of various participants will be living with the ultimate aim not to follow reality closely, but to make it disappear. Therefore, it is possible, in an extreme case that the *hyper reality* will completely substitute the true reality. (Baudrillard, 1994) Realism of virtual worlds may lead to the loss of realism in distinguishing of real and virtual environment. New technologies have caused the space compression, however, they also create a new space that is incompatible with the space within which people had been moving and perceiving them through their senses for thousands of year and also a new type of presence. (Rankov, 2006)

2 An Insight into the Ethics of a Hyper-Connected Society: Case of Cambridge Analytica

In connection with the formation of a hyper network reality that is created particularly by Internet content, it is necessary to think about the question, to what extent this paradigm may affect the real world. There are opinions that cyber space and how virtual world and individuals in it work, strengthens the position of the technological corporates that even have a potential to intervene the democratic processes in a modern society. (Cadwalladr, 2019; Cadwalladr, Graham-Harrison, 2018) Because of the fact that present society can be characterized as a hyper informational one, where information or data became the most valuable market commodity. This is the reason why the most relevant participants that can influence the things in the whole society may nowadays include not only political actors but also such gigantic companies like Google or Facebook.

The social networks have become the tools of communication and connecting, the tools of sharing and building of communities. Thanks to them, the world became smaller at virtual level. However, as time passed, they became actors of change, which has also negative impacts on the society. In 2018, Mark Zuckerberg, chief executive officer and co-founder of the biggest social network Facebook, answered to the House Judiciary Committee and to the leaders of political parties and Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament in the matter of misuse of Facebook users' data by third parties and spreading of disinformation which led to the manipulation of elections in the United States of America. On this occasion, he, as chief executive officer admitted that they were not able to

prevent the misuse of social network by third parties. He assured the committees that the intent of Facebook is especially so called social mission of connecting of its users, not trade with data. (Zuckerberg sa v Európskom parlamente..., 2019) In the end, Facebook company has accepted liability for the unauthorized disclosure of data of tens of thousands of data of its users and has committed to prevent similar misuse from the part of third parties in future and to prevent spreading of so called disinformation or fake news.

The case, in the matter of which Zuckerberg was in the European Parliament, relates to a British political consulting company **Cambridge Analytica**. This firm has developed seemingly innocent survey within the framework of Facebook social network platform as a third party for its users. The survey began following the user clicking on the informed approval that enabled the survey provider, being a third party, to obtain data from those Facebook individual users' profiles, the owners of which took the survey. (Bradshaw, 2019) However, the users had no information about the fact that the firm has gained access not only to their data, but also to data on the network of the user's friends. Based on this survey, Cambridge Analytica could define so called "waverers", thus convincible users. This group of users subsequently received the advertising content created jointly by Cambridge Analytica and marketing companies, focused on all the users with abovementioned feature. The user, included in the target group of this marketing campaign, had been attacked by posts with an content intentionally constructed in such a way as to ensure that a wavering citizen will vote on the side of the Cambridge Analytica's client. The user simply got lost in the flood of posts, which distorted his/her reality. These posts showed the reality out of context or were not based on objective facts or the objective reality was adjusted to the purpose followed by the client. This phenomenon is called as fake news. Some fake news are simply recognizable, but many of them are very sophisticated and built on the facts that were misinterpreted or misused. At present the amount of disinformation websites full of fake news and so called *hoaxes* is steadily on the increase. The dangers of these news consists in their potential to spread a mistaken assumption on security threat, which may not be real. They are based on the facts but with added distorted superstructure. Spreading such disinformation content, media become an untrustworthy source and the democratic political system is doubted. The purpose of *fake news* is to reach two extremes – to raise the passionate, sometimes exaggerated responses of recipients or their indifference due to information overload what subsequently leads to their inability to conclude which information is correct and thus they completely lose their interest in this topic. The sophistication of *fake news* consists in the fact that they build on emotionality. In most cases it is something what closely relates to people, raises the emotion and results in a lack of rational approach and a recipient's emotional action. In practical terms, this means that the recipient does not verify whether the source of *fake news* is real, whether the given information was presented also in a serious medium and spreads the

information among others and in these times of Internet social media it has a potential to grow into the spreading of unnecessary alarm. Of course, this paradigm is not typical exclusively for social media. The propaganda spreads disinformation for centuries. However, the present is characterized by huge technological progress with a lack of adaptation to critical thinking and media literacy (e.g. the students learn to work with computers or software in school, but they do not learn why they cannot trust every news they may find on Internet and how to detect fake news). (Golis, 2016).

Cambridge Analytica applied the abovementioned processes in the campaign of American president Trump and the Brexit campaign - leave.eu. (Bradsahw, 2019) There had been multiple campaigns in the third world countries before, where Cambridge Analytica verified the real efficiency of such marketing strategy. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, in 2013, Cambridge Analytica initiated the campaign with ironical slogan "Do So!" The intention was to promote the campaign of anti-establishment and to induce feelings of apathy, rebelliousness and skepticism in the electoral body of the client's competitor in connection to the political system and thus to manipulate the influenceable part of this electoral body to ignore the elections under the slogan "Do So! Don't vote!". In the end of the case, a significant fact was revealed - Cambridge Analytica was connected also with non-profit organization WikiLeaks. (Graham-Harrison, Cadwalladr, Osborne, 2018). It was believed that the organization published, at the time of American presidential election, the e-mail communication from the Democratic Party Headquarters, from which it results that the party leadership did not behave neutrally but tried to assert Hillary Clinton as the presidential candidate for the party, at the expense of another candidate within the primary election. This weakened the confidence of voters of the Democratic Party in its unity. Subsequently, there was a hacking attack and release of the e-mail communication content of the presidential candidate Hillary Clinton what resulted in the irritation of certain part of the electoral body of the Democratic Party, which Clinton stand for. The released e-mails promoted the impression that the private opinions of the president candidate differ from those presented in public. (Svet v roku 2016, 2017)

Probably, in the near term, the public will learn about the way how Cambridge Analytica affected the political behavior of voters on Facebook through the psychological mapping. More than 100,000 documents relating to work in 68 countries that will lay bare the global infrastructure of an operation used to manipulate voters are set to be released over the next months. The release of documents began on New Year's Day on an anonymous Twitter account, **@HindsightFiles**, with links to material on elections in Malaysia, Kenya and Brazil. The documents were revealed to have come from **Brittany Kaiser**, an ex-Cambridge Analytica employee turned whistleblower, and to be the same ones subpoenaed by **Robert Mueller's** investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Kaiser decided to go public after election in Britain in

December 2019. She claims, that it's abundantly clear electoral systems are wide open to abuse. She expressed serious apprehension about what is going to happen in the United States presidential election in 2020. **Emma Briant**, an academic at Bard College, New York, who specializes in investigating propaganda and has had access to some of the documents for research, claims that what had been revealed was "the tip of the iceberg". These documents are revealing a much clearer idea of what actually happened in the 2016 United States presidential election, which has a huge bearing on what will happen in 2020. (Cadwalladr, 2020)

Conclusion

The dangers of social networks do not consist only in the risk that users' data will be stolen and subsequently misused for blackmailing or abusing. In addition to these direct risks resulting from the fact that somebody gains legally or illegally access to our data and subsequently misuses them for criminal activity such as cyber grooming or identity theft, it is necessary to call the attention to the indirect risks. These risks are also connected with data security and users of social network security, but they act indirectly and the consequence is a change in behavior and decision-making of an individual in reality. The social networks connect the continents on one hand, but on the other hand, they have a potential to split the persons living in one joint household.

The security risk for today's society is an imagination that the content of social network of user A is the content of the social network of user B, user C and subsequently of the group of users. This places increasingly strong paradigm that the content of the social networks is the same for everyone and thus this is also the outside reality. Society nowadays is reaching the point, where we are becoming those creating the virtual reality with the ultimate aim not to follow the actual reality, but to make it disappear. We have to be careful so that this new hyperreality will not completely substitute the true reality, as it was predicted in 1994 by J. Baudrillard.

All individuals have to keep in mind that, since this virtual space is not only the space for communication and sharing among individuals and it became also media and marketing space, it is necessary to carefully analyze the impacts on behavioral patterns of the users, because the social networks confine unconsciously their users by a targeted marketing to tailored virtual worlds and therefore they have potential to manipulate their behavior. And principle of social constructivism in hyperconnected society take for granted, that what is happening on local level, could easily become worldwide.

In conclusion, hyperconnected society has two sides of the coin – positive and negative one. Would it be heads or tails? It depends on us, individuals, and our capacity to think, read and learn in constructive way, our capacity to fully understand what is protection of our personal data, to be aware of what is

information and disinformation and what is information security, our willingness to build our own information literacy and common sense via education, and last but not least, our willingness to have an interest to take active part in the society of information, not only to be a passive consumer of what is served.

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CYBER THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CASE OF „FAKE NEWS“ IN MONTENEGRO

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ABSTRACT

In the last two decades, new threats to national security have emerged through the cyberspace. Due to ever-expanding users of the Internet and social media, the flow of information has never been greater. One of the consequences of that trend is the problem of information reliability. The term „fake news“ was created to describe false information in the digital area. The recent arrests of journalists in Montenegro have shown how spreading fake news can endanger national security, most notably by inciting panic and public discord amongst citizens. Authors of this paper aimed to show how public reactions to fake news lead to threats of national security in Montenegro

Keywords: *cyber threats, cyber security, fake news, information and communication studies, Montenegro*

Introduction

In the late 2000s information and communications technology have begun rapidly developing. Today, they are a vital part of societies around the globe. In that regard, the processes of integration and globalization have gained new meaning. Nations around the world are no longer connected only through trade agreements or bilateral contracts, but also by cyberspace and information networks that allow them to communicate demands or pleas in real-time. With the increasing value that information and communications technology has had in the last decade, there has also been an emergence of misinformation or disinformation in the digital space. Commonly referred to as „fake news“, these incorrect information and false statements can have a real impact in the sociological and political landscape. Even largest multinational organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union have expressed concerns that “fake news” can obtain significance, thus influence and preset a clear threat to national security to countries around the world.

This paper focuses on the emergence of “fake news” and disinformation campaigns in Montenegro regarding their Law on Religious Freedom that passed

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in the parliament on December 27, 2019, under heated debate, attempts at the disruption of the vote and harsh word. The law came into effect in January 2020, and protests and news articles opposing the law have been frequent ever since.

The first part of the paper will explore the theory of national and cybersecurity and the theory of information and communication studies in the context of “fake news”. The second part will concentrate on the examination of spreading “fake news” in media while reporting on the new Law on Religious Freedom in Montenegro, which has resulted in several arrests. With this paper, the authors aim to provide an overview of how the Montenegro government sought to combat the disinformation campaign and “fake news” regarding the new law on Religious Freedom, for the purpose of protecting its national security.

1 National, information and cybersecurity in the era of “fake news” or disinformation campaigns

National security as a term has been introduced in 1943 by **Walter Lippman** and is defined as the ability of a country and/or a nation to keep its citizens and interests safe (Lippman, 1943). From its introduction to 2020, the term branched out into multiple aspects of life, and now encompasses military, political, ecological, economic, energy and cyberspace area. Every one of these every areas can present a substantial threat to the security of a nation. For decades threats from many areas have been visible to the political subject. However, there is one area that is “younger” and more unpredictable than others, the cybersecurity one.

Cybersecurity, as defined by the European Union consists of: “the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein’ (European Union Cybersecurity Strategy 2013, 3). Although it is mainly a technology term, in the last few years it has been used in numerous fields of study due to the ever-increasing dependence of individuals on technological gadgets that are connected to the Internet, thus sharing data from provider to consumer and vice versa. Cybersecurity is simple put the preservation of security in cyberspace. Cyberspace, on the other hand, according to **Singer** and **Friedman**, is the: “...*the realm of computer networks (and the users behind them) in which information is stored, shared, and communicated online... Cyberspace is first and foremost an information environment. It is made up of digitized data that is created, stored, and, most importantly, shared. This means that it is not merely a physical place and thus defies measurement in any kind of physical dimension...*” (2014, pg. 13)

In other words, the term cyberspace is a symbolic term of a virtual environment that is shaped by the users through the World Wide Web, commonly

referred to as the Internet. The Internet is an integral part of everyday life thanks to the development of communication platforms, social media websites, and applications such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Viber, etc. The proliferation of these platforms and the gained ability of every user to create/generate content has led to an astonishing and malicious emergence of “fake news” and disinformation campaigns. The latest example being the flood of false information that users of social media are pushing regarding the coronavirus pandemic (Scott, 2020).

While in the past scientists still debated about the theoretical approach to “fake news” and its meaning, in the last few years, there has been an improvement in the discussion on what identifies as “fake news”. This can be attributed to the 2016 and the Brexit referendum, United States of America presidential race and the role that the company Cambridge Analytica played in those events. According to a whistleblower **Chris Wylie**, Cambridge Analytica illegally collected data of 50 million Facebook users, and built complex data analysis tools to target potential voters (Scott, 2018).

Today, the term “fake news” is deemed not appropriate to properly describe the effect it has on the political and security scene. Thus, the term “disinformation” is being favored as an alternative. As stated by a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, named *Disinformation and propaganda impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States*: “there is an emerging consensus among public policy actors against using the term ‘fake news’ and in favor of using the term ‘disinformation’ to describe what is generally understood as false or misleading information produced and disseminated to intentionally cause public harm or for profit. (Bayer, Bitiukova et. al., 2019, pg. 23)

The same study has presented two major variables that determine the impact level of disinformation (“fake news”) campaigns. Those are:

- 1) *the pluralism of media and of ideas within the particular media landscape. A strong and lively public discourse – which presupposes media freedom and pluralism – makes the audience more resistant to disinformation and propaganda actions. When such content can be confronted with rational argumentation and various opposing views, from several sources, then the audience has a greater chance of discerning the truth. Therefore, those countries where media freedom and pluralism are endangered, typically where public service broadcasting or even a large part of the media is captured, are more vulnerable to experiencing the negative effects; and*
- 2) *the level of organisation of the disinformation and propaganda campaign. Sporadic disinformation events are not comparable with concerted campaigns using a variety of sources and communication channels at the same time. Such concerted efforts must be well-financed, which offers another anchor for investigation and control. Governmental actors are known to have larger*

financial resources at their disposal. And when the system of checks and balances is weak or deconstructed, there are slim chances of resisting a decay of democracy. (Bayer, Bitiukova et. al., 2019, pg. 53)

If governments around the world wish to protect its safety from the consequences of spreading disinformation or “fake news” they have to identify, determine and offer a legal framework that will allow them to combat such threats, while still safeguarding democracy and human rights in their respected countries.

2 Cyber security and fake news campaigns in Montenegro

Dealing with security challenges, Montenegro offers possible solutions and ways to fight cybercrimes. The Cybersecurity Strategy of Montenegro 2018-2021 identifies eight objectives to improve it:

- reliance on European and Euro-Atlantic concepts,
- strengthening the cyber defense capacities,
- centralization of cyber expertise and resources
- strengthening of inter-institutional cooperation,
- data protection,
- cyber security education,
- strengthening the partnership between public and private sectors,
- strengthening regional and international cooperation (Government of Montenegro, 2017)

As a part of Article 13a of the Law on Information Security (Official Gazette of MNE, No 14/10 and 40/16), the Government of Montenegro decided to form the Council on Information security which will monitor the implementation of the Strategy. With these objectives, the Government of Montenegro is trying to encourage a favourable environment for development and progress to the satisfaction of the citizens (Government of Montenegro, 2017).

In today’s digital era, one of the biggest digital challenges and threat to democracy are fake news. As already mentioned, the Internet has allowed various platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and they are fueling with disinformation and fake news. It’s also hard to find an approachable way to deal with the fake news in the matter of law. **Richter** wrote: “*The problem of how to counteract the dissemination of false reports and information has naturally existed since the birth of the press. The desire to find a solution raises with the growth of media influence, intensified today with the role that social media plays in informing the public.*”(2018/2019, pg. 10) International organisations around the world have been fighting disinformational campaigns and “fake news” on a daily bases, but it ultimately falls to each government to fight “fake news” that are impacting their political situation. Although Montenegro is a small nation and a young democracy it has acknowledged the problem and trying to manage it regularly.

One of the recent events that happened in Montenegro is the adoption of the Freedom of Religion law. One of the main controversies which were entitled by the article number 52 states: *“Religious facilities and land used by the religious communities in the territory of Montenegro and for which is found to have been built or obtained from public resources of the state or have been in state ownership until 1 December 1918, as the cultural heritage of Montenegro, shall be the property of the state.*

Religious facilities for which is found to have been built on the territory of Montenegro from joint investments of the citizens until 1 December 1918, shall be the property of the state.”(The Law on Freedom of Religion, transcript text, no date)

Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) sees the law as the attack on SOC and its property, while the government of Montenegro claims that the law puts all religions in the same position (Aljazeera Balkans, 2020a). Shortly after the adoption of the law, SOC supporters and priests staged protests throughout the whole Montenegro against it and claimed that they won't stop until the law is withdrawn (Kajosevic, 2020a). Apart from protests, Montenegro has been facing a “fake news” campaign. The Montenegrin Culture Ministry said that the country has become the subject of “disinformation campaign” since it adopted controversial legislation on religion which has angered Serbian Orthodox believers (Kajosevic, 2020b). Center for democratic transition did a research on a numerous of articles and concluded that the beginning of 2020, the media landscape of Montenegro was the target of an organized spreading of media manipulation with the goal of influence on events related to the adaptation of the Freedom on the Religion law. This was the most intense of the four major projects of this type in the last 18 months (Bogdanović, 2020).

One of the examples was the case of the reporter **Andela Đikanović**. Now former editor of local news-website FOS media was arrested 6th of January 2020, just a few hours after she published an article about members of the Kosovo special police forces who would come to the rescue of the Montenegrin police if the need arose over Orthodox Christmas (Tadić-Mijović, 2020). Following her arrest, the state prosecutor's office charged her with “causing panic and disorder,” a criminal offense, and ordered her to be detained for 72 hours (Committee to protect journalists-CPJ, 2020). The government accused FOS media of publishing fake news whose aim was to alarm the public and even caused riots. FOS media withdrew the article and apologized, stating that it did not intend to spread panic. Article claims were also denied by authorities in Kosovo (Kajosevic, 2020c).

Only a few days after, **Gojko Raičević** and **Dražen Živković**, editors of two local news websites IN4S and Borba, published an article about alleged explosion happened at the Gorica state villa, which is often used by the president of Montenegro(Aljazeera Balkan, 2020b). In the meantime, some regional media also transmitted the information. The police denied the report and said it was a minor failure of the electrical installations. They were arrested on suspicion of

inciting public panic and disorder (Kajosevic, 2020d). Authorities charged them with criminal incitement and released them pending trial. If convicted, they could each face a fine or a prison sentence of up to one year, according to Montenegro's criminal code (CPJ, 2020b). After his release, **Raičević** said he had double-checked the information before it was published and that his arrest was really about intimidating journalists (Kajosevic, 2020d). CPJ stated that "*Montenegrin authorities should immediately drop charges against **Dražen Živković** and **Gojko Raičević** and cease pursuing criminal cases against journalists*" (CPJ, 2020b)

While CPJ sees arrests as pursuing criminal cases against journalists and also having Asian program coordinator, **Gulnoza** saying that "*Journalists should not face criminal charges for their work; authorities should seek civil remedies, and reform Montenegro's criminal incitement laws*" (CJP, 2020b), Montenegro ministry of Foreign affairs claims that Montenegro is among a few countries in Europe that have decriminalized defamation when it comes to media rights and freedoms. It has been intensively working with the Council of Europe and the European Commission on a set of media laws for the media field to be aligned with the highest international standards (Ministry of foreign affairs, 2020). They also stated that the case of **Andela Đikanović** cannot speak about endangering media freedoms. In the letter sent to the Council of Europe, was written:

*"Although the source of the information, for which **Đikanović** claims is from diplomatic sources, is still to be identified, there are indications that the placement of this information was an attempt of the third party to interfere in internal affairs of Montenegro in order to destabilize the state and violate public order and peace. "The Police Directorate conducted an analysis of all the electronic media, both local and regional, which transmitted this news, an analysis of posted comments by readers, as well as posts and comments on social networks. The conclusion of this analysis, which was submitted to the competent prosecutor, is that this fake news caused panic in both Montenegro and the region"*(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020).

As previously mentioned, the Montenegro media landscape has been fighting with the fake news campaign in recent years. CTD has concluded that even though they've been struggling with lots of fake news campaigns, the Montenegro government still doesn't have a proper strategy and procedure for those situations (Bogdanović, 2020). Cases of **Đikanović/Raičević/Živković** showed that the news indeed spread the panic throughout Montenegro, especially following the protest that Freedom of Religion law has brought. At the national level, the right to freedom of opinion and expression is provided in the Constitution of Montenegro (LaRue, 2014). Article 47 of the Constitution, establishes that: "*Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression by speech, writing, picture or in some other manner. The right to freedom of expression may be limited only by the right of others to dignity, reputation and honor and if it threatens public morality or the security of Montenegro.*"(MNE Constitution, article 47, section 2). The law clearly states that freedom of

expression may be limited if threatens security of Montenegro; therefore if the published news were used as a tool to encourage social disruption, the same should be investigated because the freedom of expression is not above the security of the citizens of Montenegro.

While it's extremely important for media to be independent, in order to do its role as the guardian of the democracy, it's also equally important for media, according to **Richter** to: support quality professional journalistic education and training in order to produce eminent journalistic analyses and high editorial standards, which would also promote the international values of freedom of expression and media plurality; to strengthen the role of independent and sustainable public service media (PSM) online which could serve the backbone of traditional journalism with its professional standards. The role of the PSM would involve the obligation to cover the whole range of issues of public interest, including false news and providing the audience with access to professional media critique and more generally – to facilitate media and internet literacy (Richter, 2018/2019). It is clear is that in the new media landscape, credible journalism is needed more than ever especially because of the fast-evolving fake news industry. That also means there will have to be a re-emphasis on very basic reporting skills that require accurate recording and verification of information (Rodny-Gumede, 2018). This will ensure a core of qualitative information that is trustworthy, provides facts and supports constitutional values and human rights (Rodny-Gumede, 2018, pg. 285).

Conclusion

In this paper, the authors dealt with the issues of “fake news” and disinformation in Montenegro, as well as the response of the government of Montenegro on the example of **Đikanović/Raičević/Živković** cases. On this subject the authors have identified that the government of Montenegro acted according to their national security strategy and that the journalists had some questionable statements and sources backing their stories that were published online. The government of Montenegro declared that police of Montenegro acted in accordance to law by arresting the journalists with the intent to prosecute them, although some argue that was an attack on the freedom of speech.

Disinformation campaigns and “fake news”, especially ones regarding the legal system, law and religion can lead to a significant impact on the civil society in Montenegro since the new law on religious freedom mainly impacts one religious group in Montenegro. The Law on Religious Freedom came into power in January, as of the time writing this paper in March/April there have been several protests and media campaigns by interest and religious groups seeking to abolish the law and attack the government of Montenegro. These actions, fueled by “fake news” can lead to potentially lead significant consequences for the national security in Montenegro. Scientific exploration and examination of future events

regarding the ongoing legal situation in Montenegro will be needed in order to establish a finite conclusion on the real level of threat that disinformation and “fake news” can bring upon this young democracy.

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VISEGRAD GROUP - NATO AND EU INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE INITIATIVES*

Antonín Novotný¹

ABSTRACT

Currently, the V4 countries are involved in many security and defence initiatives within the EU and NATO. The valuable fact remains that even when NATO countries contribute to various clusters (EU BG, NATO NRF, VJTF, eFP), operations and exercises, the V4 forces are able to harmonize NATO and EU requirements, find common solutions and leave a visible footprint in the form of V4 EU BG. The building of the joint V4 EU BGs again highlighted the need to continue modernizing and deepening the interoperability of its own armed forces. In the future, in particular, PESCO European cooperation projects offer further opportunities to develop the capabilities of the V4 countries using the European Defence Fund and the participation of national defence industry companies.

Key words: *European Union; NATO; PESCO; Visegrad Group; Smart Defence.*

Introduction

The Czech Republic supports the development of bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation, especially with neighbouring countries, and actively contributes to these endeavours. Regional defence cooperation is based on two primary pillars; cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany and developing cooperation within the Visegrad Group. (MoD. Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic).

The formation of the Visegrad Group was one of the consequences of the end of the Cold War period. In the period after the fall of Communism, regional cooperation in Central Europe was a logical outcome in the process of transition from communism to democracy, from a planned economy to the free market economy and from a unified authoritative foreign policy to self-determination. The strategic content of the Visegrad Group's cooperation at that time consisted mainly of a joint effort of Central European countries to integrate into Western European structures, integration into the European Union and involvement in the security structures of the NATO. Security and defence issues are currently among the most important pillars of V4 cooperation.

The V4 defence cooperation is influenced by the different level of the armed forces of each country. These are mainly the amount and differences in defence

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budgets, the level of military capabilities and the involvement of the armed forces in international activities (allied exercises, NATO and EU operations, modernization projects).

The size of the armed forces of all the countries of the group 175 000 (The Secretary General's Annual Report)² is roughly comparable to France 204 000 (Global Firepower - World Military Strength) or Israel 170 000 (Global Firepower - World Military Strength). In terms of capabilities, but mainly due to the outdated military technology of the Warsaw Pact and thus lower levels of interoperability, have V4 countries gap in the comparison to the developed western countries. With regard to the V4 countries general potential, dominate Poland, due to its size and population - with an area of 71 in the world and a population of 37 (CIA The World Factbook). The total gross domestic product in purchasing power parity is the 23rd country in the world. These parameters significantly exceed the other three V4 countries.

In number, the Polish Armed Forces represent more than 60% of V4 soldiers, as well as excellence in defence spending, with a budget of 67% of the V4 budget. However, Poland's share of NATO's foreign operations is only one third of all V4 countries. By contrast, the massive investments Poland has made in recent years to modernize its armed forces amount to nearly \$ 40 billion. Poland, as the only V4 country so far, is delivering the commitment on the NATO summit in Wales to reach 2% of its defence spending. According to Global Firepower, Poland has the 24th strongest armed forces in the world, ranking eighth in the European context (Global Firepower - World Military Strength). These differences may be one of the reasons limiting the full development of cooperation in selected areas of cooperation.

Since its formation, the countries of the Visegrad Group have endeavored to carry out a number of defence projects, most notably the creation of the European Union Battle Group or the Joint Training Strategy. The Group's efforts also focused on other projects, harmonization of defence planning, but also harmonization of acquisition plans. From this point of view, V4 sought and found other partners for closer cooperation. These have recently become especially Germany with France and Great Britain, the so-called V4 + format.

1 PESCO - Permanent Structured Cooperation Program

One of the new initiatives in the EU is the PESCO program (EU PESCO Facts sheet). A total of 25 EU countries joined the initiative in December 2017, with the V4 countries no exception. PESCO emphasizes increasing efficiency in addressing security challenges and deeper integration within the EU. It is the regional cooperation mechanisms that are important for the further development

² The Czech Republic – 25 000 soldiers, Hungary – 19 000 soldiers, Poland – 118 000 soldiers, Slovakia – 13 000 soldiers

of PESCO, where EU SMEs can play an important role in it. Nevertheless, the V4 countries' attitude to this initiative is different (**Michelot**, The V4 on Defence: The Art of Disagreement). While the Czech Republic and Slovakia became one of the first countries to adopt the program, Hungary and Poland entered it practically last. In particular, before adopting PESCO, Poland emphasized its positions and boundaries that are beyond its limits. In particular, it emphasized the supremacy of the NATO defence planning process, the scope for competitiveness, innovation and the balance of the European defence industry, while maintaining a 360 ° approach to threat perception.

By the end of 2019, the European Council in 3 waves had adopted total of 47 PESCO projects. These are divided into of seven groups - training and training facilities; land, formations, systems; maritime; air systems; cyber, C4ISR; Enabling, joint; space (PESCO. EU Website). The V4 countries coordinate a total of 4 projects, one of them each. Hungary is responsible for the project of the Joint European Integrated Simulation and Training Center (EUROSIM), participant is Poland. Poland is responsible for the project of the Special Forces Health Training Center (SMTC) in which Hungary participates. Slovakia manages the Indirect Fire Support Capabilities (EUROARTILLERY) project, in which Hungary is involved. Finally, the Czech Republic is responsible for the Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Program for Future Joint Intelligence (JISR), in which none of the V4 countries are participating. In other PESCO projects, participate V4 countries only as observers. The only project in which all V4 countries participate as coordinator or participant is Military Mobility. This project aims to simplify and standardize the movement of EU troops across the territory of other Member States - table 1.

| Title/Project | Czech Republic | Hungary | Poland | Slovakia |
|--|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC) | x | | | |
| EU Test and Evaluation Centres | | | | x |
| Integrated European Joint Training and simulation Centre (EUROSIM) | | x (leading nation) | x | |
| Special Operations Force Medical Training Centre (SMTC) | | x | x (leading nation) | |
| Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/Amphibious Assault Vehicle/Light Armoured Vehicle | | | | x |
| Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery) | | x | | x (leading nation) |
| Integrated Unmanned Ground System (UGS) | x | x | | |
| Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) | | | x | |

| | | | | |
|--|--------------------|---|---|---|
| Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO) | | | x | |
| European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS (Eurodrone) | x | | | |
| Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) | x | | | |
| European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR) | | | x | |
| Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform | | x | | |
| Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) Cooperation | x (leading nation) | | | |
| European Medical Command | x | | | x |
| Network of logistic Hubs in Europe and support to Operations | | x | x | x |
| Military Mobility | x | x | x | x |
| Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS) | | x | | |
| Co-basing | x | | | |

Although the PESCO program has been in existence for just two years, the scope of its projects is already very wide. However, an analysis of the V4 countries' cooperation and their involvement in PESCO showed that there is no other actor other than the Military Mobility program, whose actors would be all four partner states. Similarly, the balance sheet of any of the four V4-led programs suggests that no country was able to reach more than one other Visegrad group partner with its program. In this connection, proposed areas of cooperation between PESCO programs include:

- The Logistics Base Network and Operations Support program, possibly coordinated by the Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC);
- Integrated European Joint Training and simulation Centre (EUROSIM) program involving Czech Armed Forces simulation and simulator centres of ground and air forces.

2.1 EU Battle Group

EU BG is criticized above all for its redundancy because of NRF or VJTF. These NATO Rapid Response Forces represent a much greater military capability than the EU BG with a wider range of applications. The question is therefore whether EU combat groups may be sufficient for the range of missions envisaged by the EU BG for these troops. The starting point may be to extend EU BG to the size of a brigade task force and to strengthen the modularity of such task forces. This would give the EU the capacity to intervene in medium and large-scale operations. As in the case of the V4 EU BG, the command would be under the group's lead state or Framework Nation. Another starting point is the joint agreement between NATO and the EU on the precise division of roles and areas of intervention. In some cases, sending EU BG might be more appropriate from a foreign policy point of view than sending alliance troops.

Improving and streamlining the V4 EU BG preparation process can be ensured by modulating of forces. Currently, while V4 states are responsible for modules, they are incomplete and need to be strengthened by the forces and resources of other partners. As a result, the process of generating forces is further extended. By complex modularization and codification of capabilities, this process, which will take up to six months now, would significantly speed up. These arguments support the deployment of complete force modules, the construction of which will be the responsibility of each partner. The proposed joint EU BG projects include:

- Development of a comprehensive modular system V4 EU BG with precisely codified capabilities,
- Co-financing transport to the area of operations using, for example, the European Defence Fund,
- Construction of a command element V4 EU BG by the Czech Armed Forces on a rotating basis with Poland (**Schreier**, Místo a úloha V4 při zabezpečování obrany a bezpečnosti).

The agreement of the V4 countries and the joint enforcement of the above recommendations could lead to greater efficiency and, above all, the operational capacity of EU BGs, not just V4 EU BG.

2.2 Joint acquisitions

Despite the efforts to revive regional cooperation in the area of joint acquisition of military equipment and material, none of the projects was successful. The reasons for the failure of cooperation are complex. These include the different economic potential, industrial capabilities, expectations and threat perceptions of the V4 countries. Due to the size of its economy, Poland's defence spending is significantly higher than the defence budgets of the other V4 countries (The Secretary General's Annual Report).³ In particular, this leads the three smaller V4 partners to find ways to change this practice. Under its 2019-2020 V4 Presidency, the Czech Republic proposes to start from a smaller project, which should be the joint purchase of ammunition. It is currently the only project supported by all V4 countries. Other projects of possible cooperation with a limited number of participating V4 countries include the modernization of T-72 tanks, the acquisition of small arms, very short-range air defence systems (V-SHORAD), but also the acquisition of a brand new tank. Perspective projects could become purchases of new technologies that the V4 armed forces do not yet have. In this context, the following areas are offered:

- cyber defence,
- satellite technology,

³ In 2018 - Poland had defence spending 12,156 billion. USD (2,05 % GDP), the Czech Republic 2,754 billion USD (1,11% GDP), Hungary 1,820 billion USD (1,15% GDP) a Slovakia 1,316 billion USD (1,21% GDP).

