Teórie mysle

Bánovský, Juraj, 1980- Teórie mysle = Theories of mind – on the problem of interpretation of other minds : k problému interpretácie iných myslí / Juraj Bánovský ; rec. Ján Rybár, Tomáš Marvan. -- 1. vyd. -- Bratislava : VEDA, vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2016. -- 214 s. -- The book Theories of mind – on the problem of interpretation of other minds aims to explore some of the main approaches present in the current research on mindreading. It is focused on answers to the question ‚How is it possible that we can attribute mental states to others?‘ It consists of five chapters, which focus on the main tenets of the intentional stance (Chapter 1), the theory of metarepresentations (Chapter 2), the theory of modularity (Chapter 3), the theory theory (Chapter 4) and the simulation theory (Chapter 5). The main objective is to provide an outline of the solutions offered by these theories to the problem of the character of theory of mind, its development and its underlying mechanisms. In order to achieve this goal, I provide analysis, comparison and critical evaluation of the leading approaches. The focus of each chapter is to present the main arguments for a relevant theory, assess the explanatory power of that theory in the light of experimental evidence, and offer a critical evaluation by taking into account objections that have been raised against it. Apart from mapping these approaches I also attempt to provide some new hypotheses about the development of the theory of mind. For example, in Chapter 2, I propose an extended theory of M-representations that links protodeclarative pointing, imitation and pretend play on the basis of structural similarities between the representations that are assumed to support each of these capacities. In Chapter 3, I explore the character of domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms that contribute to the process of attribution of mental states. In this chapter I also assess the Fodorian and the massive version of modularity and I analyze the structure and properties of the theory of mind module. I present evidence in favor of the view that an account based on two systems for mindreading (an implicit and an explicit one) offers an acceptable solution to some fundamental problems present in the current research. In Chapter 4, I criticize the “child as a little scientist” theory, especially the role of falsification in the process of theory change, but I also show that the new version of the theory based on hierarchical models and statistical learning might provide an attractive solution to the development of a mindreading system. In Chapter 5 I critically explore the radical and hybrid versions of simulation theory and I assess the evidence coming from the research of mirror neurons, which seems to support the role of simulation in mindreading. -- ISBN 978-80-224-1527-9

1. teória mysle 2. modularita 3. teória modularity 4. teória simulácie 5. autizmus

I. Rybár, Ján
II. Marvan, Tomáš

165.745
BB301