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Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu
Title Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu Par.title From scepticism to objective knowledge Author info Miloš Taliga Author Taliga Miloš 1977- (100%) UMBFF10 - Katedra filozofie
Source document Filosofický časopis. Roč. 64, č. 5 (2016), s. 691-704. - Praha : Filosofický ústav AV ČR, 2016 Keywords analytická filozofia - analytical philosophy skepticizmus - scepticism typy objektívne poznanie premisy hypotetický status Language Slovak Country Czech Republic systematics 101 Annotation The critical arguments of scepticism lead to the conclusion that no proposition can be justified as true. The attempts to define knowledge as justified true belief therefore fail, even within externalism. If we attribute knowledge to someone else, we can never justifiably know that we have done it correctly. Attributing knowledge is a hypothetical activity. Moreover, knowledge itself is hypothetical as well. There are no justifiably identifiable good reasons telling us that an investigated proposition is true. Scepticism thus leads an optimist, who holds that knowledge exists, to objectivism, i.e. to the view that knowledge is objective because its truth can be reduced neither to good reasons nor to the beliefs of investigators. Public work category ADC No. of Archival Copy 39731 Catal.org. BB301 - Univerzitná knižnica Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici Database xpca - PUBLIKAČNÁ ČINNOSŤ References PERIODIKÁ-Súborný záznam periodika 
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