- Unmanned Combat Vehicles (UCAS) with nominal operational availability above 5,400 m, i.e. above Flying level 180 (**Schreier**, Místo a úloha V4 při zabezpečování obrany a bezpečnosti).

2.3 Cooperation within NATO - Smart Defence

One of the priorities of further cooperation is the V4 country is the area of defence planning. The defence planning processes of the EU, NATO and individual V4 countries have their specifics and differences. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) provides visible outputs to individual Member States in the form of a set of forces and capabilities that are subsequently used in national defence planning processes. In recent NDPP cycles, politically motivated initiatives such as Smart Defence or Connected Forces (NATO Defence Planning Process in [Permanent] Transition) have been included in the capability development process. The specific involvement of V4 countries in Smart Defence projects is shown in Table 2.

| Title/Project | Czech Republic | Hungary | Poland | Slovakia |
|---|-----------------------|---------|-----------------------|----------|
| Individual Training and Education Programme (ITEP) | x | x | | |
| Multinational Joint Headquarter Ulm | x | x | x | |
| Pooling of Deployable Air Activation Modules (DAAM) | x | | | |
| Multinational Aviation Training Centre (MATC) | x (leading nation) | x | | x |
| Pooling CBRN capabilities POL-BGR-HUN-ITA-ROU-SVK grouping | | x | x (leading nation) | x |
| Development of Reserve Specific Capabilities | x | x | | |
| Multinational Malware Information Sharing Platform (MN MISP) | x | x | x | x |
| NATO Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training (MN CD E&T) | x | | | |
| Multinational Approaches Towards Air-to-Ground Precision Guided Munitions | x | x | x | |
| Responsiveness to biological outbreaks | x | x | x | |
| Multinational Capability Development Program | x | x | x | |
| Multinational cooperation for the provision of Land Battle Decisive Munitions (LBDM) | | | | x |
| Medical Intelligence and Information (M2I) Improvement | x | | x | |
| Communication and Information Systems Security Standards (CIS3) Communications and Information Partnership (CIS3 C&P) | | | x | |
| MCDC Project International Cyberspace Operations Planning Curricula (ICOPC) | | | x | |
| MCDC Project Medical Modular Approaches 2 | x | | | |
| MCDC Project: Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Robotics (MUAAR) | x | | | |

| | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|---|--|
| MCDC Project: Countering Hybrid Warfare 3 (CHW3) | x | | x | |
| MCDC Project: Future Leadership (FUT-LEAD) | x | | x | |
| MCDC Project: Medical Modular Approaches Employment (MMA Employment) | x (leading nation) | | | |
| MCDC Project: Multi National Integrated Cyber Fusion (MNICF) | | | x | |

Building a Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters (V4 JLSG HQ) could be a milestone in the development of defence planning cooperation, as this would be the first permanent V4 contribution to NATO. Together, the V4 aims to meet the goal of building NATO's capabilities to build JLSG HQ. Also, sharing information from national defence planning processes and NDPPs can help individual partners understand their exact functioning and identify other potential areas of capability development. It is important for the V4 countries to harmonize the approach to defence planning so as to jointly identify opportunities for cooperation based on the lack of military capabilities. Ideally, the result would be a harmonized joint acquisition plan.

2.4 Joint Air Force Training

Possible cooperation in the field of military aviation is one of the priorities in ensuring the airspace protection of Alliance countries in the framework of Air Policing in the NATINAMDS system. One of the key means of this cooperation is the creation of Cross Border Areas (CBAs) to secure cross-border flights (CBOs).

2.5 Joint training and exercises, military training

A number of joint exercises have taken place since the signing of the Visegrad Long-term Vision on Deepening Defence Cooperation in 2014 (V4. Visegrad Group Defence Cooperation). One of the first large-scale exercises was Ground Pepper Exercise, which took place in the Slovak town of Lešť that year. The exercise was attended by the forces and resources of all V4 countries and the United States, with the task of practitioners was to enhance the operational capabilities of the units to defend the national territory. Other exercises taking place on a regular basis now include, for example, Capable Logician, Tobruq Legacy, Shield, Warrior, Lampart, and more.

2.6 Visegrad Military Education Platform

The V4 countries decided to set up the Visegrad Military Education Platform (VIGMILEP), which would, among other things, help improve military education and deepen the level of training of security and defence officers and

experts. So far, this goal has been only partially achieved. For many reasons, including financial, personal and political, the V4 countries refuse to renounce their own national educational institutions in favor of a transnational educational establishment.

2.7 Communication strategy

Within the Action Plan, deepening the communication strategy was one of the areas of development of defence cooperation. The communication strategy involves the exchange of information, including intelligence. Sharing this information makes it possible to combat terrorism and other security threats more effectively.

Conclusions

The V4 cooperation in the area of defence and security will continue to be essential for all partners in the region. A rapidly changing international security environment will require an effective and immediate response. In this context, the common interests of the group should put national interests behind. The formation of joint combat groups within the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, including partner countries in their joint activities in the fields of education, training, planning, building and development of armed forces capabilities, contributed to the integration of other former Eastern Bloc countries into NATO and the EU. The V4 countries' position to find compromise solutions as well as to promote their own regional interests contributes to the creation of a Visegrad identity. The membership of the V4 countries in NATO was a consolidating factor in the mutual coherence of partners, as the principles of NATO collective defence are shared by all countries in the region. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has become a new impetus for deepening V4 defence cooperation in a rapidly changing security environment (Ukraine crisis, migration wave, terrorism). The Visegrad countries face some challenges in the practical dimension of defence and security cooperation. This is mainly due to national interests, changes in domestic political scenes, or different views on security threats. One consequence is, for example, minimal cooperation in the arms industry and the acquisition of military equipment, technology and material. The V4 countries have formed their own battle groups under the auspices of the EU and are jointly involved in the deployment of forces and assets within the Alliance's rapid response and forward presence forces. The successful deployment of the V4 EU BG in 2016 was followed by another in 2019. The participation of the V4 ground and air forces in the northeast wing of the Alliance in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, where they form part of forward presence units (eFP), is a clear demonstration of perception of responsibility for common security. These joint activities have led to the group's visibility in both the

Alliance and the European Union. The current unpredictable, rapidly changing security environment favors deepening defence cooperation. Therefore, strengthening mutual links in the regional format of the Visegrad Group, but also in the V4 + format can be the answer to countering hybrid, cyber, terrorist and conventional threats.

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ECOLOGICAL THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE PODKARPACKIE PROVINCE - SELECTED ISSUES

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ABSTRACT

"Either the human community will use its knowledge and skills to change its approach to the environment, or the environment will change its relationship with man," is the thought of President Ernst Ulrich von Weizsacker, which should be the message of today's rulers of the world. Security is one of the basic human needs. Its indispensable element is a healthy human life in his environment. The growing ecological awareness, public interest in environmental issues, pressure on politicians mean that actions are taken on many levels to improve the situation. The value and importance of the natural environment is growing, and thus the importance of ecological safety is growing. This material is devoted to the ecological safety system in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. The legal and organizational foundations of functioning as well as the goals and tasks of the municipal and powiat ecological security system were presented.

Key words: *Environment, ecological awareness, ecological security.*

Introduction

Safety has long been one of the basic human needs. Its indispensable element is above all a healthy human life in his environment. The constantly growing ecological awareness, our interest in environmental issues and pressure on politicians mean that actions to improve the situation are taken on many levels. The value and importance of the natural environment is growing, and thus the importance of ecological safety is growing. Ecological safety is a complex problem, considered from different points of view. One of the trends treats ecological safety as protection of the natural environment against degradation. For the above reasons, the authors decided to discuss these issues. The Podkarpackie Voivodeship is one of the ecologically cleanest regions in Poland. Podkarpackie has many natural values and some areas of the region are legally protected. This

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does not mean that this natural environment is free of threats. The purpose of our speech is to present environmental protection issues, with particular emphasis on ecological security threats in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, i.e. to present general activities undertaken in the region, especially the functioning of the ecological security system in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship.

1 General characteristics of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship

Podkarpackie Voivodeship is a region located in south-eastern Poland. From the north and west it borders with the following provinces: Małopolskie, Świętokrzyskie and Lubelskie; from the south with Slovakia and from the east with Ukraine. In administrative terms, the Podkarpackie Voivodeship is divided into 25 poviats, including 21 land and 4 urban poviats (cities: Rzeszów, Przemyśl, Krosno and Tarnobrzeg) and 160 communes. The capital of the voivodeship is Rzeszów - an academic, economic and cultural center. Podkarpackie covers an area of 17,846 km² (5.7% of the country), which has a population of 2,129.9 thousand residents (5.5% of the population of Poland). It is the least urbanized area in the country (around 41% of the population lives in cities).

The average population density is 119 people per km². The region covers 3 separate physiographic lands, significantly diversified in terms of geological structure, terrain and the natural environment. In the northern part, covering almost half of the province, there is the Sandomierska Basin, in the middle of the Carpathian Foothills, in the south of the Beskids, dividing into the Low Beskids and the Bieszczady. The most north - east part of the province is located within Roztocze. The basic river network is formed by the Vistula and its two large Carpathian tributaries: Wisłoka and San. The small north - eastern part of the voivodeship is the Rata and Sołokia catchment area and tributaries of the Bug ([https](https://www.podkarpackie.gov.pl/), 2019).

There are no lakes in the voivodeship, while there function some retention reservoirs - the largest is the Solina reservoir on the San River. The voivodeship belongs to the ecologically cleanest regions of Poland. Almost 45% of the area is covered by legally protected areas. They include: 2 national parks Magurski and Bieszczadzki, 94 nature reserves, 10 landscape parks, 13 protected landscape areas, 28 documentation sites, 361 ecological sites, 9 nature and landscape complexes and 1,411 nature monuments. There are also 8 areas for special bird protection (including four areas located in two provinces) and 17 habitat protection areas. The total forest cover of the voivodeship is 37.8% and is higher than the national average by 8.5%. Forests in the region cover an area of over 680 thousand Ha ([https](https://www.podkarpackie.gov.pl/), 2019).

The largest forest complexes are located in the Sandomierz Basin (Puszcza Sandomierska and Puszcza Solska), in the Low Beskids, the Bieszczady Mountains and in Roztocze. The province is an agricultural and industrial region. The industry structure is dominated by aviation, rail, chemical and food industries.

The glass, building materials, wood and light industries also play an important role. They use various resources of the region: natural gas, crude oil, limestone, gypsum and natural aggregates. Rich healing water resources are used in four spas: Iwonicz Zdrój, Rymanów Zdrój, Polańczyk Zdrój and Horyniec Zdrój. There are two special economic zones in Podkarpacie: the Tarnobrzeg Special Economic Zone "Euro-Park Wisło-San" and the Special Economic Zone "Euro-Park" Mielec. The advantage of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship is the location of the center of the Polish aviation industry operating under the name "Aviation Valley".

Farms in the region are characterized by large agrarian fragmentation. The structure of farms is dominated by farms with an arable land area of 2-5 ha (45.4%). The average size of agricultural land on a farm is 4.56 ha, with the national average of 10.38 ha. Due to its natural and social specificity, Podkarpackie is a good place to develop organic farming, without the use of fertilizers or chemical plant protection products. At the end of 2016, there were nearly 600 agritourism farms cooperating with the Agricultural Advisory Center in Boguchwała, while over 2,000 producers operated in the field of organic plant cultivation and animal maintenance. An important problem in the voivodship is unemployment. At the end of 2019, the registered unemployment rate amounted to 91.8 thousand in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, which constitutes 9.9% in relation to professionally active people in Podkarpackie.

The largest number of the unemployed can be found in the Rzeszów powiat 27.3 thousand people, while the least in the region of the Krosno powiat 20.7 thousand people without work. The city of Krosno boasts the lowest unemployment rate compared to the most economically active cities, with the index reaching just 3.7% of the national average of 13.4%. The highest unemployment rate has been recorded in Nizański (24.7%) and Brzozowski (24.2%) powiats, while the lowest in Krosno (8.3%) and Rzeszów (8.2%). Here occurs greater than in other regions of the country, hidden unemployment, which mainly concerns rural areas or areas with low urbanization.

- **What makes it stand out?** About a dozen or so years ago it was stated that Podkarpacie is one of the most boring parts of Poland. And today? Over just a decade, the realities of life in Podkarpacie have changed significantly. The main cities of the voivodship, in particular Rzeszów, Łańcut, Krosno, Jasło, Tarnobrzeg and Przemyśl are becoming particularly developed. The President of the regional capital Tadeusz Ferenc takes care of the attractions that attract numerous groups of visitors in this region of Poland. To mention a few of the most important hallmarks of this part of the country, it is worth mentioning, among others, the famous Rzeszów Monument of the Revolutionary Action, Galeria Rzeszów shopping centers and Millenium Hall, a multimedia fountain or a round footbridge, as well as the historic Castle in Łańcut, a glassworks in Krosno, the Aviation Valley, recently renovated railway station in Przemyśl or open-air museum in Sanok. All these are original symbols that make the area

stand out from other towns. In total, Podkarpackie consists of 51 cities, of which four of them have poviata rights.

- **Condition of the inhabitants:** According to the research of the Central Statistical Office, in Podkarpackie there are well over two million people. The average life expectancy of residents is about 73 years for men and 81 for women. As for the national scale, the results are positive, which is due to the fact that this area is characterized by a generally healthy lifestyle and a relatively low level of stress, for example compared to Warsaw, Krakow or Wroclaw. The environmental values in the form of clean air and unpolluted waters are definite advantages of these areas. The development of branches of the economy not closely connected with production, but more so with export as well as trade and transport seem to have the biggest impact on the above mentioned aspects. The latest results indicate that the Podkarpackie Voivodeship is in the five districts in which the number of inhabitants is growing.

2 Types of threats and their characteristics - selected issues

The ecological threat to security relates to the functioning of living nature and the living conditions of man in this environment. This threat may be caused by either human activity (anthropomorphic) or natural factors (non-anthropomorphic). It is a kind of threat, as a result of which there may be a danger to living beings, due to a change in the natural environment (Jakupczak, Flis, 2006, pp. 113). Ecological man-made threats are, for example, uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources; air, soil and water pollution; lack of municipal, industrial and nuclear waste management; use of hazardous technologies; trials of weapons of mass destruction; acid rain; soil erosion; eutrophication of lakes; loss of forests; smog; failures and accidents (chemical failures, device failures, fires, traffic disasters, construction disasters). Natural hazards include: floods, mists and precipitation, drought, forest and meadow fires, hurricane winds, seismic shocks, avalanches and landslides, epidemics among humans and animals (Kowalkowski, 2013, pp.80).

Podkarpackie Voivodeship belongs to the ecologically cleanest areas of Poland. However, despite the relatively favorable situation, there is a number of anthropogenic or natural hazards. Environmental hazards associated with human activities include air pollution, water and wastewater management, noise, waste management, electromagnetic fields, soil pollution, the impact of the mining industry on the environment and major accidents. Natural hazards to which the Podkarpackie Voivodeship is exposed are: floods, ice phenomena on rivers and water reservoirs, fires, mass occurrence of pests and plant diseases, mass animal diseases, human infectious diseases, violent atmospheric phenomena (strong winds, intense precipitation, lightning weather, snowstorms), drought, prolonged occurrence of extreme temperatures, landslides.

Air pollution is the emission of dust and gases into the atmosphere. The degree of air pollution in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship in relation to other regions of Poland is relatively low. However, the areas where there are exceedances of permissible values for dust and benzo (a) pyrene are the main problem of the urbanized and industrialized part of the voivodship. Their high concentrations are influenced by, in addition to local sources which include boilers in residential buildings - transport and industry, as well as pollutant flows from neighboring countries and provinces. As in previous years, no exceedances of the allowable gaseous pollutants, i.e. sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), carbon monoxide (CO), benzene (C₆H₆), and no limit or target values specified for metals in dust were found, i.e. lead (Pb), arsenic (As), cadmium (Cd) and nickel (Ni). The average annual PM₁₀ concentrations were in the range of 26-35 µg / m³, i.e. 65-88% of the permissible level. In recent years, there has been a systematic reduction in average annual concentrations of PM₁₀ suspended dust at all measuring points (including Jarosław, where the exceedance was registered in 2015).

As a result of combustion and combustion of fuels in car engines, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrocarbons get into the atmosphere. In addition, traffic pollution can cause smog, a specific type of urban fog created by mixing ordinary fog with smoke and exhaust fumes (Strzałko, Mossur-Pietraszewska, 2005, pp. 286). Low emissions from local coal-fired boilers and individual home furnaces, fired with poor quality coal, also have a significant impact on air quality. Low emission of pollutants is reflected in the increase in the concentration of sulphur dioxide and particulate matter, especially during the heating season. Atmospheric air quality in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship is also affected by emissions from neighbouring regions, primarily from Lesser Poland (Krakow).

Water and sewage management is the factor that poses the greatest threats to the state of both surface and underground waters. The main pressures exerted on the natural environment include: pressures of significant water abstractions, pressures resulting from point pollution and pressures resulting from the impact of area pollution. *Poland is threatened by water scarcity, although this threat has diminished due to the decreasing demand of the economy* (Dobrzańska, Dobrzański, Kielczowski, 2010, pp. 70). In the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, surface and underground waters are the source of water supply for individual sectors of the national economy, including industry, agriculture and municipal services. Most water has been collected for production purposes, then for irrigation in agriculture and forestry, and the least for water supply purposes, mainly supplying the population with drinking water. Wastewater management has the greatest impact on surface water quality in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. A threat to waters is primarily municipal sewage arising as a result of human living and economic activity, as well as area pollution, i.e. insufficiently conducted rainwater management, especially in urbanized areas, pollution

reaching the aquatic environment from areas without sewage system (leaking septic tanks) from forest areas and pollution resulting from agricultural activities - improper use of fertilizers and chemical plant protection products. Next comes wastewater from industrial plants.

Proper waste management in the commune, poviat and voivodship is one of the basic goals to be achieved in environmental protection. Waste management means the collection, transport, recovery and disposal of waste, including supervision of such activities and of waste disposal sites. The basic principle of a preventive strategy for environmental protection is the principle of reduction, i.e. minimization of waste (Nowosielski, 2010. pp. 60). Those substances, materials and objects arising in the course of human activities or the activities of nature forces which cannot be used at all or fully as intended can be colloquially called waste. These are all items, solid and liquid substances that are not sewage and are not useful at the place or in time in which they have arisen. Hazardous waste constitutes a significant threat. They arise mainly as a result of the activities of business entities and medical and veterinary services. Although this waste represents only 1% of the total mass of waste generated, its selective collection still creates a problem. Over 70% of this waste comes from the cities of Rzeszów, Tarnobrzeg, Krosno and Przemyśl (2019). Asbestos-containing waste is also hazardous. Asbestos is the trade name of fibrous minerals. Due to its properties, asbestos introduced into the environment stays in it for an indefinite period of time. As a result of the corrosion process of asbestos-containing materials, its fibers get into the atmospheric air. Asbestos dust is harmful to health, if inhaled, it causes pneumoconiosis which can lead to lung cancer (Nowa Encyklopedia, 1995, pp. 298).

Noise is one of the most common nuisances faced by people who live primarily in urban areas. There are two main categories of noise: traffic noise and industrial noise. Noise is a sound that is unwanted or harmful to human health, and its effect on people is manifested by disruption of their activity. In the case of traffic noise in the Podkarpackie voivodship, over 80% of traffic is responsible for environmental degradation from the point of view of nuisance. Railway noise is much less onerous. Industrial noise is noise emitted to the environment by various types of equipment, machines, some technological processes as well as installations and equipment of small craft enterprises and service. The scale of threats of industrial noise is not very large and the range of its impact is usually of a local nature.

The result of unreasonable, short-sighted and often inefficient management of natural resources is the disruption of biological balance leading to soil degradation. Symptoms of this process are erosive phenomena, disturbances in soil water relations, disappearance of organogenic soils, soil fatigue, soil pollution. Soil degradation means changes in its physical, chemical and biological properties. In the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, the change in the basic soil properties is primarily influenced by transport, the metal and metallurgical

industries and urbanization in the broad sense, including in particular, construction, waste storage and exploitation of natural resources.

An important threat is also the transport (road and rail) of dangerous goods. This creates a serious risk of toxic substances escaping during transportation as a result of the poor technical condition of the tanks used for their transport or as a result of road accidents and disasters (Dobrzańska et al., 2010, pp. 133). Among the threats caused by natural forces, floods are the greatest danger in our region. Flooding is a natural phenomenon caused by rapid melting of snow, heavy rains, ice on rivers, and brief storms. It is flooding a lot of water through a swollen river, heavy downpour, etc. (Kowalkowski, 2013, pp. 85). The Podkarpackie region is an area of snow thaws occurring in the early spring periods from March to April, as well as rainfresses in the summer from June to August. For the Podkarpackie Voivodship, the biggest threat is the flooding / retreat of the Vistula caused by rainfall in the Beskids and the Tatra Mountains, which in turn cause rapid surges of the right-bank tributaries of the Vistula: Raba, Dunajec and San. Also intense rainfall and violent spring thaws in the Bieszczady Mountains cause the surges of rivers and mountain streams.

3 Sources of threats

The basic task of society is to provide every citizen with adequate living conditions. Of course, it is the same with the surrounding environment as it also needs the right natural conditions. It is this aspect of security that, due to population growth, industrial development and increasing consumption, is becoming more and more important for people's existence, and thus the institutional pressure of state administration bodies on this aspect of security is increasing. Environmental protection is also significantly reflected in the National Security Strategy¹, a document that sets out the area of issues for all entities in the country, aimed at implementing, among others, prevention in ensuring adequate, safe functioning of individual units in society and the state itself.

The main sources of ecological threats in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship are related with human activity and with natural phenomena. Individual sectors of the economy and everyday life of the inhabitants are the source of pressure on the environment. Industrialized and urbanized areas have the greatest potential risk. The problem of population security in relation to the natural environment in Podkarpackie is particularly important due to the high potential of areas of special natural value, not only for Poland, but also for Europe. Physiographic lands are of particular importance here, namely: the Sandomierz Basin, the Carpathian Foothills and the Bieszczady Mountains. The Podkarpackie Voivodship is not in a bad ecological condition, well 45% of the area is legally protected regions: two national parks: Magurski and Bieszczadzki, ninety-four nature reserves, ten landscape parks, thirteen protected landscape areas, twenty-eight documentation sites, three hundred and sixty-one ecological lands, nine nature and landscape

complexes, one thousand four hundred and eleven nature monuments. There are also eight special bird protection areas and seventeen habitat protection areas. The general forest cover of the voivodship is 37.8% and is higher than the national average (Report. KWSP, 2009).

A threat to Podkarpackie connected with environmental protection may be the percentage of polluted waters in rivers due to still poorly equipped sewage treatment plants of some rural areas. Another problem of Podkarpacie is exposing the area to floods, because it is close to the largest rivers in the Vistula and San regions. Another threat to the environment is the risk of forest fires and substance spills from numerous industrial plants. The Voivodship Protection Inspectorate is the basic voivodship service limiting threats in the Podkarpackie region. The most important sources of threats are: industry and power industry; municipal economy; transport system; agriculture; Tourism and Recreation; natural hazards (Report, 2019).

Industry and power industry are a source of environmental threats in connection with emissions to the air, sewage disposal, waste generation, degradation of the earth's surface, consumption of natural resources, noise emissions and industrial failures. The occurrence of damage to the environment is also associated with the extraction of minerals, which causes the emergence of excavations, heaps of processing and deposit wastes, disturbance of water relations, air pollution, land subsidence. Municipal economy is the source of the following threats: municipal sewage, municipal waste and low emissions.

In the case of municipal sewage, the most dangerous are untreated or insufficiently treated sewage. The greatest threat occurs in rural areas, characterized by a low degree of sewage system with a high degree of water supply. Insufficiently ordered rainwater management, especially in urbanized areas, also poses a threat to the environment. There is still a low level of municipal waste recovery, and landfilling is the main method of disposal. Low emissions of air pollutants are reflected in increases in the concentration of sulphur dioxide and dust in the air during the heating season. The problem of low emissions occurs both in cities and in rural areas.

The transport system is a source of environmental threats mainly due to road transport, including primarily transit (so-called TIR), i.e. exhaust emissions, noise and vibration generation, degradation of natural values (including fragmentation of ecological corridors) and landscape, and extraordinary environmental hazards. The biggest potential noise and emission risk occurs along national roads (No. 7 Rzeszów - Kraków, No. 9 Rzeszów - Warsaw; No. 73 Jasło - Kielce) and in city centers (mainly in Rzeszów) surrounded by dense buildings. In addition, there are threats arising from disasters during the transport of hazardous materials (road transport mainly by the abovementioned roads, rail transport - mainly rail junctions Skarżysko-Kamienna and Sędziszów).

Agriculture is a source of hazardous waste (residues from plant protection products) and area pollution, which is the main threat to surface water quality. Pig

farms and poultry farms are a significant threat to the environment due to the fact that they are required to have integrated permits. The result of intensive farming is the simplification of the agricultural landscape structure. Tourism and recreation also have an impact on the landscape. Its development, especially the uncontrolled one, results in "wild development" of naturally valuable areas and threat the environment due to technical infrastructure that does not fully protect the environment (e.g. sewage and sewage treatment system) and an excessive number of tourists (including motorists). Natural hazards occurring here are mainly soil drought and the resulting high fire risk of forest areas. Locally occurring rains can cause flood hazards but they are closely related to the physical features of the hydrological system. They also depend on the water retention of soils and the condition of flood protection infrastructure. Podkarpackie Voivodship is among the most vulnerable voivodships in Poland. Flood threats occur in particular in the valleys of the rivers: Vistula, Wisłoka, Wisłok and San (https. 2019).

3 Threats and their forecasting

Forecasts are primarily a source of information for planning processes, including creating plans to prevent crises and / or optimally mitigate their negative effects. The anti-crisis plan, which is a decision on how to act, also in extreme situations, should include a description of how to deal with foreseeable events (e.g. natural disasters). On the other hand, forecast is a tool for determining various types of processes that are independent of us (Treppner, 2009, pp. 175). The result of forecasting is important when ensuring ecological safety. Tasks related to forecasting environmental hazards relate to the future. The forecast should provide an answer to the question of what will happen to the state of ecological safety in the event of a given environmental hazard. Meteorology is particularly important in forecasting environmental hazards that affect ecological security (Korzeniowski, 2017, pp. 200).

The making of forecasts may involve the recording of adverse processes or individual phenomena, e.g. the frequency of flood hazards, thermal anomalies. These types of phenomena and the negative consequences that result from them for the environment become the subject of monitoring which allows for the objective recognition of forecasting processes. After all, these forecasts meet the expectations of various entities, e.g. universal weather forecast (Treppner, 2009, pp. 176).

In order to improve the quality of the environment and ecological safety, the Podkarpackie Voivodship constantly monitors the sources and types of threats: For example, as part of air quality monitoring, the Voivodship Inspector for Environmental Protection conducts an annual air quality assessment in the voivodship divided into zones. The annual air quality assessment gives us information on the concentrations of pollutants in the area of individual zones, to

the extent that they can be classified. This classification is the basis for making a decision about the need to plan actions to improve air quality in a given zone. The purpose of the assessment is also to indicate the probable reasons for the occurrence of oversize concentrations of pollutants in specific areas. As part of the water quality assessment carried out by the Voivodship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection in Rzeszów, research is being conducted as part of the State Environmental Monitoring. The primary purpose of surface water monitoring is to obtain information on the status of river basins, necessary to support planning processes in water management and to assess the achievement of environmental objectives, mainly related to the improvement of water quality and protection against pollution. The purpose of monitoring groundwater quality is to provide information on the chemical status of groundwater, track its changes and signal threats on a national scale for the purposes of managing groundwater resources and assessing the effectiveness of protective measures taken.

Municipal waste management both in Poland and Podkarpackie is still based mainly on landfilling waste. In order to minimize the impact on the environment, the manager is obliged to monitor the landfill before, during and after the operation of the landfill, and send the results obtained annually to the voivodship environmental protection inspector. In addition, environmental noise monitoring is conducted, and acoustic maps are created for national roads and for the cities of Rzeszów, Tarnobrzeg and Przemyśl. In order to assess the risk and prevent a major accident, the Voivodship Inspectorate for Environmental Protection maintains a register of plants with increased and high risk as well as control of economic entities with a high and increased risk of failure. Analysis and assessment of flood risk is conducted by the voivode, among others based on information from the National Hydrological and Meteorological Service (PSHM), which is performed by the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management. Its tasks include taking measurements and hydrological and meteorological observations, performing ongoing analyzes and assessments of the hydrological and meteorological situation, developing and submitting meteorological and hydrological forecasts, developing and providing public administration authorities with warnings against dangerous phenomena occurring in the atmosphere and hydrosphere. These forecasts are also used when assessing the risk of hurricanes, drought or forest fires, although in the latter case forest fire risk monitoring is also carried out through e.g. a network of observations or ground fire patrols.

4 Ways and areas of influence

To limit the negative effects of human activities on the environment and counteract ecological threats to the environment, many activities are carried out in Podkarpackie Voivodeship, depending on the type and source of the threat. For example, to reduce the emission of dust and gas pollutants released into the air

from particularly onerous plants located in the Świętokrzyskie Province, projects are being carried out in the field of: improvement of fuel combustion processes, comprehensive modernization of industrial plants and professional power facilities, installation of highly efficient pollution reduction devices. In the scope of reducing the emission of communication pollutants into the air, self-governments have mainly undertaken tasks aimed at improving the road system (construction of bypasses, construction and reconstruction of roads, liquidation of poor pavement conditions). There are also activities aimed at reducing the volume of low emissions, e.g. decommissioning of local boiler houses and connection to the heating network, change of heating system, thermo-modernization of buildings. The main actions to improve water quality include construction, expansion and modernization of municipal wastewater treatment plants and existing sanitary sewage collection networks, construction of new and expansion of existing rainwater sewage collection networks, improvement of sewage management in industrial plants, including by constructing and modernizing industrial wastewater treatment plants and limiting the amount of particularly harmful substances discharged into the aquatic environment, controlling compliance with legal requirements in the field of water use by business entities, introducing modern and environmentally friendly technologies by entrepreneurs in the field of industrial production and industrial wastewater treatment.

In the case of waste management, ongoing activities to cover all inhabitants of the voivodship with an organized system of collecting municipal waste and a system of selective collection of municipal waste, including bulky and construction waste. The tasks are carried out to adapt functioning waste landfills to the required standards as well as closing and reclamation of landfills. Liquidation of "illegal landfills" and ongoing measures to prevent the creation of further places of illegal waste storage are carried out. Asbestos-containing products are gradually removed and disposed of.

The main activities aimed at reducing the impact of traffic noise on people and the environment undertaken in Podkarpackie are first of all: improvement of the road system, construction of acoustic screens and insulation of buildings, e.g. replacement of soundproof windows. The newly created local spatial development plans take into account environmental protection requirements, including noise and electromagnetic field impacts. This applies in particular to the location of new roads, shopping centers and housing construction in the vicinity of already existing communication routes and electromagnetic field emitters.

The occurrence of a serious industrial accident is associated with a direct threat to the natural environment. The obligations related to major industrial accidents rest mainly with the operator of the plant with an increased or high risk of failure as well as with the bodies of the State Fire Service. In the event of such a failure, the voivode, through the provincial commander of the State Fire Service and the voivodship inspector for environmental protection, shall take necessary actions to remove the failure and its effects. To increase compliance with the

provisions on road transport of hazardous materials, control activities are carried out coordinated by the police, with the participation of the State Fire Service, Road Transport Inspection and Environmental Protection Inspection. A necessary condition for conducting many activities is environmental awareness of the society. The implementation of tasks in this area is coordinated by the Department of Rural Development and the Environment of the Marshal's Office of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. The Department cooperates with local self-governments and non-governmental organizations, e.g. the District Board of the League of Nature Protection in Rzeszów. Ecological education of children and youth is carried out mainly in schools, through various types of competitions, actions, lectures, happenings, etc., promoting ecological knowledge among the youngest generation. Ecological education is also conducted among adults, e.g. demonstrations and presentations of proper conducting of organic agricultural production (Report on the implementation, 2010).

Conclusions

The specificity of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, as a region with an external border of the European Union, requires special monitoring of cross-border threats in the field of environmental protection. In 2014, 2018, joint control activities of institutions responsible for environmental protection were carried out in the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. Joint control activities aimed at preventing illegal transboundary waste shipments are also preventive. They are a serious signal for dishonest entrepreneurs that waste shipments are controlled. The above article mentions only certain aspects of the big issue of environmental protection in Podkarpackie as an element of internal security of the state and part of the international security system.

In general opinion, environmental safety is an extremely important area of the functioning of the individual and the state. Its protection is of fundamental importance for the life and health of the next generations of Poles. The growing ecological awareness, public interest in environmental issues, pressure on politicians mean that actions are taken on many levels to improve the situation. The value and importance of the natural environment is growing, and thus the importance of ecological safety is growing.

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ECOLOGICAL SAFETY IN POLAND LEGAL BASES - SELECTED ISSUES

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this speech is to present the issues of environmental protection in Poland, with particular emphasis on selected environment, i.e. the presentation of general actions taken in the country and more specific in the region. The claim that we all need clean air, water and unpolluted food for life is a truism. The basis of good living conditions for people is a good quality environment that brings countless benefits. Forests protect against erosion, provide wood, but they are also a place of rest and regeneration, soothing the effects of life in constant stress. Agricultural areas that are a source of food are also easily accessible rest areas for city dwellers. Swamp areas protect against floods and filter water. Many organisms, such as bees, do valuable work for humans. Communing with nature, the ability to observe it is for many people a source of deep, satisfying experiences. Continuous economic development, new technologies, constantly increasing number of people wanting more and more goods, i.e. unrestrained and facilitated by globalization processes, consumption causes that human pressure on the natural environment, and thus its degradation is still increasing. Following the words of E. U. von Weizsacker, we need to change our attitude to the natural environment.

Key words: *Environmental protection, clean air, uncontaminated food, globalization, consumption*

Introduction

Looking from the perspective of the global village of Europe, ecological security is today one of the basic elements of national security, alongside economic (also energetic), civic, social or military security. Unfortunately, this term is very fashionable today also in our constitution, unfortunately it has not been clearly defined in any legal acts in Poland. Understanding this term has become a subject of interest for many researchers as it reflects the deeper processes of socio-economic and political change. The claim that we all need clean air, water and unpolluted food for life is a truism. The basis of good living conditions for people is a good quality environment that brings countless benefits. Forests protect against erosion, provide wood, but they are also a place of rest and regeneration, soothing the effects of life in constant stress. Agricultural areas that are a source of food are also easily accessible rest areas for city dwellers. Wetlands

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protect against floods and filter water. Communing with nature, the ability to observe it is for many people a source of deep experiences that give a lot of satisfaction.

Continuous economic development, new technologies, constantly growing number of people wanting more and more goods, i.e. unrestrained and facilitated by globalization processes consumption causes that human pressure on the natural environment, and thus its degradation is still increasing. Following the words of E.U. von Weizsacker we need to change our attitude to the natural environment. Security is one of the basic human needs. Its indispensable element is healthy people's life in their environment. Growing ecological awareness, public interest in environmental issues and pressure on politicians, in the face of threats and disasters, mean that in order to improve the situation actions are taken on many levels. The value and importance of the natural environment is growing, and thus the importance of ecological safety is growing.

Ecological safety is a complex problem, considered from different points of view. One of the trends treats ecological safety as protection of the natural environment against degradation. For the above reasons, as the authors, we decided to discuss these issues, although in outline due to the framework and the publisher's requirements. The Podkarpackie Voivodeship is one of the ecologically cleanest regions of Poland. It has many natural values, and a large part of its surface is legally protected. This does not mean that the region's natural environment is free from threats.

1 The beginnings of environmental protection in the literature on the subject - selected issues

Nature protection dates back to the distant past. Its first manifestations appeared along with human interference in the surrounding, naturally functioning environment. Originally, nature protection was motivated by religious worship or fear of something unusual, unknown. It was not a conscious action, but resulting from worshiping various deities or mysterious, unknown forces. For these reasons, holy places were protected, special places of inanimate nature were respected, such as boulders, springs, waterfalls or caves and animated places, for example, sacred groves, single trees, or some animals considered to be sacred (monkeys, cows, crocodiles). Many places, such as gorges, sacred mountains and sacred groves can be considered as the first nature reserves. Over the years, they retained their original character and even survived to this day, due to the fact that people avoided them because of the legends and stories about them. People's efforts to protect nature also resulted from other reasons. Mostly they were economic motives, but also aesthetic, strategic and egoistic (e.g. ban on entry to the forest for slaves). The oldest ordinances regarding nature protection date back to antiquity (Mazur, 2000, 72).

In China (1122 BC) and Rome (5th century BC), forests protection laws were in force. Unauthorized felling of forests was forbidden there, methods of tree care and protection against fires were established. Reigning in the 3rd century BC the Indian King Asioka protected many animals from being killed for religious worship. In Scotland since 1030, in Spain since 1258, in England since 1283, fishing was restricted, protection periods, prohibitions on fishing for fry, fishing with unacceptable equipment, throwing poisons into the water, etc. were introduced. People's destructive activity towards nature and the need to protect people and the environment against the negative effects of their activity for health reasons was noticed a long time ago. Many rulers issued orders to protect the environment against inappropriate human activities (Wnuk, 2010, s. 209).

Already in the Middle Ages, rulers issued numerous laws and prohibitions aimed at protecting animals and hunting grounds. This was dictated by economic considerations, but often also resulted from selfish reasons. Monarchs protected individual species of animals, reserving them only for royal hunting. Although it became the beginning of nature protection, these orders were aimed at maintaining the privileges and could not bring positive effects in the long run. An example would be to protect the areas of aurochs which eventually became extinct. Bison, tarpons or beavers at the beginning of the 20th century were preserved in the minimum number. Traditions of nature protection in Poland belong to the oldest in the world. Already in the 10th century Bolesław Chrobry banned hunting rare beavers at that time. For economic reasons, in the Wiślicki Statute of 1347, Kazimierz Wielki took forest protection and "trees with bees" under protection" (Wnuk, 2010). In 1423 Władysław Jagiełło took the yew under the protection in Warka Statute, forbidding them to be cut down and removed from Poland, as well as old oaks: *"If anyone who entered the forest, and trees that are of great price, like a yew or alike, chopped, then by the Lord or heir may be captured on behalf of those who ask for it, it shall be given. The same custom of groves, where few forests are to be preserved"*. [Władysław Jagiełło in Kraków and in Warta R.P. 1423] (Mazur, Wierzbicka, 2012, s.77).

The statute also specified penalties for setting fire to forests. Zygmunt I Stary in the Lithuanian Statute of 1529, protected beaver lodges: "You must not plow the field further than the distance with a baton to drive oxen from the lodge." Zygmunt III Waza banned hunting, among others, beavers, tarpons, elks, falcons, bison and aurochs. Unfortunately, the last specimen in the world (female) fell in the Jaktorowska Forest in 1627 (Wnuk, 2010).

But the pride of Polish naturalists is to save the native bison. In 1810, 320 individuals were counted in the Białowieża Forest alone, and in 1939 there were about a hundred bison around the world, the number of which after World War II was only 39 individuals. A new stage of species protection has begun, in which Poland from the beginning to the present day plays a prominent role. In 1972, 401 bison already lived in Poland (Maciejewski, Kraków, s. 10).

The formation of the right idea of environmental protection occurred in the

nineteenth century. On the one hand, destructive human activity and pollution emitted into the environment along with the development of industry were noticed, on the other, particular species of plants and animals were taken care of, protecting them from extinction, or special geological forms, monuments of nature, protecting them from destruction appeared (Wnuk, s. 212). An example is edelweiss, the symbol of the Alps, a flower that does not wither.

In the second half of the nineteenth century there was a rapid development of tourism. Everyone wanted to have a souvenir from a trip to the mountains. As a result of mass picking, edelweiss began to disappear even from the hardest-available alpine slopes. In 1886 in Austria it was banned from picking and it was the first protected species there (Bery, 2013).

In 1869, Ernst Haeckel first used the term "ecology." Ecology (Greek: oikos-house) is one of the fields of biology, as a science it explores the mutual relations between organisms and the living environment of these organisms. Nature is created by inanimate (abiotic, e.g. water, rocks, air) and animated (biotic, i.e. living organisms) elements. Thus, the scope of ecology research also includes relations and interrelationships between organisms, because each organism is an element of the environment for other organisms. Ecology, as a field of science, does not directly deal with the problems of nature protection and environmental protection. Meanwhile, numerous and necessary actions to protect nature or the environment are more and more commonly referred to as ecological actions (Strzałko i Mossor-Pietraszewska, 2001, s. 361).

Alexander von Humboldt is considered the spiritual father of nature protection. It was he who introduced the concept of a "natural monument", which was originally used to define magnificent old trees. Currently, this concept has been extended to such creations as: avenues, erratic boulders, and geological outcrops. In 1872, Ulysses Grant, the president of the United States, signed a decree establishing a national park in Yellowstone. It was the first national park in the world (Wnuk, s. 2012). Any human activity was forbidden in it, and all nature was protected. The next ones were made in Canada, Mexico and South Africa. In the 20th century, this form of nature protection developed around the world. Many national parks and reserves have been created. In Poland, in 1868, thanks to the efforts of Krakow naturalists Ludwik Zejszner, Maksymilian Siła-Nowicki and Edward Janota, an act was issued to protect marmots and chamois. It was the first law of this type in the world that other countries modeled on. The idea of protecting the original flora and fauna and the landscape of the Tatra Mountains was developed in the works of the Tatra Society. It was created in 1873 and began a long fight to create a national park in the Tatra Mountains, which was only successful in 1955. The activities of the members of the Society had enormous scientific and propaganda significance (Boć, Nowacki, Samborska, 2002, s. 35).

After regaining independence, the slogans of nature protection were implemented by Jan S. Pawlikowski, Michał Siedlecki, Adam Wodziczko, Walery Goetl with prof. Władysław Szafer at the forefront. They contributed to strengthening the foundations of conservation protection and recognizing ecology as a basic scientific discipline in rational actions for species and reserve protection (Wnuk, 2013). The need to create a unified state nature protection organization was recognized. In 1919 Ksawery Prauss, the first minister of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment, appointed the Provisional State Commission for Nature Protection. The commission was active in Kraków, and Władysław Szafer became its chairman. The magazine "Nature Protection" was created. In the university cities (Lviv, Poznań, Warsaw), the commission appointed so-called school boards. The nature conservation movement was based on science center (Wnuk, 2012).

The creation of the State Council for Nature Conservation (PROP) in January 1926 resulted from the activities of the Provisional State Commission for Nature Conservation. Thanks to PROP, on March 10, 1934, the first Polish nature protection act was adopted. On its basis, numerous peculiarities of nature were recognized as monuments of nature, designs of the first Polish national parks and reserves were developed, and orders were issued to protect plants and animals. Also thanks to PROP, in 1928 the League for Nature Conservation (LOP) was created, whose task was to promote the idea of nature protection in the widest circles of society (Mazur, 2002).

The period of World War II is almost complete disappearance of the nature protection movement. However, immediately after its completion, Polish activists began work, the effect of which was the reactivation of the State Council for Nature Conservation in 1945. On April 7, 1949, a new law on nature protection was issued. The supervision of nature protection was entrusted to the minister of forestry. At the same time, the idea of protection continued to develop. Historic assumptions were expanded to include protection requirements that took into account the rational management of environmental resources in a holistic way. Public interest in these matters increased. Scientific research reached significant sizes. Specialized departments, institutes, faculties and seminars were established. In 1952, the Polish Academy of Sciences created the Protection Department, and in 1957 the Committee for Nature Protection and its Resources. In 1970, a separate committee was set up called Man and the Environment (Boć, 2002).

In 1980, the Act on environmental protection and shaping entered into force. The Act introduced the term "environmental law" which was adopted in legal literature, administrative practice and didactics (Paczulski, 2008, s. 101). After 1989, Polish environmental protection law was reformed in order to adapt it to the realities of the market economy. The effect of these works was, among others, The Nature Conservation Act of 1991 reflecting the concepts of nature conservation developed around the world in the 1980s. The end of the amendment process was the adoption of the act on environmental protection law and a new

act on nature protection, which have been adapted to the legal regulations of the European Union in the 21st century (Dobrzańska, 2010, s. 296).

Today, ecology is also understood as a science of the natural environment of man. In fact, it is a new branch of knowledge derived from ecology as a basic science. Sozology was created on the basis of ecology and related sciences. The date proposed in 1965 by Walery Goetl - sozology (Greek: sozo = protect, logos = science) is a term used in Poland as a science of nature protection, which deals with the basics of protecting natural creations and its resources, ensuring the durability of its use and mitigating the effects of adverse changes occurring in nature as a result of human activity (Strzałko, 2001). For many people, ecology is equated with protecting nature or the environment. Meanwhile, today, nature protection is an activity aimed at preserving biodiversity, rational management of nature resources, proper landscaping, preserving the human environment and enabling him to contact with nature. Environmental protection is the whole of actions aimed at maintaining or restoring balance, counteracting the harmful effects of man on the environment, i.e. preventing its devastation (Banaszak, Wisniewski, 1999, s. 16).

Some issues overlap, they are common and cannot be separated, hence it is not easy to draw the border between nature protection and environmental protection. Currently, ecological awareness is increasing. Environmental protection is one of the basic functions of the state today. It is an object of public interest and public opinion. There are many non-governmental organizations dealing with nature protection. It is of interest to the international community. Environmental protection is currently also an extensive, based on the achievements of science and technology, a very dynamically developing branch of interdisciplinary knowledge, as well as the subject of specialized didactic and educational activity called "environmental protection education" (Dobrzańska, 2010).

2 Legal grounds for environmental protection

The environmental protection law in force in the Republic of Poland has a very complex structure. This is due to the links between all areas of the economy, technology, science, education, culture and all social and economic activities with environmental protection. The enormity of issues subject to legal regulations requires solutions on an international, regional, state and local scale (Paczulski, 2008). Environmental protection law is a branch of law defining material standards, i.e. rights and obligations, legal procedures, tasks and competences of state authorities, subjective rights related to the natural environment and its protection, and sanctions for its non-compliance (Dobrzańska, 2010). In general, it can be stated that the system of applicable law in the field of environmental protection in Poland consists of the following types of legal acts, forming a specific legal order:

- Constitutional basis for environmental protection;
- International legal basis for environmental protection, including provisions of international agreements ratified by Poland and provisions of Community environmental law of the European Union;
- Comprehensive legal regulation of environmental protection based on the provisions of the Act of 27 April 2001 - Environmental Protection Law;
- Special provisions regulating environmental protection issues;
- Separate provisions of environmental protection law, specifying the environmental protection requirements in acts or executive acts to those acts whose main subject is not environmental protection;
- Acts of local law relating to environmental protection (Paczulski, 2008).

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 contains several provisions devoted to environmental protection. The most important is art. 5 of the Constitution, which made environmental protection a constitutional principle. The rights and obligations related to environmental protection are set out in Articles 68 and 74 of the Polish Constitution, and this obligation rests with public authorities. Public authorities are obliged to prevent negative effects of environmental degradation on health (Article 68 (4) of the Polish Constitution), they have an obligation to conduct a policy ensuring ecological security for present and future generations (Article 74 (1) of the Polish Constitution), the obligation to protect the environment (Article 74 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland) and the obligation to support citizens' activities for the protection and improvement of the state of the environment [Article 74 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland] (Paczulski 2008).

Citizens have the right to be informed about the state and environmental protection (Article 74 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). Other constitutional rights show that citizens have the right to proclaim and disseminate ideas related to environmental protection (freedom of speech), associate in ecological movements and parties (freedom of association and freedom of political opinion) and organize and participate in actions and manifestations in this field (freedom of assembly). Citizens also have a duty to take care of the state of the environment and bear legal responsibility for its deterioration (Article 86 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). Article 9 is also significant, stating that the Republic of Poland shall comply with international law binding on it and art. 87 (1) saying that the sources of applicable law are: the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements and regulations. These articles have given international agreements in the field of environmental protection their due status (Paczulski 2008).

International legal foundations for environmental protection are international conventions and agreements, i.e. treaties, pacts and agreements, which are legal instruments regulating international relations. The conventions and treaties ratified by Poland concern issues requiring international cooperation. For example, such problems include (Paczulski 2008):

- threats to climate change, caused by the emission of toxic substances or the emission of greenhouse gases in quantities and concentrations exceeding the regenerative capacity of the natural environment;
- protection of the seas and the marine environment against degradation caused by pollution from land and from ships;
- protection of animals and plants threatened with extinction in order to preserve biological biodiversity;
- protecting the world's natural and cultural heritage;
- issues of public participation in environmental protection, the right of access to information on the state of the environment and making environmental impact assessments in a cross-border context.

Community environmental law of the European Union consists of about two hundred different types of normative acts, established by EU bodies and international agreements ratified by the Community. The most important are the treaties, and thus: the founding treaties, their supplementary treaties, accession treaties, the Single European Act of 1986, the Treaty on European Union of 1992 and the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 2004. The Constitution contains a number of provisions that relate directly to environmental protection, defines the objectives and basic principles for developing EU policy in the field of environmental protection and defines the objectives of common policy and activities relating to environmental protection in the EU's external relations system (Paczulski 2008).

Further sources of Community law are regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions as well as technical standards and regulations (Paczulski 2008) European Union directives impose the content of national law and include, inter alia, issues concerning nature protection (e.g. Natura 2000 system), water protection and quality, air protection and climate change, protection against waste, landscape protection, health safety protection, protection against the effects of industrial accidents, environmental information, ecological risk assessment and investment impact on the environment. EU regulations are directly binding and relate to the supervision and control of waste shipments within and outside the EU as well as international trade in endangered species of plants and animals (Dobrzańska, 2010).

Comprehensive legal regulation of environmental protection in Poland is based on the provisions of the Act of 27 April 2001 - Environmental Protection Law (Journal of Laws of 2008, No. 25, item 150). The Act sets out the principles of environmental protection and conditions for the use of its resources, taking into account the requirements of sustainable development. Comprehensive issues related to environmental protection are also regulated by the Act on nature protection from 2004, acts regulating waste management, or acts related to the protection of individual elements of the environment and humanitarian protection of animals (Dobrzańska, 2010).

Special provisions regulating matters of environmental protection refer to those areas of environmental protection which have been covered by the legal regulation of the Environmental Protection Act in a general manner, with numerous references in specific matters to special acts or special provisions. Separate provisions of environmental protection law, specifying the requirements for environmental protection in acts or executive acts to those acts whose main subject is not environmental protection, are acts from other areas of legal regulation related to environmental protection only to some extent and containing therefore environmental protection regulations. Local law acts are sources of law in force in the area of activity of the bodies that established them. They are established by local government bodies or local government administration bodies to regulate various types of environmental issues. Statutory regulations are supplemented by various implementing provisions. These are regulations and ordinances issued by the Prime Minister, the minister competent for environmental protection or other ministers whose competences are related to environmental protection. These provisions specify specific issues, including pollution emission standards, standards of water quality or creation of national parks (Paczulski, 2008).

The system in force in Poland in the field of environmental protection also includes planning acts and procedures in environmental protection, environmental policy of the state, municipal, poviast and voivodship environmental protection programs, procedures for assessing the environmental impact of projects that may significantly affect the natural environment or the Natura 2000 area. It also includes plans for the protection of protected areas, waste management plans, forest management plans (Dobrzańska, 2010).

3 Changes in law in the aspect of globalization changes related to environmental protection

In the period up to 1989, Poland was one of the countries with the highest environmental pollution. It is true that the Act on Nature Conservation of 1949 said that nature protection is the preservation, restoration and proper use of nature resources, but it was a provision existing only in documents. In fact, environmental protection was not respected. The Act on the Protection and Shaping of the Environment, adopted in 1980, did not change anything. Similar laws were created in Western European countries in the 1970s in response to U. Thant's report of 1969 and the UN Stockholm Conference on Environmental Protection in 1972. UN Resolution 2398 of December 3, 1968 and the report of May 26, 1969 drawn up on its basis, UN Secretary-General U. Thant's "Man and His Environment" had unprecedented importance in the history of the United Nations in terms of environmental protection. These documents drew the attention of the whole world to the crisis regarding the attitude of man to the environment, disseminated the ideas of environmental protection in the world and initiated the

process of planned, organized action of both individual United Nations countries and on a global scale. They were also an expression of achieving the goals and tasks of the UN environmental Policy (Paczulski, 2018).

The significance of the Stockholm Conference was that environmental protection was elevated to the status of a basic function of the state. A new term also appeared - environmental policy as an integral part of state Policy (Paczulski 2008). In Poland, changes in the approach to environmental protection occurred only with the beginning of the system transformation. The process of reforming Polish environmental law took place after 1989 and consisted in adapting it to a market economy. The amendment mainly involved the introduction of financial instruments for environmental protection and increased requirements for enterprises and their impact on the environment. In 1991 an act was passed on nature protection. At that time, a more restrictive law was introduced and a system of monitoring compliance with environmental law was implemented thanks to the Act of 20 July 1991 on the Inspection for Environmental Protection. Changes in the approach to environmental protection problems reflect the assumptions included in the first ecological policy of the state in force in the years 1991–2000, and in the Executive Program four years later adopted to the state's ecological policy until 2000. The principle of sustainable development was recognized as the basis for ecological policy (Paczulski, 2008).

A global strategy for sustainable development was developed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, which took place from June 1-12, 1992. As a result of the meeting, a number of documents were adopted, including The Earth Charter, which contains the main principles of environment development as well as the Global Action Program-Agenda 21 addressed to both countries and international organizations. It is a comprehensive program for the environment and its protection (Paczulski 2008).

The idea of sustainable development was also included in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, called the Maastricht Treaty. Since then, this concept is the basic idea of environmental protection in the Community, all activities in environmental protection have been subordinated to it (Prandecki, Sadowski, 2010, s. 143). The implementation of these goals and tasks is reflected in the Community action programs, which are the basic instruments for shaping the environmental policy of the Member States. Currently, the sixth program covering the years 2001 - 2010 "Environment 2010. Our future, our choice" is being implemented (Paczulski 2008).

Poland's efforts to join the European Union required further work on the law on environmental protection. Work began on the amendment of the law, modeled on EU legislation. Ecological criteria began to be treated on an equal footing with economic and social ones. Environmental protection took the right place, allowing for permanent preservation of the foundations of economic development. On April 27, 2001 the Environmental Protection Act came into force. This is the basic legal act according to which the ecological policy of the

state is conducted. Since the time of economic transformation, we have been dealing with an active state policy in the field of environmental protection. Its implementation requires the involvement of all state bodies in it. From 2009, the binding document is the National Environmental Policy in the years 2009 - 2012 with a perspective until 2016 (Mazur, 2010).

4 Institutions and issues of ecological security

Environmental safety is a complex concept. According to M. Pietras, ecological security means such a state of social relations, including the content, forms and methods of organizing international relations, which not only limits or eliminates ecological threats, but also promotes positive actions, enabling the realization of values important for the existence and development of nations and states. There are also other definitions of ecological security, claiming, for example, that it is such shaping of natural and social relations in the Earth's biosphere that creates proper living conditions for all humanity, without undermining the foundations of life on our planet. It is the opposite of a local and global ecological disaster, expressing the order in the environment in which man also lives (Wojtaszczyk, 2009).

Ecological security can also be understood as clean air, healthy water and food that is safe for health, as well as the possibility of recreation and leisure for all citizens as well as the permanent occurrence of all currently found wild animal and plant species. Ecological safety is also a certainty of healthy living of the human species in its environment. With regard to our safety, ecological threats are conditions that create uncertainty about the healthy life of Polish residents in their environment (Kowalkowski, 2011, s. 81). Ecological security is the state ensuring its citizens a good state of the environment (air, water, food, health) so that people can realize their political and economic aspirations in health (Wojtaszczyk, 2009).

Environmental protection is a narrower concept than ecological security and is the responsibility of public authorities. It can be assumed that ecological safety is a state in which there are no environmental hazards. Environmental hazards should be understood as threats that may cause environmental damage or deterioration, posing a danger to people and the environment. It is obvious, therefore, that environmental protection affects ecological safety (Ciechanowicz, 2009), s. 60).

Ecological safety, which is to be ensured by public authorities, is the state of the environment, allowing it to be safely used. The instrument of ensuring this safety is environmental protection. Protecting should be guided by the principle of sustainable development. The environmental protection order includes all actions of public authorities preventing deterioration of the state of the environment and allowing to improve this state for the benefit of future generations. Global, international and country-wide environmental problems are

dealt with by the Sejm and Senate. They constitute the law which defines the organization and functioning of public administration bodies, the mode and principles of administrative proceedings, as well as the norms determining the material basis of the administration's operation (Ciechanowicz, 2009, s. 60).

The President of the Republic of Poland ratifies and terminates international agreements, including those concerning the environment and its elements. The Ministry of the Environment plays a special role here, as he/she has various administrative competences: management, coordination and control. The Minister of the Environment carries out tasks of the main geologist of the country, the main nature conservator and the executive apparatus. The Minister of the Environment has institutions, consultative and advisory bodies such as the State Council for Environmental Protection and the State Council for Nature Protection. The Minister of the Environment performs the supervisory function over the Chief Inspector for Environmental Protection, the General Director for Environmental Protection, the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency, the President of the State Mining Authority, the President of the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, the Director of the National Forest Holding "Lasy Państwowe", the President of the National Water Management Board. The tasks of government administration in the field are performed by mayors and municipal bodies as part of their own tasks (Korzeniowski, 2012, s. 68).

In situations of threat to ecological security in Poland, management is implemented in the general crisis management system. Institutions implementing tasks in the field of ecological security in the country are the Council of Ministers and the minister competent for internal affairs and administration, the Governmental Crisis Management Team and the Governmental Security Center acting as the National Center for Crisis Management. In the voivodship, powiat, communes are respectively voivodship, powiat, commune, and voivodship, and furthermore powiat, commune crisis management center. The effectiveness of performing environmental protection tasks and safety depend on competence in this field and sufficient financial resources. Among the financial institutions, the National Fund for Environmental Protection and voivodship funds should be mentioned first of all. Institutions and committees are important and scientific committees and social organizations. The Police, Municipal Police, State Fire Service, Sanepid must also be mentioned. Each of the listed entities has been assigned certain rights and obligations (Dobrzańska, 2010).

Conclusion

An important element of ensuring ecological safety and effective protection of the community shapes and maintains a safe environment and creates opportunities to acquire knowledge and motivation to organize protective activities. To this end, environmental protection activities are constantly carried out in the Świętokrzyskie Voivodship, for which the voivode is responsible, and

which are carried out by the voivodship environmental protection inspectorate. In addition, according to the general ecological policy of the state, ecological education is constantly carried out.

No activities in the social sphere will achieve the desired effects without their acceptance. Ecological education must take place not only at the primary level in schools, but must also include adults - farmers, entrepreneurs, officials. To this end, state authorities and the Podkarpackie Voivodeship constantly cooperate with social organizations. The increase in ecological awareness in order to create a positive attitude to the natural environment on the one hand, and the ability to behave in an emergency situation on the other, give a chance to ensure ecological safety.

Already at the end of the nineteenth century it was said that humanity plunges into the darkness of eternity and goes to destruction. Today, such conclusions from observations of industrial changes and economic era of globalization and climate change caused by elevated temperature are not noticed by a manipulated society. The thermal death is not mentioned seeing tragedies like the current in Australia. These fires on such a large scale are an example for all to draw conclusions.

Today, the scale of the problems is much broader and all possible measures must be taken to improve the state of the environment, and thus the safety and quality of our lives. We are all facing the problem of responsibility for nature.

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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF CHEMICAL CORPS IN THE NEW DOCTRINE OF THE CZECH ARMED FORCES

Pavel Otrísal¹ - Břetislav Štěpánek²

ABSTRACT

The main aim of the paper is to point to the most important aspects of its determination and importance with a focus on the Czech Armed Forces Chemical Corps, which is also very actively involved in forming the security and operational environment. The Doctrine of the Czech Armed Forces is a sectoral strategic document that implements the latest knowledge of understanding the place and role of the Czech Armed Forces in the context of the international and national security environment at regular intervals. Further goal is to point to the existence of a new Doctrine of the Czech Armed Forces, which should provoke interest in the professional public for its study and implementation into everyday professional life and discussion related to its correctness and future development trends.

Key words: Czech Armed Forces, Doctrine, Chemical Corps, Chemical support, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence, CBRN

Introduction

The Czech Armed Forces (CAF) Chemical Corps (CCs) has historically demonstrated and continues to prove that it is a valid and effective element of CAF combat support not only in the Czech Republic, but also in multinational operations conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO, "Alliance") and the European Union. The contribution of the CAF CCs is to ensure the preparation of military forces at home and abroad, the ability to perform tasks in military operations in environments and conditions that are diametrically different from those in which CCs specialists are prepared, are unique and clearly require respect and recognition. Similarly, the ability to respond relatively quickly to changing security environments and the doctrinal understanding of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence is a domain that the management of the CCs has not abandoned and fully supports, in collaboration with specialized units, departments, regiment of the CAF CCs and individual elements of the CAF CCs within military education. The systematic support of the CAF CCs management to assert its interests in NATO working groups and the effort to share information across the professional community creates conditions for individuals and groups of specialists of the CAF CCs who participate in promoting the interests of the CAF CCs within the

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Ministry of Defense (MoD). These activities, which are not very visible, create conditions for deployable units and their general acceptance within the national and international environment, thus within task forces operating in foreign missions. In the long term, it has been shown that all these skills have been successfully interconnected, thus building the name and meaning of the CAF CCs not only at home, but also in the minds of foreign experts (Kolektiv, 1999; Ministerstvo obrany, 2011).

1 General framework of the doctrine of CAF

The doctrine of the CAF is a common doctrine for all types of forces, troops and services, including the CAF CCs (Kolektiv, 2016; Otrisal, 2018; Kolektiv, 2015). It forms an important background for the development of military regulations and publications listed in the doctrinal order (Ministerstvo obrany, 2008; Odbor doktrín, 2012). Its starting points should also be considered within developing standard operating procedures. It can, therefore, be stated that it should be an integrating element of all documents issued by the Czech Republic MoD. The doctrine of the CAF is primarily intended for those members of the CAF who are prepared to perform their tasks in military operations (Ministerstvo obrany, 2009; 2009a).

The Doctrine of the CAF:

- it has been elaborated with the aim:
 - provide general doctrinal approaches;
 - to establish basic theoretical foundations for participation in operations under national command or in multinational operations of NATO, the European Union, the United Nations or other international organizations and ad hoc coalitions;
- it characterizes:
 - environment of the CAF;
 - tasks of the CAF;
 - intention to use the CAF in fulfilling the objectives of the state's security and defense policy.

2 The CAF CCS and its place in the Armed Forces

We can recall that the Czech Republic for ensuring its security creates armed forces (AF), which is divided into:

- CAF which is the main part of AF;
- Military Office of the President of the Republic;
- Castle Guard.

From the point of view of the functional division of the CAF, the new Doctrine of the CAF has newly applied formations and units of cyber and territorial forces. It is also stated that the CAF organizational structure includes, inter alia, active backup units, to whose organizational structures the CAF CCs also contributes and the forces and means of intelligence.

The CAF CCs continues to be part of the elements of combat support. Combat support is given by the capabilities of both lethal and non-lethal, especially selective action on the enemy, its objects and systems and possibly other actors located in the area of operation, the ability to obtain the necessary information about the enemy, other actors, process of the commander and in favor of guiding the means of action. It creates the necessary conditions for the operation of its own troops and makes the enemy forces more difficult.

Chemical Corps, as part of combat support forces, are designed to provide direct support in the operational area by implementing CBRN Defence. Here it is necessary to recall that the current definition of the scope of the CAF CCs stipulates that the CCs fulfills the most complex and specific measures of chemical support (CS) in monitoring radiation, chemical and biological situation, in removing the consequences units and equipment in areas contaminated with radioactive compounds, chemical warfare agents, biological agents and Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM). Although the understanding of CBRN Defence currently restricts the scope of CS measures and newly elaborates it into CBRNN Defence measures as a functional tool for the development of specialization, the concept of CS was not completely abandoned and should have been mentioned here. This allegation reduces the importance of the CAF CCs because it is well known that measures of protection of troops (forces) are implemented primarily, and therefore mainly by own resources and units, units, volumes and equipment and the proportion of specializations, thus even CAF CCs is minimal here. It is still asserted that the CAF CCs is involved in the implementation of CBRN Defence measures by earmarking specialized technical means and specially trained forces.

Although it is not explicitly stated in the Doctrine of the CAF that the CBRN Defence within the scope of the CAF CCs falls within the category of so-called special measures of CBRN Defence, it should have been stated that CBRN Defence also integrates protection against TIM. Indeed, it is evident that CBRN Defence measures are somewhat different from the implementation of the TIM measures in all aspects of the specific measures being implemented.

The doctrine of the CAF strives to maintain the maximum degree of universality. It avoids typing of units, but speaks of a group definition, thus combat support units are intended, etc.

3 The CAF CCS in operations

Operations in which the CAF participates are categorized with regard to the differing basic characteristics. In line with the Alliance's intentions within the conflict spectrum, the CAF can be deployed in all types of operations. The same type of operation may be conducted in different dimensions of the conflict spectrum and may be related to a different focus depending on the level of violence to be faced in the operation environment. In the parts of the Doctrine of the CAF dealing with types of operations, attention is focused only on crisis response operations and within them the military contribution to humanitarian aid. Understanding humanitarian aid is based on the knowledge that it involves activities and tasks that alleviate or eliminate human suffering. Humanitarian assistance from the CAF can be provided in response to both natural disasters and industrial accidents associated with the release of TIM. It may also be necessary to eliminate the consequences of conflicts or flight from political, religious or ethnic persecution. Humanitarian aid is limited in scope and duration and is intended to complement or enhance the efforts of the host State's civil authorities, international organizations, non-governmental and other civilian actors. The different types of military support are:

- provision of emergency assistance following natural disasters;
- providing support to displaced civilians;
- conducting security missions;
- providing technical assistance and technical support, and providing support for the elimination of consequences following chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents*;
- eliminating the consequences of radioactive, chemical and biological contamination.

The reference to the source, which is placed in the doctrine instead of the symbol "*" under the number 37 and is linked to the document AJP-3.8 Allied Common Doctrine for Protection against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons, but has not yet been fully implemented. Indeed, the perception of specialization as a form of fulfilling CS measures is more and more prevalent than as part of specific CBRN Defence measures. Even today, when the concept of combined CS and CBRN Defence measures, called CBRN Defense, was introduced and basically accepted, it is not fully realized and reflected in the thinking of specialists of the CAF CCs. In fact, making a reference at this point is meaningless. Even if I accepted the approach that "providing technical assistance and technical support and providing support in the aftermath of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents" would fall under CBRN Defence measures, "removing the consequences of radioactive, chemical and biological contamination" definitely do not fall within the scope of CS measures. There is therefore a contradiction and intermixing of specific CBRN Defence measures with CS measures, which does not create a common understanding of these

categories, but rather confuses and partially demagogues understanding and understanding of all aspects of CBRN Defence and CS activities. They form an important background for the development of military regulations and publications listed in the doctrinal order.

The discrepancies need not only affect the perception of the Doctrine of the CAF as such. In Chapter 1 of this article, I stated that: ...Doctrine of CAF “constitutes an important background for the development of military regulations and publications listed in the doctrinal order.” This claim is still valid, but there is a contradictory perception. In the doctrinal system of the CAF, the Doctrine of CAF is on the highest position. It should be the basis for all military regulations and publications at all three subsequent doctrinal levels. In addition, and it is very important to mention, the Doctrine of the CAF is presented in the subjects of The Theory of Military Art, which is part of the common foundation in the period before the division into modules. In the case of specialization of CCs, thus within the module commander of chemical units, teachers should take the Doctrine of the CAF as a basis and professional military regulations and publications to seal into its framework. In some cases, this will be relatively difficult to implement.

4 Common Functions

The commanders are obliged to use so-called common functions when organizing operations (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Common function

They are a framework that allows the commander and staff to visualize, synchronize, integrate and manage operations. They are a practical description of the capabilities of the deployed forces. The commander must assess these common functions, both in planning and conducting operations. As shown in

Figure 1, the common function is no longer included security of the troops (forces). Those common functions that fall within the scope of the CAF CCs activities are included in Force Protection and are referred to in conjunction with AJP-3.14. It is interesting to note that elsewhere, the Doctrines of the CAF (under footnote 46 on page 49), information activities are understood as information operations.

5 The Doctrine of the CAF and Chemical support

The term “chemical support” is not mentioned in the Doctrine of the CAF. According to the categorization shown in Figure 1 and described in Chapter 4, this is de facto correct. The question is whether the elements of combat support should not be listed and units of CCs. It has already been stated that their framework is embedded within the elements of combat support.

However, combat support elements provide administrative, logistical and technical support for combat elements and combat support elements. Combat support includes security in the areas of logistics (Host Nation Support), transport and helicopter aviation, air search and rescue services, military health, veterinary, communication and information security, personnel psychological and spiritual services, territorial forces, or other required forms security. Elsewhere, the Doctrine of the CAF states that combat support is the sum of preventive active and passive measures aimed at reducing and minimizing danger, and that it is the sum of the measures, activities, and capabilities of all-round support. It meets the support requirements necessary to fulfill the task of combat and support units, including personnel and administrative, logistics, technical and armaments, transportation, storage and repair, material and services, communications and information systems, movement, health and security by the host state.

It turns out that it was not possible to defend the historical position of CS in the system of support of forces activities. Despite the above mentioned universality and generalization of the assertions of the Doctrine of the CAF, I believe that when enumerating (specifying) individual measures (summary) of the combat support, the category of "chemical support" should be mentioned. But it is necessary to add that the engineer corps, thus the forces of combat support represented by the engineer troops and fulfilling the tasks of troops engineer support, is in comparison with CCs even worse.

Conclusion

The doctrine of the CAF should be a document respected across the whole CAF. The analytical perspective presented in this article presents certain aspects of its conception and perception at the strategic level. I am convinced that, despite some vague or somewhat incomplete or contradictory claims, it will find its application. However, it will have to be skillfully and highly qualified explained

and then implemented in military regulations and publications of the subordinate order, not only in the competence of the CAF CCs, but especially in the scope of mechanized troops, which is responsible for creating military regulations (publications) for units, formations and brigades. It is necessary to point out the fact that the membership of specialists of the CAF CCs in the author's team cannot be associated with full pride for the achieved result. The processes and procedures associated with its elaboration were somewhat specific only for example because the final team was not available for final assessment and final completion and approval. A partial excuse may be the fact that the authors could not influence these aspects.

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THE ROLE OF GLOBAL POWERS IN THE BLACK SEA REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM FORMATION

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ABSTRACT

Since ancient times, the Black Sea has been a key point in regional and international geopolitics, being a region of the interests' convergence of the major actors on the international stage, with the position of smaller actors being permanently related to them. The following factors have led to a negative impact on the development of the Black Sea region, and to the formation of a collective security system: the absence of a friendly leader or sponsor state, which also incurs most of the costs (Greece and Turkey play only partial roles); the existence of unresolved security issues between several parties; tendency to circumvent delicate economic problems; excessive bureaucracy; and consensus decision-making mechanism. In this paper we will analyze the most important points of view of the security formation around this region, as well as the key positions of the big global and regional players, also giving perspectives of situation's further evolution. A great interest in the region manifests for NATO (USA, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria), Ukraine, Rep. of Moldova, Russia and even China. Global Powers' interests are simultaneously implemented via their multilateral initiatives, namely, EU's idea of united Europe, NATO's foundation of Multinational Divisional Headquarters South East, Russia's supported Turkish Stream pipeline and other hydrocarbons transborder transportation projects, China's Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation Project (三海港区) under the framework of 17+1 (CEE+China) cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative.

Key words: Black Sea, NATO, European Union, cooperation, security system, geopolitics, multilateral initiatives, foundation, formation, transportation projects

Introduction

The concept of "security" is a multidimensional term, which refers not only to the political and military aspects, but also to the economic, social, cultural, environmental and even demographic aspects.

Today, the space defined by the new concept of the Extended Black Sea Region has begun to acquire the profile of a true geopolitical pivot, not only as an outpost of NATO and the EU, but also as a space of strategic interest for the western economic circuits (Kolodzjei, 2005).

The security environment in the Black Sea region is currently undergoing a series of transformations under two major aspects: the impact of NATO and EU

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enlargement on the region and the development of cooperation between riparian states. The vision on security in the area divides the riparian countries into three categories: NATO and / or EU member countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, which structure their security strategies according to the international status and role involved in belonging to these organizations. The Russian Federation, which has a distinct vision of security, stemmed from its position in international relations and countries aspiring to NATO and EU membership, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which have begun a process of adaptation to requirements in these organizations.


With the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism and globalization, the importance of the Black Sea is increasing considerably, becoming itself a factor of decision and influence worldwide, but also an arena of confrontation between regional and large powers (Asmus, 2006, pg. 231).

A potential solution to the problems of the region can only be based on an expanded security concept, incorporating regional integration, democratization, economic growth and redefining Black Sea policies and strategies.

The security of the Black Sea is a very complex process and it has many dimensions that will be taken into consideration in this work, such as:

- military security;
- energy security;
- economic security;
- political security.

Picture 1 Security's dimensions in the Black Sea region



1 NATO – EU's vector and the guarantee of security

The NATO and EU positions on the Black Sea did not always have the same starting point, but coincided largely due to the fact that a large number of EU members are also NATO members. According to NATO Secretary General, **Jens Stoltenberg** “*The Black Sea is an important strategic point for NATO, so we have increased the Alliance's presence in the Black Sea region both on land and at sea but also in the air*”, giving a clear message that an attack on the 3 NATO members with direct access to the Black Sea (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria) means an attack against the entire alliance (Toucas, 2017).

The US, the main NATO power, has allocated increasing funds for activities in Eastern Europe, either to strengthen an expanded (north), or adapted (south) presence, whose well-planned rotation is close to a permanent presence. New facilities are being built, which are not for long term (over 25 years), but neither the US military bases, with some exceptions, no longer develop long-term facilities. Also, multiple exercises are planned, which maintain the level of preparedness of the deployed forces, but at the same time support the armed forces of the Eastern states to reach the allied standards and to integrate all the forces in a possible common mission (Pavel, 2018).

The European Union, which is increasingly concerned about achieving the goal set by the Lisbon Treaty itself, on a common defense and security policy, seems to have received the necessary impetus to accelerate the processes of integration in the field of defense after the events of 2014. The Russian factor, according to the EU, has increased the state of insecurity of all Europeans. The European Union has shown that it has more control in the economic field than in the military, giving NATO the military attributes for the Black Sea region (Radu, 2019).

According to the analysis undertaken, the development perspectives of the NATO-EU vector are as following :

- the further failure of Turkey's EU accession negotiations will lead to an even larger NATO-EU split and a possible approach to Russia, China;
- the possible loss of Turkey as an ally in the Black Sea region will make Romania's importance grow considerably, an EU-NATO state, but that is not a member of the Schengen area, which demonstrates the multiple vulnerabilities of an extremely fragile construction;
- the emergence of an EU security structure in the Black Sea would contradict NATO, with Romania and Bulgaria, two strong NATO supporters and US partners (Jeffrey, Rumer, 2006);
- US interests and influence will remain strong in the Black Sea region as the vector NATO-EU will maintain stability and status quo;
- the lack of constructive dialogue with Turkey, and even with the other riparian states, will make the concept of NATO Black Sea security

formation and the NATO-EU vector vulnerable to any form of external aggression.

The NATO-EU vector in the formation of the Black Sea security system is a reality that must maintain the stability and status quo of the region at political, economic and military level. For its proper functioning, it is preferable for the EU to remain active economically and politically and NATO militarily as well as politically. Good cooperation with all Black Sea neighbors and even China, which is not a direct part of the area, is the best solution for long-term prospects, and through EU mechanisms and economic support it will be the first step towards to achieve cohesion (Radu, 2019)

2 Russia's trajectory as an alternative security system formation

Russia's role in the extended Black Sea region is crucial, many former Soviet countries, as well as the remaining enclaves, referred to as "frozen conflicts", still have ties to Moscow, some of them even wanting to unite with Russia. This, of course, angered the western countries, actively involved in the democratization process in this region. A conclusive example is the failure of Ukrainian revolution in 2014, since then the Black Sea Region has become much more militarized, and the ratio of forces and military demonstrations has multiplied considerably. Despite many objections, Russia has always actively contributed to maintaining stability and peace in this region, in history by making various alliances to protect its interests and people but also to remove threats from Turkey and the Asian people to have complete control over the Black Sea area (Litovkin, 2019).

In many ways, the Black Sea region has a more strategic value to Moscow than the Baltic sea, because the Kremlin has shown its willingness to use force there than anywhere else along the NATO's eastern flank but this escalation will not lead to a direct conflict with NATO, but will significantly worsen relations with Russia. That is why dialogue with Russia is needed in order to define interests and solve problems peacefully.

There are several medium and long-term perspectives on the development of the Russian security system in the Extended Black Sea region :

- the separation of Turkey and Bulgaria from NATO and EU policies through economic and energy incentives is a key element of Russia's strategy. The operations of influencing information and media channels in these countries are aimed at encouraging positive attitudes towards Russia and minimizing its growing military capabilities;
- a possible alliance with Turkey in the medium term perspective, based on a strong economic cooperation, however, in the long term, relations will cool down, as Ankara's ambitions will be greater than Russia's expectations and a clash of interests will occur, which will redirect Ankara to other power centers;

- with key allies in the enlarged Black Sea region such as Hungary and Armenia, Russia will seek to expand its influence in the adjacent regions as well;
- with a weak NATO, countries with a strong Slavic character but also energy dependents at the moment, such as Serbia and Bulgaria will be the first to come to the negotiation table with Russia;
- in the long term perspective, if the Russian alternative security system proves to be viable, it will lose power with the involvement of other global players, such as China. Its existence in the region will be conditioned by how well the Kremlin can negotiate with the Chinese side or others (Kirillova, 2019).

Russia's alternative guarantee of security and security system in the extended Black Sea region is a possible scenario in case the NATO-EU vector force decays in the area over time. The most important thing for Russia to maintain this balance in the region is firstly to control the ambitions of Turkey through energy and tourism dependence, then to keep the competition between Romania and Hungary in the course of showing to Russia availability in cooperation, then to increase influence in slave countries and other NATO countries such as Greece and Albania and lastly good cooperation and negotiation with China. The key to Russia's success in the area as a long-term leader in this alternative scenario is to maintain and strengthen ties with China, without interfering with China's direct economic interests in the region.

3 The strategy of third countries in the extended Black Sea area

Although many states in this vast area of the Black Sea are non-affiliated in any political-military bloc, they are an integral part of “*The Black Sea Economic Cooperation*” (BSEC), contributing more or less to the economic development of the region. The policy of these states can be characterized as “*chaotic*”, because they sometimes tend towards more centers of power, and their economic stability considerably decreases with each crisis of geopolitical orientation. (Gusilov, 2016, pg. 27). A conclusive example is “*The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development*” (GUAM), a regional organization of four post-Soviet states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.

This organization was not successful from the very beginning because all of the Member States are facing major problems, many of them from the soviet past such as borders and nationalities, new ones such as Russia's growing influence and the appearance of “*frozen conflicts*”. These problems have blocked any tendency for European or NATO integration of these states, which at the same time have also tackled an anti-Russian position, which has led to internal conflicts in the areas where there are many ethnic Russians (Gusilov, 2016, pg. 31)

Two interesting positions in BSEC are represented by Serbia and Ukraine, two countries with strong attachments to Moscow, but also with European aspirations. But their success depends largely on how they will solve their internal problems peacefully, because they must negotiate very well with both poles of power in order to obtain relative stability and political continuity, maintaining at the same time the balance and equilibrium between them (Napoleon, Dragoi, 2018).

Unlike Serbia, where things are much quieter now, in Ukraine it is a field of confrontation between two poles of power - the NATO-EU vector and the Russian Federation. Before to the tumultuous events of 2014, Ukraine did not have a clear strategy for the Black Sea. However, the loss of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas fueled the strategic thinking of Kiev. Ukraine is currently focusing on several strategic objectives: developing natural gas resources, maritime security in the Black Sea and preventing a disruption of maritime traffic, as happened after the incident from October 22, 2018, in the Azov Sea, when Russian naval and coastal vessels intercepted Ukrainian vessels passing through the Kerch Strait, seizing three of the ships and arresting Ukrainian sailors. (Triantaphyllou, Aydin, 2015).

4 China: Economic dragon's appearance on strange tides

Albeit facing dramatic spreading of a deadly 'Wuhan coronavirus' in the beginning of the 2020, China's rise continues to impact global politics in general and the Black Sea region and its littoral states' international agenda in particular. China has been demonstrating restrained approach towards Russia's absorption of Crimea in 2014, established strategic partnership with Ukraine in 2011, signed a Free-Trade Agreement with Georgia in 2017. However, the most significant multilateral project in regards with the Black Sea and Balkan Region is Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries (17+1). The nine of its seventeen CEE parties are Black Sea and Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia).

Former Prime Minister of China Wen Jiabao in his speech at China-CEE States Trade and Economic Forum in 2011 had stated that Central Europe would play a 'bridgehead' (桥头堡) role in China's cooperation with Europe (温家宝, 2011), and this slogan was reiterated in 2015 by Vice-Chairman of Romanian Senate Augustin Mitu (中东欧, 2015).

Over the past few years, China has strengthened its cooperation with CEE countries, primarily by using the "17 + 1" dialogue format, as it was indicated by the following steps:

1. Expanding former 16+1 dialogue format by inviting Greece for the 17th full membership, which could allow to connect port facilities and transport corridors invested by Chinese business from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea

and via Rail Baltica project (to which Chinese officials has showed public interest) to link it with Beijing's Arctic transport projects in Finland. It is notable that some CEE countries (primarily Poland) had previously expressed plans to expand this dialogue by inviting post-Soviet states Ukraine and Moldova (Mierzejewski, 2014). However, China from the very beginning was the rule-maker in inviting new parties and seemingly makes its final choice in favor of Belarus, since its official delegation of Belarus regularly participates in CEE+China summits as observer in recent years. This step indicates China's desire to put this dialogue to a greater extent under its control.

2. There is some evidence that in April 2020, at the 17 + 1 summit, the Chinese delegation will be headed by President Xi Jinping for the first time. This step predicts transformation of the 17+1 format from a purely economic to an economic-geopolitical one (as an important segment of the Belt and Road initiative, launched by China's incumbent leader in 2013).

The Black Sea and the Balkans is the core region of this strategy, but unlike other great powers, China's interests in the region relates to its commercial ties, which include trade, investment, and connectivity (Table 1). Albeit Montreux Convention allows all non-Black Sea warships to stay in the Black Sea for 21 days, Chinese vessels rarely visited this region. Guided Missile Destroyer Qingdao and Patrol Boat Yantai, for instance, paid separate visits to Sevastopol and Constanta in July-August, 2012, (中国军舰, 2012) and Frigates Linyi and Weifang visited Novorossiysk for celebrating WWII anniversary in May, 2015 (中国海军, 2015).

Table 1. China's Trade with the Black Sea Region States in the First Half 2019 (2019年)

| | RMB bln | YoY |
|----------|---------|--------|
| Russia | 351.39 | 11.5% |
| Turkey | 66.58 | -13.7% |
| Ukraine | 36.91 | 33.0% |
| Romania | 22.36 | 7.2% |
| Bulgaria | 9.01 | 10.2% |
| Georgia | 4.64 | 30.1% |
| Moldova | 0.51 | 13.0% |

On a par with foreign trade, investments in transport infrastructure are becoming China's fastest developing areas of cooperation with the region. The Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and CEE, signed in August 2017, proposed Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation Project (三海港区) as one of the priorities for the 16+1 cooperation (中国—中东欧, 2017).

Considered as Black sea region gateway to Europe, Bulgaria and Romania are subjects of special attention by China. Bucharest and Sofia hosted 16+1 summits respectively in 2013 and 2018. In July 2019, China and Bulgaria

established strategic partnership, which does not look like routine step despite small numbers of bilateral trade. The purpose of this particular step, alongside with other similar, are to bridge bilateral cooperation with the EU Black Sea littoral states to 17+1 format, since every state promotes specific area of cooperation: Romania – cooperation in energy, and Bulgaria – in the field of agriculture.

However, Beijing's initiatives in the Black Sea region are actively opposed by both great European powers and the United States. One of the instances is US-China frictions in Romania. The most intense confrontation unfolded around the idea of expanding the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. In May 2019, the Social Democrat government of Romania signed an agreement with the China General Nuclear Power Group to finish construction of two reactors of Romania's only nuclear power plant which supplies 20 percent of gross national energy. This investment was estimated at nearly 8 bln USD, but after government replacement in October, new Romanian Prime Minister, Ludovic Orban, announced that Bucharest is refusing to cooperate with a China's company and will seek new investors (加拿大, 2020).

Conclusions

In the long term we can say that there are some prospects for development of the situation and strategy of the third countries in the extended Black Sea region :

- without solving internal problems and without cooperation with both the EU and Moscow, the territorial integrity of Ukraine, such fragile, will be threatened by disintegration or civil war throughout its territory;
- Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Moldova and Serbia would be possible in the long term, if these states solve their problems with their territorial integrity, and especially if they offer concessions to Russia in the case of of Moldova, a country with many ethnic Russians, they must convince Moscow that their integration is not a threat to Russia and that they will keep good cooperation with Russia further;
- Georgia's European integration even in the long term is impossible; the Caucasian country with many territorial problems, located within the conflict area between anti-democratic regimes of the Middle East, Azerbaijan and Iran, and pro-Russian Armenia; could avoid its geopolitical vulnerability by seeking to Europe, but also cooperating constantly with Russia and Turkey;
- countries in the extended Black Sea area such as Albania and Macedonia can become members of the EU in the medium and long term perspectives, if they will show their constant devotion to European values and will continue the fight against corruption;

- the elimination of territorial conflicts in Moldova can only be possible by renouncing Transnistria, a region that did not belong to this country in the past, preferably it would be its transfer to Ukraine, as a “reward” for the loss of Crimea, Russia's role being crucial in solving this problem;
- in order to promote their economic interests and save economic prosperity, littoral states could focus on Asian powers such as China, using wide opportunities, opened up with the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative, despite ideological differences, and thus becoming a “Chinese bridge” to the EU.

In conclusion, the Black Sea enlarged security system is very complex and has many dimensions of understanding, and the cooperation of third countries with Russia, EU-NATO and even China will maintain stability and peace in the region for a long time. It is important to understand the plans of these states that can cause crises throughout the region, and also to find ways to solve them.

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NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

We are focused on to what extent the security system of the EU and national states has been threatened and what the threatening factors are. Our aim is to contribute to discussion and reflection on topical issues of security environment and security system as a follow-up to the dramatic development that have resulted in the massive migration of people from the African and Asian continent, and in the European Union's break-up, especially in view of the permanent mechanism of redistribution of asylum seekers. We try to answer the question: a) Has the international security situation changed in the second decade of the 21st century for the better b) or the worse? To this end, we use deductive, analytical, political, comparative and descriptive exploration, prediction, explanation, scientific methods such as Hanlon's razor.

Key words: *climate, Economic and War migrants, European cohesion, Dublin system, allocated quotas, Social and Security Threats, Chaotic Horizontal Management of the Society, Quality of Life, Hubris Syndrome*

Introduction

Most of the theoretical approaches to assessing the role of the security system of the European Union and the nation state settle down and do not go beyond national and Union primary law. The mechanism of the functioning of the Czech Republic's security system is a complex intertwining of both internal and external vertical and horizontal relationships, where there are numbers of friction areas and non-negligible security risks. The European Union stands at the threshold of the new decade of the 21st century facing new challenges and perspectives. It is not good enough to know about the (non) functioning of the European Union mechanism and keep silent. The Union, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2000 (in Article I-8 talking about EU symbols) for the first time officially mentions that the motto of its activity is "United in diversity".

The European Union, in synergy with nation states, will either return to its activities in order to meet this motto so that its council will go through some changes or it will collapse. Elections to the European Parliament 2019 will take place from 23 to 26 May 2019 as the 9th in order since 1979. They are expected to be the first elections after the Brexit in the remaining 27 member countries and the first challenge for Europeans to introduce the fundamental changes.

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1 Research Questions and Objectives

After reviewing several examples in a number of European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) in connection with illegal migration and the assessment of recent security threats, we have dealt with the following research questions:

- 1) What is the role of the European Union and the nation state at the present time?
- 2) Does the safety of Europeans affect the hybrid behaviour of political elites?
- 3) What are the main security risks and threats to the European Union and national states in the emerging decade of the 21st century?
- 4) How to reverse the under-financing trend of Member States' defence?
- 5) Vision about the European Union after the elections in the coming decades?

As a result, the study's main objective is to examine and assess to what extent the functioning of the EU and national security systems is jeopardized:

- 1) Underestimating the fact that democracy is a system of equality and openness to the public space.
- 2) Under finance the defence of national states.
- 3) Not respecting the fact that the security system of the countries of the European Union is placed in the rhinoceros of the political forces.
- 4) Brexit-price = reduction in economic growth and GDP growth.

Possible classification of research significance:

- 1) Strategic relevance: Strategic plans and long-term visions for the further development of the European integration process.
- 2) Informative significance: what are the main security risks and threats to the European Union and national states in the emerging decade of the 21st Century.
- 3) The importance of cognitivity: analytical description of assumed safety risks, possibilities of their prevention and overcoming.
- 4) Scientific significance: by defining the possibilities to prevent possible risks, opening up space for substantive, concrete and addressable changes in the internal and external relations of the "two-speed Europe".

2 Democracy is a system of equality and openness to the public space

How is it with the fragility of the balance of European democracy? The European Parliament is democratically legitimized, MEPs are elected. However, the rights and duties of this Parliament are restricted (Rožňák, 2015). The European Council is indirectly democratically legitimized, as the heads of government were elected in the elections in the individual EU Member States. It is a paradox, the nations whose power was to be broken had to be institutionally

equipped with power in the Union. In order to start post-national development and to create supranational institutions, national governments had to agree. Only the governments of the sovereign democratic states had the right to concede or, eventually submit the right of sovereignty to collective interest. For this purpose, an organ had to be set up where the democratically legitimized representatives of nation states meet and where, according to the rules recognized by national parliaments, joint decisions could be made. This institution became the European Council. At first, the European Parliament - this representative of the European people - was powerless, but with every new EU treaty by which national sovereign rights were handed over to the Union, the rights and opportunities of the European Parliament grew. The European Commission, however, is quite another cup of tea. The Commission is an institution in which democratic legitimacy is completely denied. Commissioners are proposed by the Council of the European Union, on the basis of suggestions made by the national governments, and then appointed by the European Council after the approval of the European Parliament. It can be easily deducted that the triad of European Parliament, European Council and European Commission produces a black hole in which what we understand as democracy, is disappearing. (Menasse, 2014). The problem of EU remains that as far as supranational solutions are concerned, EU has very few competencies and "Brussels" is not to be blamed for, but those whom we can vote for: national governments. This is the real EU drama: national democracy blocks post-national development, post-national development destroys democracy (Menasse, 2014)

3 Migration exists from negotiation

It is the movement of a minority in which there is a change of residence within or across the boundaries of any administrative unit in the most common use within a state or states where similar or identical economic conditions or similar or the same political or religious laws apply. Migration can have or has significant economic, cultural and population implications, it is one of the most important regional processes. From the demographic point of view, migration can be expressed by several indicators. One of these is the migration balance (sometimes also "net migration"), which reflects the difference between the number of immigrants (immigrants) and emigrants in the area. Depending on the outcome, we are talking about either migration growth / gain or migration / loss. It is calculated as follows:

$$M = I - E$$

M= Migration Balanc, I = Number of immigrants, E = Number of emigrants

Source: author

Migration

Migration (arrow number 1) in conflict areas, unfortunately, is a common phenomenon in the 21st century. Conflicts of conflict (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Central African States of island states and nations) and social (including political) or economic differences in migration are a serious socio-economic problem. Migration may be voluntary (for work or for relatives) or forced (the cause of which is usually a severe deterioration in living conditions, war status (Kurds, Jews, Ukrainians from eastern Ukraine, dictatorships, etc.) The world's most emigrants currently come from Afghanistan (4 500000) and Palestine (4 123000), and the number of people living in a country other than their birth is estimated at 150 000000 to 185000000. In most countries, it is very difficult to obtain asylum (Switzerland) because their asylum policy is based on a very thorough examination of the reasons for emigration and the success rate of asylum applications is in percentage units, mainly for political reasons. People in special facilities, with the level of services provided here in many developed nations, including the US, very much. With regard to the declining population of most developed nations, the question arises whether controlled migration of particularly educated populations is not a solution to the imminent aging of the population. There are, however, cultural and religious differences and, in many cases, also the xenophobic mood of the domestic population, fearing job losses and rising crime rates.

Emigration

Emigration is an expression from the perspective of the source of the movement (where it comes from), it is the eviction of the population. Emigration (out of the widespread migration, eviction) is leaving the country of origin and moving to another country, as shown in the diagram (Figure 1) on the arrow as number 2. We talk about emigration when there is an element of will in the game - when people have a choice. As for an act where people cannot choose, or they have to change, for example, religion, we are talking about expulsions and exults, and in some contexts we are more likely to use the term exiles (Morberg,1976). The causes of emigration can again be economic, political or religious, or a combination of several.





Figure 1. Migration, emigration and re-emigration
Source: author

Re-emigration

Re-emigration is the movement of the population, which involves emigration and re-immigration. Migration is a global phenomenon caused not only by economic factors but also by social, political, cultural, environmental, health, education and transport factors. The reasons for migration are interregional and intra-regional differences, a lack of job opportunities that lead to a low level of living conditions between different socio-economic groups. There are three components of population change: a) mortality, b) fertility, and c) migration and two types of migration: internal and international. Internal migration is the movement of people from one place to another place in a given country. International migration is the movement of people from one country to another in order to gain employment, to set up a family or to raise the standard of living. This is generally the case because people have less opportunity to improve the socio-economic situation in places of dislocation and are forced to migrate to more developed areas.

Different approaches by scientists allow you to study migration from different perspectives. Sociologists emphasize the social and cultural consequences of migration, while geographers emphasize the importance of migration in terms of time and distance, and economists emphasize the economic aspect of migration. Politologists are interested in how migration (emigration, immigration) influences the power behaviour of the elites, whether their activities and well- security of the company are already managed.

4 Accessions of the V4 countries to the migration crisis and security



Map 1. Main trends of migration to Europe / countries of the European UnionSource:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Map_of_the_European_Migrant_Crisis_2015_%28cs%29.png

Czech Republic and migration crisis and security

Although the number of asylum seekers in the Czech Republic is growing steadily, their number is still relatively low. The reason is geographical location, relatively lower economic level compared to Western neighbours, small communities of foreign nationals from countries with the highest number of asylum seekers, and also the already mentioned restrictive immigration policy. Although the EU has approved redistribution quotas, which have become mandatory for the Czech Republic, only individual persons have actually been redistributed. The Czech president's negative comments on Muslim migrants cited in foreign media contribute to the fact that even in the coming years, the Czech Republic will not be a popular destination for Muslim immigrants. The Czech Republic's spending on migration in 2015 amounted to about one billion crowns, which is less than one thousand of the state budget for the year. The Czech Republic has contributed to the relevant European Union funds, assisting the Middle East, the Western Program (in support of Syrian inhabitants and refugees)

as well as the UNHCR. The largest amounts from the state budget of the Czech Republic were allocated in the context of migration for the purposes of stabilizing the countries that are the source of migration and the place of the main transit of migrants. Humanitarian aid to countries hit by the refugee crisis and war conflicts is also significant.

Hungary and migration crisis and security

Hungarian leaders' views differ greatly from the Brussels mainstream, and also about issues surrounding the migration crisis. The Hungarian Government's approach to migrants is constantly criticized by most European states. Hungary, like the Czech Republic, rejected the idea of mandatory quota for the redistribution of migrants, and in December 2015 Hungary even filed an action against these quotas at the European Court of Justice. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is one of the hardest opponents of the EU's immigration policy. Orban in Hungary unofficially assumed the role of leader in V4 on issues of migration crisis. However, despite strong disagreements between the Hungarian government and Brussels, the Hungarian population still agrees with the idea of European cooperation, as evidenced by the 2014 research, when 48% of the voters voted the confidence of the EU. Like some other V4 leaders, Hungary has radically expressed itself about the current migration crisis. Hungary clearly refused mandatory redistribution of refugees through quotas. Already after the outbreak of the 2015 migration crisis, Hungary has decided to build a barrier to protect the Hungarian border in the south, thus limiting the transition from Hungary to Germany. The Hungarian government perceives refugees and migrants from the 2015-2016 wave as those who have gone to Europe without permission and are reluctant to cooperate with local authorities. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban himself was the first European leader to hold a referendum on mandatory quotas on October 2, 2015; most voters voted against mandatory quotas. In 2016, Orban proposed Lisbon as a solution to the current migration crisis in Europe. According to Orban, Schengen has to go through the subsequent changes that will help to stop the collapse of the EU. In his speech in March 2016, Orban pointed out that immigrants bring increased crime and terrorism to European countries. Mass immigration from different regions is a threat to the European way of life, culture, customs, and Christian traditions. He also stressed that the previous immigrants were not able to get too involved, living in their own communities with the view that the current migration crisis is planned and directed, and its purpose is to change the cultural nature of Europe and destroy the sovereign nation states. Hungary's attitude towards the migration crisis of 2015-16, along with the rejection of a state-funded redistribution mechanism or campaign against immigration, illustrates the decision to build a fence at the country's borders. The decision to build a fence took place only after other Member States did not respond to the request for assistance in resolving this crisis. It should be recalled that Hungary sought to address the situation in accordance

with its duty to protect the EU's external borders. Since September 2015, Hungary has built 175 km of fence along the border with Serbia, then on the border with Croatia another 375 km fence. The construction of fencing at the border was followed by other European states. A number of countries have thus tightened border controls at the EU's internal borders.

Poland and migration crisis and security

Poland, the only Central European country, was not directly confronted with the effects of the migration crisis. As far as geographical location is concerned, it is furthest away from migration routes, where refugees and migrants come to Europe. On the other hand, Poland actively participated in the search for a solution to the migration crisis. According to surveys from the PEW Research Centre, Poland is the country with the largest share of EU support. Poland, however, abandoned the key vote in the V4 and supported the EC's proposal with quotas. Petr Kratochvil sees it as a pragmatic decision by Poland, but it does not change the fact that Poland is essentially the same with other V4 countries in most of the attitudes towards migration. An important figure for Polish and European politics is Donald Tusk, who has been President of the European Council since 2014. As he is one of the most important positions in the EU, his attitude to European integration is proactive. The current security challenges that threaten the future of the EU and therefore Schengen, including migration, are perceived as grave and at the same time claim that only a single EU can solve the situation without jeopardizing the future of European integration. All the important measures that EU member states have to take must be implemented in a coordinated and cooperative manner. According to Tusk, it is essential for the country to financially support countries under pressure from the migration crisis. However, on the other hand, the EU will expect intensive assistance from the partners, thus avoiding any humanitarian disasters. The EU must prioritize a suitable migration policy that will help resolve the current crisis and not the other way round. For Tusk, the most important issue is how we have control over our borders. The future of Schengen is threatened, so European countries have to step up border controls. Witold Waszczykowski, Polish Foreign Minister, defined the migration crisis as a result of negligence. Europe has only concentrated on the crisis in the euro-zone, Greece, Brexit, and has not followed the events in the Middle East after the outbreak of the Arab Spring that has seen a number of conflicts, including the situation in Libya, which has been affected by European intervention as well. Poland has expressed little willingness to accept refugees, with the fact that they themselves are heading to Germany or Sweden. The question of mandatory quotas later on, Poland, like the other V4 countries, was considered dead. Concerning security concerns at EU level, according to Waszczykowski, there is no real common foreign and security policy, so any measures in connection with the security risks of migration will be solved by

Poland or NATO or bilateral cooperation with the US or individual regional neighbours.

Slovakia and migration crisis and security

Most Slovak political elites agree on the approach to current security risks and hence also rhetoric towards the EU and the future of Schengen. The opposition to government under the leadership of the Smer party represents, in addition to a part of the opposition, the Slovak president Andrej Kiska himself, who, unlike the domestic government, supported most of the EU's steps in the area of migration waves. Regarding mandatory quotas, Kiska argued at the end of 2015 that it was not a lucrative solution, but that it had to be accepted if decided by the relevant European institutions. He also added that the migration crisis has been the biggest problem for Europe since the end of World War II. The prominent opposition politician and chairman of the political party, Freedom and Solidarity, Richard Sulik, opposed to President Andy Kiska, refused mandatory quotas and overall perceived the whole process of so-called compulsory distribution of refugees very negative. Slovakia has therefore generally rejected the quotas, but a small number of refugees have been accepted under voluntary redistribution.

5 The security system in the rhomboid of political forces




Figure 2. Migration, emigration and re-emigration
Source: author


The European Union and the Nation States (NS) security systems are set up between the Council of Europe (CE), the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and NATO. Quite understandably, there are a variety of interests, multi-directional political forces and varied pressures among these rhomboid vertices of the security system of European Union and the nation member states. The force field is determined generally by the primary law of the EU and the NS. (Lisbon Treaty, 2008, 508 pp.). In the Lisbon Treaty, Title I, Common Provisions, Article 3 states that 1. „The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people“. 2. „The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate

measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime"(Lisbon Treaty, 2008, 25-26). European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. European Council nominates and appoints with the agreement of the President of the European Commission the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy (HR/VP CFSP EU). The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the gradual definition of a common defence policy that could lead to common defence. The Member Nation States actively and unreservedly support the Union's foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, and respect the EU's activity in this area. (Lisbon Treaty, 2008, 35-39). If we add NATO and especially the US requirements to overall situation, it is clear that the political oppressive atmosphere in the EU and the national member states' security rhomboid is simply a day-to-day accompanying phenomenon of the functioning mechanism of the Union.

6 Hubris Syndrom and Lucifer's effect

David Owen is particularly interested in leaders who were not ill in the conventional sense, and whose cognitive faculties remained working, but who developed what he calls the "hubris syndrome". "Hubris is inextricably linked to the possession and exercise of power. If an individual is deprived of power, the syndrome usually wears off," Owen says. "In this sense, it is a disease associated with persona swell as with a particular position. Moreover, the circumstances in which this function (position) is performed, affect the likelihood that the leader will succumb to it." [OWEN 2011]." A hubris feature is the inability to change the direction of politics, as it would be necessary to admit one's mistake. Owen in this context, talks about the so-called hubristic career and hubris is understood as a certain loss of the abilities: „Political leaders suffer from a loss of capacity and become excessively self-confident and contemptuous of advice that runs counter to what they believe in or even of any advice at all. They begin to behave as if they dared to oppose the prevailing conditions." Usually, though not always, they are punished for that deed by Nemesis. As the Pulitzer Prize winner Barbara W. Tauchman says, the art of ruling is to restrain their own ambitions and keep the head open. However, we don't seem to realize that power begets foolishness and brings an inability to think. Structurally induced stupidity is typical for behaviour of detached ruling classes and, unfortunately, is highly relevant and ubiquitous. The elite that loses connection with the majority of those they govern, want to control (and, in fact they do control) society without really knowing what it is going on in it. The society today is (frequently) formed on one hand of a small elite, and on the other hand of the majority of the population. Both groups differ sharply from each other in a life style, think in and interests. Only a few people

realize that it can, ultimately, cause a destabilization of delicately balanced internal state security. It's better to avoid thoughts about the implications of the foolish behaviour of politicians and elite that have impact on external security. A politician statesman, is responsible for the welfare of his nation and must act according to different rules than an intellectual sitting in the café. Such a politician becomes then a states man. Unfortunately, various players on the Czech political playground are playing the games falsely, and their behaviour represents an immediate security threat for everybody. Apart from few exceptions, politicians are not doing what they are paid for. This "high-ranking snakes in suits" as aptly characterized by Robert Hare and Paul Babiak, subject their entire holding to Lucifer's effect (give me a power and I will give you prosperity and security) are political psychopaths and parasitic predators. We can see a profound discrepancy between the performance of (not only Czech) political entrepreneur and the reward (income) that he/she will receive from voters.



Schema 1. Hubris syndrom - a vicious circle 1

Hubristic behaviour, security threat and national security of the Visegrad countries

A typical feature of hubristic behaviour is the inability to leave the troughs in time. Even the Book of books states that humility coheres with the conception of truth. Where there is a boundless pride and where there are no restrictions for such an individual, he or she then sets off inexorably on the path to the intoxication by power. It seems that nothing is impossible and threats are ephemeral: From the

given examples it can be concluded that hubristic behaviour possessing a security threat is carried out according to a regularly recurring pattern:

A. An individual gains a glory and admiration, and despite expectations achieves a certain success. → B. This experience goes straight into his/her head. → C. Starts to treat others with contempt and despise. → D. Gain the faith in own abilities, thinks he or she can do anything. → E. This excessive self-confidence leads to incorrect perception of reality and mistakes. → F. In the end, one meets one's goddess of reprisal, Nemesis, who will destroy him/her. [ROŽŇÁK, 2014]. Hubris syndrome affects people in power, the syndrome is something that appears, it is a manifestation of natural processes, a set she has a power similar to the power of God (he or she is blessed with "Providence" -is superior). Hubris syndrome was formulated as a pattern of behaviour in a person who has 3 or 4 symptoms of the following list:

- 1) Narcissistic attitude to see the world primarily as an arena in which he or she can exercise power and seek glory, and not as a place with problems that require pragmatic and not self-centred approach.
- 2) Venturing into the events, which will probably throw him or her in a bad light, i.e. which does not improve his or her image.
- 3) Shows disproportionate concern for own image and presentation.
- 4) Exhibits messianic zeal and exaltation in speech.
- 5) Conflates self with nation or state into such a measure that prospects and interests of both entities considers to be identical.
- 6) Uses the third person or royal 'we' when speaking about oneself.
- 7) Shows excessive self-confidence, accompanied by contempt for advice or criticism of others.
- 8) Immense self-confidence, escalating to a feeling of own omnipotence, as far as what can be personally achieved.
- 9) Shows accountability not to a „secular“ instance of justice and colleagues but only to a higher court (history or God).
- 10) Displays unshakeable belief that he or she will be vindicated in that court.
- 11) Resorts to restlessness, recklessness and impulsive actions.
- 12) Loses contact with reality, gradual solitude.
- 13) Allows moral rectitude to obviate consideration of practicality, cost or outcome end displays incompetence with disregard for nuts and bolts of policy making.
- 14) So-called Hubristic incompetence where supreme overconfidence leads to inattention to details, the speech can be spoiled because a leader influenced by his or her exceeding self-confidence did not go into trouble to solve its practical aspects (Owen, 2011).

The hubris syndrome is set off by a trigger, which is power. Hubristic traits and the hubris syndrome appear after the acquisition of power. Among the key external factors influencing human behaviour clearly belong:

- 1) Prevailing success in the acquisition of power and its holding.
- 2) Political environment where there are minimal restrictions on the personal authority of a leader.
- 3) Substantial power over a length of time.

7 Basic changes in the performance of the danger of citizens of national states of the European Union

We find ourselves in a difficult situation. The dismal economic situation is obvious, for the time being, it is only occasionally interrupted by signs of improvement of some economic indicators. The differences between “the old” and “the new” countries and the individual member states of European Union are not disappearing, on the contrary; the economic differences among the EU member states are striking. The multi-speed European Union simply exists. It looks like the dream of prosperous Europe without wars has dwindled away. We cannot close our eyes to the rolling tsunami of immigrants on the southern wind of the permeable borders to the EU from Africa, the situation in the nearby Ukraine, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and not to mention the radical political Islam. In addition, the Europe is dying out. The seriousness of the situation is in no way diminished by the fact that either we do not acknowledge the depth and scope of the crisis situation or we tend to downplay them. No doubt, the media and people in various managerial positions affected by blindness have their share in this state of affairs. Many advisors of political deputy ministers of various departments are not familiar with either the issues of the department or people in it. They lack just “a little thing”—certain knowledge of the sector, experience and empathy. And so “we” do not mind that we uncover to “the third party” the formerly unthinkable facts, stripping naked. Andor Sandor, (Šandor, 2018) appealing to reason and highlighting many professional misconducts, now reminds us of the Bedouin cry lost in the desert. The world around us is changing. We have two options: either to stand idly by or to be active. Unfortunately, the European bureaucrats are pushing the citizens into a vicious circle of their new ideologies and carefree materialism. Clear evidence of that is the Czech society. In this context it is easy to interpret a certain decline of democracy in recent municipal parliamentary and in particular in European elections. An inactive, but radicalizing disgruntlement led citizen at the pub dominates again. Surprisingly, this is of benefit to an active, so-called “apolitical” and “café” minority. Political parties do not admit themselves their own crisis. They don’t seem to mind that political parties in the Czech Republic resemble political discussion clubs. It is sufficient to take a closer look at their members’ base and the issues they deal with.

Emerging "non-political movements" with simple slogans for solution to intractable European problems are trying to brainwash the Europeans through media. Weird movements, whose members "work hard" and know "how to do it", are getting the green light on European motor ways. Petr Fiala states aptly in his essay entitled "At the end of carelessness" that: "It only looks like a paradox. On one hand, I argue that the European Union has been going in the wrong direction, it has no good answers either to economic and social problems, or to the security issues and on the top of that the West as a whole implements insufficiently consistent policy to defend their interests. At the same time I say that the Czech Republic must be firmly, clearly and actively a part of this "problematic" Western community (Fiala, 2015).

The aggressive War – brain drain and Security

Despite the persistent convincing from the side of believers in the European postmodern and transnational paradise, it is obvious that the sovereignty and legitimacy of the national state is gradually dissolving along with its security in the supranational structures. It is qualification and education of the population that determines apposition on the ladder of prosperity and security of a society. Day by day we can observe and be part of "the aggressive war" for a skilled manpower and the "brains". "Brain drain" is a bloodless struggle for the present and the future welfare and security of all of us. In this "brain drain" the important role as always and everywhere play: (1) money, but also (2) more and more „quality of life“. Watching the foreign policy of the United States of America through rose-tinted glasses and blind obedience in the implementation of sanctions against one of the world nuclear superpowers and one of the largest countries in the world, the Russian Federation, is undoubtedly a mistake.

This contribution about the "new (non) hazard" in a broader context is coherent with collapse of the bipolar world, with the changes in the international environment over the past two decades, when, allegedly "an antagonist" disappeared and "the winner of the Cold War (World War III)" – U.S.A. emerged. In my view, it is desirable for the Czech Republic to focus on the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). These countries represent 40 percent of the world's population and a fifth of the performance of the global economy.

Union pilots and politicians of the EU member states should be thinking about why the BRICS countries are unsettled by: a) repeating market shocks and b) wavering oil price. Furthermore, they should consider, why the countries of dynamically developing economies already decided at the summit in Ufa (July 2015) to: 1. Raise a mutual fund worth 100 billion USD and 2. Establish a development bank, i.e. the tools to fight against currency crises and to create a financial system independent on the West, particularly on the USA. I am asking a question, what exactly the security is and what it means to be (un)safe. It looks like there were no great unifying topics after the collapse of the USSR. And so we

are fumbling and searching. We released the genie out of the bottle and now we do not know how to put him back. Big issues of the day such as ecology, terrorism, elimination of poverty, migration wave, radical Islamism, ISIS, unfortunately do not evoke integrated action of all states.

Before the election they are all for the eradication of poverty (or at least unemployment rate reduction) and strengthening the security, but after the election it cannot cost them even a bit of their own wealth. Demands for flexibility and adaptability of states, companies and politicians in a turbulent environment and globalization processes of the 21st century are growing. For the vast majority of people, the ongoing local war conflicts are taking place on their TV screens and in the safety of their homes – this is changing their thinking and the attitude towards their own safety.

Free cross-border movement

Previously fragmented Europe turned into a super state, which is gradually taking control over earlier inalienable security and defence competences of national states. We are witnesses of Europeanization and of a fundamental transformation in perception of (in) security, but also of the changing relations between particular states. The Europeans dream of the free cross-border movement of people without degrading customs checks and personal searches came true by creating the so-called Schengen. It includes the territories of most European countries, where people can cross the borders of the contracting states at any place, without having to pass the border control. The same principle is valid for foreigners who have the so-called Schengen visa. And so, the great advantage of Europeans has become their weakest link. The consequence of a toothless defence policy of the EU is a failure to protect the EU borders and the imminent result is de facto opening of Europe to the wave of immigrants. The attractiveness of Europe and its high living standards of people living in strong welfare states are a paradise dream into which, quite logically, migration waves of people are rolling, reaching out their hands to the European wealth. Due to the opportunistic, hypocritical and irresponsible policy of "Brussels", Schengen gets into a huge crisis. The entrance to nationalism in the EU countries is ajar. We are finding ourselves „at the end of carelessness“, as Professor Petr Fiala points out, but without any considerable response (Fiala, 2015). In addition, the power centre of gravity to the great indignation of the French (winners of the last Great War) moves from Paris to Berlin (to the loser). If in a short term "Brussels" does not take crucial and tough protective measures, we will shortly lose one of the greatest achievements of the free movement of people between the EU Member States. It is quite clear that if a European super state is not capable of protecting its sovereignty, it will be done by the member states alone. This would mean that a construction of liberty and freedom of movement would collapse like a house of cards. Politicians should seriously and with all due vigour react to the state of media, social networks and even pubs, that are full of debates about refugees.

Some of them speak of the necessary solidarity, others point out an economic and social impacts that could be disastrous.

The optimal solution would be:

- 1) to come to terms that one excludes the other, i.e. „Schengen excludes quotas and quotas exclude Schengen” (free movement of persons),
- 2) take clear and tough precautions to protect the external borders of the European Union,
- 3) improve procedures set for return of refugees,
- 4) reduce social benefits for refugees,
- 5) collaborate with the countries in regions in question,
- 6) toughen up penalties against traffickers and smugglers of people.

Without a certain political courage and adoption of tough and power arrangements there will be end to free and unrestricted movement of the Europeans in Europe, indeed, the democracy itself will be endangered. Czechs and Slovaks know only too well that independence can be lost, without firing a shot, that freedom and security are at risk if the "attacker" ends business relationships, stops supply of important raw materials (oil, gas, food, water) and energy and/ or prevent an access to important international institutions. Economic and political war takes place without a shot, but it is not more humane. The centre of gravity of national security is moving towards a new concept of international security. In the process of (un)approximation of winners and losers, a national state gradually loses its unique position. As Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde state: "Security threats are not only of the military threats origin" (Buzan, Waever, Wilde, 2005). The source of the threats can also be in non-negligible extent incompetent decisions and unwise public speech of people active in politics and then media response to their speech (Nečas, Andrassy, 2018). Important evidence is that for the public tenders in the abroad is obligatory use of the Czech public procurement law (Pomazalova, Korecki, 2011) during mission accomplishment. In this context, we ask the question: "What is more dangerous: Good intentions combined with stupidity or an evil spirit associated with intelligence? Politicians with the help of powerful media and often corrupt editors are brainwashing and influencing millions of people through media. They take decisions with a far-reaching impact on the lives of these people. Hutchinson's prayer reminds physicians that their first duty is not to impair the patient's condition further. If we replace the word "patient" with the word "voters" this physician's prayer can become a politician's pray as well (Owen, 2011). Politicians have a duty to intervene only if such intervention has a real chance to improve the current status and resist temptation of self-serving interventions. Thus the basic properties of physicians (Bučka, Andrassy, 2017) and politicians must be: 1. competence and 2. Ability of realistic assessment of what can be and what cannot be achieved. Anything that can make such an assessment difficult can inflict a considerable damage. However, probably the most unfortunate is an

effort to breed a "new European man". Attempts of some Brussel's architects to change the thinking of Europeans by the force of political arguments strongly reminds of ill famous communist education and the unsuccessful attempt to create a new socialist man acting according to MOKOBUKO= Moral Code of Builder of Communism. As in then the CMEA countries, so now in the EU countries, the citizens live in accordance with the national traditions that resist any unification efforts.

8 Traditionalists versus Wideners and Security

Other risks reducing the security of the contemporary world, as highlighted by the Copenhagen School proponents are problems in the economic sphere and other processes, often of global origin. Threats appear in new guises. To the dangers and threats, without any doubt, belong the following: economic threats, the vulnerability of modern technology, computer crime, power blackouts, changes in the political field, high unemployment, so-called "non-diseases" (swine flu, AIDS, alcohol and drugs addiction), crime, bribery, organized crime and its penetration in to society, an aging Euro-Atlantic population, migration, population decline, piracy at sea and in the third medias and their technology, vanishing resources of oil, water, tropical forests and certain food. Also a loss of society's memory (see our last extraordinary parliamentary elections that were seen as a total collapse of the party system established in November 1989), fading tolerance, increasing arrogance, changing face of democracy, flourishing bureaucratic structures, foolish elite and media, escalating aggression and an increasing desire of political parties and their representatives for power, stupid and arrogant decisions of politicians and media activity, political culture steeped in corruption and clientelism. Czech people see clientelism and corruption as a high security risk. All this logically offers up a change of view on the role of traditionalists' security studies that, in their implementation of strategic security visions and objectives, are limited to military-political topics. On the contrary, the "wideners" wish to include into the security studies also the current economic, social and environmental sectors. Economic threats are much more realistic than the military ones, and the likelihood that the society will endanger itself, is substantially higher than a risk of being militarily attacked from the outside (Robejšek, 2006). In the opinion of the Copenhagen school representatives more important than a strong army is the defence against economic aggression and social pressures/demands of immigrants pouring in to Europe from countries whose culture is not only incompatible with our traditions, but also with the environment. However, traditionalists are neither willing, nor they are able to put this theory into practice.

Conclusions

The results obtained from our research bring realistic answers to the questions that we asked at the beginning of this study:

- 1) European Union and national security systems, respectively. of the Member States of the EU is in the rhythm of the political forces (NS) between the Council of Europe (RE), the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and NATO, with transnational structures dominating 85%
- 2) The hybrid behaviour of political (non)elites has a clear negative impact on the safety of Europeans.
- 3) Structurally induced stupidity is typical of the behaviour of segregated ruling classes and unfortunately is very relevant and ubiquitous.
- 4) The main security risks, without claiming an overall list, include:
 - Insufficient funding of Member States' defence. Concluding public space, disregarding the fact that democracy is a system of equality and openness to the public space.
 - The zone of unacceptable security risks lies within the limit of unacceptable risk and the maximum risk level.
 - The existence of a synergistic effect of risky phenomena.
- 5) The trend of under-financing of Member States' defence can be reversed only by increasing defence spending, by adjusting national budgets, by modernizing the armies of the EU Member States.
- 6) The change of the European Union and the functioning of its institutions after the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 is necessary.
- 7) The third decade of the 21st century sets the political and military elites of the European Union and national states a mirror that reflects the image of prosperity and security from a different point of view than in previous years.

The main objective of the study was therefore to examine and assess the extent to which the functioning of the EU and national security systems is threatened:

- 1) Underestimating the fact that democracy is a system of equality and openness to the public space.
- 2) Under finance the defence of national states.
- 3) Not respecting the fact that the security system of the countries of the European Union is located in the corridor of the political forces: the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Commission.
- 4) Brexit Prize for Member States, EU Member States = reduction of economic growth and GDP growth.

Possible classification of scientific significance:

- 1) Strategic relevance: Strategic plans and long-term visions for the further development of the European integration process.
- 2) Informative meaning: what are the main security risks and threats of the European Union and national states in the developing decade of the 21st century.
- 3) The importance of cognitivity: analytical description of the anticipated security risks, possibilities of their prevention and overcoming.
- 4) Scientific significance: by defining the possibilities to prevent possible risks, opening up space for substantial, concrete and addressable changes in the internal and external relations of the "two-speed Europe".

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DETERMINANTS OF STATE SECURITY POLICY BASED ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA

Kamila Sierzputowska¹

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize the contemporary national security policy of Estonia, embedded in such areas as strategic objectives of the state, defense potential, defense capabilities, security environment, defense cooperation, and effective deterrence. The need to ensure security is clearly stated in the legal acts adopted by the Riigikog, including the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia of 28 June 1993; the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia of 2017; the Foreign Policy Development Plan until 2030; the National Defense Development Plan for 2017-2026; the Military Defense Action Plan; and the National Military Defense Action Plan. The strategic pillar of the country's security is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is an essential guarantee of Estonia's national defense. Active NATO membership is the top priority of Estonia's security and defense policy.

Key words: *Estonia, NATO, security policy, defense cooperation, defense capabilities, effective deterrence*

Introduction

Estonia, located in the north-eastern part of Europe, is one of the smallest European countries. The country's location, as the northernmost Baltic country that borders Finland across the territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland and has a land border with Russia and Latvia, contributes Estonia's a quite unique geopolitical position. Its peculiar location on the continent, enriched by more than 1,500 islands (mainly uninhabited), shaped as a lowland area, makes an invasion on Estonia's territory rather easy.

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Political and administrative map of Estonia

Source: <http://pl.maps-of-europe.com/maps-of-estonia/>

Undoubtedly, the country's small demographic potential is a relatively weak point. Its area is inhabited by 1,324,820 people (as of 1 January 2019), mainly Estonians (68%). (Eesti statistika aastaraamat, 2019) However, $\frac{1}{4}$ of the country's population are Russian citizens (25%) and the representatives of other nations (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Finns, Tatars, Latvians, Jews, Poles, Germans and Lithuanians). More importantly, the population of Estonia is steadily decreasing (mainly due to negative population growth and a negative migration balance). According to statistical forecasts, in 2080 the population of the country will drop to about 1.2 million people. Thus, over the next 60 years, the population of Estonia will decrease by 11%, i.e. by 35,800 people over the next 25 years and by 145,200 people by 2080. At the same time, the ageing of the Estonian population will accelerate. (Eesti statistika aastaraamat, 2019)

The above-mentioned conditions are an essential starting point in building the country's security policy. The political consciousness of Estonians is contaminated by the painful periods in the history of the state and nation. The historical memory of the nation, formed within the framework of the country's difficult experiences, is a testimony to the events whose course shaped the Estonian statehood. Over centuries, the lands of present-day Estonia were under the rule of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Teutonic Order, the Russian Empire, the Third Reich (Bazylow, 1985) and even the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This continued until the creation, not without difficulty, of an independent state after World War I in 1920. (Makowski, 1931) The country was subjected to the last foreign domination between 1940 and 1991, when the country was Sovietized, i.e. it was incorporated as the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Soviet Union. The above conditions constitute an important background for the process of shaping of the national security policy. The process of formation of optimal solutions began when the Republic of Estonia

regained its independence in 1991. The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize the contemporary national security policy of Estonia, embedded in such areas as strategic objectives of the state, defense potential, defense capabilities, security environment, defense cooperation, and effective deterrence. The need to ensure security is clearly stated in the legal acts adopted by the Riigikog, including *the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia of 28 June 1993; the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia of 2017; the Foreign Policy Development Plan until 2030; the National Defense Development Plan for 2017-2026; the Military Defense Action Plan and the; National Military Defense Action Plan*. The strategic pillar of the country's security is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is an essential guarantee of Estonia's national defense. Active NATO membership is the top priority of Estonia's security and defense policy. Like other NATO Member States, Estonia emphasizes the development of a mobile and balanced armed force and increasing its ability to participate in international peacekeeping operations, and consistently supports NATO's "open-door" policy.

Building the foundations of the security policy - difficult beginnings. The dilemmas of the independent Republic of Estonia

After the break-up of the Soviet Union and the regained national autonomy, the Estonian government, like the other Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia, started to work on determining new principles of its security policies. In this context, the first challenge in the mid-1990s was to build defense capabilities, especially the formation, size, and nature of the armed forces of the sovereign but small state. The process of formation of the National Defense Forces of the republic was the subject of a long, nationwide debate in the Parliament (Riigikogu). The construction of the foundation for the state's defense structures was one of the key elements of the revived statehood in the 1990s. One should keep in mind that these activities were accompanied by complex problems and threats that emerged at that time:

1) Russian troops stationed in Estonia's territory

Negotiations of withdrawal of all Soviet troops started immediately after Estonia regained independence in 1991. However, *The Agreement between Estonia and the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and the conditions for their temporary stay in its territory* was not signed until 26 June 1994. Meanwhile, complications concerning the ambiguity of the provisions of that document - for each party - prolonged its ratification procedure until 1996;

2) Internal policy dilemmas

Creating a new structure of the armed forces - the future model of the army, its composition, and its size were the subject of a tedious debate on the Estonian political scene;

3) Ethical and moral crisis of the Estonian society

A noticeable process, especially among the young generation of the Estonian society, was the widespread lack of interest in politics, as well as in military service. This phenomenon became an important challenge for Estonia's political class in their efforts to create new foundations for national security;

4) Unfavorable demographic trends in the early 1990s

While at least 10,000 migrants have been coming to Estonia every year for 50 years, since 1990 almost 100,000 foreigners have reemigrated: returning to their "homelands" - countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, mainly Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and countries of the European Union (e.g. Germany and Finland). (Kulu, 2020) These migration movements (a rapid increase in migration in the first half of the 1990s) were accompanied by a decrease in natural growth (almost by half!). (Eesti statistika aastaraamat, 1998) The situation relatively stabilized at the end of the decade;

5) Disputes in relations between Estonia and Russia.

The main challenge at the beginning of the 1990s was Russia's adaptation to the new, unfavorable geopolitical situation. The new security architecture has forced a reorientation of Russian foreign policy, although the loss of control over the Baltic states has not led to its complete reconstruction. The neo-imperialism visible in Russian politics resulted in the fact that the Balts were regarded by the then political elites as a natural post-Soviet space, and therefore, despite the collapse of the USSR, they recognized the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as a Russian sphere of influence. Consequently, the pro-western orientation of Estonian foreign policy, chosen after 1991, and the associated start of the process of integration with European (EC) and Atlantic (NATO) western structures met with Russia's clear disapproval.



Changes in Estonia's borders after World War II.
Source: <https://eurasiangeopolitics.com/baltic-maps/>.

Moreover, in addition to issues related to the then emerging national security strategy for Estonia, the confrontational nature of Russian-Estonian relations was strengthened by the ongoing dispute over the shape and future of the lands taken by the USSR after World War II in 1944. These included areas to the east of the town of Narva, incorporated into the Leningrad Oblast and the Pechory Region incorporated into the Pskov Oblast. In 1953, the city of Jaanilinn (Ivangorod) became a part of Russia. Until 2005, i.e. until the signing of the border treaty, the two countries had a dispute over territorial issues, which was mainly due to historical reasons. (Jagusiak, 2013) However, the state of bilateral relations was further deteriorated by the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia. The legal and national status was a major source of tensions in mutual relations throughout the 1990s.



Concentration of citizens of Russian origin in Estonia

Source: <https://mapasinteractivos.didactalia.net/pt/comunidade/mapasflashinteractivos/recurso/mapa-fisico-de-estonia-grid-arendal/5da7a3f6-f854-40af-ba35-a4c07c2eb40c>

The Estonian authorities, aware of the fact that there are clusters of Russian enclaves in their territory, which constituted up to 95% of the population (in the north-eastern border districts of Narva, Kohtla - Järve, and Sillamäe) and enjoyed extensive autonomy and had secessionist attitudes, considered them to be a potential cause of destabilization of the state. The feeling of threat from Russia, experienced by the Baltic States, influenced the adoption by the Estonian authorities of restrictive rules for granting citizenship. Both the *Citizenship Act* of 1992 and the subsequent act of 1995 introduced very restrictive naturalization procedures (broader than the previous language test and including a declaration of loyalty to the state and a "5+1 census"² concerning the duration of stay in Estonia and possibility of exclusion from the naturalization process). In addition, several legal categories were introduced to define access to civil rights (Estonians, foreigners, undefined, and undeclared persons). In addition, according to the criterion set, national minorities were divided into historical, i.e. those living on the territory of the country for centuries and connected with it, and colonizing, i.e. those resulting from external aggression or illegal immigration to Estonia after 1940. (Kozakiewicz, 2003) The legal provisions on national minorities, as intended by the Estonian political elite, were to create a situation in the long term where groups of "illegal Russians," deprived of Estonian citizenship (according to the then-adopted legislation), who were staying in Estonia's territory, would be forced to leave it. Such a model of minority policy had its origins in the historical premises, being a consequence of the harm suffered by the Estonian people (annexation and occupation of the Estonian territory after 1940). (Kozakiewicz, 2003) The strong refusal to grant Estonian citizenship was met with protests from the Russian authorities. This situation was also negatively assessed by the OSCE and the EU, which in turn forced the Estonian authorities to work on a modernization of its nationality policy.

Towards Western guarantees

After it regained independence, Estonia started to develop from scratch the structures of the individual branches of its armed forces, the command systems, the training system, and the military education system. Another important challenge was to undertake work related to the creation of a "concept of national security, which establishes the objectives, principles, and directions of the national security policy." Its main objective was to ensure Estonia's independence and freedom, its territorial integrity, its political system, and the security of its citizens. EU and NATO membership became the priority for Estonia's foreign policy. For Estonia, as well as for the other Baltic States, Russia and the associated threat were the key security benchmark. Consequently, the main

² One of the conditions for acquiring citizenship is 5 years of permanent residence before submission of the application and one year after its submission.

assumptions of the security policy responded to the growing fears among the Baltic states of Russian revisionism and neo-imperialism, and Russia's anti-Western foreign policy, especially in the first period, in the first half of the 1990s. Thus, the basic threats that were identified in the early 1990s when the concept of security was being developed included:

- 1) the revival of Russian imperialism;
- 2) use of Russians living in Estonia to achieve political goals;
- 3) the conflicting nature of the Estonian-Russian relations;
- 4) the danger of rebuilding the Russian totalitarian state;
- 5) the anti-Estonian foreign policy of the Russian Federation. (Knudsen, 1993)

Estonia's pro-Western orientation was reflected in the efforts to define the country's place in the new geopolitical situation. Integration with international organizations, namely United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, and Council of the Baltic Sea States, as well as the start of efforts to become a member of the European Union and to join the Partnership for Peace in 1994 clearly defined the direction of foreign policy of the independent Estonian state. All political groups in the country unanimously defined NATO membership as a strategic objective of the country's foreign policy and the only effective way to provide hard guarantees of national security. Integration into EU structures and efforts to gain NATO membership were treated as parallel and priority tasks within the framework of the formulated security policy. With the submission of its accession documents in 1994, the efforts to join NATO determined the diplomatic work of the Estonian authorities. Given the unchanging geopolitical ambitions on the part of the Russian Federation, the determination to adapt the country to Western standards (those of NATO member states) in order to speed up membership in this Euro-Atlantic security organization as much as possible seems understandable. Especially considering that only a policy of "maximum anchoring" in Europe and the Western world could allow for effective separation from post-Soviet space. The meaning of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was of great political importance. Having little military potential, a small number of troops, modest equipment, and limited defense capabilities (anti-aircraft, anti-tank) would make the country's self-defense impossible. (Szymański, 2015) At the same time, Estonia demonstrated its fundamental determination to become a member of the Alliance by, among other things, emphasizing its loyalty to NATO after the events of 11 September 2001 and giving its unequivocal support to the anti-terrorist coalition (warfare and peacekeeping missions: Enduring Freedom and ISAF). On 29 March 2004, Estonia became a member of NATO and, as a result, gained security guarantees as an allied country. NATO membership was an unequivocal expression of support from the western world, so important primarily because of the lack of any alternative to ensuring the security of the Baltic States. At a similar time (May 2004), the country's government signed the

Accession Treaty, as a result of which Estonia became a part of the European Union. Both these events are milestones for the development of the country and its position in the region. The politically, militarily and economically strengthened Estonia was effectively building the image of a modern, effective, and influential state on the international arena. During the celebration of the 15th anniversary of NATO membership, the Estonian Prime Minister Jüri Ratas assured that 2004, when the country became a member of two important, and as he put it, desirable but unattainable Western institutions - NATO and the EU - was a great unification event and the most important moment in Estonia's history. During the same celebration, the then President Lennart Meri, while raising the flag, assured that this step meant that Estonia would never be alone again. (NATO accession..., 2020)

Principles of Estonia's security policy

The document that forms the basis of Estonia's security policy is *National Security Concept of 2017*, which defines the general objectives, principles, and trends of security policies. This document replaced the previous concept of national security approved by the Riigikogu in 2010. The new concept has been verified by the changes in the security environment related to globalization and, above all, the impact of international crises and conflicts on the Estonian national security system. The Estonian government sees the country's security as part of a wider international security. The security policy is based on a comprehensive security concept that covers all the areas relevant to its development. It is intended to maintain national sovereignty and continuity through prevention of threats, as well as swift counteracting of threats, regardless of the severity and scale of the threats and the potential of the enemy, including the involvement of Estonian citizens. The pillar of Estonia's security policy is the principles contained in the United Nations (UN) Charter, especially *the right and freedom of each country to choose its own security solutions*. The effectiveness of these actions is to be ensured by coordinated foreign and domestic policy tools. Close cooperation with allies and other international actors, and in particular membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, are the main guarantees of the national security. As a result, Estonia considers its own security and the security of its allies to be indivisible. The same threats and problems equally threaten the security of the allies and Estonia itself. (National Security Concept..., 2017) The concept defines the main sources of threats to Estonia's security, making them primarily dependent on the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region and the relations between neighboring countries. It points to Russia's increased military activity and its revisionist ambitions in Eastern Europe as a potential cause of another conflict in the region and an immediate threat to Estonia. This is particularly valid due to the fact that the Russian Federation has strengthened its armed forces and increased the number of Russian soldiers in the

border areas of NATO member states, including the Baltic Sea region and the Russian-Estonian border. Hence, for contemporary Estonia, it is NATO that provides the basis for security and defense cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region and the basis for collective defense. Actions aimed at weakening NATO and the solidarity of the allies threaten Estonia and transatlantic security. (National Security Concept..., 2017) Changes in the international environment have been reflected in many of the documents that constitute the pillars of national defense in Estonia. Its general assumptions for peacetime are defined by the *Peacetime National Defense Act of 2002*. The above-mentioned *National Security Concept of Estonia*, and other key legislation, such as the *National Defense Strategy*, the *Military Defense Development Plan*, the *Military Defense Action Plan*, and the *Emergency Defense*, correspond to the 2002 legislative framework. Its strategic dimension is defined in § 2, which assumes the development of international cooperation and the possibility of entering into agreements and alliances for military or defense purposes in order to achieve the assumed national defense goals. (Peacetime National Defense Act, 2002) The cyber attack on the Estonian state in 2007 and the war in South Ossetia (2008) changed the perception of potential threats. This was reflected in the provisions of the strategic documents adopted in the years 2010-2012. The Republic of Estonia, like the other Baltic States, focused more closely on conventional threats, the activities of foreign secret services, and the challenges of cyber security. (Szymański, 2015) However, a fundamental paradigm shift in its security policy took place after 2014. The annexation of Crimea in March of that year and the war in eastern Ukraine led to an increased sense of military threat in the region, raising awareness of the need for a more active defense policy in Estonia and its reorientation within the framework of increasing international instability. Aware of their small defense potential, the Baltic States, including Estonia, undertook cooperation at the bilateral level, as well as within the framework of regional and international organizations (cooperation within, among others, the EU PESCO, the *Bucharest Nine*, the *Nordic-Baltic Eight*, and the *Nordic Defense Cooperation - NORDEFCO*). The events in Ukraine led to deeper cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, especially in military, energy, and information matters. This has resulted in the aforementioned conscious consolidation of efforts to improve security, including the unanimous demand for a strengthened allied presence on the eastern flank. The NATO summit in Newport (2014) was supposed to assure NATO's eastern allies (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic States) of allied solidarity. However, its provisions, often described as "moderately positive," have led to the rotational presence of small allied detachments, also in Estonia. A fundamental change in the alliance's engagement on the eastern flank was brought about only by the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Its participant agreed on an increased NATO (EFP) presence, in the form of permanent, rotating, fully armed battalion groups, in the territory of the four countries of the eastern flank of the alliance: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,

and Poland. The deployment of multinational battalion groups in each of the Baltic States was an important complement to their limited defense capabilities.



- *Główny polygon i garnizon wojsk lądowych – main army training field and garrison*
- *Główny port wojenny – main naval base*
- *Baza lotnictwa (BAP – baza misji Baltic Air Policing) – Airforce base (BAP – base of the Baltic Air Policing mission)*
- *Poligon i garnizon wojsk lądowych – army training field and garrison*
- *Port wojenny – naval base*

Military infrastructure in the Baltic States


Source: <http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/17848?t=Polityka-bezpieczenstwa-i-sily-zbrojne-panstw-baltyckich>

In Estonia, the battalion battle group currently consists of 1,100 NATO soldiers deployed in the Tapa army base. The group comprises approximately 850 Brits and 200 Danes stationed together with soldiers from France and with the Estonians themselves and is capable of responding rapidly to small scale threats. Their number actually doubles the potential of the professional component of the Estonian army. This is because Estonia does not have a typical volunteer army with a professional component; the number of soldiers is approximately 6,000, with a half being conscripts. The largest component is the Voluntary Defense League (Kaitseliit), which is part of the Estonian Armed Forces with 15,000 members. Hence, the increase in the military presence of the allied forces in Estonia (joint exercises and modernization of military equipment and infrastructure) fills the gaps in its defense capabilities. Therefore, in order to facilitate the coherent and effective functioning of national defense, Estonia is

developing its fundamental pillars: military defense, civil support for military defense, international activities, and internal and external security, as well as maintaining continuous cooperation of the state with the society, appreciating the role and importance of voluntary military formations in building of the defense capabilities of the state. (On Estonian Victory Day..., 2018)

An additional aspect that strengthens the country's defense is the deployment of an American armor brigade capable of responding to major crises. The investment under the US support program *European Deterrence Initiative* was a landmark investment in Estonia's military infrastructure. As part of the expansion and modernization of the Ämari air base, new hangars, loading platforms, barracks, and other facilities have been built with full US funding. For a country without combat aviation, the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission, carried out since 2004, is a key guarantee of airspace protection.

To sum up, even before joining NATO, the Estonian government, aware of the importance of Article 5 and allied support, had already significantly involved the country in initiatives carried out under NATO scenarios. Active participation in international operations, outside the treaty area, since the 1990s (Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya) has demonstrated the country's loyalty and emphasized the importance of the transatlantic community in Estonia's security policy, as well as strengthened its position in the Alliance and made its image of an ally more credible. This commitment was also evidenced by a number of initiatives implemented after 2014, whose priority was to develop the defense potential of this small country.



Defense expenditure of a NATO country

Source: NATO

The investment in special forces, the development of military cooperation with the United States as well as the most important allies from Europe, the development of the NATO Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn, the technical modernization of the military infrastructure (mainly with the support of the USA), and presence of a battalion battle group within the framework of the EFP in Estonia are examples of long-term projects implemented to strengthen Estonia's military potential. Absolute support for the transatlantic community also translates into increased defense spending. Estonia is one of the seven NATO countries that met the obligations adopted during the Warsaw summit (2016) as it maintains its defense spending on the level of 2% of the country's GDP³. The increase in the sense of security is accompanied by an increase in confidence in NATO in the Estonian society. According to a study systematically conducted for the Ministry of Defense, the Alliance is considered to be the main guarantor of stability in the region, and the actual presence of allied forces on the eastern flank has undoubtedly contributed to an increase in the sense of security of Estonian citizens. (Avalik arvamus ja..., 2019)

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POLARITY OF THE WORLD BETWEEN GREAT POWERS AND REGIONAL HEGEMONIES*

Vesna Stanković Pejnović¹

ABSTRACT

The category of superpower, as distinct from great power, has become naturalized in the discourses about international relations. Superpowers are dying out, only great powers is likely to take a more regionalized form, possible downsides of a more regionalized international society. We are facing a future with no superpowers. The world in this century will belong to no one, but various regional hegemonies. Today we must be aware value of regionalism in resolving conflicts and fostering cooperation, because regional countries enjoy specific legitimacy. Regional response to power can also be found at the societal level directed at both the global hegemon and the great/regional powers. Whereas the old regionalism was concerned with relations between nation-states, the new regionalism formed part of a global structural transformation in which also a variety of non-state actors were operating at several levels of the global system.

Key words: *polarity, superpowers, great powers, regional*

Introduction

Polarity is generally defined as the number of great powers in the system and became established way of thinking about military-political structure at the system level. (Kaplan, 1957). Only strong states can project amity or enmity toward others, whereas weak states cannot compose a security complex. (Buzan, Weaver, 2003, pp. 20–22).

We are living in a weak unipolar world order at the global level, whereas a numbers of variations in the regional orders from balanced multipolarity (likewise East Asia) to strong unipolarity (likewise the North America) at the regional level. Polarity is generally defined as the number of great powers in the system and became established way of thinking about military-political structure at the system level.

Regions are the most important level for the post-Cold War era security among the existing four levels: domestic, regional, inter-regional, and global since there is only one superpower that can operate globally.

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Superpowers or great powers?

According to Barry Buzan since 2004 there was no superpowers, only great powers, which produce rather uncertain world. (Buzan, 2011, pp. 4) Superpower is a polity whose political, military, cultural and economic reach extends across the international system. Great power is one whose reach extends only across more than one region. (Buzan, 2008, pp. 554–70.)

Some authors use the terms “imperium” (that is, the combination of America’s territorial and nonterritorial power) and “core states” (Japan and Germany), (Katzenstein, pp. 2005), while Buzan and Wæver stick to more traditional categories such as superpower, great power, and regional power. (Buzan, Wæver, 2005, Kupchan, Mahbubani, 2013, Kupchan, 2010).

Buzan rejects the neorealist assumption that the major powers of the day will necessarily be rivals with intention to dominate the whole system. Such a regionalized world must aspire for coexistence international society with some elements of cooperation. (Buzan, 2011, pp. 3)

The mainstream polarity debates typically ignore the fact that there is an alternative to having either to balance against the US or bandwagon with it. Others can, and increasingly do, use the diminished power and authority of the US as a reason to ignore or circumscribe it, and to carve their own pathways in regional and global politics. (Lake, 2009, pp. 149) He rejects the neorealist assumption that the major powers of the day will necessarily be rivals with intention to dominate the whole system. Such a regionalized world must aspire coexistence of international society with some elements of cooperation. (Lake, 2009, pp. 201)

Unipolar systems possess only one great power, which enjoys a preponderance of power and faces no competition. (Monteiro, 2011, pp. 13) The lack of total external control of the unipole limits its power. However, the unipole faces no competitor in regard to hegemony. While the unipolar power may be incapable of projecting its power in totality over the other states in the international system, it is uncontested.

Wohlforth argues that in a unipolar world, the balance of power would promote peace since capabilities are concentrated. Following balance of power theory the chance for uncertainty is reduced in a unipolar world and thus the chance for conflict is as well. (Wohlforth, 1999, pp. 34)

Concept of superpower cannot be reasonably applied to the present situation in the 21st century, and that the world politics is going to be marked by “decentered globalism”. This is the world in which “there will be no superpowers, only great powers”. In his analysis of the international system, Buzan uses material and social factors to explain why the United States will not remain a superpower, whereas China and the EU will not become superpowers at all. He then goes on to look at why “a world with only great powers is likely to take a more regionalized form” and what the downsides of regional hegemony are (Buzan, 2011, pp. 3). States are still dominant referent objects of security, and

security threats travel more easily over short distance (Buzan, 1998). It is for this reason that security dynamics is more comprehensively analyzed at a regional level, because “the shared process of constructing security concerns and methods for dealing with them amongst member states, points toward a functioning system that can be systematically identified”, as opposed to the global level (Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010, pp. 733).

According to Kupchan the world will be dominated by no single superpower in a regionalized world, but Mahbubani stands up for the attitude that the East will find its place in what is going to be “One World”. (Mahbubani, 2013, pp. 315) Charles Kupchan has been writing extensively on the effects of change in power distribution on the US-led international order, defining the international environment as such where “power is diversifying, not one in which all countries are converging toward the Western way” (Kupchan, 2012, pp. 3). Although he recognizes that Asia will likely “assume the mantle of leadership” in this century, it cannot be said that “any country, region or model will dominate the next world”. It is important to note that Kupchan’s vision of the international system includes “numerous power centers” and “multiple versions of modernity” (Kupchan, 2012, pp. 3). He wants explore the causes and consequences of the global turn, and to counsel the West how best to minimize the consequences of the decreasing hegemony (Kupchan, 2012, pp. 10–11).

Some authors sees global turn as a big opportunity for the world. The world has changed significantly under the influence of economic and technological globalization, by “the great convergence“. Global civilization makes an impact on “human condition” due to globalization and interdependence (Mahbubani, 2013, pp. 2). Mahbubani “gives rise to a new discourse about the global condition”, which is the requirement for advancing global convergence. Secretiveness of the global civilization is achieved through forces of globalization and mediated by transnational elites educated in the West. (Mahbubani, 2013). He argues for the need of effective global governance reform of the United Nations system. Particular attention is directed to the reform of the Security Council which needs to provide more room for rising regional powers and small states. Mahbubani calls for “principles of global ethics” which can serve as the Kantian categorical imperative that would drive societies toward greater solidarity in this shrinking, converging world. (Mahbubani, 2013)

The superpower status of the US rests as much, or possibly more, on its social status as on its material capability. (Buzan, 2011, pp. 6) Changes in social support on either the domestic or international level could quite quickly shift the US from superpower to great power status. Japan and the European Union are both great powers on economical scale, but they lack capabilities to project military power globally. China possesses many of the superpower attributions, but it is only a rising great power or regional power comparing to the United States. Many great powers have very little to do with the global management of deterrence due to their limited capability. (Acton, pp. 2011). The nature of the

China that rises, however, will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. In the absence of any common cause, it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China's challenge to US hegemony. (Buzan, 2011, pp. 8)

Russia and China are two great powers that might disrupt the global management of security and thus might not be deterred without nuclear option. (Kupchan, 2001) The EU is still surprisingly widely talked about as a potential superpower, but despite its promise in some factors it has one fatal flaw. In material terms, the EU is second only to the US in overall size and capability of its economy, command of technology, finance. Its military capability is far behind of the US and more comparable with that of China, but that is not the EU's main problem in the superpower stakes. (Buzan, 2011, pp. 15)

Most appearingly, the US will fail to sustain its current position as the sole superpower, and that no other state will rise to that rank. If this prognostication is correct, then the emergent post-colonial world order will have no superpowers, but several great powers. The natural dynamic of such a world will be towards a more regionalized international order. (Kupchan, 2010, pp. 16).

Power of Regions

The study of regional orders—including the construction and organization of regions, the cultural, political, economic, and strategic interactions that occur both within and between regions, and the relationship between these interactions and the international system at large—is important to our understanding of the world. Regions are defined by powers of various kinds: the sole superpower and its imperium, great powers including “core states” that serve the power and purpose of the imperium and, to a lesser extent, regional powers. Regions become “substantially more important” sites of conflict and cooperation than in the past (Buzan, Wæver, 2003, pp. 10, Katzenstein, 2005, pp. 24) but they have also acquired “substantial” autonomy from the system-level interactions of the global powers (Buzan, Wæver, 2003, pp. 4)

According to Buzan and Wæver the regional structure of international security is shaped by 1+4+x distribution of power. At the top is the United States, followed by the EU, Japan, China, and Russia, with the the rest at the bottom. This structure is divided into three types of regional spaces. Region is shaped by outside forces; “unstructured regions” where regional interactions are not sufficient to generate a discernible structure of interdependence, and the third and most important and the most common are called “regional security complexes”, which “refers to the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other”(Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 43). Power is a central variable in differentiating regions conceptualized as security complexes. (Jervis, 1979, pp. 289-324).

According to Katzenstein's opinion of regions, only one power really matters. This is the U.S., which maintains a global presence and whose power and preferences are critical to the shape and functioning of all regions. But a crucial role in this hegemonic order is played by the "core states" of Germany and Japan. (Katzenstein, 2005, pp. 237) Sphere of influence organized by a great power located within the region of could be challenge to the American imperium. Such regional spheres of influence can be either benign/open or coercive/closed. Kupchan envisages the possibility of "benign regional unipolarity," which would presumably remain open to rival great powers. (Kupchan, 1998).

The European Union challenges the American imperium in various ways: through normative dissent (at least over multilateralism, even if one does not accept Kagan's more dramatic characterization of these differences), and by increasingly self-organizing its own defense, and third, by providing an alternative source of peace operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and nation-building) in out-of-area locations. Similar resistance to the U.S. could emerge in Asia as the region begins to self-organize its political and economic space and develop mechanisms and capabilities for handling regional peace operations. (Kagan, 2002)

Many contemporary conflicts have raised regional concerns and efforts to cope with these conflicts in order to sustain peace, order and security primarily through regional arrangements and actions at the regional level rather than international actions at a global level. (Lake, Morgan, 1997)

Regions are made permeable by globalization and internationalization. Globalization is driven by technology, nonterritorial actors, and processes, such as multilateral corporations and nongovernmental organizations, whereas internationalization is about territorially based exchanges, in which national sovereignty is "negotiated away," rather than transcended.

Regions are not to be conceptualized "in terms of geographic contiguity, but rather in terms of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states which often (but not always) inhabit the same geographical space." (Adler, Crawford, 2002) Regions could express collective identities, self-generated and recognized as such by outsiders. (Wæver, 1993) Regionness could also be a function of regionalist ideas and discourses, and the prominence of regions may well depend as much on "representation" as on „reality.“ (Dirlik, 1992) Regional institutions created by great powers or regional powers are not necessarily more effective at limiting violence and generating rule-governed interactions than are those created by small or weak states. (Acharya, Johnston, 2008). Regions, like nation-states, are to some extent imagined communities. (Ozer, 2014). Regions are "parallel smaller international systems." (Lemke, 2002) By accepting the regional level of analysis, instead of subsystems or regional security complexes, we can see "local hierarchies." One should also

pay attention to how regions socialize powerful actors on their own terms, rather than simply playing the hegemon's game.

Some authors argued that the world is divided into 'regions' and 'powers' with a sole superpower, the United States, and a series of great powers, the European Union, Japan, China, and a number of regional powers such as India. (Buzan and Weaver 2003, pp. 40).

Many contemporary conflicts have raised regional concerns and efforts to cope with these conflicts in order to sustain peace, order and security primarily through regional arrangements and actions at the regional level rather than international actions at a global level. (Lake, Morgan, 1997)

Conclusion

There must be 'third way' between attitude of US hegemony and those who believe in the necessity for the US to take a more accommodative leadership role in a multi-power world order which lead to more radical transformation in the world order. In this perspective there are no superpowers only great powers and regional powers, capitalism in various versions is the accepted form of political economy, regional orders are stronger than the global one, and at the global level there is a well-grounded pluralist international society mainly motivated by coexistence, but with significant elements of cooperation around collective problems (arms control, environmental management) and projects (trade, big science). In this world is vividly equitable global distribution of power, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, a powerful norm of anti-hegemony and the visible presence of collective problems. Compatible social orders and cultural commonality are necessary conditions for security community. The practice of strategic restraint is equally important, but the cases of security community confirm that even states that do not embrace institutionalized restraint at home are able to exercise restraint in the conduct of their foreign policy. (Kupchan, 2012, pp. 283).

We are witness the period when the compelling power of governments and individuals could change the path of international relations (something harder to do in an era of flighty capital and transnational corporations), and a reminder that if broadly liberal regimes do not create order, there are plenty of illiberal ones that will. (Stanković Pejnović, 2017, pp. 124)

Union is the most advanced form of stable peace. The constituent states not only escape geopolitical rivalry and embrace rules and institutions to regulate their relations, but they go on to pool their sovereignty and merge into a new political entity. In sacrificing their individual autonomy, these states advance, in Deutsch's words, a "pluralistic" into an "amalgamated" security community. (Kupchan, 2012, pp. 284).

Unions are governed by collective institutions which supersede the sovereignty of member states and have authority over a broader range of policy

issues. A security community regulates security and, in some instances, economic relations among its members, with autonomy to conduct their own diplomacy and commerce with outside states. A union usually exercises control not only over relations among its constituent states, but also over their collective diplomatic and commercial relations with other states; unions act as a single entity in the international arena.

The relationship between regions and powerful actors from outside and from within involves identifying conditions that lead regions to challenge external influence and theorizing about the different forms such resistance can take, at both the state and the societal level. One should also pay attention to how regions socialize powerful actors on their own terms, rather than simply playing the hegemon's game. Study of these dynamics is ultimately crucial for understanding the endogenous construction of regions.

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THE PLACE AND THE ROLE OF THE CBRN DEFENCE PROBLEMS IN THE PEDAGOGIC-EDUCATIONAL PROCESS OF MILITARY HIGH SCHOOL

Břetislav Štěpánek¹ - Pavel Otrísal²

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the integration of CBRN problematic into the pedagogic-educational process of military high school, where chemical education tends to pupil - non-soldier differentiate chemical theory, model and reality, solve a practical chemical problem related to environmental protection, or perform simple chemical experiments, processed the results of observed experimental processes and measured values and was able to apply chemical knowledge in preparation for the defense of the state.

Key words: CBRN, problematic, chemistry, theory, practice.

Introduction

The current world security environment is characterized by the existence of threats related to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the leakage of industrial hazardous substances (IHS). Even though the mass threat of their use (possibly misuse) is not foreseen in principle, it is not possible to exclude their use by different interest-oriented groups. For these groups of persons, it is not possible to predict what quantities and, where appropriate, what types of WMD are available and, where appropriate, which treatment processes have passed before they are used.

1 Security environment of the Czech republic

The environment affecting the current security of the Czech Republic (CR) is characterized by a high dynamic of change and difficult localization and predictability of threats and risks stemming from them, their sources or potential impacts. Based on the analysis of the security environment in which the Czech Republic is located, it is possible to identify specific threats to its safety. The Czech Republic, as a responsible member of international organizations, includes among the relevant security threats even those that do not have a direct impact on its security, but threaten its allies (Gerhát, 2019). In view of the focus of this article, the authors consider the relevant threat regarding the proliferation of

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WMD and their porters. Some state and non-State actors seek to openly or conceal the acquisition of the WMD and their porters. The proliferation of these funds can have serious implications for security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The specific threat is then the possible use of ballistic missiles and flat-flight missiles carrying conventional or non-conventional rockets. The general characteristic of the WMD is their ability to intervene from a long distance of the territory of the Czech Republic or its allies, which puts high demands on active and passive countermeasures, among which we primarily include measures of protection against WMD and IHS. Protection against WMD and activities related to its realization is a very important domain of the Czech army. In 2002, the Czech Republic took over the commitment to develop and implement the protection against WMD in the North Atlantic Alliance. The Czech Republic was retained as a responsible member of the Alliance. In essence, it used its historical experience in the development of the issue of protection against the WMD and undoubtedly found the future skills and knowledge potential in the scientific and educational fields.

The theory of protection against WMD must always be very well thought-out. The theoretical aspects of the protection against WMD are linked in particular to the knowledge of the professional terminology, the basic principles of the function of the WMD, their destructive principles and the fundamental aspects of protection against them. This issue is very well and detailed elaborated in the Czech army at the level of military doctrines, regulations and publications. Thus, both strategic approaches to protection against WMD and operational and tactical approaches are taken into account. The legislative activity in this area which falls under the responsibility of the Chemical troops (CT) of the Czech Army is very active and the age of publications does not exceed 3 years.

Practice assumes training in the use of means of individual protection, detection and decontamination means, means and methods of notification and warning of anticipated and actual radioactive, chemical and possibly biological contamination, and in Not least the basic devices of the individual's medical equipment. It is important to emphasize that the theoretical and practical aspects of the protection against the WMD are not the domain of the Chemical troops of the Czech Army, as is sometimes misinterpreted, but the knowledge is belonging to all kinds of military expertise. In practice, this means that every soldier must be able to respond adequately to the threat of the possible use of WMD or the leakage of IHS into the environment. And the role of military education is irreplaceable in this case, not only as a body providing education, but also a body that offers educational activities.

1.1 The issue of protection against WMD in the educational process of the military high school

The authors believe that the pupils-non-soldiers of the military High School (HS) should set an example in the application of knowledge and skills falling within the framework of the preparation of citizens to defend the state, in which the issue of protection against WMD and IHS falls. It is known that this preparation is an integral part of the defense planning of the Czech Republic. It is necessary to keep in mind that the legal duty of citizens to defend their homeland has not been even with the professionalization of the Czech army. Systematic and differentiated preparation of citizens to defend the state is one of the prerequisites for creating the necessary capabilities to ensure the defense of individuals and society as a whole (Anonym, 2019). If this provision is valid, it must therefore be applicable and required in the conditions of the military high school. Given the position of the military high school in the system of education and the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense, it is possible to expect to play the role of coordinator and possibly the implementer of selected measures of preparation of persons to defend the state.

The National program of Education in the Czech Republic, the so-called white Paper, and Act No. 561/2004 Coll. on pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary professional and other education (the Education Act), as amended, introduce a new system of educational Programs (Banýr, Beneš a kolektiv, 1995). The curricular documents that define and describe the program of education (curriculum) are formed on two levels: state-in the form of the National program of education and framework educational programs (FEP) and school-in the form of school education programs (SEP), Education in a particular school is carried out.

The issue of protection against WMD is an integral part of the educational-educational process of the military high school. *The theoretical aspects of the protection against WMD* is included in the subject of chemistry, which is conceived in the military secondary school following the FEP and SEP as a general educational subject with a link to the vocational training component. The subject's curriculum is divided into 1 up to 4 (Škoda, Doulik, 2007). Year with the curriculum is shown in table 1.

Table 1 Chemistry Teaching Plan

| Year | I. | II. | III. | IV. |
|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Subsidy | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Duty | mandatory | mandatory | mandatory | mandatory |

Education in the subject of chemistry aims to distinguish chemical theory, model and reality from the pupil, to solve a practical chemical problem with environmental protection, or to perform simple chemical experiments, to process

the results of observed Experimental processes and measured values, and proved to be able to apply chemical findings in further vocational education and practical life as well as in preparing citizens to defend the state. The pupil is led to the active scientific and practical thinking and to the analysis of previous knowledge to obtain further logical conclusions (RVP, 2014).

The first year and part of the second one presents pupils in the issue of General chemistry, which is closely followed in the second part of the second year of Study of technical inorganic chemistry. Basic principles of general chemistry are familiarized by the pupil with basic regulations of the building of atoms and molecules, chemical bonds, intermolecular forces of the non-binding nature and causes of the physical and chemical properties of the substances. It recognizes the causes and methods of calculating the thermal coloring of chemical processes and the patterns that can affect the speed of chemical reactions and their yield. He introduces electrochemical principles and their use in various fields of human activity. The pupil also recognizes the potential negative impact of the toxicity of chemicals. Fundamentals of inorganic chemistry provide insight into the chemical structure of important groups of inorganic substances, their physical and chemical properties and possible toxic properties, understanding the principle of acidity and alkalinity of acid solutions, bases and salts and their expression with pH values. Technical inorganic Chemistry offers familiarization with properties and chemical reactions of selected elements, their sources in nature and practical use. The selected technology of the production brings to the pupil the environment of industrial chemistry. This topic is closely linked to the study of the basics of analytical methods and procedures.

The third year is devoted to organic chemistry. The basics of organic chemistry familiarize the pupil with the legality of the chemical structure of organic matter, the construction and chemical nomenclature of hydrocarbons, their properties and natural resources. Students recognize the principles of oil, coal and natural gas processing as raw materials for the organic chemistry industry. This curriculum is followed by technical organic chemistry, which the pupil puts into the issue of hydrocarbon derivatives. The pupil examines their internal structure and their dependent physical and chemical properties. He sorts the hydrocarbon derivatives into characteristic groups according to chemical systematic. He learns these substances to name and vice versa based on the name to assemble the chemical formula. The pupil recognizes applied chemistry on examples of selected chemical products, used in various industries and in various areas of everyday life, their production technology and the impact of chemicalization on the environment. In this context, the pupil recognizes the realities of different options.

The fourth year follows the subject of biology. Biology as the science of life provides in its subject the education and the possibility of educational action on the pupil. This fact must be respected in the course of the teaching and use of all the elements that are offered, starting with the health education and ending

with the ecological training. For the rational development of pupils provides a system of basic information, which is linked to the knowledge adopted by pupils especially in the context of natural history in primary school. The pupils are made available not only by the system of basic biological concepts in their natural, especially the developmental context, but in particular the laws between phenomena. The acquisition of biological knowledge and legality has the pupil to lead to logical, creative thinking and to acquire skills and habits to treat the diversity of logical and thought practices, the bases of which are in multilateral relations, for biology particularly typical.

The thematic unit of natural substance and biochemical happening is devoted to natural organic substances - lipids, carbohydrates, proteins and their metabolism in the human organism, nucleic acids and biocatalysts. Emphasis is placed on familiarization with biochemical essence of transmission of genetic information, possibilities of mutation and types of mutagenic factors, related to the chemistry of human society life and lifestyle. Information on current environmental pollution issues by chemical products is obtained by the pupil over the whole course of the study.

The practical aspects of the protection against WMD are devoted to the subject of military training, in which pupils during the spring period of the third year undergo specialist field training from chemical preparation, which is secured in conjunction with the 31th Regiment of radiation, chemical and biological protection in Liberec in the military training Area Tisá within the range of one school week. The individual topics with a budget of hours are given in table 2. Practical training is managed by instructors and platoon commanders who are responsible for the training and readiness of pupils, and are also guarantor of the various topics of chemical preparation. The aim of practical training is to acquaint pupils with ZHN, with the means of individual protection of the individual including their proper use within the given time limits. Furthermore, pupils must be able to participate in maintaining the sustaining the fighting of their unit in a contaminated environment (ŠVP, 2015). Topics in the field of protection against WMD are in line with the SEP and thematic plans of chemistry and military training courses.

Table 2 Topics with chemical training hours

| Order | Chemical Preparation - III. Year | Number of hours |
|-------|--|-----------------|
| 1. | Nuclear Weapons and protection against them | 2 |
| 2. | Chemical weapons, combat biological agents and protection against them | 2 |
| 3. | Industrial toxic substances, inflammable devices and protection against them | 2 |
| 4. | Individual protection means | 3 |
| 5. | Means for implementing protection against WMD for individual and small units | 3 |
| 6. | Means of detecting radioactive and chemical contamination for the whole army | 2 |
| 7. | Means to perform immediate partial decontamination of persons, weapons and equipment | 3 |
| 8. | Decontamination of persons, weapons and technology | 6 |
| 9. | Overcoming and disinfestations of contaminated areas | 4 |
| 10. | Warning Signals and action after them | 2 |
| 11. | Demonstration of technique, decontamination line and contaminated area | 7 |
| | Total | 36 |

Conclusion

The aim of theoretical teaching and practical training of pupils from Military High School in the protection against WMD is the acquisition of theoretical knowledge from chemistry and practical skills in chemical preparation, which prepares pupils to successfully manage the downstream training of services and facilities in the Army of the Czech Republic. In teaching and training, the emphasis is on mastering the activities needed to survive and to perform the combat tasks necessary for the performance of the service as a member of the Czech Army. The educational process of the military high school in the issue of protection against WMD aims to prepare the citizen to defend the state through the preparation of the pupil for the career of a soldier of the profession.

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THE CONCEPT OF THE TERRORIST SEMI-STATES – A CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM

Daniel Svoboda¹

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to apply the concept of terrorist semi-states to the case of the Nigerian jihadist organization Boko Haram. The paper is focused on the concept of terrorist semi-states according to Or Honig and Ido Yahel, based on the fifth wave of terrorism, at least according to the Jeffrey Kaplan's concept. In other words, the paper will verify the legitimacy of the classification of Boko Haram among the so-called terrorist semi-states, where it was included together with the Islamic State (ISIS). I operate with the concept of Honig and Yahel, and for the purpose of my contribution, I am inspired by the criteria they set out, which I will apply to the Boko Haram case, to verify whether and to what extent it fills the definition of a terrorist semi-state. Terrorist semi-states in the subjugated territories create certain forms of quasi-states, based on the secessionist tendencies of the rebel groups, which constitute them. However, they differ in their millenarian character, the brutal way of waging a war, which aims in particular to destroy the old order and create a radical new society, and in seeking to establish a global caliphate, a theocratic Islamic state governed by Islamic law called shari'a. For this reason, the case of Boko Haram has been selected as an example, which, mainly in northeastern Nigeria, but also in neighboring states, controls a large part of the territory and exercises government (including shari'a law), while still practicing violence and waging asymmetric and unconventional form of armed resistance against the state, where it operates. Along with the new waves of terrorism and new ways of waging war, we may increasingly encounter such terrorist semi-states in the future, which would also imply necessary reflection of established theories of state. Terrorist semi-states, such as the Islamic State or Boko Haram, control and rule a large part of the state's territory and form their own institutions on it, but at the same time wage a constant armed struggle with state and often international armed forces. One of the greatest achievements of these groups is the creation of some kind of quasi-states. However, they don't seek international recognition.

Key words: *terrorist semi-states, quasi-states, islamic fundamentalism, islamic terrorism, caliphate, Boko Haram, Nigeria, statehood*

Introduction

In the last two decades, a new phenomenon of specific type of terrorism has emerged. From the beginning of the 21st century, we can see rise of a different and dangerous type of terrorism, which **Or Honig** and **Ido Yahel** labeled as a *terrorist semi-state (TSS)*. **Honig** and **Yahel** define terrorist semi-states as rebel groups that a) control portions of a weak state's territory, maintaining governance

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there; b) but still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states (TPVS) (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1211).

The concept of terrorist semi-states is one of several innovations or redefinitions of **David Rapoport's** four waves of terrorism. According to Rapoport, we can divide the history of modern global terrorism into four different and specific periods. For each period **Rapoport** determined its own characteristics and criteria. These four waves are: the anarchist wave (1880–1920), the anti-colonial wave (1920–1960), New Left Revolutionary wave (1960–1979) and religious wave (1979–2000) (Rapoport, 2004, p. 46–73)². Some scholars argued (e.g. **Jeffrey Kaplan, Anthony Celso, Or Honig** and **Ido Yahel**) that since the beginning of the 21st century, the fifth wave of terrorism has emerged. Although definitions of the fifth wave of terrorism differ, all of them have something common – they argue that some new terrorist groups differ significantly from the previous waves. **Kaplan** into fifth wave include the Khmer Rouge or LRA³, but not Boko Haram or the Islamic State (ISIS) (Kaplan, 2008, p. 12–24; Kaplan, 2010). **Celso** or **Honig** and **Yahel** already include into the fifth wave of terrorism also jihadist movements like Boko Haram or the ISIS (Celso, 2015, p. 252–258)⁴.

This paper analyzes the Nigerian jihadist terrorist organization Boko Haram from the perspective of the concept of the terrorist semi-states. This paper verify the legitimacy of the **Honig's** and **Yahel's** classification of Boko Haram among the so-called terrorist semi-states, where it was included together with the ISIS. I use the criteria they set out, which I apply to a Boko Haram case, to verify whether and to what extent it fills the definition of a terrorist semi-state.

1 Definition of the term terrorist semi-states

According to **Honig's** and **Yahel's** concept, terrorist semi-states are, as I mentioned above, defined as rebel groups that a) control portions of a weak state's territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states. That means that these rebel groups are different from most terror groups in history (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1213). For better understanding is important to show in which ways the terrorist semi-states are different from previous terror groups. *First*, they exhibit state-like behavior with respect to all manner of domestic affairs. This includes, for example, establishing institutions of law and order such as police forces, schools, healthcare infrastructure, and social organizations. *Second*, they engage in terrorism towards other states which are unrelated to the weak state (the third party victim state –

² **Rapoport** argues, that the fourth (religious) wave of terrorism continues until today (Rapoport, 2004, p. 46–47).

³ LRA – Lord's Resistance Army.

⁴ **Kaplan** includes Boko Haram and ISIS into the fourth (religious, especially Islamic) wave of terrorism (Kaplan, 2008, p. 12–24; Kaplan 2010).

TPVS), instead of focusing all their fire on the struggle against the remnants of the weak state (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1213).

According to **Honig** and **Yahel**, full-fledged terrorist semi-state must have three characteristics: *First*, it must possess relatively exclusive military control over a continuous bloc of territory. Hence, just controlling enclaves within the weak state or having to share effective control with other significant forces (regardless if they are the weak state's forces, an invading force, or even a force of a competing large terror group) would mean the entity is not yet a terrorist semi-state (though complete Weberian monopoly of arms is not needed as some rogue groups or symbolic contingents of the weak state may be present in the territory). *Second*, the terrorist semi-state must lack international legitimacy (which often happens due to its terrorist behavior and its establishment in the weak state's sovereign territory) since otherwise we are speaking about a normal state (which admittedly engages in terror). And *third*, the group must hold a revisionist and not just secessionist ideology in the sense of aiming to eradicate not just the weak state but actually the TPVS as well (Honig–Yahel, 2019, p. 1213–1214).

I also consider as important to mention differences between the terrorist semi-states on the one side and the quasi-states and the jihadi proto-states on the other side. There are three main differences between the terrorist semi-states and **Brynjar Lia's** concept of the jihadi proto-states⁵. *First*, not all the terrorist semi-states made announcements about the formation of an Islamic state (e.g. Hamas, Hezbollah). *Second*, **Honig's** and **Yahel's** definition only refers to organizations that maintain permanent control over a defined territory, and provide state-like public services. Therefore, organizations like Al-Qaeda, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (which operates in the Sinai Peninsula), which fall under **Lia's** definition, are not considered terrorist semi-states. *Third*, **Honig's** and **Yahel's** definition of terrorist semi-states includes only organizations that attack other countries besides the failed state. Therefore, some of the Jihadist movements that appear in **Lia's** study are excluded from this one, like the Caucasus Emirate (only operates in Russia) and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (operated in the 1990s in Egypt) (Lia, 2015, p. 31–41).

The key difference between the quasi-state and the terrorist semi-state is, according to **Peter Jackson**, that quasi-state is described as a state in name only, that is, a state that possesses international legitimacy but lacks the ability to establish control over its territory (Jackson, 1993). A semi-state is the exact opposite – its legitimacy is not officially recognized internationally, but there is no danger of it collapsing without external intervention (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1214). There are also another definitions of quasi-state. The term *quasi-state* was firstly introduced by **Martin Glassner** and **Harm de Blij** (1988). Closer to the example of the terrorist semi-states may be the concept of **Pål Kolstø**, who uses term quasi-state for state units that fulfill the factual features of statehood, but

⁵ Namely, jihadi insurgents who announced the formation of “Islamic states” or “emirates”.

have not been recognized by the international system as sovereign, i.e. de facto states, which originated by relatively natural way. In most cases, these states arise from secession from another state with weakened legitimacy, and which seek international legitimacy ((Kolstø, 2006, p. 723–740). As a quasi-states we can label Abkhazia, Artsah (Nagorno-Karabakh), Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, South Ossetia or Transnistria (Kosienkowski, 2013, p. 56).

Some scholars may ask why the rebel groups described as the terrorist semi-states are not included into fourth (religious) wave of terrorism. How they differ? **Honig** and **Yahel** have identified nine different dimensions of difference between the terrorist semi-states and the regular Islamic groups belonging to the fourth (religious) wave. There is not enough space in this paper to describe all dimensions in detail – besides, that is not even goal of this paper. I just use these dimensions for the analysis of Boko Haram case to verify whether and to what extent it fills the definition of a terrorist semi-state. The nine dimensions are:

- a) A religious self-identity or merely the attempt to exploit symbols for mobilization.
- b) The extent of the group members' religiosity and the consequent strategic flexibility/pragmatism.
- c) The geographical spread of the terrorist semi-state phenomenon.
- d) Tactics.
- e) The devoted defense of and attachment to a certain territory (A "Homeland").
- f) The extent of self-funding and independence from sponsoring states.
- g) The size of the group's fighting force and its implication for its foreign/military policy.
- h) The identity of targets and what it means about the nature of the terrorist semi-state's motivation.
- i) The importance of physical and visible assets for the terrorist semi-states's survival and their greater caution (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1219–1224).

3 A case study of Boko Haram

Islamic State in West Africa, formerly known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād and commonly known as Boko Haram is Salafi Jihadist terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, but also active in northern Cameroon, southeastern Chad and western Niger. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by its first leader **Mohammed Yusuf** and its original goal was to purify Islam in northern Nigeria (Mandaville, 2014, 317). Boko Haram, which is compound of Hausa word *boko* and Arabic word *haram*, is usually translated as „Western education is forbidden“. Since its foundation, Boko Haram stand strongly against Western-style of governance and education and seek for adopt Shari'a law in all Nigeria and creation of an Islamic state – caliphate (Anyanwu – Nwanaju 2010; Forest 2012; Agbiboa 2013; Akinbi 2015; Comolli 2015).

Shari'a law has been already implemented in 12 northern states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but a years before the foundation of Boko Haram. Since **Mohammed Yusuf's** execution by the Nigerian military forces in 2009, Boko Haram has been led by **Abubakar Shekau**, who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2015. Although Boko Haram declare effort of creation caliphate, according to **Honig** and **Yahel** they rather create the terrorist semi-state in reality. Both of them set out in their paper *A Fifth Wave of Terrorism? The Emergence of Terrorist Semi-States* several criteria, which full-fledged terrorist semi-state must have. Two key points to define, three characteristics, nine dimensions, which differ the terrorist semi-states from regular Islamic groups belonging to the fourth (religious) wave and also some differences, which differ the terrorist semi-states from another concepts like quasi-states or jihadi proto-states. I apply all of these criteria on Boko Haram case to verify if it fulfils subsumption into and definition of the terrorist semi-state according to **Honig** and **Yahel**.

First, two key points of the definition of the terrorist semi-state, which are a) control portions of a weak state's territory, maintaining governance there; b) but still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1211). Since 2013–2014, Boko Haram gained control over portions of territory of Nigerian Borno State, from which the group come from. They establish state-like entity on the occupied territory, and start to rule and govern in a Taliban-like style (Zenn, 2017, p. 181). Is estimated that in 2015 Boko Haram controlled around 50,000 square kilometres. In the same year Boko Haram lost Borno's capital Maiduguri to Nigerian federal armed forces (Adelaja – Labo – Penar, 2018, p. 37). Boko Haram on the subjugated territory maintain governance, including practising Shari'a law and strict Salafi doctrine (Zenn, 2019; Zenn, 2020). Although Boko Haram has controlled a large part of territory, still launch terrorist attacks against third party victim states – in the Boko Haram insurgency are from 2009 involved beside Nigeria also other neighbouring states, which are members of Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), which is mandated to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency – Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This military coalition is also supported by many countries outside Africa – mainly by France, the United Kingdom or the United States. Boko Haram fulfil both key points of the definition of the terrorist semi-state. Boko Haram achieved one of its goals and took control over a portion of territory in northeastern Nigeria, but the group still continue with practising terrorist attacks against not just Nigerian armed forces and civilians, but also against third party victim states. Both activities (governance and terrorism) are very important for the terrorist semi-states. Providing governance and public services distinguishes them from the traditional Islamic terror groups (e.g. from fourth (religious) terrorist wave) as the terrorist semi-states can claim to uphold the Shari'a and thus seem even more Islamic than their predecessors (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1213).

Second, the three characteristics, which each full-fledged terrorist semi-state must have. First characteristic, terrorist semi-state must possess relatively exclusive military control over a continuous bloc of territory. This is quite similar to the first point of the definition of the terrorist semi-state. Boko Haram continue in a long-term tradition of Islamic states in northeastern Nigeria, which has existed in this region since the Middle Ages (Robinson, 2004; Loimeier, 2013; Aghedo – Osumah, 2014, p. 209–210). Mainly in the Borno State the group controls a continuous bloc of traditionally Muslim territory. Territory, where has existed during the last few centuries Islamic states – emirates and sultanates (Kanem-Bornu Empire, Sokoto Caliphate and other). Second characteristic, the terrorist semi-state must lack international legitimacy. Boko Haram is designated as a terrorist organization by a lot of states (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia) and also by the United Nations, so, obviously, Boko Haram lack international legitimacy. Third characteristic, the terrorist semi-state must hold a revisionist and not just secessionist ideology in the sense of aiming to eradicate not just the weak state but actually the TPVS as well. Boko Haram's ideology is based on Salafi Jihadism – its main goal is to purify Islam from everything modern and return it to its beginnings, to the ages of the Prophet Mohammed⁶. The group also wants to destroy contemporary Nigerian state of a Westphalian style (as relict of Western imperialism and colonialism) and replace it by an Islamic state – caliphate. Therefore, the ideology of Boko Haram is secessionist and also revisionist.

Third, the nine dimensions, in which the terrorist semi-states differ from regular Islamic groups belonging to the fourth (religious) wave of terrorism.

a) *A religious self-identity or merely the attempt to exploit symbols for mobilization*. It may seem that the terrorist semi-states are just development of Islamic terrorist groups, but **Honig** and **Yahel** argue that the real question is to what extent religious doctrine actually dictates the group's behavior (or whether religious symbols are cynically used to mobilize and get more resources) (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1219). The true is that many Islamist terrorist groups just use a religious face and lack religious legitimacy. Many of behavior and practices of Boko Haram are not compatible with the principles of Islam. Religion in this case frequently serve just as a tool used for gaining power and way how to spread terror against all who are labeled as faithless (Celso, 2015, p. 256–258). Boko Haram lack religious authority of many of Nigerian Muslims, both Islamic scholars and ordinary Muslims. Even many of Nigerian Salafists disagree with the group's direction (Anon, 2012, p. 118–144; Voll, 2015, p. 1189). For many scholars the group's practices have nothing to do with Islam. Saudi Arabia's grand mufti, **Sheikh Abdulaziz Al al-Sheikh**, declared Boko Haram was “set up to smear the

⁶ Although Salafi movement is reformist movement within Sunni Islam with roots in 18th century Wahhabi movement led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabi Salafism is also official doctrine of Saudi Arabia.

image of Islam”, while **Shamsi Ali**, an American Imam, called Boko Haram leaders “blasphemous” (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1220).

b) *The extent of the group members’ religiosity and the consequent strategic flexibility/pragmatism.* According to **Honig** and **Yahel**, the more group members are religiously devout, the less space the leader has to maneuver unless he is a well-esteemed cleric who can couch his controversial decisions in religious terms (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1220). Neither Mohammed Yusuf, nor Abubakar Shekau are educated Islamic theologians. Religious ideology was not the main motivation for joining the Boko Haram for many members of the group, in contrast to the devout members of the groups of the fourth wave.

c) *The geographical spread of the terrorist semi-state phenomenon.* As **Honig** and **Yahel** argue, this is the weakest point of the fifth wave thesis, because the phenomenon of the terrorist semi-states are restricted to Muslim areas and is typical for Muslim terrorist groups, so here is hard to find differences between the fifth and the fourth wave (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1220). However, according to this criterion, Boko Haram can be included into both the fourth and the fifth way.

d) *Tactics.* Critics of the fifth wave thesis may point that both the terrorist semi-states and Islamic terrorist groups have the same hallmark, which is using of suicide attacks. Although it seems to be clear, e.g. in the case of ISIS, another terrorist semi-states use different tactics, rather than suicide or car bombing they use armed attacks (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1220). For my analysis is important, that this is exactly the case of Boko Haram (or also Al-Shabaab). Boko Haram’s tactics includes armed attacks rather than suicide attacks. Infamous are cases of massacres of civilians, kidnappings, rapings and killings (Celso, 2015; Zenn, 2020). According to the Global Terrorism Database, Boko Haram’s suicide attacks constituted only 25 % group’s attacks, compared with the 46 % of armed assaults (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1221).

e) *The devoted defense of and attachment to a certain territory (A “Homeland”).* **Honig** and **Yahel** argue that the terrorist semi-states control and govern specific territories in which they try to uphold a certain way of life (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1221). This dimension is very similar to the first point of the definition of the terrorist semi-states and also to the first of its characteristics. A „Homeland“ of Boko Haram is in the Borno State and the neighbouring states in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram control significant parts of territory in this area and consider Borno’s capital Maiduguri as its own capital. This is the reason why is Maiduguri considered to be at the heart of the Boko Haram insurgency.

f) *The extent of self-funding and independence from sponsoring states.* The terrorist semi-states’ control territory generates for them a greater self-funding capacity than fourth wave groups. The main source of income is taxes. After assuming control over their territories, almost all the terrorist semi-states started to collect taxes from their new subjects and some even imposed new taxes, such as Boko Haram (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1222). The main source of Boko Haram’s income are taxes, also because the majority of natural resources

(especially oil) of Nigeria are situated around the Delta Niger, located in the coastal zone in the Christian south of Nigeria.

g) *The size of the group's fighting force and its implication for its foreign/military policy.* The terrorist semi-states have much bigger military wings than fourth wave terror organizations. According to the estimations of Amnesty International, Boko Haram have around 15 thousands of fighters (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1222).

h) *The identity of targets and what it means about the nature of the terrorist semi-state's motivation.* Attacking fellow Muslims is a much more common practice among the terrorist semi-states than it was among the regular terror groups belonging to the fourth wave (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1223). As I mentioned above (dimension 1) Boko Haram frequently attack Muslims which don't share its values and disagree with group's direction.

i) *The importance of physical and visible assets for the terrorist semi-states' survival and their greater caution.* The terrorist semi-states are far more vulnerable to a sweeping military operation than are the fourth wave terror groups. This is largely because the terrorist semi-states are greatly dependent on guarding certain physical and visible assets (notably territory) in order to ensure their functioning as a semi-state and thus their continued survival. It is true that theoretically speaking they could always become terror groups again if they lose control over these assets. Yet, this is not appealing for them after having real power over people, treasure, and land, and especially after branding themselves as better than most terror groups given their establishment of a real Caliphate where Shari'a rules can be enforced (Honig – Yahel, 2019, p. 1223). We can see that physical and visible assets are very important for Boko Haram which may be associated with their plunder nature, where the material aspects and power is for the group more important than religious and sacral aspects.

Conclusion

After this analysis I consider Boko Haram as a clear example of the terrorist semi-state, because the group fulfils both the key points of the definition and also the characteristics of a new concept. When we follow **Honig's** and **Yahel's** dimensions of the differences between the terrorist semi-states and the groups belonging to the fourth (religious) wave of terrorism, Boko Haram should be included in all dimensions into the terrorist semi-states, just one dimension (n. 3) may be questionable and Boko Haram may be included into both waves. Since 2015, Boko Haram had lost most of its territories, but still control a remnants of its former territory and Boko Haram insurgency still continue. Is possible that with the defeat of Boko Haram, the group's remnants will lost also the remains of its original territory and become a regular Islamic terrorist group. But there is no doubt that the group once existed as the terrorist semi-state and in near future we

may increasingly encounter such entities, especially in Africa, where are religious violence, weak states and terrorism on the rise.

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YOUNG PEOPLE IN A THREAT NETWORK

Krzysztof Żołyniak¹

ABSTRACT

Today's youth are a generation brought up in the age of new technologies. The Internet has become a substitute for the social life, without which young people often cannot imagine proper functioning. It is normal for them to move between two worlds - real and virtual. The problem arises when they begin to be so "absorbed by the Internet" that they blur the borders and flee to another "better" world according to them (Załęcka, 2012, s. 222). The subject of this article is an attempt to define the threats to which young people are exposed as network users. The author tries to show that in addition to the infinite possibilities that the Internet creates, it also has dark sides. Drawing attention to the risks associated with the using of the network, as well as the fact that you should not always absolutely believe in content and materials published on the Internet. It is worth teaching young people how to select information so that they are not "information noise", but specific knowledge on the subject of the interest.

Key words: Internet, threats, danger, youth,

Introduction

The Internet is considered to be the biggest „mass medium”, or even „super medium” to date. It is a powerful machine that, compared to other media, is able to serve as a global relay. None of the contemporary media is able to achieve such a range, it is possible only if they choose the Internet as their distribution channel (Kluszczyński, 2001, p. 20-22).

For modern teenagers, the use of the Internet is an everyday life. It gives many new opportunities and has been one of the most important tools for learning and communication. The widespread use of the Internet by children and young people has many advantages, but, like any tool, it carries risks to which young people are particularly exposed. (Włodarczyk, 2013, p. 49).

There are many virtual threats, they are variable and new ones appear in a flash. Data security, intellectual property protection as well as peer violence and hejning or problems such as grooming, sexting and dangerous contacts are part of virtual life. It is very important to recognize these dangers and to be able to counter them. (Czerwińska, Drdzeń, 2017, p. 535).

1 Internet – a 21st century medium

The 21st century is the age of the Internet, as a mass media that has many functions and its application has a global dimension. What the Internet offers is

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used in everyday and professional life. Among other things, it helps to establish various social relations, which contributes to its position as a mass media. Information about what is happening in the world is transmitted over the Internet. It is also a form of entertainment, fun and makes free time more attractive, allows to communicate in many ways, it relaxes, helps to develop one's career, influences the auditory and visual experience (Paluchowski, 2009, p. 355-356).

An equally important function of the Internet is the communication function. This is an original way of communication for people who make new friends using, for example, e-mail, which is a very convenient form of correspondence and takes less time than writing and sending a traditional letter.

Another form of communication on the Internet is chat, where you can talk anonymously to unknown people. Messengers are generally available to talk to family, friends or strangers. An interesting form of communication is also discussion letters, where people send e-mails to each other about their point of view on a particular topic (Aouil, 2008, p. 16-29).

The use of the Internet for educational purposes is also a very important and interesting function of the Internet, which is especially used by young people when writing works, reading online or preparing notes. A novelty is distance education, a method of learning accessible to all without the need to leave home. The whole education process is similar to traditional teaching, there is also participation in classes, and teamwork, lectures, debates and joint meetings. Students can communicate with each other on various Internet forums, using discussion letters and other communicators (Polowczyk, 2004, p.135-137).

The scale and ways in which young people use the Internet in the context of the development of digital competences – digital, as well as information, specialist or social – make it necessary to talk about it in terms of opportunities and challenges it brings to users. The Internet can be seen as a center for managing personal and school life, recreation, as a source of knowledge and information and a medium for presenting oneself and a tool for creating and exchanging thoughts (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 8-9).

2 Young people trapped in the Internet

The rapid development of the Internet, which has become a widely available tool for network communication via personal computers and servers, significantly affects the formation of awareness and attitudes of young people, but also arouses admiration, curiosity and interest among commercial entities (Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant, Kelly, 2009, p. 248). This makes young people spend more and more time surfing the Internet, making new friends, looking for information on a subject of their interest or for educational purposes (Segiet, 2002, p. 92).

Children and young people, growing up surrounded by modern technologies, treat and perceive the use of the Internet and its services, communicators and various applications as an integral part of their everyday life at home, at school

and in the environment. They engage in a wide variety of activities on the web, which in their opinion is “forever”, and which is the natural environment that accompanies them at home, at school, in public space. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 6).

It is very important for young people to be able to use the functions and opportunities offered by the Internet. There are many such opportunities, but they do not always have a positive impact on the formation of young people’s personalities (Segiet, 2002, p.92). Young people living in the media society have social development disorders. Sometimes there is a tendency for them to withdraw from social life outside the network and isolate themselves from environments outside the digital space. This deepens the problem in real life, because closed network environments are people with the same inclinations. Users of digital reality often have weaker ties with family and friends. Networking also displaces forms of direct, personal contact and the quality of these meetings. Electronic space is an indisputable priority. The real world can be only a secondary addition to the digital world for a young man dominated by the web. Messages in the virtual world are sometimes treated as a first-rate impulse (Rózewicz, 2011, p. 13).

The Internet in its essence contains a whole range of possibilities, but also threats. Scientists list three main forms of risk:

- 1) The nature of the medium
- 2) Harmful content and contacts that can be encountered online
- 3) The characteristics of the programs and websites that are targeted when using the network (Cent, 2006, p. 87-88).

As far as the nature of the medium is concerned, the following dangers can be distinguished: alienation and dehumanization, problems in distinguishing between the virtual and the real world, taking up a large amount of time, which can lead to addiction, saturation with harmful content and the ease of establishing unwanted contacts, difficulties in effective protection against threats (Cent, 2006, p. 88).

As regards the content and contacts that can be encountered online, particularly dangerous ones are: pedophilia, erotic and pornographic content, the possibility of easily obtaining information about the person with whom one has made acquaintance, about the property or planned trips of family members, contacts with sects on websites, blogs, communicators, illegal transactions, i.e. sale or purchase of illegal items or items that you do not actually own (Cent, 2006, p. 90).

One of the biggest, if not the biggest risk to the child you can encounter online is harmful content on the Internet. They are defined as materials that can evoke negative emotions in the recipient or that promote dangerous behavior. These include, in particular, pornography, materials showing violence, as well as content that encourages behavior that is harmful to health (e. g. use of drugs) or self-destructive (self-mutilation, suicide). In the case of children, all these

materials can have a negative impact on their emotional, cognitive and social development.

There are many definitions of pornography in the literature, most of them refer to texts or images (on graphics, photos, films) depicting erotic scenes with indecent content, thus emphasizing the purpose of the message, which is to arouse excitement in the recipient.

The definition of pornography was formulated by the Supreme Court of Poland. According to her “pornographic content (...) is contained in a fixed form (e. g. “pornography”) film, photos, magazines, books, paintings) or not (e.g. live demonstrations of human sexual activities (in particular the presentation of human sexual organs in their sexual functions), both in terms that do not contradict their biological orientation and in terms of human sexual activities that contradict social patterns of sexual behavior’ (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 42-43).

In 2017 The Foundation Give Children a Strength as the request of the Ministry of Health as part of the National Health Program 2016-2020 conducted research: Contact of children and young people with pornography. The research report shows that as much as 43% of children and adolescents aged 11-18 years had contact with pornographic and sexually explicit materials. The fact that 18% of respondents come into contact with such content at least once a week may be worrying. Children and adolescents most often use materials presenting people naked (69% of the respondents), but – it is worth emphasizing – as many as 60% of the respondents also saw content presenting sexual intercourse. Unfortunately, as many as 22% of young Internet users aged 13-18 years old have seen pornographic materials containing verbal and physical aggression. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 44).

In Poland it is legally prohibited to present pornographic content to a minor under 15 years of age (art. 200 § 3 OJU. of 2019, item.1950 of the Penal Code). However, there is a great deal of difficulty in enforcing these provisions with regard to online pornographic sites. In practice, therefore, access by minors to such content is unsecured or only fortified by the message that it is adult content. Even less protected are usually contents containing brutal violence and other harmful content (Wójcik, 2017, pp. 273-274).

Both of ease of publication of materials on the Internet and the lack of effective mechanisms for verifying them before they are published also make it possible to post brutal and drastic, shocking or sensational content on the Internet. Recently, the so called “Youth:”, which is popular among young people, has become an example of this kind of creativity, patostreamy, i.e. regular live broadcasts presenting behaviors considered socially unacceptable, such as vulgar expressions, name-calling and humiliation, brawls, alcohol or drug libations. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 45).

On the Internet, children can also access content that presents anti-social behavior in a positive light, such as describe how to get and use drugs or how to replace them with legal substances with similar effects. Other parties may

encourage auto-aggressive behavior such as self-harm, eating disorders and suicide. Parties that praise self-destructive behavior are dangerous to the health and life of a child, because from them they can learn how to hurt themselves and, at the same time, become convinced that this type of behavior is the only appropriate way out of a problematic situation. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 47).

Another factor that poses a threat to the use of the Internet is the fact that the Internet is being made with strangers who seem to be friendly, in order to gain the trust of the other person and, at a later stage, to obtain specific information concerning age, appearance, telephone number, address. (Danowski, Krupińska, 2007, p. 12-13).

Grooming (often referred to as grooming) can be defined as a specific type of relationship between an adult and a child for sexual exploitation. It takes various forms, from forcing to view pornographic materials, through extortion of intimate materials from a child, forcing to record such photographs or recordings, to physical sexual contact during appointments (Wójcik, 2017, p. 276). In the process of grooming, pedophiles subject children to psychomaniac. Sometimes an element of seduction is pretending to be a potential victim's peer, at least in the first stage of the relationship. It happens that sexual contacts between a minor and an adult are initiated by a child. Young Internet users', announcements indicating readiness for such a relationship can be found in dating or chat services. It should be stressed that such a circumstance in no way releases the perpetrator from moral and criminal responsibility for the committed crime (Nobody's Children Foundation, 2008, p. 12).

Another threat that can be encountered online is peer violence called cyberbullying. Cyberbullying and electronic aggression on the Internet are phenomena – directly or indirectly – affecting most Polish youth. Peer violence on the web is referred to as cyberbullying. In the Polish language there is also another term referring to this phenomenon – cyberbullying, i.e. violence using information and communication technologies. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 21.)

Jacek Pyżalski distinguishes between electronic aggression (single acts violence on the web and cyberbullying (intentional action, lasting a longer period of time, from which the victim cannot defend himself). Peer-to-peer aggression on the network is similarly defined by the US Cyberbullying Research Center, defining it as “deliberate and repeated harm caused by computers, mobile phones and other electronic devices”. (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 21-22).

The basis forms of cyberbullying are calling, harassing, threatening, blackmailing with the use of the net, publishing or sending out ridiculous, compromising information, photos, films with the use of the net and impersonating someone against their will, as well as exclusion from the peer group online (Wójcik, 2017, p. 279). These behaviors have different sources: lack of role models, lack of interest on the part of parents, willingness to discharge negative emotions, low self-esteem, drawing patterns from brutal computer

games, unpleasant childhood experiences and too much free time. Such ridicule in a wronged person may cause a sense of social disapproval, emotional disorders, low self-esteem and, as a consequence, school-related problems (poorer academic performance, truancy, inappropriate behavior) (Danowski, Krupińska, 2007, p.14-16).

A new trend is the so called “New trend”, sexting and sextortion. These are popular phenomena that Internet users encounter, regardless of age, gender or origin. In recent years they have become more and more frequent and take very different forms. Until a few years ago, the phenomenon of sexting concerned the transmission of intimate material between people who had a relationship or another relationship. Nowadays, naked, often intimate and erotic materials are sent to different people and treated as normal, everyday web activity. The transmission and dissemination of such material carries many dangers and can have negative consequences. Above all, it must be borne in mind that children and young people themselves become creators and thus victims of the distribution of sexual abuse material, which, once online, will probably never disappear. In addition, children, adolescents and adults may be victims of crimes such as grooming, seduction and sextortion – sexual blackmail – as a result of recording and recording intimate material. (NASK, Report, 2018, p. 28).

Another threat that exists in the network are the sects operating there, otherwise known as “para religious movements”, or “cult movements”. The sector is primarily characterized by the different religious practices and behaviors of its members in order to mark their distinctiveness in the organization of the religious community and the liturgy. Members of the sect operate in many areas of the network, whether on websites, blogs or instant messaging, knowing that they are a huge source of information about potential members they intend to involve in their organization. The information is drawn from the descriptions, confessions of young people about their problems, dissatisfaction with life, depression. The members of the sect offer help to such people by organizing meetings, giving free advice, spiritual support, perfectly matching the needs of people with problems. During such meetings, a lost person can feel appreciated, needed, endowed with love and the feeling that finally there are people who want to help with their problems. When he realizes that meetings or advice are not meant to help, but to destroy his life, it may be too late to withdraw. People who join the sect, who are sometimes kept there by force, have no chance of winning with the ruthlessness of its members (Danowski, Krupińska, 2007, p. 17-18).

Trolling is also an important threat today, i. e. anti-social behavior characteristic of Internet groups, discussion forums, chats and social networks. It's deliberately influencing other users in order to ridicule or hurt them by sending out aggressive, controversial, often untrue messages. Children are particularly vulnerable to this type of risk in social media. A false, distorted informational message can negatively affect a young person's sense of identity, views and knowledge. (Derlatka, 2017, p. 34).

There are many other dangers for children and adolescents on the Internet, including those of adult Internet users. Among them, the following situations are worthy of attention: intrusions into computer systems, illegal copying and distribution of computer programs (piracy), unauthorized destruction of computer data. It should be borne in mind that children, as Internet and computer users, fall victim to such crimes, but are also often the perpetrators. Children using the network are also exposed to the consequences of traditional crimes such as theft, fraud and extortion (Nobody's Children Foundation, 2008, p. 17-18).

Characterizing the risks associated with Internet access, one cannot forget about the increasingly frequent phenomenon of addiction, i. e. "recurring habit that increases the risk of illness and related personal and social problems" (Danowski, Krupińska, 2007, p. 32).

The problem of Internet addiction mainly concerns children and adolescents, because due to their immaturity they become addicted to it much faster than adults. The variety of activities that are attractive to undertake on the Internet makes young people devote more and more time to it. Spending many hours a day in this way disturbs their development, especially in terms of social contacts. The literature on the subject mentions the following consequences of the abuse of the Internet by children: emotion isolation from the outside world, decrease in the number of direct peer contacts, increasing tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contacts in the real world in case of difficulties related to them, increased risk of contact with inappropriate content for young people and considering it "normal", e. g. "normal", computer games glorifying violence or vulgar language, destructive influence of content on personality development and interpersonal contacts, change of language (its impoverishment, technical slang, use of abbreviations), addiction to computer games (more often concerns children) and the Internet (more often concerns young people), health effects: lack of concern for personal health and hygiene, deterioration of vision, head, muscle, back and spine pains, susceptibility to infections, skin irritations, hyperactivity, insomnia (Grabowska, 2017, p. 140-141).

FOMO is another threat resulting from dependence on the Internet, and in particular on social media. FOMO (abbreviation for fear of missing out) is defined as the feeling of fear or anxiety of being excluded from a community or of being left out. It is "an overwhelming fear that others may be just experiencing more satisfying experiences, from which one is excluded by absence. Although the very concept of FOMO was first used by Dr. Bishop of the Netherlands. However, it is only since the emergence of social media that Internet in this issue has increased. We are particularly vulnerable to the FOMO feeling nowadays, when everyone, thanks to smartphones, can be online all the time and social media meets our general need to belong to a group, to be up-to-date. Thus, it may seem to people that even a momentary exclusion from media activities will result in their exclusion or omission from social life. Many researches consider FOMO to be a

kind of civilization disease to which all media users, regardless of age, are exposed (Rywczyńska, Wójcik, 2018, p. 34).

Summary

It would be difficult for young people to imagine life without relatively new technology, which is undoubtedly the Internet. It is a useful and incredibly helpful medium. It provides comfort and ease of operation. In addition to the benefits they bring, they also pose many risks to the young person if they are used inappropriately. The risks discussed were considered in terms of how the Internet can affect a person's abnormal psychological and social development. The most common threats that occur in the network are listed, i. e. pornographic materials, destructive to the human personality, offensive, information on aggression and violence, computer piracy, data theft and Internet fraud and sects operating there. However, it should not be forgotten that the recipient may also become a creator of various types of threats by sending out offensive correspondence, showing aggression towards other users, sending computer viruses, downloading pirated copies of programs, games, music from other users in exchange for sharing them on his computer, deleting important data or information, hacking into the computers of other users (Izdebska, 2008, p. 218).

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EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES RIGHTS IN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary dynamic technological development and the recent economic growth increase social disparities and the polarization between countries. Occurring dichotomy is the result of not always fair, both economically and ethically, activities of transnational corporations. Strong competitive position of international enterprises gives them an influence on legal regulations and even makes them able to force national governments to enact laws restricting control over their activities. It leads more and more often to violation of basic employee rights by companies seemingly focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR). This results not only from the desire to minimize costs, but also from the increasing impunity of large enterprises. Host countries are to choose between economic development reflected in numeric results and caring for the basic social needs of their citizens.

Key words: *employment security, highly-educated employees, labour force discrimination, international enterprises*

Introduction

Currently, the strong competitive position of international corporations, as well as financial resources they acquire, cause that those companies have greater and greater impact on shaping the legal provisions in their host countries. Sometimes they are even able to convince governments to enact regulations restricting control over their activities. Mentioned control could be related to several aspects of corporate operations. The most important of them are considered to be operations such as taxation, environmental impact and behavior towards labour force. This article concerns mostly the third one, with particular emphasis on the situation of highly-educated employees. Among them, phenomenon such as non-adequate salary, overtime work, constant pressure on better results and even mobbing are no longer considered as an inappropriate behavior, but seem to be the current reality of career-builders in the developed countries. Employers more and more often act as if the long-term wellbeing of their staff was not important. All they are focused on today is costs minimalization and the easiest way to achieve it seem to be savings on employees. On the other hand, the governments of the host countries face a choice between possible foreign investment and the citizens' feeling of social security at the workplace. It seems that the differentiation between those two is beginning to blur. Young,

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well-educated people, who by definition could constitute the core of their country's economic development, are to agree on that standards in order to be able to earn for living. However, the pressure on them may have a very negative impact on their mental and physical health. It also reduces job satisfaction, decreases productivity and as a consequence leads to rapid burnout. Though, it is not being considered as an obstacle for business leaders, because such an employee, after a year or two, can easily be replaced with another young idealist looking for professional experience. Under the guise of compliance with governmental regulations, transnational corporations sometimes even exploit them, what could be identified with modern-day slavery. Unfortunately, governments seem to increasingly prefer the benefits of short-term economic growth over the implementation of a coherent long-term sustainable development strategy. This trend obviously causes a gradual reduction of confidence in the business sector and political elites. On the other hand, today's CEOs are mostly concentrated on achieving better results than the competition, which is not only a confirmation of their above-average managerial skills, but is also increasingly becoming an inseparable element conditioning their level of life satisfaction.

Impact of the level of education on employment conditions and opportunities

The further presented situation should not be astonishing today, however, taking into consideration the deficit in the scientific papers describing this particular matter, the importance of the topic of employment security seems not be commonly understood. One of few case descriptions that is currently available is the *Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises* that has been issued in July 2019. This body of the United Nations indicates the need to maintain at the national level adequate policies that meet the basic human rights requirements while attracting foreign investment. Precondition to achieving this state is to identify negative impacts on employees resulting from business activities in all sectors. (Working Group on the issue..., 2020)

University graduates without professional experience play an important role in the hierarchy of potentially employed people. They are considered to be one of the most crucial segments of the modern labour market. Most of them would probably like to form professional position in accordance with their internal system of values. Unfortunately, those assumptions will quickly fall apart, due to the need to adapt their expectations to the reality of the corporate world, as well as to the workstyle of people who may be less educated than them. (Macko, 2009) It happens, because corporate world is usually an extraordinary environment, which does not necessary take into consideration acquired diplomas, knowledge, abilities and competences. Self-awareness, confidence and social acquaintances play often more important role instead. In result, young, educated person is not secure neither about getting a job, nor about maintaining employment for a longer

period. It can be admitted that in democratic countries, every citizen has the right to be engaged in any desired occupation. However, university graduates choose corporate career, as it is said to be the only possible sector today that will ensure their above-average material status.

On the other hand, over the last years there seems to be an increasing demand for highly educated workers, even in low-paid jobs. This causes that a growing number of well-qualified employees is working below their qualifications. The main reason for that, unfortunately, seems to be an general growth of the amount of educated people, which is globally being experienced today. Young people tend to continue their education longer than decades ago, what may be considered as a key factor in the response to the challenges and opportunities the changing labour market brings. Moreover, being a part of a higher education institution enables an attainment of upskilling during working life. Another reason for the described phenomenon is the fact that the confidence in the skills and abilities owned by younger employees is being doubt both by employers and by themselves. That is why they prefer to stay outside the working environment for longer in order to make sure they gained all the qualifications needed for success in the modern workplace. (The Workforce View in Europe, 2019) This implies that in the near future, or maybe even today in some areas, market may be full of human resources overeducated for the jobs offered and skilled workers will not be safe from being displaced. (Employment and Social Developments..., 2018) Moreover, the reality is that a regular employee is going to be replaced faster than any person on the managerial position. In case of massive job reductions or financial cuts, managers would probably get their salary increase anyways. This seems to be illogical because, while managers' professional experience cannot usually be denied, it happens more and more often that their education is at a much lower level than their subordinates. On the other hand, with the hope of finding a satisfying profession, as already mentioned above, those subordinates decided a few years earlier to invest in education, although if they entered the labor market at the time, their current professional situation could be extremely different. Of course, there is still a group of so-called orderly professions, but the question arises whether in a few years there will be an adequate number of jobs for people currently studying in this fields.

The most significant violations of employees rights in Europe with examples of Poland

The most important question on the topic is when the labour discrimination occurs. Stereotypically this term is identified with third world countries and offenses such as child abuse, sexual harassment. However, none of both has to happened and the discrimination against an employee may still arise. This phenomenon has way broader understanding today and it is visible worldwide, also on the developed territories. It implies toxic relationships at work, also such

as the unequal position of the boss – supervisor, which may turn out to be pathological. Unfortunately, there are not many cases of employees who have initiated such a case in the court. There are just few, because “employees-friendly corporate culture” is said to be imitating home. That means that workers should be extremely proud of being a part of it, feel honored while getting additional tasks that are not in their scopes and be ready to stay there as many hours as needed. Violence also happens there quietly and although everyone knows about it, it is not spread outside. It is not just a theory.

According to the report *The Workforce View in Europe 2019*, 28% of employees is aware that their employer does not pay any attention to their mental wellbeing. (Workforce View in Europe, 2019) The report was published was based on survey considering 10 thousand workers from 8 European countries. Polish employees were the only representatives of Central- Eastern Europe in the research and that is why this paragraph will contain references to the labour market situation in this country. The respondents were asked about the existing work environment and their expectations for the future of their career path. Managers seem not to be aware that lack of wellbeing decreases employees’ productivity. As written in the survey’s report, nearly a quarter (23%) of respondents points out that bad supervision is for them the biggest productivity drain, up from 19% last year. The majority of Polish employees feel discouraged also due to low pay and remuneration (35%), lack of managerial recognition (25%) and poor leadership (19%). (Workforce View in Europe, 2019) This is followed by other negative issues, such as ineffective and overcomplicated processes (18%) and a lack of coworkers’ support (18%). One of the most visible confirmation for that is also the fact that 60% of European employees regularly work unpaid overtime. Almost one in eight of them claim to be working more than 10 hours per week for free. (Workforce View in Europe, 2019) Of course “volunteering” at the workplace should not be taking place. However, supervisors tend to admit, that the reasons for those extra working hours is not the fact that an employee is overwhelmed, but he may not be able to deal with time management. This does not seem to be a reasonable argument taking into consideration how much money a single huge company spends on personal development trainings yearly, how often the employees signalize the need for team expansion and how stressful the corporate environment might be.

Although it is well-known that the persisting stress can lead to physical and mental exhaustion and negatively affect the productivity and health of the organization, it still seems to be an unsolved matter. Corporations act as if they forget that regardless of the sector, the costs of mental health issues in the workplace are enormous. Today, employees in Europe remain stressed out, with more than one in six personnel experiencing stress on daily basis. Similar case can be noticed in individual countries, with Polish workers remaining the most likely (25%), out of all the nations measured in the survey, to experience stress every day in their working environment. Looking at different business sectors, the

most stressful jobs are those related to sales, media and marketing, retail, catering and leisure, as well as in financial services. In all of them, about 20% of people employed claim that feel stressed daily, what is four percentage points higher result than the average. (Workforce View in Europe, 2019)

However, apart from the labour force discrimination, there also are some other aspects that boost the feeling of employment insecurity among employees. In Poland, one of such is definitely the popularity of short-term contracts. This forms of employment agreement affect a third of respondents (34%) in most of the sectors, rising to 54% in arts and culture and to 43% in media and marketing, as well as in sales. It may seem not to be a crucial issue, however in practice it has a real impact on employees' life. No research is needed to find out that such an uncertainty about "tomorrow" does not influence positively the personal feeling of employment security. Moreover, looking at the numbers, more than a quarter of short-term contractors experience difficulties while willing to get a bank loan, 22% due to the fact of not having a regular contract, is not able to get any sort of employee benefits, 19% claim that it causes their cash flow problems. (Workforce View in Europe, 2019)

Employment insecurity in corporate sector- areas and reasons

According to the literature, one of the most practical reason for the lack of employment security is related to the differences in wages between European countries. This is a natural thing that people earning reasonable salary feel way more comfortable in their working environment. The thing is that today the differences exist even on the same positions in the frames of the same company. According to Eurostat data, an hour of work in Poland costs an entrepreneur in average 10.1 euro. Meanwhile, the average for the entire EU is 27.4 euro. (Eurostat, 2020) Trying to find the reason for that, the most visible one is the cost of living in certain countries. Of course in Denmark for example it is much higher than in Poland. However such a wage gap also results from the simple fact that people agree on the proposed salary level and the companies do not see the need to pay them more.

It is widely known that the main goal of the corporation's activity is to make a profit. There are many components that can contribute to its fulfilment. The examples of such are internationalization of the company, the positive image of the company obtained through various types of activities in the area of CSR, or the recently fashionable greening of the products offered. However, these activities can be quite expensive, so in order to implement them, companies look for savings in other areas of their operation. Of course, the easiest way is to save on employees. Unfortunately, this is an increasingly common practice, and the income gap exists not only between countries. It is actually even more visible between people on top positions and those who are at the beginning of their career path and it is constantly growing.

Moreover, top managers seem to be treated today as unsurpassed role models. This should not be the case, because in reality a manager is primarily an employee who is paid to fulfill his tasks. The director is not deciding what goals a given organization has to achieve - his job is to meet the expectations of the owners who hired him. As it has already been mentioned above, corporations dispose higher budgets than some governments. That is why their position and economic importance has not changed over the past decades, despite matters such as Samsung's corporate scandal, the scandal of VW fraud, or even an oil spill in the Persian Gulf. Although many members of the management are responsible for numerous catastrophes, they still enjoy the widespread reputation of people necessary for achieving social and economic progress. The contemporary, respected CEO adheres to his own rules, which are not necessarily consistent with the norms imposed on the rest of society. Features such as the ability to think strategically, in-depth knowledge of the industry or tenacity are no longer considered qualities necessary for proper management of an enterprise. (Bloom, Rhodes, 2018, pp. 116)

It cannot be denied that repetitive deviant behavior in the workplace is harmful to the mental and physical health of employees and also cause interpersonal and team conflicts. In the long run, there may also be more absenteeism or a higher level of accidents caused by excessive stress. In addition, the reduction of employment in selected departments or staff exchanges carried out from time to time in large companies, combined with increasing competition in specific industries, multiplied the pressure felt by employees. Today, a feeling of tremendous stress is common and continues to increase. That is why over the last decade there were definitely more cases of burnout than 15-20 years ago.

On the other hand, corporate supporters tend to say that if it had not been for private entities, thousands of people would not have a job at all and event more of them would not have an access to variety of products. However, it is important to remember that companies produce goods and services for those who have purchasing power. They do not even try to fulfill the basic needs of people with no money to express their needs in the market place. On the other hand, governments may seek to attract international enterprises in order to provide the capital that a country lacks for investment. (Nicula, 2015)

Conclusion

Employment security should be seen as a component of the more global concept. (Virtanen et al., 2002) In the developed countries, demographic changes, as well as economic and political conditions have not only contributed to increasing competition for good employees, but also, as a result of openness to the economic migration, have contributed to the rise of competitiveness of labor markets on a global scale. Therefore, the company's attractiveness is becoming an important indicator of the organization's ability to recruit and retain staff. The

question arises whether it is possible to create such a law that would take care of the rights of corporate employees and allow enterprises to make profits and stimulate stable economic development.

At the same time, states cannot be considered as the ones responsible for violations of human rights by private entities, but for their own actions or omissions (e.g. not taking action to prevent or settlement of violations). However, the requirement to respect human rights in all the actions undertaken by business sector, should be clearly articulated. States should be able to support entrepreneurs in respecting employees' rights, e.g. by providing them with appropriate guidelines and promoting good practices. It is also important to encourage, and sometimes even require, companies to inform on their impact on human rights and actions taken in this respect. (Ploszka, 2016)

Theoretically, people are aware of the described mechanism and there is a common feeling that this situation should have been changed, however the "how" question has not been exactly answered yet. The reason for that could be the fact that corporations are identified with an outstanding financial power which is greater than the power of many economies. This power of corporations obviously comes from many aspects, such as for example their international status, attractiveness of job offers, and the taxes they are supposed to pay for the hosting economy. That is why while a government negotiates with an enterprise any investment idea, the company is mostly on the winning position. The very first predictor considered while making any investment decision by a huge corporation is its possible profitability. Furthermore, enterprises tend almost always not to consult their plans with any form of local community. This raises question whether this described corporate power is able to prejudice democracy. Governments however does not have to ignore possible foreign investment, but they need to remember that long-term growth is not possible if the rights of highly qualified employees are not properly protected.

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ECOLOGICAL SECURITY AS A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPEAN UNION CITIES. EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES

Artur Życki¹ - Zofia Sujkowska²

ABSTRACT

The climate change observed in recent years has commonly started to be defined and called as a climate disaster. It became the foundation of powerful social movements that are being created, especially among young people, in order to prevent environmental cataclysms. In the foreseeable (short) time, issues related to the ecological security and life on Earth phenomenon, will become the main reason for the political dispute, both regionally and globally. Disagreements may also apply to the survival of many species of flora and fauna, as well as human beings themselves. All current conflicts, in the situation of the fundamental issue such as life or its lack on our planet will become, or even are already becoming irrelevant, trivial, simply preposterous.

Key words: ecological security, climate change, city, good practices, environmental protection

1 Social responsibility of urban agglomerations in relation to the climate change

In this paper, particular attention will be paid to the cities- areas where pollutions are the main cause of the public problems today. They are responsible for around three fourth of the global CO₂ emission. (Cities and Pollution..., 2020) This means that the success of agglomerations in reducing greenhouse gas production will be key to achieving the zero net global emission by 2050. Thus, global warming could be reduced to a "safe", "desirable" level of 1.5 degrees Celsius. Essentially, achieving this state could be even possible, however it requires making compulsory decisions and allocating the necessary funds for that purpose. The issue is not in technical possibilities, it is more about the social awareness, humans' habits, selfishness and far-reaching courageous political decisions made by world leaders. However, by the usage of contemporary technologies, it is probable to reduce emissions in urban areas by 90%.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, at the United Nations climate summit in 2015 in Paris, the world community pledged to protect the climate for the first time and decided to make a global agreement on this matter. The European Union as a leader in pro-ecological changes has made decisions on

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climate neutrality, which is to be achieved by 2050. In order to become climate neutral, less energy should be used and when used, it should come from renewable sources. The absorption of emissions by their natural absorbers, i.e. green areas, mainly trees, must also be increased. (Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 2015)

More than half of the 7.7 billion people in the world live currently in the cities or in the suburban area. (World Population Prospects, 2019) The battle for our planet will be won or lost in there. Urban municipalities are more and more often obligated to plant trees, switch to renewable energy, forbid the use of vehicles with diesel engine in their area. These activities are said to be not only climate-friendly, but also they may increase economic development and make cities more comfortable to life in, as well as increase the health conditions and productivity of their inhabitants. Urban areas, especially medium and smaller ones, have to implement their pro-ecological policy in cooperation with their national governments. Although they possess generally higher finances than non-urbanized areas, the scale of necessary outlays for "green" policy exceeds their financial capabilities. Legal decisions in such matters also quite often go beyond the competences assigned to the local municipality.

On the other hand, large urban agglomerations have the financial resources with which they are able to introduce the "green order" themselves. Although the legislation regarding environmental protection depends to a large extent on state decisions, agglomerations are financially self-sufficient. The easiest way to demonstrate the scale of their power is by the fact that there are 11 cities in the World which economies are larger than the GDP of Poland (data for 2015). (Urban Europe, 2016)

2 Climate change - adaptation activities

Climate change that is happening now, will impede or deteriorate the quality of life in cities. Even assuming that it will be possible to limit the temperature rise on Earth by "only" 1.5 degrees. This indicator is achievable by making a huge effort. That means that in 2020, world leaders have to make decisions that would result in a 45% reduction of global CO₂ emission in the next decade. Such decisions, although necessary, are financially, socially and politically expensive. They require courageous visionaries at the lead of the world governments. However, political sphere is experiencing a chronic deficit of such people.

Even assuming the positive scenario (temperature increase in the world by not more than 1.5 degrees), changes that will occur in 2050 will be shocking. From the recent perspective, ecological situation will change to such an extent that without proper preparation, our adaptation to it will not be possible. According to the scientists from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich, in several decades, the temperature in London will be comparable to the current average temperature in Barcelona. In Copenhagen people will be able to

grow vineyards, Rome will have to deal with the desert heat. In the scientists' report, it is forecasted that in the northwestern cities of the United States, the temperature in 2050 will be similar to recent one in the cities located a thousand kilometers south, i.e. today's cold Seattle will have the current temperature of San Francisco. In Berlin, due to its location, the temperature in the summer period can rise by more than 6 degrees Celsius. Mentioned anomalies are not a script from a science fiction movie but a simulation of heat increase in 520 cities with the predicted rise of temperature in the world. Such a scenario is possible, assuming the fulfillment of a positive predictions for the future: a moderate temperature increase.

Climate change and the attitude towards it of major social powers will change the political map of individual countries. Moreover, those anomalies will be a fundamental factor in international relations. Social pressure related to the inconvenience of everyday life caused by climate change will be initially felt by local municipalities. The most sensitive areas of current and future climate threats are the European Union countries. Some of them have already started preparations to actions aiming to minimize the negative effects of temperature rise on Earth. A good example of this is an industrial German city- Karlsruhe with the size of 200.000 citizens. However, this paper will focus more on the European leaders in the fight against climate change: the capitals such as Berlin, Helsinki and Vienna³.

3 Examples of good practices

3.1 Karlsruhe

Today, this city is said to be one of the warmest in Germany. According to cautious forecasts, by 2050 the number of tropical days per year (with a temperature exceeding 30 degrees Celsius) will double to the minimum of 60. This phenomenon will be accompanied by very hot nights with temperatures above 25 degrees. (Klima Karlsruhe, 2020) Due to such a situation, organisms will be unable to regenerate, especially the elderly once, what may increase their mortality. The World Health Organization estimates that by 2050 the death rate of elderly people worldwide, due to heat, will be ten times higher than in 1990. In Karlsruhe, local authorities started the implementation of preventive actions against this scenario such as:

- construction of 200 municipal drinking water wells;
- issuing a recommendation that each flat roof should be planted; By 2018 roofs of 5,000 residents were already greened. The same greening will apply to the

³ In 2019, those metropolises were ranked as one of the top ten cities in the world with the best quality of life, see report: Europe's Greenest Capital Cities (2019), Compare the Market, London <https://www.comparethemarket.com/energy/content/europes-greenest-capital-cities/>

walls of public buildings in the city, planting tree species that cope well with climate change: lack of water or heat;

- designing squares and buildings in bright colors and painting the facades of houses in white.

These activities, although quite simple and not requiring large financial effort, aim to implement more coldness to the city and reduce the usage of air conditioning, which consumes energy and in result increases CO₂ emission. (Klimaschutzkampagne, 2020)

3.2 Berlin, the green metropolis

In the second decade of the 21st century, Berlin has been purchasing the energy for around 3.3 billion euros per year. It is estimated that by the end of 2030 the costs of climate protection for this city will be on average between 100 and 170 million euros yearly. What regards to households, is the fact that spending on ecofriendly behavior will rise from 0.4% to 0.7% of current (2020) revenue. The city and its inhabitants accept these expenses. On the other hand, savings from an environmentally friendly strategy will result from the planned reduction of energy consumption by about one third by 2030 and by half by 2050. This is a huge amount of money. (Klimaneutrales Berlin 2050..., 2020)

While Berlin public procurement orders, introduced the criterion of climate protection. Now, together with renovating public buildings, the attention is paid to the reduction of their energy consumption. This capital promotes solar energy and associated energy management (based on the simultaneous production of electricity and the heat in the power plant). This results in lower fuel consumption and is beneficial for the economic and ecological reasons.

Traffic is said to be the second pollutant emitter after buildings. There are over 1.2 million cars registered in Berlin, what gives the proportion of 342 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants, much lower than at the country level in whole Germany. There are also 70 bicycles per 100 inhabitants, and over 700 km of bicycle paths in the city. Walking and cycling in Berlin are much more popular in Berlin than in other parts of Germany.

This capital is called the green metropolis. There is a huge number of beautiful parks, forests, gardens, canals and lakes. 59% of the city's area is green, there are almost 20 million trees, and the residents' lifestyle is characterized by pro-ecological attitudes. In 2019, the city authorities introduced the Berlin City Greenery Charter, which has adopted:

- more greenery: existing areas must be networked, sealed and unclosed;
- better maintenance: urban greenery is used much more often than in other areas, therefore its protection should be intensified;
- more financial resources for districts for maintaining and developing green areas.

Program design The Berlin City Green Card is available on the Internet, it is constantly being commented and reviewed, and inhabitants are welcome to post their remarks. (Die Charta für das Berliner..., 2019) All the constructive opinions are going to be included in subsequent editions of the program. Berlin's determination to achieve climate neutrality is admirable. This is a good example for other European capitals and other German cities.

3.3 Helsinki, the most functional city in the world

Aristotle 2400 years ago said “People come to this city in order to look for a livelihood to stay there, to lead a good life”. This wisdom has not lost its relevance. Helsinki has a goal is to be a city that provides jobs and the best conditions for a good life. The capital of Finland also aims at being the most functional city in the world. It is supposed to be the space for all residents, a community that creates its own territory. Its attractiveness results from a clean and safe environment, an unique urban culture and the involvement of the inhabitants in building a good and functional everyday life. Clean water comes from the tap, buses run on time, education is the best in the world, it is ecological, safe, friendly and nice.

Helsinki is a combination of rational functionality and original austerity. It is modern, dynamic, vital city that creates opportunities for self-development disregarded elsewhere in the world. This is possible because of the technologically advanced know-how, cultural offer and world-class education.

Helsinki recognizes its responsibility for the climate. It seems that the goal of its municipality is to be a pioneer in the fight against climate change. The objectives for that are: the reduction of emissions by 60% till 2030. Moreover, by 2035 the electricity used by the city will be produced only from renewable sources. The capital of Finland joined The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), which declared that member cities would be climate neutral by 2050 at the latest. In order to reach this goal, specific actions have been undertaken:

- the greenery area in the city is being increased, mainly by planting that types of trees that are the largest CO₂ sinks;
- newly built and old renovated buildings are equipped in much better energy parameters;
- a comprehensive, intelligent, environmentally neutral transport system has been introduced;
- by electric (public and private) transport and by popularization of cycling and walking, CO₂ emissions from road traffic have been dramatically reduced. (Maailman toimivin kaupunki, 2017)

It is very important that all these activities are being implemented in cooperation with the business sector on a market basis, together with the active participation of residents. That guarantees their durability, gives chances for the creation of profitable innovations with export potential and social acceptance.

3.4 Vienna, an eco-friendly lifestyle promoted by free access to cultural goods

The Vienna Climate Protection Program was launched in 1999 and its subsequent editions are continued. It includes 37 sub-programs, which contain of 385 activities focused on five areas:

- energy production;
- energy efficiency, the latest know-how;
- city mobility and transportation;
- waste management and green area protection;
- public relations. (Klimaschutzprogramm Wien, 1999)

Due to the program implementation, the emission of 1.4 million tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere was avoided every year in the years 2009-2020. Moreover, Vienna is constantly introducing proven methods of reducing greenhouse emissions: expansion of the municipal heating network and an increase of its efficiency, use of renewable energy sources, ecological renovation of buildings, development of zero-emission urban transport, reduction of individual car traffic, development of cycling possibilities and encouraging inhabitants to walk instead of commute on vehicles. (Klimaschutzprogramm... 2009)

In Austria, the pro-ecological lifestyle is widely promoted. *Climate Friendly Life* initiative was created with it in mind. The awareness that individual decisions: nutrition, housing (buildings, heating, electricity), mobility, clothing, consumption, leisure, have a significant impact on reducing decarbonization and the knowledge about that is becoming increasingly common. The project *Let's make ourselves an intelligent climate* is another idea. Via the website, residents of Vienna can obtain information on "climate-friendly life". The spectrum of activities is wide: from waste segregation initiatives to special mobility courses. The initiative is sponsored by the City Council.

The city authorities are also introducing legal solutions to protect residents against environmental disease. From March 2019, new buildings should be equipped in heating networks using renewable energy sources. Developers have introduced the need to designate charging places for electric vehicles, parking lots for bicycles, as well as greening of facades. These and other actions of the local authorities and residents turn into the above average quality of life in the Austrian capital. For many years, Vienna has been at the forefront of the annual Global Liveability Ranking. In the last Ranking of 2019 the city won first place. (The Global Liveability Index, 2019)

Currently (inauguration on 6/02/2020) a new pro-ecological project is being tested in Vienna, which proposes a wide cultural offer in exchange for climate protection activities. The Kultur-Token App rewards climate-friendly behavior and in return offers a cultural activities in selected institutions in Vienna. The project involves the leading cultural organizations of the Austrian capital: Wien

Museum, Volkstheater, Wiener Konzerthaus and MuseumsQuartier. The idea is that the users collect points for performing environmentally friendly activities, that are exchangeable for free tickets. Anyone who goes to work on foot or uses public transport (one of the best in Europe) can collect virtual tokens. The App tracks the user's daily route and grants points for traveling around the city on foot, by bicycle, scooter or public transport. One token for a selected cultural institution in Vienna can be obtained when resigning from the car reduces CO2 emissions by 20 kg, what can be achieved, e.g. by walking to work for about two weeks. This innovative climate protection program, after its successful tests in Vienna, has a chance to be adapted in other European capitals.

Summary

Today, cities are responsible for around three fourth of global CO2 emission. This means that urban agglomerations have above average responsibility to maintain ecological sustainability. Issues related to the ecological security are important enough to become the main reason for the political dispute. It is also visible today in a form of social movements that are trying to persuade national governments to undertake ecofriendly actions. The struggle society has to deal with is to limit global warming to "safe" growth level, what can enable authorities to plan and implement various environmental protective activities. The scale of the problem is well-demonstrated by scientific simulations for 2050, which shows that the matter of global warming is more relevant than humans thought decades ago. It is serious enough to encourage international organizations to introduce global agreements on this matter, what has an example in the case United Nations or the C40 declaration. In the paper presented, the good practices are being described based on the experience of chosen European capitals: Berlin, Helsinki and Vienna. Those cities are extraordinary in the creation and implementation of actions taken to minimize the effects of global warming.

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